Comments by "" (@BobSmith-dk8nw) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  9. If you are a destroyer escorting something - and an enemy surface combatant comes along - you throw yourself at that enemy combatant or combatants - to give the thing you are escorting a chance to run away, all the while screaming on the radio for help. That is what you do. If you get sunk - you get sunk but that is your job. Even if you can't actually hurt the enemy combatant you are attacking - while they're sinking you - they aren't sinking the thing you are escorting. And - it is for this reason that you carry torpedoes. Your "main" armament may not amount to much but there are no surface combatants who want anything to do with a torpedo. So - even if you don't carry enough to make getting a hit a probability - the very threat of your torpedoes may well be enough to get the enemy to turn away to avoid them. The enemy can of course try to comb the wakes of your torpedoes by heading towards them but this increases the closing speed so much that it cuts down on their ability to comb those wakes successfully. If they head away from the torpedoes that cuts down that closing speed to give them a much better chance of combing the wakes. Getting them to turn away - increases the chances of the thing you are escorting to escape. Of course, this doesn't always work. The Glorious didn't get away and in the Battle off Samar - none of Taffy 3 should have. But - the Japanese commander got wounded - and that may have distorted his judgment ... as it has a tendency to do ... so he seized on a false report of the Americans being some where they were not ... then left. His cruisers were closing in on the baby flat tops and would have probably sunk them, like they did the Gambier Bay - but they were recalled and the sacrifice of the American destroyers - paid off. Of course the fact that the aircraft of like 9 small carriers were all attacking the Japanese surface combatants, was a factor in the confusion as well. .
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  16. My Dad was in the Marines and eventually I was myself. I read a young persons history of the Marines from the school library when I was 10 and that transitioned me from wanting to be a Cowboy to wanting to be a Marine. During my High School years - Robert Leckie was my favorite author. I read Guadalcanal Diary and a number of Morrison's books. Eventually I read Franks book on the Campaign and also read a History of Marine Aviation in WWII - among other works that I can't recall just now. So I've been studying this campaign or parts there of for longer than most of you have been alive. And - it was truly joyful to listen to 3 well informed people talking about this campaign. I drank beer with a group of other history buffs for over 20 years and this reminded me of that. The Guadalcanal Campaign in 1942 was the last chance Japan had of avoiding utter disaster in the war, even if it wasn't much of a chance. I disagree with Jon that the Japanese ever could have won the campaign. Even after the shellacking Henderson received you will note - that the attempt to unload supplies the next day from the Japanese Transports - which in desperation were run aground - utterly failed. The airfield had been put right back into operation and those transports were sunk and their supplies destroyed. Here - the thing was - the Japanese Navy couldn't operate in daylight against the airfield and even if they had had spotter planes that survived American Air - it's uncertain they could have so destroyed the field as to take it out of operation for anything but a short period of time. The Americans had all the equipment there that had been used by they and the Japanese to build the air field - and could rapidly repair any damage done to it. As to New Guinea - the main factor (as I understand it) that prevented American Transports from supporting the Buna-Gona Campaign was a lack of charts for those waters. The "Rag Tag Fleet" MacArthur's people put together - was of much smaller ships - many of which may well have already operated in those waters so that even if they didn't have charts (and they themselves may have had them even if the Navy didn't) the crews of these ships might have been familiar enough with these waters to operate in them. The thing with the Kongos was that they were the only Japanese Capital Ships that were fast enough - due to their Battle Cruiser History - to operate with the carriers. And so - once again - we have that excellent researcher - Jon - whose conclusions are completely out to lunch. Yes - they may have been escorting a crappy little carrier at the moment - but - there were not going to be any more of them - and when they got some better carriers - using all the Kongos in the Guadalcanal Campaign they could lose them all the way they'd lost half of them in a few days. The decisive moment in the campaign was when Nimitz replaced Ghormley with Halsey. Whatever his later faults - Halsey, like Grant, would go right at the enemy regardless of his own losses - as each of these men understood - that their enemy could not replace his losses - but they could replace theirs. This point is well made in the discussion of that last battle. The Comment I loved the most was about people who stopped reading Mahan after the Decisive Battle. That was the Japanese to a T. They had all their submarines out chasing warships. They had some very notable results but - submarines are much more effective against merchant ships. One Japanese characteristic - is that they tend to develop their plans based on group consensus - but then - if they need to change their plans they tend to be inflexible. The best example of that is their attempt to avoid becoming a colony by becoming a colonial power. They just didn't seem to realize that that time had passed when they went about conquering China. They also don't seem to have noticed - that none of the Colonial Powers had let any of the other Colonial powers take ALL of China. Thus the Americans stopped supplying them with the oil they were using to rape Chinese cities. The big thing here though - is that you train the way you are going to fight - because you WILL fight the way you train. The Americans practiced Daylight Gunnery before the war and the Japanese practiced night battles. The thing with firing guns in a night battle - besides the fact that everyone can see you - is that after you do - the flash destroys your Night Vision and you can't see anyone else - unless they are on fire. Catch on fire - and EVERYONE shoots at you. Torpedoes were the weapon of Night Warfare - before Radar. You could fire your torpedoes without the enemy knowing you'd done so or even if you were there. The Americans had no torpedoes on most of their Cruisers and the torpedoes they had on their destroyers were horrible - in contrast to the Japanese - who had the best torpedo in the world. Very good points about the CIC and Radar especially that the Americans could actually field all of them they wanted. One of the things about the American/British Technological Team - was that things the British thought up - the Americans (besides the things they thought up themselves) could mass produce. The Germans were the only other participant that was on a par with the Americans and British Technologically - and they - couldn't come close to the Americans ability to mass produce things. Webster's remark pretty much sums up the Axis forces in WWII: "You have horses! What were you thinking?" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyZK8k4gzyg No one else - not even the Russians - could touch that. .
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  23. Yeah, you did see some Gallantry from the Germans early in the war. There was even an attempt by some Italian and maybe German submarines to tow some British survivors to an area where they could be rescued - but the British attacked them. The British were much more concerned about losing yet more ships and crews to submarines than they were about the survival of crews that had already been put in the water. Read "The Cruel Sea" for a lot of incidents involving the deaths of allied sailors. The book is a novel but it is based on the author's experiences in the war as related in some non-fiction books written before it. There is one incident where a merchant ship had been torpedoed and sunk. The British escort ship the characters in the book are on at the moment is looking for the submarine - and picks up a contact - right under the surviving crew - so - it attacks it with depth charges - killing those survivors. Afterwards, they realize - to their horror - that the sonar contact they had picked up - was the sinking hull of the merchant ship - not a German submarine. When the Bismarck was sunk - British warships were pulling survivors from the water - when there was a report of a submarine periscope - they broke off rescue efforts and the only survivors of the Bismarck's crew were the ones picked up before the report. This was in reaction to an incident in WWI when four British Armored Cruisers were sunk by a submarine because they thought that the first ship hit - had hit a mine - and were all stopped picking up survivors. They never did that again. Sometimes there were dedicated small ships detailed to rescue survivors and sometimes the escorts would do it - but a lot of men were left to die in the water because of fear of submarine attack. .
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  25.  @TTTT-oc4eb  Your arguments are irrelevant Bean Counter. When all these Capital Ships were designed - no one knew how things were going to shape out. You are also ignoring the fact that had Halsey left his Battleships to cover San Bernardino Strait things would look much differently than you have depicted. It wasn't the fault of the Iowa's designers that Halsey was stupid. Also - Halsey having been stupid not to leave them to guard the strait - THEN - he pulled them and sent them down there after it was to late - just as they were about to make use of those big guns on the Japanese decoy fleet. THEN you are ignoring the fact that the Japanese COULD have chosen to employ their main fleet off Guadalcanal - back when it could have made a difference - and the fleet actions we might have had then could have been much different. As to the slower classes of battleships before the Iowas - 1 knot can make a real difference over time. Yes - those classes could and did escort Carriers - but - the Iowa's were better at it - if for no other reason than they were faster. The speed of the Fleet Carriers - (Carriers being fast so they could get as much wind over the deck as they could) - was not the limiting factor if their escorts couldn't keep up with them. Also - as I believe I have pointed out to you in the past - there are only so many ships that can be fit in a fleet formation and still be in range of the ships they are protecting using WWII technology. Cruisers take up about the same amount of maneuver space as a Battleship. Thus - you can better fit battleships in a fleet formation to protect carriers with their AA than you can Cruisers. The closer they were - the more 5"/38 guns could participate and closer still more 40mm guns could participate. Fleet Defense is conducted in layers. First the Destroyers, then the Cruisers and then the Battleships - and then the Carriers. Trying to use Cruisers to protect the Carriers - is penny wise and pound foolish. You want as much protection as near the Carriers as you can get - and THAT - is what you get with Battleships in that role. The other thing is - those Cruisers had to come from some place - and them being used in the Center of the Formation - takes them away from the next layer out. Lastly - Battleships can take more punishment themselves - and not have to withdraw or be left behind because of damage than Cruisers. Smart Asses like yourself are not nearly as smart as they like to think they are. There are reasons why the term Bean Counter - is a pejorative. .
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  45. Japanese Doctrine had their Carriers Operating in 2 ship Carrier Divisions. Here - their doctrine can be described as "One ship - with two hulls" . The Carrier Division would launch a single strike made up of planes from both ships. One Carrier would launch Dive Bombers and a few Fighters. The other Carrier would launch Torpedo Bombers and a few Fighters. This allowed them to get off a balanced Strike Group very quickly. Then - they would get off a Second Strike Group - with both ships launching the Dive Bombers and Torpedo Bombers they had not included in the first Strike Group. Now - one of the problems with this - was that these two ships were organizationally tied to each other. Thus - when Shokaku was heavily damaged at Coral Sea and Zuikaku lost much of it's Air Group - both ships went back to Japan and neither was a Midway. In Contrast when Yorktown was heavily damaged and it's air group shot up - they managed to fix it well enough to operate in a few days - and gave it Saratoga's Air Group - and it was at Midway. This is a very accurate illustration of Japanese Thinking. They come up with a very clever way of doing things - but - when that won't work because things have changed - their response is less than ideal. The Japanese Carrier Divisions that made up Kido Butai were Kaga & Akagi Hiryu & Soryu Shokaku & Zuikaku By combining all six of their Fleet Carriers - with over 400 aircraft - they just waltzed about the Pacific Stomping On People. The problem was that, trying to do to much at the same time, they didn't keep it together. If they had had six carriers at both Coral Sea and Midway - each would have been a different battle. .
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