Comments by "Gregory Wright" (@gregorywright4918) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  17. A good list, Drach, with a couple omissions (probably ones out on loan?): Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), by Paul Dull Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power (1909-1941) by Mark Peattie The Japanese Submarine Force and WW2 by Boyd and Yoshida The Japanese Merchant Marine in WW2 by Mark Parillo If your interest is in shipbuilding, there is a good chapter on Japan in: Naval Shipbuilders of the World by Robert Winklareth For individual ship focuses, aside from the cheap Osprey series, there is the Legends of Warfare: Naval series, which has Ahlberg & Lengerer doing the Soryus, Kongos, and Fubuki classes and their derivatives, the ShipCraft books, and the Anatomy of the Ship series. For "what were Japanese thinking", I would add: The Pacific War 1931-1945 by Saburo Ienaga Japan 1941 by Eri Hotta Japan Prepares For Total War by Michael Barnhart Fading Victory - the Diary of Admiral Motome Ugaki I did appreciate Japanese Destroyer Captain by Tameichi Hara, but I thought it needed to be taken with a bit of scepticism, not quite as much as Mitsuo Fuchidas books. Saburo Sakai's memoir was good as well, but he was part of the land-based naval air forces (flying a Zero), not the ship-based ones. Finally, there are some great battle studies, of which the best recently are: Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway by J Parshall and A Tully The First Team (2 books) by John Lundstrom Pacific Crucible (and 2 more) by Ian Toll Fortress Rabaul by Bruce Gamble Rising Sun, Falling Skies (and 2 more) by Jeffrey Cox Islands of Destiny by John Prados Empires in the Balance (and 2 more) by HP Wilmott Some of the latter ones focus more on US/Allied actions, but they mix more Japanese perspectives in than books from earlier. Final question - how do we get a library card for the Drach Collection?
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  69.  @bkjeong4302  Bk, as Hat Trick mentioned, you are judging early-war formations with post-war ideas. Remember the lesson of the Glorious, however stupid her captain was. There are times when the carrier cannot operate her planes - at night, in bad weather, and even when trying to transit in a different direction than the wind. At Coral Sea during the night of May 7-8 the carrier forces may have been significantly less than 100nm apart, depending on whose track you believe. At Midway the US carriers had to turn toward the Japanese to conduct flight ops while the IJN was turning away. Spruance turned away at night despite the hit he would take on range in the morning, knowing that he had no heavies in his formation to battle potential IJN heavies at night (and the Japanese did consider trying to find and fight him that night). The fast battleship had several reasons for joining the carrier formation. She protected the formation from other fast battleships or heavy cruisers, she acted as a heavy AA escort, she also was a magnet to draw battleship-focused attackers away from the carriers, and she served as a fuel reserve to top off destroyers when the oiler was not close by. Flank speed was very expensive in fuel, even for the very efficient US boilers, so it was only used for flight operations and attacks. Cruising speed of 20-25 kts was much more common and fuel-efficient. But due to the relatively short range of US carrier planes the US carriers had to close in to launch strikes and could not maintain a "several-hundred-mile gap".
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  111.  @robertf3479  Speed can be made up in different ways, but they influence the operations you can do. For example, the standard fleet strike operation was the "deck load" launch, in which about half the air group was sited at the rear of the flight deck and launched all at once. If your carrier could not make 30+kts, your planes could still get off by siting a smaller group at the rear, taking up less room and allowing more length of deck for the take-off run. On the little CVEs, the big planes had to be spotted at the very rear of the deck and launched individually or in very small groups, being fed up from the hangar deck as they launched. That works for non-strike missions like ASW patrol, but not for full strike launches (unless you are willing to have the planes circle for a while waiting for others to launch). The other thing that can be done is use of a catapult. I am not familiar with which CVEs had catapults and how often they used them. Ranger had a couple, but I think I read something about them not being used as much. As far as the battleships, "fleet speed" was usually between 20 and 25 kts, and the fleet direction of advance was often not the same as the wind direction, so carriers would break away from the fleet to conduct flight ops with their faster cruiser and destroyer escorts and then rejoin. The different speeds would be adjusted depending on the wind speed available at the time. Battle formations and speeds under air attack were different from flight ops, and depending on the type of attack the carrier might be steaming in circles or zig-zags.
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  174.  @baronungernthebloody553  That was extensively studied and different fleets adopted different air group balances, even changing during the war. The Brits started heavier with fighters, but their fighters were also designed and trained to be light bombers on the side. The USN and IJN started out with only about 25% of the total as fighters, but increased that after the late-42 battles and the US was doing more than 50% late-war (or using fighter-bombers like the Corsair). The IJN also looked into putting all fighters on one ship of a group of carriers, and having one devoted to dive bombers and one devoted to torpedo bombers. They decided against it due to the issue of combat damage - you lose a whole type of plane if one ship is taken out, better to spread each type across all the decks. The IJN did develop a multi-ship air strike plan of pairing two carriers together so that one whole squadron of dive bombers from one ship would go on a strike along with the whole squadron of torpedo bombers from the paired ship, rather than half a squadron from each which otherwise would have been the default (the IJN was using a half-group as the standard strike package, because that was how much they could spot on the deck for launch at one time and they did not want to have the first half waiting in the air while the second half was spotted and launched). The USN learned this during 42. As far as Taffy 3 is concerned, keep in mind it was not expecting to have to face an IJN surface force. It's job was air and ground support of the landing. The main battle fleet, TF 38, was supposed to deal with enemy warships. The Taffys had some anti-ship stuff in the magazines, but not on top for easy reloading. A number of planes were launched with anti-sub and anti-ground loadouts because that was how they were armed before dawn. As the battle went on the anti-surface stuff was brought out and loaded as the planes cycled down on the carriers further from immediate danger.
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  220. Part of the Kantai Kessen doctrine was the assumption that the enemy forces, whether US or UK, would be coming at them with a superiority of forces. The plan to deal with this was the "whittling down" tactics. Subs would start this, so they were positioned way ahead and had to preserve their torpedoes for the major targets like battleships and carriers. Long-ranged land-based naval air units were also a part of the advanced forces, as well as hit-and-run attacks by the carrier forces aimed at the enemy carrier fleet. Training in night operations was focused on the lighter forces so that they could take part in "whittling down" the enemy main fleet before it could get to the critical area, where it would finally be met by the battleship line in Main Battle. The ironic part of all this is that this is exactly what the US did to the Japanese in the cascading battles around Leyte Gulf - subs and aircraft doing long-range recon and getting early hits in (goodbye flagship Atago), air power being used to whittle down the incoming heavies (goodbye Musashi), then the climactic clash of the battle lines - which sort-of happened at Surigao (there wasn't much left of the Japanese battle line), but not at San Bernardino like it should have, thanks to Halsey's distraction and mis-communications. It was left to the little guys, again, to hold the line until the big ones could come back - but then the enemy lost their nerve, gave up and sailed away. Which is probably what Kantai Kassen was aiming for, even if they could not "whittle down" the enemy fleet enough to defeat it like at Tsushima. But the single-minded focus on preparing, equipping, and training for this war-winning clash, and the glory gained in making sure your own attack damaged one of the enemy's primary ships, explains a lot of Japanese actions, from the airmen's over-focus on battleships at Pearl Harbor, the sub's over-focus on carriers and battleships around Guadalcanal at the expense of all the smaller supply ships allowed to slip through, to the light-weight construction and lack of armor in Japanese naval aircraft (in order to increase their range and maneuverability). Escorting civilian merchantmen was hardly thought about before the war, despite the stark example of what the U-boats did to their former ally the UK in WW1 and their similarity as island nations needing overseas resources. Vital destroyers could not be spared from their jobs with the fleet, and no one had built any dedicated escorts until they were forced to by increasing losses. Radar and sonar were neglected until they saw how the Allies were using them to defeat their highly-trained forces. And they did not have the training program, particularly for airmen, to replace their losses because they were hoping their pre-war plan would be enough to either bring them a quick, decisive victory or so bloody the enemy that they had to fall back and end up in a stalemate.
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  379.  @wedgeantilles8575  For the same reason that IJN subs were told not to waste torpedoes on merchant shipping but to focus on the biggest warships they could find. Yes, there is some "honor" part to it, but it is mostly economy - they only had so many weapons, and so much time. As Bk Jeong says, they were also limited in the amount of time they could spend there by the amount of oil they brought (they had some tankers, which they refueled from before the strike, but they had to preserve a margin in case they got into combat). But if you look at the priorities Yamamoto gave the strike planners, battleships were at the top, followed by other warships. The strategic goal was to disable enough battleships that the US would be reluctant to move forward to relieve the Philippines or help defend the Dutch East Indies. Oil tanks were not on the planning list. Weapons were selected and modified for the special situations (shallow harbor, inboard battleships) expected, but no testing or training was done on hitting oil tanks. The Japanese expected that the US had plenty of oil (they did) and could easily rebuild the tanks and refill them if needed (they could; the shortage was in oilers that could do underway replenishment, not in tankers to move oil from land base to land base). Plus the tanks were separated by earth berms to prevent fires from spreading, and had built-in fire suppression systems. Two to three dive bombers would have been required for each tank, wasting a lot of time and weapons that were needed for higher-priority targets. Then there is the myth of the "Third Wave". The first two "waves" were really each half of the full striking power of the Kido Butai, which could only be launched in two parts because they could not all fit on the deck during the launch cycle. Japanese carriers could not warm up engines in the hangar, so planes were lifted to the flight deck, spotted at the far rear, then the engines were started and warmed up. In order to have enough run for getting off, the foremost planes could not be more than halfway back. Once the first "wave" was off, the second "wave" was lifted from the hangars to the flight deck, spotted, then warmed up and launched. The first "wave" was told not to wait for the second to get airborne, but to proceed to the attack on their own. Each "wave" was made up of a mixture of fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers trained to work together. Once the second "wave" was gone, there were no more strike aircraft on the IJN decks - just some fighters staying back for CAP. So in order to have a "third wave", the first "wave" would have to land, be lowered to the hangar decks, refuel and rearm, be brought back up to the flight deck, respot, warm up engines again, take off and fly back to Pearl (about 60-80 minutes away at that point). But the next problem would be that that was the time at which the second "wave" would be arriving back needing to land. This is the same problem they had at Midway, with fatal consequences. By cancelling any follow-up strike, Nagumo unknowingly did not face the dilemma he would confront at Midway six months later.
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  714. @ 1:41:48 There was NO "Third Wave". After the second wave left around 7AM the only planes left on the Kido Butai flight decks were CAP fighters, I'm not sure how many but I think two chutais or around 18. IJN carrier attack doctrine was the massed strike composed of two parts, each part being half of the attack strength of each carrier, because (simplistically) only about half of the full complement of planes could be fit on the flight deck for a single launch (allowing enough take-off room at the forward end). Carriers were matched in pairs, and each unit would contribute an entire squadron of either dive bombers or torpedo bombers (which doubled as horizontal bombers when needed, particularly for land attacks), sending the other squadron up with the second half of the strike. The fighter squadron was split between escort fighters going with the strike and CAP fighters that stayed back to defend the fleet. When people theorize about a "Third Wave" what they really mean is a second strike by what was the First Wave, after it flew back, landed, refueled and rearmed, and was spotted and launched again - which would take about 2-3 hours, counting flying time. This was the big problem at Midway - the First Wave was on its way back while the Second Wave was still in the hangars, armed for anti-ship strike in case anything threatening was discovered by recon. The commander of the First Wave called for a second strike on Midway, and Nagumo ordered the rearming of the attack planes with land-attack weapons (swapping torpedoes for bombs), when the first report came in of USN ships in the area. The big problem was what to do then - send off the second wave to hit the ships with the wrong weapons while the first wave circled the carriers, or landing the first wave while rearming the second wave again and then launching the rearmed second wave. Note also that the original question was pitched as to what the Enterprise could have done on the EVENING of Sunday the 7th, ie after the KB had already started heading north. I don't know if Enterprise could have caught them, particularly since her planes did not have the longer range of the lighter IJN planes and she would be approaching from the southwest at a diagonal.
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  999. That might be a little extreme. They learned the battle side of things fairly well, and trained their men exhaustively. They believed more in the "metaphysical" side of conflict, the "spirit" over the "steel". That may stem from believing that they were an Empire descended directly from a god. They had pretty good advisors in the Germans and Brits, so they learned about staff work and planning as well as battle tactics. What was "broken" (or never worked right) was the necessary subordination of the military to the civil government, and the consequent objective analysis of whether it was "worth it" to pursue a military solution to insolvable problems. The Kwantung Army kept thrusting ahead in China, even despite Army higher-ups back in Tokyo telling them they could not afford it. Reading pre-war memoirs, it seems everyone knew that taking on the US and the UK was a bad idea due to the economic disparity, but no one could break out of the self-made whirlpool of events and national pride. Even on a "total war" footing (which they entered with rationing and restrictions on civilian production in 1937) they never had a realistic chance. As to their leadership, that may also have been influenced by their "spiritual" background. They believed in ancestor worship and group consensus, so there was less of a "meritocracy" that recognized and promoted those who performed better over those who were older and in the traditional line of seniority. Nagumo got to command the Kido Butai not because he was an outstanding aviator or air theorist, but because he was next in seniority to command. He did not like the Pearl Harbor plan, but got stuck with it. Several times lower-ranked officers showed initiative or criticized plans from higher ranks (like Tanaka and Hara), but they were then shunted into side jobs to quiet them. Yamamoto was the only one with the seniority and leverage to promote "out of the box" thinkers like Genda, but he also had to be careful not to push too much change, and once he was gone there was no one with the same leadership.
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  1107.  @bkjeong4302  There is an element to "national character" as well that figured in those decisions. The Germans made highly-engineered tanks, with tight tolerances. They expected that there would be a "teething time" when problems would be worked out, but in the rush of '42-'43 when they needed SOMETHING to counter the T-34 & KV-1, that time was sacrificed. They actually did have the ability to recover and repair tanks, but that depended on them winning the battles so they could recover the breakdowns. Once they started retreating that went out the window. The other part of their strategy of dominating the enemy was they expected to be on the offensive and to have the better doctrine and tactics. Once the Russians recovered from the shock and rebuilt their Stalin-decimated officer corps and doctrines, that was evened out. For the Japanese, their "national character" was putting everything they could into the first strike, hitting the hardest and the fastest at the longest range. Their aircraft sacrificed armor and self-sealing tanks in order to get more range and maneuverability, making them "Ronsons". Their ships were fast and hard-hitting, but weaker on armor, self-maintenance and crew comfort. Their torpedoes were big and had great range, but if hit when still aboard could sink the ship. They were great when on the offense, but their grand strategy was to expand, build a defensive perimeter, and then go on the defense. That second phase was were their lack of defensive capabilities cost them. Plus the lack of a good long-range pilot training program.
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  1853.  @tomdolan9761  Shinano's watertight doors were not fitted or tested when she was sunk because she was on her way from Yokosuka to Kure, where she was supposed to be completed and have all the doors and seals tested. If you look at the pace of her construction, the IJN put her work on pause from December 1941 to July 1942, due to the apparent fragility of battleships after Force Z was sunk. They were working with a reduced force only hard enough to get her ready to leave the drydock. Then they picked it up after Midway, but left many of the battleship features like the barbettes in place (though they did not fit the whole armored belt). They were expecting to finish her by April 1945, but put a rush on it after Philippine Sea in June 1944. If you look at build dates, Yamato took 33 months to launch and 49 months to be ready to commission at Kure, and Musashi took 32 months to launch and 52 months (and a week) to be ready for commissioning at Nagasaki. Shinano was laid down at Yokosuka in May 1940. Since it was a different shipyard I would not expect "builders efficiencies" to accrue, so say around 33-34 months to launch and around 52-54 months to be ready to commission. That is a launch date around March 1943 and a commissioning date around September 1944, presuming they did not pause her work after Force Z went down. As I recall, Yamato was not "ready to fight" after commissioning, requiring another three to four months for completion and training. Musashi is recorded as still receiving secondary guns and radar after her commissioning, not being considered ready for another four months. So I don't think Shinano could have made Leyte Gulf, even if she had been pushed forward as a battleship like her sisters.
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  1963.  @lukedogwalker  The Panama Canal was protected by extensive fortification and distance from Japanese attack. Just getting to Pearl was a stretch for the Japanese fleet, which is partly why they could not stick around. Panama would have been more than twice as far, with much of that time in well-traveled waters where they were much more likely to have been spotted. The USN DID redeploy significant assets from the Atlantic via the Canal, including several battleships and aircraft carriers as soon as they could be stocked. Without the Canal they would have had to steam around South America, adding a couple weeks to the transit, but not making it the multi-month endurance challenge that the Russians did since all of the ports along the way were fairly friendly. As far as the Japanese "pressing forward for a Decisive Battle", their Kantai Kessen strategy was based on holding back and letting the enemy wear themselves down coming to them, using subs and aircraft to whittle down the main battle fleet till they could be faced with nearly even odds. The expected area of confrontation had been moved outward from Japanese/Korean waters to the Philippine Sea area, but they did not have any shipyards further south so they did not want to have the battle any further out. Where are you thinking they might be willing to do that - Oahu? the West Coast? In those cases the IJN fleet would be past their own logistical limits and suffering from similar problems as the arriving US fleet, which would probably head for San Diego for a short refit and reorg before it started across the Pacific proper (which is what the Yorktown and New Mexicos did in fact on their redeployments).
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  2446.  @w8stral  What Drach was doing with this video was calculating from numbers of planes on deck how the doctrine and strategies of the air commanders were changing in 1942. The problem with this is that sometimes the numbers of planes on deck is not indicative of doctrine, but rather just whatever could be scratched up for an operation after extensive combat and operational losses. This is part of the question around the TB squadrons after Midway. Both sides had production issues with some planes in 1942. The US had discontinued making the Devastator in favor of the Avenger, and the IJN was unable to ramp up production quickly after early losses. The switch from a non-folding wing on the Wildcat to a folding wing may also be why more fighters were aboard in the fall of 1942, rather than a doctrinal change. Or perhaps we could say that it ENABLED a doctrinal change. In any case, the issue of scouting was a big part of the difference in USN vs IJN air doctrine, and one that was undergoing change in 1942. Both sides had extensive land-based patrol squadrons, but expected only general locations from them while relying on fleet-based aircraft for immediate strike guidance. The difference is that the IJN started out relying on battleship and cruiser floatplanes for most of that, while the USN had a squadron on each carrier whose primary designation was scouting. Over time and in the heat of combat the VS squadrons became more like the VB squadrons, while the IJN tasked more carrier-borne aircraft to scouting as they discovered the failures and limitations of relying on off-carrier floatplanes. As far as modern operations, for the USN take a look at what they are trying to do with unmanned platforms, whether aerial drones or unmanned surface or underwater vehicles. I agree it does not replace a master like the S-3, but there are other sources like satellites, Global Hawk, and forward-deployed subs that can also feed data back. The problem is that the AWACS is the only one the CBG commander directly controls.
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