Comments by "Tim Trewyn" (@timtrewyn453) on "Ukraine's Alternate Win Condition: Inside the Gamble on the War of Attrition" video.

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  30. We are seeing larger warheads and cluster warheads having an impact, e.g. dry dock in Sevastopol. 155mm shells weigh about 100lbs. While certainly not pleasant, personnel in a trench line can survive bombardment by this class of ammunition. The 500lb, 1000lb, and 2000lb munitions that can be delivered by F16s, often in the form of stand-off glide bombs with inertial guidance, are another matter. Russia is issuing warnings about F16s because they see a genuine threat. It makes sense to me that Ukraine is not going to push on infantry assaults now if it is just a few months away from the capability to package SEAD and heavy munition air strikes on Russian defenses. The mud is irrelevant, in fact it suppresses any Russian counterattack. Ukraine can rotate and rest its troops while its larger air force pounds Russian defenses. Will F-16s get shot down? Yes. But F-35s will continue to cycle into NATO and NATO F-16s can then cycle into Ukraine. 155mm should be saved for what it is appropriate for. If the southern Russian defense has 200,000 personnel, and if that army collapses when half of those personnel become casualties that cannot return to the fight, then it still takes 400 days for Ukraine to attrit that 100,000 at an average of 250 casualties per day. And it is somewhat doubtful that Ukraine achieves that average. Russia will probably get better with time at minimizing defensive casualties, even with 1000lb bombs falling on them. If they are not being assaulted by infantry, then they just stay spread out over the defensive lines while their air force and air defense learns how to take out F16s. Taking out Russian rail and road links to its forces in Ukraine is essential. If Russia can maintain its logistics, then it can maintain its bombardment of Ukrainian positions and infrastructure and it will be the UAF that collapses. Ukraine does not have to establish air superiority to drive out Russian forces. It does need the air power to SEAD and open windows of opportunity to strike targets with heavy bombs anywhere in or near Ukraine. Those targets need to include the Russian rail system near as well as within Ukraine, or Russia will probably be able to sustain its occupation.
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