Comments by "" (@BobSmith-dk8nw) on "Drachinifel" channel.

  1. Thanks for doing this. I've been reading about F4F's for over 50 years and learned a good bit that I was unaware of. As to pilots not being happy with it ... First off - they had to pump the damn landing gear over a couple dozen times just to get it up and down. I cannot imagine there was a single pilot who liked that particular aspect of the plane. The fact that if you didn't really put some force into that last pump - the landing gear might not fully lock - well that was just one more thing not to love about the process. Next - you have the narrow track of the landing gear. Now - if you are landing on a Carrier - IT is headed INTO the wind - so you don't have to worry about cross winds - but - if you are landing on land - say at Henderson Field - then you DO have to worry about cross winds. And the F4F's were notorious for ground loops. Yet another thing pilots might not like - was that the reason they were flying an F4F - was because they were on one of those smaller flat tops ... which they might also not be to happy about. Of course - one of the main factors in the experience of flying an F4F against A6M's in 1942 - was that they were still going against the cream of Japan's aviators. Whatever anyone may have to say about the P-39's P-40's and the F4F's - THEY were the ones who defeated the Japanese in 1942 and much of 1943. By the time the P-38's, F6F's and F4U's became the dominant aircraft used by the Allies - the P-40's and F4F's had killed most of the best the Japanese had. The Japanese had gotten their licks in but - they could not replace their losses - and we could. The guys flying the P-38's, F6F's and F4U's - not only had better aircraft than the Japanese - they were also not flying against the highly trained aviators the Japanese had in 1942 - because those guys were dead. .
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  3.  @iatsd  When it comes to the predictability of waves - YOU have no idea - do you? I don't know how much time you've spent on or near the Ocean - but you are talking out your ass. It isn't that there aren't differences between the times between individual waves - but there IS an average and there ARE patterns. The Ocean is not doing what it's doing randomly. There are various factors involved but - over a period of time - you can get an idea of the sea state you are in. My experience with waves comes from body surfing - which I did a LOT when I was in High School. You go out and start looking at what the waves are doing that day. After a while - you can pick up the patterns - and those patterns ARE predictable. Typically you'll have like 3 big waves - then a certain period of smaller ones - and then here come 3 more big ones. You can also make judgments about which of those 3 big waves should be the biggest. Given that your ability here to judge what the Ocean is doing is going to have an effect on which waves you are going to catch - and which waves you want to look out for so they don't dump you onto the bottom - you have to PAY ATTENTION to what is going on around you. Your statement asking if someone should sit there and count the screws - is an indication that you have no idea of the kinds of things people are routinely assigned to do aboard Naval vessels. You're damn straight someone might well have been assigned to sit there and time how much those screws were spending out of the water. They may not have been able to precisely calculate exactly where they were - but they SHOULD have known that there could have been a serious error in their calculations. Given that they were getting indications from the radio beacons that their position was off - they should have been going slower and paying more attention to what was going on around them - just like that other unit DID do. .
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  13. Two things. First off - the reason for the excess numbers of Officers - was the ability to expand the military in the event of WW III. In WW II they could draft enlisted men en-mass and give them a few months of schooling in their MOS and likewise crank out a bunch of 90 day wonders to fill the junior officer ranks - but - they didn't have enough senior officers to lead them. It takes decades of experience to become a General Officer or an Admiral and they just couldn't do that over night. So - to avoid what happened in WW II - they planned ahead - and had more senior officers than they needed - at the moment so that if they did need them to command a greatly expanded military - they'd have them. At one point in time in WW II the Army was taking Managers who had run a business with a thousand people in them - and making them Lt. Col.s without ever having been Lieutenants, Captains or Majors. So - having all these people who could function as Admirals and Generals - with the experience to know what they were doing - was a good idea. As such - each one was rotated in and out of actual command positions, alternating with positions on someone's staff or sitting in an office pushing paper. Since the end of the Cold War - they don't do that as much as they did. Second - the problem with technology - is that no one knows how well it will really work - until they try to use it against a real technological enemy. Examples of that from WW II would be of Airplanes and Tanks. There had been all kinds of theories between the wars but much of that turned out to be wrong. If you take a detailed look at the Air Power Enthusiasts like Mitchell and Douhet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giulio_Douhet they were WRONG about most of the things they had theorized about. Air Power was very important - but the actual implementation of it - bore little resemblance to what the Air Power Advocates of the '20's and '30's thought. One of the most egregious example of which was the Bomber Mafia running the American Air Force (I know AAC/AAF) which fought any idea that there could possibly be a need for Fighter Escorts and things like Drop Tanks. A lot of Bomber Crews died because of this attitude and how long it took them to fix it. The Americans have been in a number of low level wars against weak opponents but none against a technological equal like Germany. Of course - it hasn't had a real technological equal since WW II but even so - if the Warsaw Pact had tried to come through the Fulda Gap - we do not know what would have happened on land, in the sea or in the air. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were both geared up to fight each other - but - they hadn't actually done it - so they didn't know just what would really happen. We have had a number of Games about WW III but the people making those games do not have full access to each sides real technological information - so - all that they are doing is reading - Jane's Fighting Ships https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jane%27s_Fighting_Ships and Combat Fleets of the World https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_Fleets_of_the_World and guessing. .
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  18.  @bkjeong4302  No. The Fast Battleships were superior to Cruisers in every case - and the choice was NOT Battleships or Cruisers. That's a stupid persons idea. It wasn't just money that was the factor. Cruisers could be built in shipyards that couldn't build Battleships - so that is not a consideration. If there was a ship type that was in competition for ship yards with the Battleships - it was the Aircraft Carriers - not the Cruisers. During WWII they were building as many Cruisers, Destroyers, Aircraft Carriers and Battleships as they could. If they needed new ship yards - they opened new ship yards - and - it was a lot easier to open a new ship yard that could build smaller ships than bigger ones. So it was NEVER a case of them choosing to build Battleships INSTEAD of Cruisers. They were ALWAYS building BOTH. Your ignorance here is appalling. The primary reason they stopped building Battleships and canceled some of those under construction - was that the war would be over by the time they were completed and in a Post War World we were going to have a vastly smaller fleet. You are WRONG about having more ships in the circle. This isn't a time when these ships have missiles with a range of 100 miles. You have again ignored the point I made about maneuvering space. You can only fit so many ships in close to the ships you are defending - or they will collide with each other - and THAT is more important than how many rings of ships you can have. 5" .38 cal. and 40mm AA guns have a limited effective range. What WAS important was to have as many of them as close to the ships they were defending as possible. The farther out an AA ship is from the ships being attacked the less effective it's fire is going to be. If the aircraft are coming in from one side of the ring - ships on the other side of the ring will not be able to engage them effectively - or - at all. The ships that will be MOST effective are the ones that are closest to the ships they are defending - and THAT is why they had the Battleships closer to the carriers rather than farther out. You are still assuming that the attacking aircraft are going to have to fly through the fire of this whole ring of ships - when that is not the case. Weather can shield aircraft from observation. Although WWII Radar is less effective alone than in combination with visual siting - you can in cases of poor visibility use radar only to fire on aircraft if you KNOW they are enemy aircraft but that often isn't the case. Even in modern times Rules of Engagement often require visual identification to try and avoid Friendly Fire incidents. There were times when there were massive raids with a large number of enemy aircraft all approaching from one direction which were easily spotted - but that was not always the case. Often times there would be a few aircraft that would not be coming in from the anticipated direction. These aircraft would go after your high value ships - and you might have only a short period of time to engage them before they attacked. So - you always wanted to have most of your AA firepower as close to the ships you were defending as possible. The Franklin was attacked by ONE enemy aircraft that came out of the clouds undetected and so severely damaged the ship that it never saw combat again. Here - no one saw this aircraft before it came out of the clouds and attacked - but - the point is - that such attacks did happen - and if they did - it was better to have your AA Fire Power concentrated closest to the ships you were trying to defend as the amount of time you were going to have to engage aircraft like this was very limited. The idea that it was better to have more barrels in a bigger circle - is just silly. The number of guns in your whole fleet isn't what mattes - the number of guns and their ability to concentrate their fire power - close to the ship you are defending is what matters. And - WHAT alternatives to leaving TF 34 behind? Not going after the Japanese Carriers? No one would have done that. How could anyone know that they had already expended all their planes? Not to mention the fact that however many planes they had lost - they could at least theoretically have gotten more. We had hardly ever been as hurt by Japanese Battleships as we were by Japanese Carriers - so - Halsey was more worried about them than the Center Force that seemed to have turned back after the loss of the Musashi. OF COURSE they sent our fleet carriers after them. That is why the Japanese did it. They sacrificed their carriers because - without aircraft and pilots they weren't worth anything any more anyway - and they KNEW it would draw off our fleet carriers. Halsey was not being stupid for going after the Japanese Carriers - he was stupid for not leaving TF 34 behind. I can see why he might have wanted the Battleships as escorts for his carriers but - they weren't going to do that - they were going to run down the Japanese Carriers with the Battleships and blow them out of the water ... They should have left - someone - behind to guard that strait in case the Center Force turned around - as it did - and the Battleships were the most logical force. They could be split off - they were strong enough to deal with the enemy - and - the Taffy's could provide air cover. As to our fleet carriers running away as the reason they would have been safe ... that would not have been a consideration. Their escorts - which of course would have included the Battleships - were more than sufficient to engage the enemy. So - while they would have avoided engagement by the Japanese Battleships - they wouldn't have had to just turn tail and run. Besides which ... the Japanese Cruisers were not slow ships. So - while the fleet carriers were certainly faster than the Escort Carriers - I don't know how fast they were compared to those Japanese Cruisers - which did in fact do a lot of the damage to Taffy 3 - and were about to catch it ... So - the ability of our fleet carriers to just run away ... is not something I would have considered a factor in anything - and it is a mark of your ignorance that you even mentioned it. I've known a lot of silly people like you - who get some theory and get really adamant about defending their silly idea - and as I said - it IS just an academic discussion. You can't KNOW how something they didn't do would have worked out - all we do know - is what they DID do - and that worked out very well. So - your silly little idea - is IRRELEVANT . .
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  19.  @bkjeong4302  First off we need to be clear on something. Your argument is that they should not have built ANY Battleships for WWII. My argument is that while Battleships are certainly more expensive than Cruisers - it was advantageous to have them - so that when their advantages over Cruisers mattered - you would be able to use those advantages. If you didn't need those advantages then a Cruiser would do. But - as I said - you cannot predict what you will need and what you won't. Given the amount of time it took to build those ships - you couldn't just wait until you needed one to build it whereas you could be more flexible in building smaller ships like Cruisers since they took less time to build. You have spoken like a true Bean Counter. I have NOT "massively over estimated the effectiveness of Battleships". As is typical of people like yourself - you twist what others have said to your own meanings - rather than respond to what they actually said. Thus - much of the problem here is your failure at reading comprehension. If you paid attention to what I was saying - I was talking about situations where the differences between their guns and Cruisers DID matter. For those in situations where the Battleships would have made a difference - your cost analysis doesn't mean a damn thing compared to the cost of their lives. You blandly shrug off as "situational" those occasions as if they did not occur, would not occur or could not occur. For those whose lives are on the line in those situations ... that logic doesn't matter. The logic that does matter is - "if we had been able to destroy these targets - I would not have died." And then of course - there is the interpretation of the data you have put on it - which I would dispute. Those who are Bean Counters tend to juggle the facts to suit their purposes. What was it? "There are lies ... there are Damn Lies ... and then ... there are ... Statistics ..." which anyone can juggle any way they see fit. Now - I'm not accusing you of lying - most Bean Counters are so wrapped up in their Bull Shit - that they really believe it. It's just that - just because they believe it - doesn't mean it isn't Bull Shit. As to the concentric rings of AA ships - yes - that is what they did - because they didn't have enough Battleships. The more Battleships you have in your concentric rings - the more effective they will be - especially the closer to the ships they are defending. We are not arguing here over having only Battleships vs. only Cruisers. In your concentric defense they would have the Battleships closest to the target, then Cruisers and then Destroyers. If they had not had the Battleships - which is what your logic is saying - they would not have had the concentration of fire power closest to the ships they were escorting that they did. Thus - the reality is - that it was better to have Battleships AND Cruisers - than just Cruisers alone (which is what you are saying). The other thing about your dismissal of the Battleships - is that at the time most of them were built - no one knew just how effective aircraft were going to be. No one knew just what kind of dominance aircraft would come to have. And yet - there were still a number of times when Battleships really mattered. The other factor there - is the influence of Radar - which was unknown at the time. The Bismarck was after all sunk by Battleships. A torpedo bomber got lucky - and got a steering hit - or it would have gotten away - but - this was getting lucky. Then you have the night time surface engagements that took place where the guns of Battleships did matter. Not to mention the Battle Off Samar - where despite the amount of air search capability the US had - the Japanese still got their Battleships in range of our lighter forces - specifically because - Halsey didn't leave any Battleships to guard the San Bernadino Strait. So - we have two things going on here. One is an academic argument about how effective Battleships were vs. cheaper alternatives. Your argument that they shouldn't have built them - cannot be proven - since they DID build them. The other is the History of what actually happened. Here - your arguments that they shouldn't have built Battleships and your dismissal of them is irrelevant - since they had built them and did have them. .
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  25. First off - it is "Battle OFF Samar". This battle is somewhat unique in having been named this way, it is believed because of the wording of an early report on the Battle from one of the senior Naval Officers involved. Next - habits die hard. Halsey was still fighting the ghosts of the early war Japanese Carriers in the Battle of Cape Engano. Just as the Japanese had hoped - he was going after those carriers despite the fact that their naval aviators had become ineffective and severely reduced in numbers. In fact, the air strike launched by these carriers to attract the USN's attention - was mixed up with a land based attack and not even noticed. It was only later when US recon spotted them that Halsey went after them. Kurita was still in the mode of preserving a fleet in being. Japan, throughout the war, was worried about losing ships - because they knew they couldn't replace them. At Pearl Harbor and Savo Island - they had withdrawn when they had achieved an ascendant position - out of worry for losing their ships. After Midway - when their worst nightmare occurred they were even more concerned. So - here - Kurita goes into the battle KNOWING that it is the IJN's last fight BECAUSE THEY DON'T HAVE THE FUEL FOR ANOTHER ONE - yet - in the end - he withdraws to preserve his force - when there was no longer any point to doing so. Another factor here - is the importance of communications. Halsey had Lee create a battleship force to guard the San Bernadino Strait but - didn't tell them to do it. Everyone else thinks he's done it but he doesn't leave ANYONE there. The Japanese Southern Force was split into two, rather than combining into one force under one Admiral - and these two guys didn't like each other - so they never said a word and went into battle individually. Of course it wouldn't have made much difference ... but ... The other thing is - and this I have not seen mentioned any where - why the hell didn't Kurita have SOME kind of recon reports on the position of the American ships? The Japanese had been attacking the US for some time with aircraft - so they had them - why the hell didn't they have dedicated recons reporting to Kurita so he had some idea where the US ships were? Of course - a factor in that could be that they were getting shot down ... but I've heard nothing about any attempt to provide such recon. .
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  30. As with the Monitor and the Warrior - with the Virginia and the Warrior we have the same situation where you have different ships designed to do different things. During the American War Between the States - you had a number of different ship designs (or uses of ships already able to fill a function). You had unarmored blockade Runners which were mostly merchant men designed to be fast so they could out run the ships of the Union Navy. You had unarmored blockading ships - which some times were literally (or at least so it seems to me) to be physically blocking the routes into Southern Harbors and sitting at anchor as they did so. You had the armored Virginia which was designed to sail down the river from it's base to destroy the unarmored blockading ships. And you had the armored Monitor that was designed to deal with the armored Virginia. The Warrior - iirc - was designed to fight other warships (specifically The Gloire). If either the Virginia or the Monitor had come out into the open ocean - the Warrior should have beaten them (if they didn't sink first). But - if the Warrior had had to sail up a river to get at the Virginia ... the results would be more problematic. For one thing sailing up a river like that - for which they may not have had any current charts showing sand bars and such might also expose it to shore batteries and "torpedoes" designed to keep the Union ships from doing the same thing. If the Warrior had tried to come up a river to engage the Virginia (which I can't imagine her Captain would be foolish enough to do (about as foolish as they would have to be for either the Monitor or Virginia to go out on the open ocean to engage the Warrior)) and it had run aground - then what would have happened? If the Virginia could just sit off the Warrior's bow or stern and not be hit, where she could pound the same spot on Warrior's armor - could she have gotten penetration? After all - the bow and stern were not armored. So - once again - we have these meaningless comparisons of ships not at all designed to confront each other where each would not have fared well in the others environment. Virginia was in fact destroyed to avoid capture when it was judged that she (though fully fit) was never the less, unfit to take out on the open sea where she might escape. Suppose - to perform a similar exercise - the Enterprise had fought the Yamato? Which ship would have won? Well ... the Yamato did in fact fight some small aircraft carriers where we can see about how such an engagement might come off. IF the battleship could get within gunnery range of the aircraft carrier - advantage battleship. IF however the aircraft carriers aircraft spotted the battleship before it's guns were in range - then you have a case much more like that resulting in the sinking of the Yamato. .
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  35. One thing about early war Japanese Carrier Divisions - was that the Japanese looked at these Divisions as One Ship - Two Hulls. The problem was - that it took to long to get a full - Balanced - strike launched from one ship - the way the Americans did it - so they'd break their strikes up into two strikes, first launching one strike and then the other from one Division. They also, of course - might have multiple Divisions. Thus - for their 1st Carrier Strikes from a Division - they'd have one ship supply the Torpedo Bombers and the other the Dive Bombers - while both contributed Fighters. For the 2nd Carrier Strike from a Division, the Carrier that had provided the Torpedo Bombers - now - Provided the Dive Bombers and the Carrier that had provided the Dive Bombers provided the Torpedo Bombers - with again - both Carriers contributing fighters. The Americans ended up sending out independent squadrons of different types and - they didn't have enough fighters to always provide a separate escort for the Dive and Torpedo Bombers - as well as their CAP. The thing the Americans did - was split up their Carrier Divisions into separate Task Forces so that when the Japanese found one of them - they didn't necessarily find the other. Of course - this further hurt the Americans ability to operate a single, large Strike. One of the things about Midway - was that the Americans committed their aircraft in largely unescorted separate squadrons that all kind of dribbled in - letting the Japanese CAP deal with them one or two at a time. With 4 Carries to provide CAP at Midway they largely slaughtered these separate American Squadrons. It was only pure luck that had the Enterprise and Yorktown Dive Bombers both show up while the Japanese - suffering from Target Fixation - had all their CAP down attacking VT-3 and VF-3. At the Battle of Santa Cruz - the Americans had Enterprise , Hornet and Wasp - but - had detached Wasp to refuel so she and her Air Group missed the Battle. At the beginning of the war the Japanese Carrier Forces - and their Navy in General - were superior to the Americans - but - the Americans gave as good as they got over all - and the Japanese could not replace their losses. So - as the war went on - the Americans got better and the Japanese got worse. .
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  49. This is a comment about Japan and a certain Japanese way of doing things. My First post was long enough - and YouTube will truncate them - so this is done as a separate post. Different nations tend to have different characteristics or "personalities". The US for example - has - after a long war - abandoned it's allies and quit. We did that in Vietnam and we are doing it again now in Afghanistan, abandoning people we promised to protect to the tender mercies of the people they had joined us in fighting. We should all hang our heads in shame for that - but there you are. This characteristic - BTW - was what the Japanese were counting on in their hopes for a negotiated settlement. So - it's not like the Japanese were completely out of line in thinking they could outlast us - they just weren't able to do it - and we had better leaders than Johnson, Nixon, Obama, Trump and Biden. So - with that introduction - I studied Asia a good bit when getting my MA and came to a few opinions about the way the Japanese tended to do things. Here - Rigidity - is the word that comes to mind. Pretty much - once they make up their mind to do something in a certain way - they need a 2x4 across their face to make them realize that what they were doing - doesn't work any more. Historically, when the West first began to get ships able to sail to Asia and back - one of the things that came on them - were Missionaries. In Japan - political groups formed around the Western Religion the missionaries brought with them - which the Shogunate crushed. They then made the decision that since these Westerners and their religion had caused a problem - that they should be excluded - and they were. 200 years later ... they got the 2x4 across their face when such as Commodore Perry showed up and demonstrated the advancements that had been made in Naval Bombardment Technology during those years. Seeing that Exclusion ... didn't work any more ... the Japanese got together and thought about what they were going to do. The rest of Asia had been colonized by the West with Japan being left out because ... it didn't really have anything but mountains, rice paddies and Japanese ... which no one wanted. China was (at that time) relatively rich and ... the Colonialists were busy chowing down on it. So - given that their objective was to avoid becoming a colony - they decided that - If You Can't Beat Them - Join Them . And thus Japan set out to become a Colonial Power. They started off with Korea - then took Manchuria and then ... long after everyone else - they began to really go after China. The problem here for them - was that Colonialism ... was a passing fad ... that ... and the original Colonial Powers (since they didn't want to fight over it) had divided China up into Spheres of Influence - rather than trying to take it over. When Japan invaded China - that was going a bit to far for the West. First, they were more sympathetic to the Chinese than they themselves at one time had been - but also - just as they had not wanted any one of them to have the whole pie - they didn't want the Japanese to have it all either. Thus, when the Japanese got the Germans to impose on the Vichy French to let them come into Indochina to interfere with Chinese Supply Routes - the US, Britain and what was left of the Dutch - cut off their oil. Now - how these guys could think that this would result in anything else but Japan attacking them ... well ... they just didn't seem to know the Japanese very well. Reading John Toland's The Rising Sun I got the impression that the more moderate men making up the Japanese government were caught between a rock and a hard place. They believed that if they ever backed down to a Colonial Power - they were on a Slippery Slope to becoming a Colony - but - they knew that if they went to war with the US and Britain - they'd be destroyed. So ... what to do? What to do? Become a Colony or Be Destroyed! What to do? Pressured by more radical people the moderates threw up their hands and said in effect "All right. YOU do it" and let these more radical people take over. These people then found themselves in the same position - become a colony - or be destroyed - and they were being pressured by people more radical than they were. So - finally - they threw up their hands and said in effect to these greater radicals "All right. You Do It." When they got to Tojo - he did. Here I've always seen this as the Japanese choosing to commit National Seppuku. Basically - it was more honorable to be destroyed than become a colony. What's odd though - was to watch them start to bull shit themselves once they'd made the decision to be destroyed. They started thinking - that if we just bleed those soft, decadent Americans enough - they'll quit. Now ... as history has show us - if they had been able to do it - that might have worked ... but they couldn't and it didn't. Now - where this rigidity of thinking is displayed in the Midway Campaign - where the US slapped the Yorktown back together and put the Saratoga's Air Group on it - the Japanese pulled both ships in the Shokaku and Zuikaku Carrier Group back to Japan. The Japanese way of thinking about carriers - was that a Carrier Group consisted of one ship - with two hulls. Both ships were integral, inseparable parts of the whole - which worked very well for them. But between the Shokaku's Air Group and whatever else they could come up with - they could have had Zuikaku as a 5th carrier at Midway. Maybe if I get farther along in Shattered Sword I'll find out if any of them even thought of doing that. One of the things about that rigidity of thinking though - is that ... that hasn't changed ... .
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  50. Yes. I've begun reading Shattered Sword but only just. I liked the touch of the young Japanese Sailors washing down their anchor chain - oblivious to what was a head of them. I've been studying Midway since High School in the late '60's when I read Lord's Incredible Victory . I also played the Avalon Hill Midway game repeatedly with my buddies, which if nothing else made me familiar with the ship names. I was also well aware though of the two light carriers the Japanese had - as the player in the game could use those as well. One thing you guys failed to mention about Fletcher - was that he was in command of the Relief Mission to Wake Island - that turned around - so the Marines blame him for THAT too. Here though - Kimmel was the one who made the plan - which sent the Lexington to do a diversionary attack - rather than sending it and Saratoga to relieve Wake. The stupidity of that I'll not go into but - it was the decision of Admiral Pye - who relieved Kimmel - to abort the relief effort (which he hadn't liked anyway). I went to church as a teenager with a guy who had been on Wake and spent the war as a POW and the Marines there were mad as hell - as far as they were concerned - they were winning the battle. I've read that the numbers of Japanese would have been more effective once the sun came up - but - we'll never know about that. Here - though is an interesting aspect of the battle that you see at Corregidor and Tarawa as well. The American Command, consisting of the Naval and Marine Commanders - had lost touch with a number of their positions and thought those positions had fallen - when it was just that the comm wire to them had been broken - and this had an impact on their decision of the Naval Commander to report "Issue in doubt" and then later to surrender. This - much like Singapore (though with far fewer men) was a defeat that may well have been avoided. So - I was one of those who initially blamed Fletcher for a lot. I have however, over the years come to have more respect for the man - and the fact that he did seem to learn from his experiences. As to the Hornet - it certainly could have been saved and I believe they did attempt to take it in tow but - we lost that battle - and the decision was made to not risk the loss of more of our ships trying to protect CV-8. I said in an earlier post recently - there is a tendency in history to go from one extreme to the other in a lot of judgments. Thus - something is either great or it's shit. Here - I think a more balanced judgment of the contribution of the American Torpedo Bombers would indicate that they did make a contribution to the success of the dive bombers. Here - what you have is not merely the Torpedo Bombers - but ALL of the American Attacks that day which preceded the Dive Bombers - and their cumulative effect on Japanese organization. The Japanese CAP had been bouncing back and forth between high level patrols and low level attacks like a Yo-Yo all morning long. Taking the time of the different attacks and saying that - because the Japanese CAP had time to climb back to Altitude - doesn't mean that they did - or if they did - that they resumed their proper patrol positions. In fending off repeated American Attacks - this would, to my mind - have resulted in fatigue of the pilots and a continuing need to rearm and refuel (if not replace) those aircraft making up the CAP. An argument can be made - that the repeated American Attacks - somewhat - wore down the Japanese CAP. I've read that the last actions of the CAP were focused on the Yorktown's VT3 and VF3 aircraft where it was said the Japanese CAP had become Target Fixated. Here - having to deal with Fighting 3 rather than unescorted torpedo bombers added to their difficulty. In addition to all that - these continued attacks would have disrupted Japanese Naval Operations as well - and had their look outs looking for more torpedo bombers instead of up into the sky. The final point though - is that when the Diver Bombers showed up - there was no CAP up there and the Japanese, without radar, were surprised. Lastly, two things. Both the Brewster Buffalo and the Douglas Devastator were roundly condemned after Midway. Again, we have the It's Great or It's Shit syndrome. While these aircraft were both justly replaced by better ones - they weren't as bad as people make out. The TBD's had done better at Coral Sea. The F2A's had been employed in situations the first half of '42 that would have gone badly for better aircraft. They were heavily outnumbered and going against some of the best Aviators in the world. So - yes - replacing them with better aircraft was the right thing to do - but they weren't as bad as they were made out to be. As to another item mentioned - if Air Group 3 had done better than Air Groups 6 or 8, one thing to note would be the difference in the group numbers and what that may have meant for the experience of these Air Groups. The Saratoga and Lexington had been around for almost 20 years and that institutional depth of experience could have been a factor in their Air Groups performance. ?? .
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