Comments by "Vikki McDonough" (@vikkimcdonough6153) on "Battle Carpentry - Woodwork Under Fire" video.

  1. 0. After the capture of the Marianas, why did Admirals Nimitz and King both want to go for an invasion in the South China Sea area (initially Formosa/Taiwan, later changed to the Philippines because Douglas MacArthur) rather than sailing about the same distance north instead of west and going for Japan directly? With most of the IJN's heavy units based in the Dutch/British East Indies at this point to allow them to stay fuelled (the exceptions being the Ises and a couple of carriers without air wings, none of which would've posed much challenge against the full strength of the USN in the Pacific), they'd've been very badly out of place to counter an American invasion of the Home Islands in late 1944, leaving them to run the gauntlet of wave after wave after wave of attacks by U.S. carrier aircraft and submarine wolfpacks all the way from Borneo up to Japan itself only to then be forced into a decisive battle entirely on the USN's terms (not to mention the value of going straight for the head and potentially knocking Japan out of the war before Christmas 1944). 1. Why didn't the U.S. launch B-29 attacks on the IJN's East Indies anchorages (Lingga Roads, Brunei Bay, Tawi-Tawi)? All of these anchorages were within B-29 range of major Allied airbases that were either capable of supporting B-29s historically or could've been easily upgraded to support them: Lingga Roads from RAF China Bay (which was used as a B-29 base historically) or from Exmouth Gulf in northwestern Australia, Brunei Bay from Darwin or from Sentani in northern New Guinea, and Tawi-Tawi likewise from Darwin or Sentani. 2. Why do those people who question Rodney's exceedance of her nominal top speed when chasing Bismarck never question Samuel B. Roberts's exceedance of her nominal top speed when chasing Center Force?
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