Comments by "William Cox" (@WildBillCox13) on "The Drydock - Episode 027" video.
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Gato class submarines weren't like those from other nations, but paved the way for future innovations and alterations of design for everyone. A) Bigger hulls can carry more in terms of specialists and specialist equipment. Wartime patrols from all nations with submarines found strange bedfellows and fellow travelers aboard at the worst moments. B) Air Conditioning (Crew Comfort +1), C) Onboard Refrigeration. Without a doubt, USN submariners ate the best. (Crew Comfort+1), D) Better sensors for surface operations. RaDAR was a luxury few other nations could afford to mount on their submarines. Few will deny that RaDAR for target detection and shadowing was the greatest advantage of all. And, since most submarine existence was on the surface (the U-waffe was effectively neutered once the British concentrated surface and airborne ASW patrols just outside of Brest. Put simply: submerged transit was exhaustively expensive in time and fuel. That defeated the U-Boat arm BEFORE ElInt and code-breaking is factored in.). Good show, you lot. E) better weaponry for fighting it out when surprised or unable to dive. Surface weapons on submarines were effective; torpedoes were hugely expensive. They were the sexiest (highest sticker price) budget item for individual rounds, other than wunderwaffe. Many, many, many, submarines resorted to deck guns during patrols, especially early on (for almost everyone), and near the end (for the USN). This truth has been overshadowed by submersible fanboiz, who favor the torpedo (perhaps the most inaccurate way to deliver a single warhead ever*) in their popularist accounts. Remember, submarines of the period were surface ships, not Aquaman: they were slow and relatively unmaneuverable when submerged. E) Gatos were better sea boats than the submarines of other nations, able to maintain a higher speed for longer in an open seaway. As Drachinifel points out, T-Class were very short ranged for fleet boats. This precludes their effective integration into the PTO . . . which was one third of the war for the UK (unless you ask Singapore, Hong Kong, India, Australia, or New Zealand), and half of the war for the USA**.
The downside to the larger boats should be included in any look, of course. For one thing, Gatos (and Typ IX, and B1) had longer diving times (not that much longer in practice, btw), and were more awkward when maneuvering in close spaces. Drachinifel also rightly points out that UK and, especially, Deu, boats could run a bit deeper (considerably deeper for the Deutschers) with confidence. This can be very effective in keeping you alive . . . once you're trapped and held down by enemy ASW assets. Which is the one thing EVERY submarine commander wants to avoid. It's also more of a tribute to your welding and packing gland technology than it is to the metal of your hull.
*I am talking CEP here. One did not use a V2 on a ship at sea. And Tallboys NEVER hit fish, whales, or dolphins . . or invisible wreckage or chunks of floating ice) on their way to target. Further, no dropped iron bomb ever circled around to strike the bomber who dropped it (though a few bounced). Also, air currents do not divert bombs with anything like the effect that water currents have on torpedo tracks. And, of course, bombs aren't near as likely to porpoise.
** And here is where code-breaking really came into its own. Both Germany and Japan were interested in trading materials and tech. Several trading missions were perpetrated through submarine means; only one of these really came through and that but partially. Google I-51 for more on that. These submarine missions of military mercy were intercepted, in the main, thanks to a combination of code-breaking and SonoBouy+FIDO tactical coordination. So that extreme long radius of action of fleet boats (for IJN, KM, and USN types) should not be discounted or marginalized.
Finally, never underestimate the effect that crew comfort has on combat efficiency, which is not quite congruent with, but heavily affects, efficacy.
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Your is a valid point. As I see it, a warship usually compares its value* with that of the enemy units it destroys. But, ultimately, it's a financial equation. If it sinks a KGV, it's a big deal, expensive as all get out. But, if it makes you burn a million tons of oil and wear out all the engines on a whole medley of pursuing warships, plus expend all that ammo (meaning barrel life exceeded in many cases) . . . it's a Pyrrhic victory when you do catch her. And your pursuing ships aren't where they might be better needed. And won't be for some time.
*The combined value of building the ship, the cost of its upkeep and fuel and ammunition and crews (training, feeding, shore facilities, hookers and beer, et al), repair, scraping and painting . . . versus that expended by the enemy it opposes.
Lack of oil doomed both Germany and Japan, long before they launched attacks on nations capable of mounting an effective defense while possessing the resources to also develop and launch counterattacks. A lot of the war effort of both nations (Germany and Japan) was directed to absorbing foreign owned oil fields and processors. And tankers.
So I think we can consider the oil spent as valid as any other measure of competition other than loss of life. In that way, Bismarck and Tirpitz both served their purpose by forcing the enemy to expend about 5:1 in terms of resources, refits, dockyard space, Tallboys, oil, and all the rest.
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