Comments by "William Cox" (@WildBillCox13) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  54. A most interesting question. Here's my spin on it: First? My understanding of topic. Reduce cross section of penetrator and you increase penetration for an equal weight/mass round (and propellant charge*). Smaller impact area transfers more energy into a smaller point, concentrating stress on a hard, but brittle, surface (face hardened plate is the similar to Tempered Glass for its method of impact resistance). That's the good part. Unfortunately, artillery rounds in flight are affected by aerodynamic/fluid dynamic factors the same as any Mach2-3 Jet. There is a "perfect" length versus diameter plus optimal ogive for every particular caliber of gun. Make an artillery round too long (L:W) and it tends to nutate severely in flight, which loses accuracy, and absorbs muzzle energy through greatly increased drag. That's the bad part. Now for a bit of hard evidence. Planet Slo-Mo has a video posted where they fire both the 12.2cm P Obr 42/L46 AND the M4 (L) Tank's 76mm M1A1/L51, and follow the rounds in flight. Notice that even these, supposedly "perfect" shapes are prone to nutation throughout their flight. Longer L:W rounds are far worse. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xpJ8EoGmLuE So-o, why not? Diminishing returns. Disclaimer: I am no military expert. I am old and have spent most of my life reading military history and technological examinations of military gear. For absolute understanding, let me recommend Ian Hogg. *Reducing barrel diameter makes you increase the heat and pressure in your chamber, too. You'll need a reinforced Breech,, Chamber and Barrel to push the same mass the same speed through a smaller barrel.
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  64. Germany could just buy the A6M2 for Graf Zeppelin . . . the Stuka would be good enough for an Intruder, trading slow speed for pinpunkt accuracy. As for Torpedo Bombers, why not just buy those superannuated Fairy Swordfish Great Britain is trying to sell off? They'll have the far superior Albacore, of course, but . . . why are you laughing? World War Two seems to indicate that ships without carrier air support are balls flapping in the wind. The Z Plan was cool and all, but more Carriers and Heavy Cruisers were all that Germany really needed. About twenty of each. The Merchant Raider group . . . pursuing the Guerre du Course, or Handelskrieg . . . was a great idea--for World War One. Once the B24 Bomber was drafted to patrol the "U--Boat gap", however, the paradigm had been ruined. Until then the Armed Merchantman, Merchant Raider/Panzerschiff, or Cruiser Submarine, was still a viable option for a cash strapped nation to examine. Once Air Cover became more or less universal it spoiled everything. You need Carriers to support your convoy raiders. You need heavy cruisers to support your carriers with AAA. You need Fleet Destroyers . . . or whatever the La Fantasque was . . . to physically screen the Carriers and Cruisers (or, for rich nations, battleships) from questing motobomba . . . and, suddenly, you're in a naval race* against Great Britain and the USA. Which you can't win. Back to submarines! *Naval Arms races never mention the most vulnerable factor in the coherent plan of operations at sea: the fleet replenishment train. You can cripple your enemy if you find his before he finds yours. His ships WILL run out of fuel, food, and, especially, ammunition and medical supplies after any regular engagement. If you take out his oilers and ammunition ships, he will soon be a paper tiger. If Bismarck had . . . nothing. Just finding her pre--positioned replenishment ships would have been a dangerous passage, with every supply ship used soon after destroyed on its way back to base. And, once they'd all been sunk, there'd be no second Bismarck sortie from Brest or St Nazair. There is an argument to be made that Imperial Japan ignored our Fleet Replenishment Train with her submarine force. Had her skippers sought out the USN oilers and ammunition ships . . . and hospital ships . . . she might've slowed our expansion into what she considered her personal sphere of influence. Submarine Ninja; Skulkers and Assassins; rather than stealthy Shinobi seeking a favorable advantage against a mighty foe. Oilers are critical weapons of war. We crippled Japan by sinking all of her oilers. The lack of oil paralyzed her fleet. Similarly, our war against Germany was a war against her ability to supply herself with fuel for her Panzerwaffe, Luftwaffe, and U--waffe. lack of oil grounded her fighters, stopped her tanks, and made her ships floating hulks. "Screw that well screened battleship! I'm looking for those vulnerable, juicy, oilers!" --Smart Sub Skipper
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  88. Gato class submarines weren't like those from other nations, but paved the way for future innovations and alterations of design for everyone. A) Bigger hulls can carry more in terms of specialists and specialist equipment. Wartime patrols from all nations with submarines found strange bedfellows and fellow travelers aboard at the worst moments. B) Air Conditioning (Crew Comfort +1), C) Onboard Refrigeration. Without a doubt, USN submariners ate the best. (Crew Comfort+1), D) Better sensors for surface operations. RaDAR was a luxury few other nations could afford to mount on their submarines. Few will deny that RaDAR for target detection and shadowing was the greatest advantage of all. And, since most submarine existence was on the surface (the U-waffe was effectively neutered once the British concentrated surface and airborne ASW patrols just outside of Brest. Put simply: submerged transit was exhaustively expensive in time and fuel. That defeated the U-Boat arm BEFORE ElInt and code-breaking is factored in.). Good show, you lot. E) better weaponry for fighting it out when surprised or unable to dive. Surface weapons on submarines were effective; torpedoes were hugely expensive. They were the sexiest (highest sticker price) budget item for individual rounds, other than wunderwaffe. Many, many, many, submarines resorted to deck guns during patrols, especially early on (for almost everyone), and near the end (for the USN). This truth has been overshadowed by submersible fanboiz, who favor the torpedo (perhaps the most inaccurate way to deliver a single warhead ever*) in their popularist accounts. Remember, submarines of the period were surface ships, not Aquaman: they were slow and relatively unmaneuverable when submerged. E) Gatos were better sea boats than the submarines of other nations, able to maintain a higher speed for longer in an open seaway. As Drachinifel points out, T-Class were very short ranged for fleet boats. This precludes their effective integration into the PTO . . . which was one third of the war for the UK (unless you ask Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Australia, or New Zealand), and half of the war for the USA**. The downside to the larger boats should be included in any look, of course. For one thing, Gatos (and Typ IX, and B1) had longer diving times (not that much longer in practice, btw), and were more awkward when maneuvering in close spaces. Drachinifel also rightly points out that UK and, especially, Deu, boats could run a bit deeper (considerably deeper for the Deutschers) with confidence. This can be very effective in keeping you alive . . . once you're trapped and held down by enemy ASW assets. Which is the one thing EVERY submarine commander wants to avoid. It's also more of a tribute to your welding and packing gland technology than it is to the metal of your hull. *I am talking CEP here. One did not use a V2 on a ship at sea. And Tallboys NEVER hit fish, whales, or dolphins . . or invisible wreckage or chunks of floating ice) on their way to target. Further, no dropped iron bomb ever circled around to strike the bomber who dropped it (though a few bounced). Also, air currents do not divert bombs with anything like the effect that water currents have on torpedo tracks. And, of course, bombs aren't near as likely to porpoise. ** And here is where code-breaking really came into its own. Both Germany and Japan were interested in trading materials and tech. Several trading missions were perpetrated through submarine means; only one of these really came through and that but partially. Google I-51 for more on that. These submarine missions of military mercy were intercepted, in the main, thanks to a combination of code-breaking and SonoBouy+FIDO tactical coordination. So that extreme long radius of action of fleet boats (for IJN, KM, and USN types) should not be discounted or marginalized. Finally, never underestimate the effect that crew comfort has on combat efficiency, which is not quite congruent with, but heavily affects, efficacy.
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  151. I spoke on the absurdity of significant ASW capability being appended to the Fleet Destroyer concept in your video on the Atlanta class. I will make the point again for this excellent class of Fleet Destroyer. The last thing you want to do with a valuable warship, when in an enemy submarine operational zone, is leave it dead in the water (which cruisers and battleships had to do in order to recover floatplanes), or trawling along at very low speed and in straight lines. That latter is exactly the procedure for detecting and combating enemy submarines. Zut alors! But the Destroyer, you might well object, is the "Greyhound of the Sea"! She is neither slow, nor likely to move in straight lines . . . unless she is detailed to be left behind, holding a suspected enemy submarine at bay, while the more valuable component units in its task force escape. So we take a very fast, light, ship and make it do slow trawling . . . ASW trawling is done at 3-8 nauts per hour. Any faster and your hydrophones can't hear anything over the susurrus of the sea*. As for active SoNAR Illumination ("Pinging" SoNAR), world war 2 SoNAR illuminators had a very short effective range, i.e.: 100-200m to either side of the ship, except in very calm seas. When the carrier group suspects a submarine, it moves off at high speed, leaving behind a Fleet Destroyer or two to keep the enemy submarine at bay. While the tactic is effective enough as a deterrent to further interference from that particular enemy submarine, it also weakens the carrier group. Fleet Screening--especially carrier screening--requires your physical presence on site and, if your Fleet Destroyer is "back there somewhere", you aren't with the carrier(s). In a war of attrition that can be crucial. Two destroyers stripped from the enemy carrier group by one of your submarines . . . is a tactical victory. A cheaper, more expendable . . . no kidding . . . alternative was sought, and found, in the form of the ASW Frigate. Smaller, lighter in displacement, slower, optimised for the ASW Trawling Mission. An ASW Frigate doesn't need the same high speed performance as a Fleet Destroyer, and, in result, does not travel with the carrier group. Instead, the ASW Frigate sails with the Fleet Replenishment Train, which is composed of ships much slower than the Carrier group's Fleet Carriers, Fast Battleships, Cruisers . . . and Fleet Destroyers. The Fleet Destroyer merely waits for the ASW Frigate(s) to show up, then hands over to it (them) and races back to its intended role of Fleet Screening. That seems reasonable, doesn't it--to let specialist ships, more expendable ones, to boot, take the load off the Greyhounds of the Sea? Except . . . anyone remember that WW2 Carrier Air Wing Strike group that followed an enemy Destroyer back to its parent carrier group? Yep. I sure do. But, to make the Fleet Destroyer carry all that extra armament . . . its fantail overloaded with 30-50 500lb bombs . . . I mean Depth Charges . . . as if deck mounted torpedo ordnance wasn't enough risk on an unarmored ship already . . . is both superfluous and dumb. At best, the Fleet Destroyer only needs a few DC or a single Hedgehog to render it capable of its effort diverting ASW role. The ASW Frigate will soon be on the scene. What the Fleet Destroyer needs isn't more ASW ordnance--it needs more AA Dakka! *It's still like that today, btw.
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  160. My thought (the redesign of the Kreigsmarine is an ongoing item of discussion with two of my WW2 focused mates) as follows: Replace all secondary armament on KMS with the navalized 12.8cmFlaK40/L56 in doppellafette. Replace all of the twin 3.7cm/L70 with single 5cmFlaK41/L65 (longer range, higher ROF, and who cares about flash or smoke when you're moving at sea and directed from off mount). Place a 2cm FlaK(v) at each corner of the citadel. Remove all torpedo tubes from cruisers and use the weight savings to reinforce deck armor aft. Why? A navy of small size will fight a lot of running battles. Better armor over the steering gear is a must for that. Finish Flugzeugtragers A und B and, for goodness' sake, replace the Me-109T with a navalised Fw-190(G serie?). For a torpedo bomber buy off all those British Swordfish they're about to replace with the vastly superior Albacore. If they won't sell them, then adapt the Stuka D serie. Short range, but a better performer overall than many contemporary torpedo bombers. Your point about the "Cruiser armed Destroyers" is a telling one. All DDs need Dual Purpose Main Battery weapons. Replace the 15cm SK with the 12.8cm FlaK40 for DDs as for all larger schiffen. Seetakt (or Gufo, depending on size) all 'round. More than that, an RWR like Metox might be very useful for surface units, especially against night attacks by allied (i.e. Coastal Command) patrol bombers. Spend effort producing the Gabbiano class ASW trawler in large numbers. I agree with the more Scharnhorst > fewer Bismarck paradigm. Two or Three Scharnhorsts accompanied by a single Graf Zeppelin would make a formidable raiding group. Use them to draw allied attention away from your wolf packs. If you really want to warp the weave, why not replace all capital ship catapults with larger models, politely ask the Nihonese emperor for volunteers, and launch a barrage of MXY7mod22 aerial kaiten as you approach the Grand Fleet? "There seems to be something wrong with the bloody sky today." Replace Goering with a navy man, or, at least, a global strategist, rather than a continental one. We need maritime patrol bombers and we need them NOW! Take Malta. At all costs. Oh, and "Raeder to all U--Flotte: do not radio acknowledgement of orders received".
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  170. Off topic but still capable of generating controversy . . . The great kaiju-Japanese resistance to any potential allied invasion of the Home Islands. Here are some points worth considering, followed by my tentative conclusions: 1) All remaining IJN warships were heavily damaged, reduced to use as strafing targets for USAAF fighters. In fact, most IJN ships had been sunk at their moorings. No resistance there. 2) The 25mm was still the worst AA gun of the war. It does not suddenly become effective-except in a work of utter fiction. Small resistance there. 3) Japan went to war to obtain a source of fuel oil. She had no--read zero--access to antiknock additives so absolutely necessary for high performance fighter engines*. No oil, plus no antiknock, means no kamikaze planes to intercept our landing fleet. You can't fly a fighter if you have zero aviation gasoline. And Japan was out. 4) The Japanese version of Hitler's Volksturm was being issued yaris and naginata polearms from museums. We would be murdering the defenders, not suffering huge casualties from them. Moreover, Japanese army rifles were bolt action, and there was no automatic rifle, or large numbers of the Type 100/400 SMG available to counter an enemy heavily supplied with automatic weapons. 5) Japanese midget submarines were terrible, just like everyone else's. No effective resistance there. If you need more, watch Drach's video on the Axis' small submarines. 6) A serious drop in materiel maintenance, and repair capability and quality of repairs effected, spelt death for any air resistance-and, remember: Japan had ZERO GASOLINE to fuel them. 7) So strapped for materials was the Japanese military that most bomb fillings had been replaced with picric acid--a large step backwards. Conclusion: Were we facing a long term, low intensity, war against "terrorists/freedom fighters" on the Home Islands? Absolutely. Were we facing organized and effective military resistance to a mass invasion? No. Japan had none to offer. For those who disagree: Please, oh pretty please, find documentation on the amount of aviation gasoline Japan had hoarded way in anticipation of an allied invasion. I looked and that's where I began to gather my current conclusions. There was none. Nary a mention of hidden fuel reserves for anything, let alone high performance fighter engines. No gas means no kamikaze planes or boats or submarines. Zero major resistance. Better chance of dying from the clap after the occupation began. Which has happened since on more than one occasion. *The ONLY source for those was the USA. That's why the P51 was what it was--able to operate at higher manifold pressures (>50lb) due to the cooling effect of lead additives. Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles does extensive coverage on this peculiarity of high performance fighter aircraft propulsion. It's here, on YouTube, somewhere.
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  179. 1) The proper form is: "Ineptitude". 2) IMHO: Lengthening the barrel does improve efficiency--up to a point (I cite the 5cmKwK38/L43 versus the L60 in example). You can gain about 100mps improvement in MV that way, which equals slightly better accuracy, penetration, and range. To make full use of the concept, however, one increases the propellant charge in order to impart much greater velocity to the emergent projectile (or dumbfounded sparrow). This method can increase MV to a much higher number (as much as 1000mps more), but requires much higher chamber pressures (and heat) to accomplish it. That leads in every case to shorter barrel life. You can restore longevity to the HV weapon by overdesign of its chamber and barrel, but that's seriously expensive, resulting in a much heavier, hugely more expensive, gun (cough 17pdr cough). Ultimately, logistics is everything, and wins. Shorter barrels are more economically sustainable*. It was the increase in industrial technique that empowered lengthening of warship guns between the wars. Nineteenth century metallurgy gave us the 42--45 caliber Main Battery guns so much used in WW1 designs. The late 1930s saw another level--up of design because of improved metallurgy, machinery, and technique. Iowa class battleships exemplified this change by bringing the 16"/50cal rifle into the spotlight. Dedicated Secondary Batteries, which had things like the venerable 5"/51 cal Rifle, and the various 6" weapons studding the sides of the Kongos, and Deutscher everythings, disappeared as quick as forward looking nations could manage, to be replaced with shorter barrel, Dual Purpose, mounts and weapons. *Imagine what would've happened if one ship's guns burned out in the middle of a fight! Pretty difficult to replace your 11" Rifle's barrel at sea. <Radio Messenger enters the bridge of HMS Prince of Wales> ""Radio intercept reports the following, sir! I quote, verbatim! 'Britisher pigdogs! Stop pummeling us, won't you, while we replace these furshlugginger barrels'!"
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  181. Interesting stuff. I hope you don't mind my chiming in. Worst design? Every Battlecruiser. Every one. Don't give your unarmored stern to an enemy dreadnought, says I. It's just plain silly, don't you know. Other worst design? Every Dreadnought type that was designed with underwater torpedo tubes. Every one. An "Unsinkable" Ship should have fewer holes under the waterline. Not more. Especially torpedo holes. Worst in service? HIJMS* Mutsu. You only had one job, Mutsu . . . Oh! And HIJMS Taiho. Wait! Do I have room for another? The M Class Gunboat Submarines! Bang! Glub! Worst employment? Every dreadnought sent to Gallipoli. What were they thinking (cough Churchill cough)? Also, taking CBOR** Monitor into a seaway. HAHAHAHAHAHA (glub)! Also rans: HMS Victory (1737). <The opening strains of the Flying Dutchman waft in from the quay. The director calls out> "Action!" Glub! USS Owasco (and class). What were they thinking? They rolled like drunk dolphins! Any warship with a single rudder. What were they thinking? Steam Powered Submarines. Not until nuclear power. No steam plant to strut upon. It takes a ship (1900--1980) several hours to work up steam. A submarine does not have that kind of leisure. Ever. Life comes at you fast on a submarine. Look up INS Sindhurakshak for more on that. ;-) Catapults on a Battleship. Two problems with that. Enemy submarines are out there, praying,that you come to a complete halt in order to hoist your scout plane back aboard. The second problem is AvGas tanks on or near your deck. An accident waiting to happen. Bad Ship! No no! You would need a "flying on" deck to make that work . . . but it wouldn't, as we already know from the 1920 experiments. Shipboard delivery by airplane would have to wait for the HOS 1. Really, HIJMS Tone and Tikuma might've looked into flying on decks, too. Angled ones (as in ski jump) for flying on, instead of all that complex handling gear. Fun for pilots, I bet. Notes: *His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Ship **Cheese Box On a Raft
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  189. More of a super destroyer than a cruiser, this class of ships was only given two screws, limiting maneuverability. Whereas SoNAR and Depth Charges seemed a good idea for a super destroyer meant to provide general support to carriers, in practice the last thing you want is a cruiser moving slow enough to use its SoNAR (which requires a very slow trawl; 3--5nts) in an area where enemy submarines are expected. In fact, this seems like a good place to discuss the ASW capabilities of fleet destroyers in general. Any ship too valuable to give up to a submarine torpedo should move faster than the submarine on the surface. The utility of Fleet Destroyers as ASW frigates is questionable, but they are less valuable than Carriers, Battleships, or Cruisers. By process of elimination a Fleet Destroyer or two will be detailed to hold down a located (or suspected) enemy submarine long enough for friendly ships at risk to escape the area. Unfortunately, this process requires the Destroyer to move very slowly and in a straight line, while trawling with its Active SoNAR (which, despite all the positive hype had very limited range--i.e.: 100m to either side of the ship in a seaway). Over 8 nauts speed and Passive (Hydrophone) SoNAR would not be able to pick up anything. No fast moving ship of WW2 (or today) could detect a submerged submarine, however, and every Fleet Destroyer that a carrier battlegroup leaves behind to manage suspected enemy subs is lost to the carrier group (and ends up far away from the fleet supply train) as a result. Since a big part of carrier screening is physical presence, that loss weakens the carrier battlegroup's defense. Enter the ASW Frigate. Smaller than the Fleet Destroyer, less well armed, slower, and, ultimately, easier to produce in large numbers, the ASW Frigate is optimized for low speed ASW trawling. Most ASW frigates were, unfortunately, unable to keep up with carriers. And therein lies the rub. Purpose built ASW Frigates are terrible sea boats, being small, slow, and designed without crew comfort in mind. But, their SoNAR, coupled with Hedgehog + Depth Charge armament, is effective and, best of all, they are expendable*. Rather than moving with, and screening, a carrier battlegroup, the ASW Frtigate moves with the Fleet Train (composed of slower oilers, dry goods replenishment, reefers/refrigerators, and ammunition, ships). If the carrier group is harassed by enemy submarines it moves on and the Frigates are detailed to trawl the area as they arrive from the fleet train. This frees up any Fleet Destroyers left behind to keep that sub at bay. Being expendable is not pretty, but it is crucial to the survival of your most valuable combat units. I relate this as an ex ASW Frigate crewman of the early 1970s**. The expendable part was well explained by our captain and we took it as a matter of pride to do our jobs exceeding well. We were protecting carriers from the enemy and the carrier was the main arm of force extension and for showing the flag in foreign waters. *The Gabbianos proved that ** I was NOT a SoNARman.
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  193. The Deutschland (I refer to these as the Panzerschiffe) class ships were a good bet. Sure, they couldn't effectively counter a cruisers division, or trade broadsides with battlecruisers (wait-yes they could), but those were few and far between and panzerschiffe were cheaper. Also, diesel ships didn't need to wait to "build steam'" after being in harbor, and so were far quicker to react to calls to battle. Otherwise, Germany might've needed a class of cheap, standardized, fast tankers, and the fuel to keep them topped off stored at Kiel or Brest. Or an Oil tank farm in Norway with enough crude to amount to a strategic reserve. To allow these far cruising raiders to reach safe harbors when necessary, a U-flotilla would issue forth and meet them in the approaches. PzS had ammo limits, but extraordinary long range. They're big enough to carry Seetakt, or Gufo. I would suggest replacing the mixed secondary batteries with the navalized 12.7cm FlaK40/L56 in singles or twins, depending on space. No torpedoes. Land them all. Replace the tonnage saved with the 4cm Bofors AA Cannon, already in production for the KM. With eight 5" DP (the flak 40 was a very good gun) replacing the secondary battery, and a couple dozen 40mm Bofors (singles and twins) replacing all 37mm and 20mm leFlaK, they'd be better able to defend themselves against a wide range of probable threats. Also, KMS Deutschland aside, it would be easier to lose a PzS to attrition, than it would to lose a Bismarck. I would so want the two Graf Zeppelins (or Peter Strasser or whatever), despite their drawbacks, if I intended to make long distance surface forays against allied convoys. The big rifles would be switched out for 12.8cm sFlaK40 in Doppelafette with significant savings in topweight. Battleships. Tirpitz is a nice ship, but, again, replace the 3.7cmFlaK with the 4cm M28 and reduce secondary battery to rationalize it to a single caliber capable of dual purpose engagement. The what and how of its deployment would be the main consideration of the OKM. Send out the two Bismarcks with the two Scharnhorsts and the two Graf Zeppelins, get them through the allied cordon and free in the Atlantic . . .and what next? Commerce raiding? You're already doing that cheaply with the PzS. All I can think of is guarding your own convoys or invasion fleets. Or seeking out the enemy, looking for Gotterdamurung . . . or his carriers. Yum yum! Germany could underwrite the Italian Regolo type ultralight cruisers and the cheap, modular, Gabbiano convoy ASW escort. German efforts would, instead, be used to beef up its mosquito fleet (gotta love those Benz powered E-100 speedboats) and maritime air patrols. They'd keep the Tommies hopping, keep them honest (heavily escort all coastal traffic) and out of the Bay of Biscay. I'm with you on the Me109T. I think it might've been easy to adapt to the launch cradle (attachment points or something), but the Fw190A, with its radial engine and wide stance, seems made for the carrier fighter role. There were some fine Italian planes, too, that might've lent well to conversion. These would be lighter, but some were excellent performers. Since the stringbag was so successful, early on, the Navalized Stuka would seem like a dream machine for intruder and torpedo bomber pilots. Compare it to the Dauntless. German Destroyers were interesting, but problematic. The new, high pressure (1000psi or something along those lines), superheating, steam powerplant the cause of Prinz Eugen's woes) was not yet mature enough to be altogether dependable. It was the right direction, engineering-wise . The USN used that system very well in the ''60s and 70s. Better to build more cheap escorts and E-boote. My opinion is that the 15cm/149mm gun was a mistake for Destroyers. Any main armament on a tin can should be AA capable. So build the Regolo in large numbers and arm them with the FlaK40 and a bunch of either 3.7cm or 4cm AA autocannon. U-Boote are the "other" fleet, of course. The Typ VIIC is versatile, small of silhouette, and maneuverable, but had so many drawbacks as part of a strategic blockade that it would have to be replaced on the slips with a better idea. Too bad the Walther boat closed cycle system was impractical until the 2000s. Of course, if we're waiting till late '44 or early '45 we can employ large numbers of the Typ XXl. Again, it's not perfect, but it'll do for a while. A possible use for Heavy Destroyers comes to mind. Mining and interdicting Baltic trade and military shipping. A fast DD Flot could dash up and in, drop mines, and back to German ports before dawn. It would not likely work well in restricted waterways or close to large air bases, but, as a stab in the dark, it might world well enough.
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  243. Consider the differences in design philosophy. Battleship HighCap has a base charge equal to about 7% of the round's total weight. Regular artillery HE has explosive filler equal to over 75% of the shell's total weight. HiCap is mostly a giant penetrator. Artillery HE is equivalent to a giant flash-bang grenade (with shrapnel percs). They are used differently, they detonate differently and the detonations have markedly different effects. The HiCap explosive charge is pretty much a high speed rocket motor/base bleed charge. It DOES NOT DESTROY THE PROJECTILE. It isn't powerful enough. So, upon initiation, the charge jets outward at a very narrow angle, nonproblematic in an enclosed space but extremely inefficient as a high explosive when striking soil, clay, or even rock. With that said, the crater caused by sheer transfer of kinetic energy from any Battleship projectile* is big enough to look like a large bore artillery shell hole. Artillery HE does destroy the projectile; in fact, that's how it gets those shrapnel percs. Its detonation is not confined** and explands omnidirectionally. It has much greater concussive effects near the target, but little penetration of armor, earth, or clay. Moreover, many fuzes (especially grazing fuzes) fail against soggy loam, humous, or wet clay. Battleship HiCap was NOT meant for shore bombardment, other than against casemated or turreted shore batteries. Can it be turned to purpose? Yes. Definitely. Is it as effective at "shelling" as ordinary tube artillery on a per bore size basis? No. *Main Armament/Main Battery. (Line Throwing guns not included) ** Unless detonating in a building or bunker
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  252. The Colt Mk12 20mm cannon had several major issues mitigating against its use in aircraft. Standard German and British 20mm types enjoyed greater reliability. This is why service versions of the F86 (excluding the D) were armed, instead, with the .50cal M2 (HB). From everyone's favorite argument mill, Wikipedia: "The Mk 12 was an advanced derivative of the wartime Hispano HS 404 that had been used on British and some American fighter aircraft during World War II. It used a lighter projectile with a bigger charge for better muzzle velocity and higher rate of fire at the cost of hitting power. It entered U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps service in the mid-1950s, replacing the earlier M3 cannon. In service, the Mk 12 proved less than satisfactory. Although its muzzle velocity and rate of fire were acceptable, it was inaccurate and frequently unreliable. Pilots of the F-8 Crusader over North Vietnam, in particular, appreciated the presence of the cannon, but jams and stoppages were common, especially following hard dogfighting maneuvers." The earlier Mk 3 was even worse: "The British version was also licensed for use in the United States as the M1, with both the United States Army Air Corps (USAAC) and U.S. Navy planning to switch to the 20 mm calibre as soon as the gun could be produced in sufficient numbers. In 1941 a very large building program was established, along with the production of ammunition. When delivered, the guns proved to be extremely unreliable and suffered a considerable number of misfires due to the round being lightly struck by the firing pin.[11] The British were interested in using this weapon to ease the demand on production in England, but after receiving the M1 they were disappointed. British wing-mounted fighter weapons by this period were cocked on the ground by the aircraft armourers before flight, the built-in pneumatic cocking mechanism used previously being regarded as unnecessary weight and detrimental to aircraft performance, so any stoppage in flight made the gun unusable until it could be cleared on the ground. The misfires also had the tendency to cause aircraft with wing-mounted guns to yaw away from the wing with the failed gun when the guns were fired, due to the unequal recoil, thus throwing off the pilot's aim."
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  269. My Spin on a hypothetical rejuvenation of the IJN in '44? Like Drach said, it takes time to launch hulls, to fit out ships, and to work them up for combat duty. The planning would have needed to begin in the fourth quarter of '41 at the latest. Modifications are cheaper, time-wise, if not too extensive. For extensive conversions you night as well build a new one from the ground up. I cite the Italian Aguila, and the various proposals for Kriegsmarine cruiser conversions. And the Ise/Hyuga thing. What was that, anyway? A ninja tool for the Village Hidden in Stupidity? Still, a few things stand out: 1) the Japanese had a goodly number of Vickers PomPom from various new possessions, or scavenged from wrecks. The plans and tooling and even samples of Bofors M32 gun could've been transferred through U--Boat activity (there were historical precedents). Devote all of the IJN's resources into mass production of 40mm AAA and ammunition, load down the Akisuki class ships with single and dual mount (the quad was late innovation) 40mm, rather than 25mm. Then just focus on the Akisukis, and also produce a small ASW escort for the crude oil safaris. 2) Clear the N1K1J for carrier Ops. Poke friendly holes (for ventilation) in the Taiho's sides, and use her as a plane magnet for the allied forces. If you need more aggro, pair her up with the Yamatos. 3) Fortify Truk. Maybe unload all of those superfluous 25mm guns there. 4) Ask the Kwantung Army to offer to help Chiang eliminate the Communists in a two--pronged offensive. Make a deal to pay him, as the representative of the legal government of China (a la Pu-Yi), a large indemnity in art, sculpture, financial aid, western medicines, some great opium (which Chiang would use to, ahem, "motivate national sentiment") and sake, and offers of both technological exchange and cooperative ventures, and thereby seek to pacify China . . . and bring its resources of food and minerals under one roof. 5) Treat the Pacific side Panama canal locks like the British treated the gates at St Nazaire https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_Nazaire_Raid. 6) Offer aid to Vichy. Perhaps transport "agents provocateurs" to the African littoral by submarine? Run a ninja hit on De Gaulle? Or, even better, to keep up a plausibly deniable dialog between the two halves of the French People in case of an eventual rapproachment? 7) Change the Navy's effing codes. Frequently. And with prejudice. Or, alternatively, make a deal with the Ainu, like we did with the Navajo. Use them as Code Talkers. 8) Submarines, submarines, submarines. Remember, your original plan to bring the US fleet into a Grand Battle can only work if your subs can go for his carriers, while he's pounding your decoy (see number 2 above) to smoldering ruin. 9) Make an open appeal to return prisoners as a gesture of civilized comportment. Offer any allied prisoner a pardon if he signs a pledge to make war no more against the rightful rulers of the world. With all the food from a willing China, you'll be able to raise the standard of living for your peasantry, AND feed prisoners like you'd want the emperor to be treated if conditions were reversed. Very Buddhist of us. Western fools would misrepresent it as adherence to their silly "Christian virtues". 10) If you have all those new resources . . . perhaps you might reach out to your natural partner in world trade . . . India. After all, they hate Churchill, too. Spread a few rupees around and see what happens. 11) Send an official embassy to the USA, with full autonomy to negotiate and . . . offer to sell them Chinese scrap iron and Dutch Crude oil below scale. Not to generate good will, mind you, but to insult the bastards for starting this whole thing in the first place. 12) Offer a diaspora group citizenship if its members would like to colonize some of your new possessions. Protest in world maritime courts if their rights are abused by allied acts of terror. Why? Number 11, M----------r. Who's the Good Guy NOW? Hehe.
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  274. The easiest What if might be: "What if that rudder killing torpedo had missed the Bismarck?" Along with that we might ponder what would have occurred if KMS Bismarck had been able to take on her full load of fuel at the start. That Oil Processing system was a factor in KMS Graf Spee's fate, too, though in result of other factors. After that, however, it all sort of falls apart. For Bismarck to achieve her brief (the guerre du course) she needed to reach her first operational area undetected. Part of the plan was to draw reaction into the wake of her sortie, to stay one move ahead. She was meant to follow the shipping lanes, finding convoys by code--breaking (back home) and patrolling, heading from operational area to operational area. Once she was "made" (detected) she was already trapped, being too close to coast to break through into the Atlantic. The one chance, now that her cover was blown, was for Bismarck to run for the French coast. And that single torpedo ended that hope. Even had she made it into the Atlantic with Tirpitz and the two Battlecruisers (yeah, yeah, I know-they're battleships with teeny little peckers), she could only survive one fight . . . before needing replenishment and refueling. And the Eleven Allied Battleships arrayed against her would've been in her way. Bismarck needed sisters, large and small, and really foul weather. And improved Seetakt. Consider this idea: if Bismarck and her mates could draw off the whole of the capital ship roster into the south Atlantic, she would remove them from the map of Europe for at least a week and a half. If Hitler had launched Seelowe, while the Home fleet was gallivanting around elsewhere in a search for national prestige . . . but, of course, he was not ready. Kampfgruppe Bismarck and the three Panzerschiffe were supposed to be in their operational areas when the war began. That would start the stern chase to bring them to "justice". That would draw off the Home fleet and pretty much everything else in a hunt for the raiders (The cost of that effort was incredible in the event). The warships would romp through the Atlantic, spreading havoc, splitting up to head for friendly bases in far away Nihon for scraping and a bit of topping off (in return for technical plans and schematics). And all of those allied pursuers would be low on fuel and worn out, too, needing refit and rotation of their crews. As they fell back on Home ports, Hitler's cunning plan would be revealed: his ten merchant raiders, already in position (and innocent as sleeping lions) would then begin their murderous cosplay along the "lone wolf" lanes. Why this and not something better--say, Grosserkampf Ost--suited for a racial Gotterdfamurung? I have the secret. If Hitler could cause maritime insurance premiums to rise high enough, his enemies would wither on the vine from lack of sea trade. Loyd's had come to a similar crisis in the Great War. The USA was interventionist only as long as her factories were exporting overseas. If the great manufacturies had lost money, they would have lobbied against further involvement in a "European War". And, his other great geopolitical delusion was that he could "handle" France and Great Britain, while kicking in Soviet "Russia's" so-called rotten door. The only way I see he could've dealt with the strategic problems at his doorstep (widescale unemployment, runaway inflation, and national disunity in perilous times), was to charm France, CzechoSlovakia, and Italia, into joining a unified crusade against his greatest peeve . . . cigarette smokers . . . wait! I mean Jewish-Bolshevism. With the fleets of Italy and France in step with his policies of economic . . . er . . . rationalization, the Mediterranean would've been an Axis bathtub and all African Oil would be his. Except: "I dunno, Yogi. Mister Poland's not gonna like this!" But it would cover hairy Hitler's strategic arse.
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  309. A few WW2 specific facts before I begin: Convoy average speed: 12 nauts (12 nautical miles, or 14 standard miles) or 18 nauts (21 miles) per hour, depending on type of merchant ships. (Liberty ships 12 nauts. Victory ships 18 nauts). Convoy escort average maximum speed: 21-24 nauts. U-Boat surfaced speed: 21 nauts U-boat submerged speed: 7-9 nauts (much slower if hiding from enemy SoNAR) To whit: The convoy escort's duty is to escort the convoy. As with rearguards, its essence is not confrontational. It is meant solely to cause the enemy to "deploy", by which I mean in this case to submerge (or, simpler, to slow way down). Once the convoy passes the escort must leave off the attack, and burn oil to get back to its main mission: escort the convoy. Use of this understanding as a deliberate tactic revealed one of the errors of cheap, mass produced, ASW frigates. Those, you see, were not meant to zoom around at 30 nauts, they needed merely to outrun enemy subs on the surface. And, with the engines they got, this was often a difficult stern chase . . . AND a very long run at maximum power to catch up with the convoy again. The kind of run that ruins engines (which then puts you out of the game until refurbished in a yard). Happily, once the u-boat is submerged and the convoy passes, its captain is forced to surface again in order to outrun the convoy and reposition himself for a new attack. A surfaced U-boat is at its most vulnerable for interception by Destroyers, of course. Far worse is the danger of interception/interdiction by air. That introduces the Distant Cover idea. In the distant cover group you have a Carrier which sends out CAP, and ASW and Anti-shipping patrols. You'll have cruisers and, quite often, a battleship. Those are the specialists meant to engage and defeat the enemy units trying to destroy the convoyed merchant ships. If the convoy escort can force the U-boat to submerge and evade, breaking off its torpedo attack, then the convoy is no longer the hunted. No matter what happens to that escort ship, the U-boat and its course are now known quantities whose future is very, very, short. Hunter/killer groups, as separate from distant cover, were only tried a few times and found out to be great wastes of time, ships, and effort. This would come back in the Pacific near the end of the war, however, when many Allied warships could be sent off to sink one (or a small group of) code-broken IJN I-class submarine raider(s) or transport. That's how we get newsworthy stories, like that of USS England. Notes: 1)Destroyers are general warships far more valuable and expensive than mass produced convoy escorts. And they are far more needed for their intended mission of screening friendly capital ships than they are cruising at low speed. It's the same as using Afghan hounds for sheepdogs. This forced upon the allies an economy of resources than ended in the purpose built ASW frigate. 2) The real philosophy behind the Guerre de Course/Handelskrieg is the raising of maritime insurance rates and, therefore, loss of entrepreneurial profits on transported goods. When the costs of transport exceed the expected mission overhead (and also exceed the hoped for profit), the entrepreneur stops sending goods by sea. -WBC
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  405. I can see it now as though it were yesterday. U372, under our beloved Fregaten Kapitan Alfred "Alfy" Krosse, had slaked our thirst for the enemy on the fat tankers of Shell and Esso, sinking 37,000 tons in a week and two days. On a cold, gray, Tuesday in early February, 1942, we were on the surface, recharging our batteries and pooping over the side, when our air watch lookout, der unterste Offizier Gus "who drank all the Echt Kölnisch Wasser?" Mestik, cried: "It is BALLOON!" We had been discovered by a division of the dreaded K-Class "Papier Schlachtschiffe"! Streaking toward our poor Iron Pig at a blistering 18 kilometers per hour, the courageous madmen of the Helium Corps squeaked like so many chipmunks as they attacked. Empty beer bottles rained down upon us like the wrath of Bacchus, forcing some men over the side and driving the rest of us below. After a torturous minute the deluge slackened. A brave soul-I think it was Gunther Bateman- opened the hatch and popped his head out. A bucket of chum was his reward, dumped from the closest of the three K luftschiffe. In an instant, he was mobbed by all the seagulls in the ocean, eaten alive, dying by the dance of many beaks as the old salts used to say. We came about and raced for home, pursued by the angry squeaktoy squeals of our Helium Corps harassers. As one might well imagine, this sad chapter in the KM's honorable history was not recorded in U372's log. -- Senior putterman Wilheim "All Hands" Heimlich in The History Channel interview, May 1989.
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  416. Re: Deutscher Ach Ach zur Zee. The navalized 12.8cmFlaK40 is a good start. Replace every darn 15cm SK in the KM with a FlaK40, The 5cmFlaK41 is an entirely ignored choice, but on a ship (with off mount fire control) its drawbacks (flash and smoke) would not be crucial. Its longer range and heavier bursting charge (compared to contemporary 3.7cm and 4cm weapons) would also be useful. Finally, the navalized 2cmFlaK38(v) is good enough for government work in the Point Defense role. Oh! And I'd put the Zeetakt RaDAR cables under armor as much as possible. As far as "What If" scenarios go . . . I'd trade out cruiser torpedo mounts for increased storage-and then I would build amidships vertical launch rails for the Ba349 Natter. In a similar fancy I had considered replacing IJN Yamato's float planes with multiple MXY7 mod 22 manned cruise missiles on a three for one basis. Launching and commissioning Graf Zeppelin as an escort carrier for the big ships (which was the original plan) might in part mitigate the overwhelming Allied airpower advantage, or, at least, reduce losses per Schlachtschiffe sortie. I'm no fan of the Me109T, but imperfect fighters are better than no fighters at all. Bismarck and Tirpitz, Graf Zeppelin, and FT Seydlitz would've made a formidable division. In a perfect "WIldWar '46" scenario I'd give all the Axis carriers the N1K2 with twin 13mm HMG and twin 20mm cannon. And a couple of C6N Scout/Torpedo bombers . . . and a few C6N1-s nightfighters. As long as we're talking fantasy, why not have a Vril officer on every bomber. He (more probably she) could create an atmospheric distortion ahead and above the plane so as to disrupt allied bomber "paulks". The British would respond with Crowley trained witches . . . I should write a book . . . wait! I did! Just finished "The Crowley Effect" last week. ;-)
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  435. Imagine if those heavies escorting KB's 1st Carrier Fleet had replaced their 25mm, Hotchkiss-derived, autocannon with Vickers "Pompom guns"(which they had a small number of already). An IJN Battleship (or Kongo Class) bristling with quadruple or octuple 40mm pompoms, rather than similar numbers of 25mm cannon in pairs and triples, might've been a more dangerous beast. Such a choice might not have altered the war's course, but could have made it a tougher ride. World War One Battleships were hulls, to which various upgrades might be applied and new gear amalgamated in order to improve general or specific utility. Rather than Weapons Systems (meant for a specific task), by the 1930s they were Weapons Platforms (which are meant to be altered to fit changing requirements). The best use of them in the Second World-ish* War seems to have been shore bombardment and, to this end, they were stippled with AA weapons (something Drachinifel has occasionally pointed out). This rendered them more resistant to attack from the air, something very likely when you are bombarding an enemy coast. Most WW1 veterans were not the equal of modern battleships, no matter how comprehensive their upgrades were or had been. For one thing, their decks were paper thin against plunging fire. Consider: if you add weight above the waterline you raise your metacentric and your ship becomes a bad roller. Add 2 or 3" inches of deck armor to a topheavy design (and many, many, warships are precariously balanced against topweight), and your BB might turn turtle in a storm . . . From Combined Fleet dot Com: "The ingenuity of the Japanese in these achievements in adhering to, while also defeating treaty limitations, were widely, if grudgingly, praised overseas at the time. However, the result with ships that follow these principals such as the HATSUHARU and CHIDORI-class are ships whose area above water was very great in relation to below surface. Even to layman, they appear somewhat ungainly and top-heavy. That impression will receive devastating confirmation the year after the first ships of both classes make their 1933 debuts." In other words, these venerable WW1 ships were already pushing their hulls' tonnage limits when launched. When you try to add Between the Wars innovations and concept changes in terms of torpedo bulges, additional armor plating, and the inevitable extra ballast to counter rolling, you become aware that World War One battleships could never be World War Two battleships. Unfortunately, WW1 Battleships were all that Japan had got, realistically speaking. The Nagato was not going to defeat the Washington, despite her considerable weight of metal. The Yamashiro was never going to defeat the South Dakota, and the Yamato, national prestige in a brightly wrapped box that she was, complete with Type 13 and Type 22 bows, was no match for the three Iowas.
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  507. Vagaries of wartime exigency. A few thoughts on the perceived missions, and ultimate employments for the various carrier air platform imperatives. The obvious choice for a Km carrier deck fighter/interceptor was the Fw-190, which had both a wide track landing gear AND a radial engine. I say this as a USN man, of course, by no means ignoring the various British expediencies (the liquid cooled Merlins on Sea Hurricane and early iterations of what became the Seafire) and utter cockups* (cough Gloster cough Fairey Albacore cough). Strangely enough, the Dive Bomber was an obsolete idea by 1941, despite the energy both Germany and the USN put into the idea. BTB (SB2C) and Stuka (the only Dive Bomber EVER with its own, rad, theme song) were anachronisms . . . ones Billy Mitchell would've given his eye teeth for two decades earlier. The Torpedo Bomber (whose ultimate expressions; the Martin Mauler and Blackburn Firebrand, were stinkers unrelenting) was really a range battle between the makers of Light and Medium AA and and those responsible for torpedo manufacturer. WW2 seemed to indicate that obtaining a good return for the cost of an aerial torpedo attack required two things seldom assured: absolute local Air Superiority and mass numbers**. Indeed, the USN gradually pared down its specialist aircraft to a comfortable minimum, the process accelerating briefly with the clearance of the F4U for carrier ops (and many thanks to the Royal Navy for that bit of counter intuitive insight). The Corsair could, in a pinch, do it all. With enough production capacity available, only J2F and R4/HOS1 were needed for lesser duties; i.e.: SAR and ASW patrol. Consider that the most useful torpedo bomber of the war wasn't much of a torpedo bomber in the event. The TBF/TBM proved to be most adaptable to every mission not requiring a fighter or VSTOL or aquatic plane. Notes: *The USA had more than its share of these. The P39 losing its supercharger was probably the most egregious . . . except the Mk 14 torpedo and Mk VI exploder combo . . . and the B29 (which had as many engine fires as the He-177) . . . and the world's sexiest Dive Bomber, the A36 Apache . . . ** Repulse and Prince of Wales, and the Pearl Harbor Attack are good examples. * Misty Lagoon Airmen were so successful because of training, tactics, AND numbers. Unfortunately, the war between Flak and Torpedo manufacturers was a losing one for their side.
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  539. The Bismarck's mad career, Open Wildnam Style!. Kampfgruppe Lütjens: KMS Bismarck KMS Eugen KMS Zeppelin Two big What-ifs (once you allow the Graf Zeppelin to be worked up)" 1) What Air Wing? 2) A Battlegroup without support ships is an offering to the gods of war . . . who are notoriously fickle. Wild Bill's T.O. &E: Without any major changes (like replacing all of Bismarck's 3.7cm SK FlaK with the Bofors 4cm FlaK, as Eugen had), I see the Zeppelin's LuftGruppe/Fliegergruppe as follows: 30x Me109T Fighter/Interceptor (bad choice for a carrier fighter, but oh well) 12x Ju87zs (zur See) (Better than the Dauntless, imo) 3x Fa61 SAR rotorcraft (best damn SAR unit in the war up till that point) Alarrrum! AKTION! Zeppelin's CAP makes sure no sneaky swordyfish gets inside torpedo range. Further, if you think Lutjens would continue to his assigned raiding area, turn to page 2. If you think he would've engaged the UK battlegroup and then headed for France, turn to page 41. Fantasy Football, Kriegsmarine Edition: Fliegergruppe Zeppelin: 25x Fw109A (2x 13mm, 2x 2cm, plus underwing racks for 250kg Bomb and underfuselage rack for drop tank) 10x Fw109 G fur torpedo . . . a fast, small cross section, torpedo intruder. 5x Fw190 Kononekampfer (6x 2cm MH151/20. I leave off the twin 13mm Fuselage MGs) 5x Fa61 SAR/ASW Rotorcraft. Alarrrrum! AKTION! Bismarck recognizes she's got enemies in the area, launches two short range search planes (Fw190A with fuselage tank). Roll dice . . . DISCOVERY! Graf Zeppelin launches a strike and beefs up its CAP, using all of its planes, other than the SAR backups. Five torpedoes are dropped . . . . run . . . one hit scored on Prince of Wales! She drops back, 10 nauts slower, and, while the Hood is getting wise to the change in tactical superiority, she runs afoul of Bismarck and Eugen's accurate main battery fire. 24May1941 at 1000 hours, Hood learns for herself what happened at Jutland to Beatty's Battlecruisers so many years ago. Hood blows in half, Prince of Wales is already out of the action by torpedo hit (plus her forward quadruple turret is historically OOC). Lutjens has a major choice now. Historically, he was conservative of his main battery and impassive to the Hood's sudden demise. I believe he would've headed for his intended operational area. Bismarck's fuel situation was already grave, due to problems in the fueling system BEFORE she left harbor . . . this severely affected her range, so she was forced to seek out her hidden tankers immediately, or go dry. 6000 tons of fuel is a lot for a destroyer, but not much for a battleship. Plus, there was (in my What-if) a carrier, and a heavy cruiser and all moving at speed . . . From Wikipedia: "To support and provide facilities for the capital ships to refuel and rearm, German Naval Command (OKM) established a network of tankers and supply ships in the Rheinübung operational area. Seven tankers and two supply ships were sent as far afield as Labrador in the west and the Cape Verde islands in the south." As we know from hindsight, once a German tanker was used, it was soon on the bottom of the sea. Bismarck would leave a string of sunken support ships in her wake, meaning she would arrive at her intended zone pretty much S.O.L. Kampfgruppe Lutjens would tear the belly out of any convoy it encountered. But, and it's a very big butt, her fuel and ammo were not inexhaustible. You, of all folks, know how soon a battleship's big guns run out of ammo. I imagine Eugen would use torpedoes for the big ones . . . better than closing to range against armed enemies, as the IJN cruisers discovered. Torpedoes on the deck of a cruiser are an open invitation to disaster. Use 'em up first, says I! Kampfgruppe Lutjens would be "run down and brought to bay" by whatever ad hoc forces the UK could amass on site, of course, like the other commerce raiders were. Her (Bismarck's) guns would soon be empty of ammo and then what? My! That felt good. Okay, back to you.
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