Comments by "harvey young" (@harveyyoung3423) on "The Liberal World Order Is Dead. National Conservatism Offers Our Best Hope for the Future" video.
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Part 4: I've also posted this to my Part ! as a reply because its the context but i have gone on a bit and its become a stand alone piece too.
Just to dispel possible interpretations of the idea of the existence of different language and forms of life and of the hermeneutic circle, as a relativism or relativisms, i don't think that claim can be made here. My view is that relativism presupposes a positioning and structure that they all are "within". as such you would need to be able to make a radical distinction between form and content, you would have to have a formal framework or structure that was its self universal and eternal. then you could claim the relativism was of different content, substantive differences but within a objective structure. I think i was inspired by a conference i went to at Dusseldorf Heindrick Heine University on analytical philosophy and meta-metaphysics. It contained many disquieting and quickening papers. But in this context a paper on the philosophy of mathematics on structure and substantive difference "Can structuralism solve the Plurality Problem? by Sophie Allen, and "Substantivity and Merely Verbal Dispute by Vicktoria Knoll. My sketch of a view here is not as far as I can tell there explicitly or implicitly, but emerges from there I think. So the view is relativisms presuppose a formal structure which would be a kind of hermetic closure if such a formalism were even possible. eg perhaps a pure theory of law Hans Kelsen (but held that even this presupposes the possibility of different ground norms. A view from the NCF conference of abstract axioms and separate possible content Bounded variables etc. in this context then rights would be separable from common law and vice versa. It might imply Rights have no history but you can hold that rights and equality are a historical project that develops over time in content towards an end a telos. Natural right and law do not have to presuppose all rights are given from a Genesis or origin. The problem of how rights relate to concrete laws is still there . An approach by Peter Suter hold that rights are in a kind of Russell Paradox structure. (the paradox of set theory or the liar paradox "All Cretan's are liars". But this i hold to be really a performative speech act contradiction type problem. Rights are still laws, but laws about laws like the old question "can God create a universe with contradictory logics, or Can God create a world governed by immoral principles and rules. it s the Hume question to Blackstone in Yoram Hazon's discussion why should we follow the law. Is there an eternal law that tells us (commands us) to follow the laws. it the problem do laws need our consent, and is our consent the event that commits us the law. (e.g the Ten Commandments and the "process" of a 40 year journey in the desert to actualise a community to be able to follow the law after escape form Egypt and its laws. Hume expresses this as an is ought problem. and it is generalised beyond just law. So rights are laws of law that is rights are about the possible content of laws and their application including instituional activity and political apparatus. (see Hanana Arendt). So relativism can be seen as the notion or end of a project to separate form and content as if rights were not speech act limits but an evolution a destiny an "advent" "to come". that is relativism as to content, would be the position when absolute rights were at an end and forma and content had radical separation.
Hermetics of getting in and getting out i think is a different problem like the problem of the other in Hegel that becomes the central theme of 20th century phenomenology that of a closed structure, a metaphysical closure, that is a closed subjectivity and privacy v an open publicity. or the publicity is the form and privacy is the content , that cannot be the correct view at all. this is why the point raised that community substancivity cannot simply be seen as "privacy" verses rights as publicity. there can be no radical form and content distinction, no radical public private distinction, or duty and self interest. I'm sue i have also been heavily influenced by Derrida here.
It might well be Hegel's point in an early paper Gluben and Wisen (faith and reason). Robert Pippin is great on this as this form content distinction he makes in Kant's CPR "Kant's Theory of Form" he takes to a defence of Hegel.
Very young Marx wrote an essay on Hegel's Philosophy of Right (probably when he was like 16 finishing a PhD joke!). he says on Hegel's view of dialectics as mediating between two abstract notions in conflict (like abstract sovereignty and abstract individual) that it is like when a third person tries to mediate between a husband and wife having a conflict , both turn on the mediator. Also the Conservative Prime Minister Disraeli went to visit Manchester at the same time as Engle, which is I think where the idea of Two Nations and One Nation Conservativism came from.
I made a point during the talk that Christianity the New Testament was a profound Critique of Greek and Roman thought. One way to think about this is to think of it as a Critique of necessary sacrifice. This attempt to leave sacrifice behind is also through out the Old Testament so the New Covenant (Ne Testament) as a radical break from the Old Testament is wrong. But is the idea of an escape form necessary sacrifice a good idea. Well watch one of the best and most scary movies I have ever seen i watched it like two days ago. its called "Life" the supports are great but the lead actor Jake Gyllenhaal is beyond brilliant as he moves though through the whole spectrum. Trigger warning!
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Part3:Now it seems these themes are been linked to communitarianism (Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre here in UK) and Conservatives in the US which seemed before to be anther terms for neo-liberalism, the difference was that neo-liberalism I think was the economic theory of minimum state, while neo-conservatism was its cultural aspects, which they figured the individualist economics needed as perhaps to buttress it, give it a more substantive intellectual frame than economic reason for political justifications because all you get form neo-liberalism is speeches about data projections. Maybe it’s no more than fancy stuff bolted on to make the Rhetoric sound more sublime, which is what my left wing collages thought when I was reading this stuff for ages years ago. To this I guess is the idea that since a few of them had been Trotskyists in the 30’s they were well aware of what Adorno and Marcuse were up to in the US and knew long before anyone else that it was the young would be very susceptible to the ideas of Marxism, and they weren’t wrong about that. So they saw a job of providing a cultural counterpoint to these ideas that would be attractive without a PhD in Differential Utility Economic theory. You can start to think the whole Cold war popular music and movie “production” was just a response to the Gramskieian threat. Except they are so aesthically sublime creations of genius no philosopher could have thought them up from a Conservative reading of Hegel.
My view is when the Soviet Union Collapsed there was no one to limit their creativity, and so they run off without any constraints, with a globalised liberal individualist economy, and with people treated just as commodities moving from boarder to boarder and then Blair’s reintroductions of a inter European kind of positive rights based state in an international order (you can get his from Hegel if you want). Problem is now the individual the family the community are as rights holders increasingly mediated though the international universal mode of right. This means say if without some buttress, like a council and a country, your rights claims are measured under the species of eternity (sub specie aeterni). That is my local endowerment and welfare claim is allocated by comparison with every local area in the world. There are of course at the time of writing vartious buttresses we think we can be passive in relation to them. We don’t need to make an effort to keep them. But they are in Hegelian speak mealy sub efficent and sub equality contingent modes, left over from a more primitive and barbaric age (like before the 20th century period of modernisation and civilisation!) so these modes are to be actualised though struggle and conflict into their place in the finite whole. “They”, no, “we”, no, “I”, “me” should have been doing this work in the 1990s. Instead I started off doing philosophy and a bit of partying and ended up doing partying and a bit of philosophy.
So if you go listen to Eddy Cochran’s Summertime Blues (1956-7) he’s figured out the problem already in all its Hegelian dialectics of anonymity silence deafness blindness and sublation of the very right it claims to actualise: consent, speech, reason, response and responsibility. If you want to understand Kant essentially its Ken Dodd who you need cos in an interview he says he read lots of Kant and when asked: “How do you make someone laugh? He replied something like “You don’t make someone laugh, you open up a space for them to laugh in”. Hegel’s a bit tougher to summarise in a sentence but for a book that I think has grasped it: Bella Thorne’s “The Life of a Mogul” The thing all these post Kantian political philosphers on th lef and right miss is that culture as cause and engineering is a contradiction in terms. As Kant says if you can see the rules it’s not art or aesthetics. Happy xmas.
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Just to dispel possible interpretations of the idea of the existence of different language and forms of life and of the hermeneutic circle, as a relativism or relativisms, i don't think that claim can be made here. My view is that relativism presupposes a positioning and structure that they all are "within". as such you would need to be able to make a radical distinction between form and content, you would have to have a formal framework or structure that was its self universal and eternal. then you could claim the relativism was of different content, substantive differences but within a objective structure. I think i was inspired by a conference i went to at Dusseldorf Heindrick Heine University on analytical philosophy and meta-metaphysics. It contained many disquieting and quickening papers. But in this context a paper on the philosophy of mathematics on structure and substantive difference "Can structuralism solve the Plurality Problem? by Sophie Allen, and "Substantivity and Merely Verbal Dispute by Vicktoria Knoll. My sketch of a view here is not as far as I can tell there explicitly or implicitly, but emerges from there I think. So the view is relativisms presuppose a formal structure which would be a kind of hermetic closure if such a formalism were even possible. eg perhaps a pure theory of law Hans Kelsen (but held that even this presupposes the possibility of different ground norms. A view from the NCF conference of abstract axioms and separate possible content Bounded variables etc. in this context then rights would be separable from common law and vice versa. It might imply Rights have no history but you can hold that rights and equality are a historical project that develops over time in content towards an end a telos. Natural right and law do not have to presuppose all rights are given from a Genesis or origin. The problem of how rights relate to concrete laws is still there . An approach by Peter Suter hold that rights are in a kind of Russell Paradox structure. (the paradox of set theory or the liar paradox "All Cretan's are liars". But this i hold to be really a performative speech act contradiction type problem. Rights are still laws, but laws about laws like the old question "can God create a universe with contradictory logics, or Can God create a world governed by immoral principles and rules. it s the Hume question to Blackstone in Yoram Hazon's discussion why should we follow the law. Is there an eternal law that tells us (commands us) to follow the laws. it the problem do laws need our consent, and is our consent the event that commits us the law. (e.g the Ten Commandments and the "process" of a 40 year journey in the desert to actualise a community to be able to follow the law after escape form Egypt and its laws. Hume expresses this as an is ought problem. and it is generalised beyond just law. So rights are laws of law that is rights are about the possible content of laws and their application including instituional activity and political apparatus. (see Hanana Arendt). So relativism can be seen as the notion or end of a project to separate form and content as if rights were not speech act limits but an evolution a destiny an "advent" "to come". that is relativism as to content, would be the position when absolute rights were at an end and forma and content had radical separation.
Hermetics of getting in and getting out i think is a different problem like the problem of the other in Hegel that becomes the central theme of 20th century phenomenology that of a closed structure, a metaphysical closure, that is a closed subjectivity and privacy v an open publicity. or the publicity is the form and privacy is the content , that cannot be the correct view at all. this is why the point raised that community substancivity cannot simply be seen as "privacy" verses rights as publicity. there can be no radical form and content distinction, no radical public private distinction, or duty and self interest. I'm sue i have also been heavily influenced by Derrida here.
It might well be Hegel's point in an early paper Gluben and Wisen (faith and reason). Robert Pippin is great on this as this form content distinction he makes in Kant's CPR "Kant's Theory of Form" he takes to a defence of Hegel.
Very young Marx wrote an essay on Hegel's Philosophy of Right (probably when he was like 16 finishing a PhD joke!). he says on Hegel's view of dialectics as mediating between two abstract notions in conflict (like abstract sovereignty and abstract individual) that it is like when a third person tries to mediate between a husband and wife having a conflict , both turn on the mediator. Also the Conservative Prime Minister Disraeli went to visit Manchester at the same time as Engle, which is I think where the idea of Two Nations and One Nation Conservativism came from.
I made a point during the talk that Christianity the New Testament was a profound Critique of Greek and Roman thought. One way to think about this is to think of it as a Critique of necessary sacrifice. This attempt to leave sacrifice behind is also through out the Old Testament so the New Covenant (Ne Testament) as a radical break from the Old Testament is wrong. But is the idea of an escape form necessary sacrifice a good idea. Well watch one of the best and most scary movies I have ever seen i watched it like two days ago. its called "Life" the supports are great but the lead actor Jake Gyllenhaal is beyond brilliant as he moves though through the whole spectrum. Trigger warning!
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