Comments by "Gregory Wright" (@gregorywright4918) on "Operation C - What Happens if the two fleets clash?" video.

  1. I think she could take on two at night with her radar, presuming the IJN floatplanes are not up to their night-time tricks like in the Solomons. I also think Drach is right that Nagumo would keep at least two of them back to backstop the rest of the KB.
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  2. You could say this would preclude Midway happening at all...
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  3. Might even make the IJN rethink the utility of the Soryu/Hiryu/Unryu design lineage if the RN gets a few decent torpedoes into one or both (I'm betting they have a hard time dealing with one, and definitely sink with two or more). Aside from Taiho, that was the historical core of their carrier future when they did not continue building Shokakus. It would also punch a hole in their "victory disease" two months before it was deflated at Midway, causing a reassessment of what they were trying to achieve out there with Kido Butai and probably leading it to become a reserve force like the rest of the capital ships.
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  4. Range is one thing, but it is mitigated by much worse targeting. Around Java the IJN was dumping dozens of torpedoes in the water at long range and getting few hits. The bigger factor might be that oxygen torpedoes leave little wake, making them harder to spot incoming. Either way, the RN has more experience with radar-controlled night combat, while the IJN's experience has been in chaotic engagements like Sunda Straits or Balikpapan without the benefit of good radar.
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  5. If you figure she can handle two, and Nagumo would not dare send more than two to "investigate" so the others could cover the KB, we're good.
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  6. Coral Sea was ONE month later, and used CarDiv 5 because the other two were desperately in need of a refit. 1 & 2 spent late April and early May in port (Kaga was already there due to grounding damage). A triumphant RN fleet in the Indian would have forced IJN to re-orient westward to protect the oil-rich DEI. With the loss of 1/3 of KB they would not have detached CD5, thereby splitting their forces. Also a factor was the Doolittle strike on April 18, two weeks after Op C.
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  7.  @robruss62  If CarDiv 2 is wiped out, Midway won't happen. Midway was mostly a reaction to the Doolittle Raid, but relied on the expectation that the US carriers would have to come back from the SW Pacific short 2 (Lex & York at Coral Sea), so the ratio of forces was 6 or 4 to 2. If the KB gets a bloody nose and loses 2, you can bet Coral Sea doesn't happen so Midway would be a 4 vs 4 setup. But Yamamoto would have to re-orient to protect the oil-field gains in DEI, so he'd have to base out of Singapore and look toward getting more forward bases to warn about approaches of the Eastern Fleet. He might even pull the KB back to Japan like the BBs and use it as a deep reserve.
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  8. You have to wonder if Coral Sea or Midway even happen then. The IJN will have to rethink why they are risking the KB needlessly and probably reorient to face west rather than east. KB retreats to Singapore for repairs, does not react to Doolittle raid, and push southward is cancelled in favor of developing plans for push westward to create more strategic room around the oil-rich DEI.
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  9. The IJN pulls the KB back to Singapore and re-orients westward to build a bigger buffer around the oil-rich DEI. Perhaps the Andaman islands become replacements for Midway?
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  10.  @Destroyer_V0 The Long Lance was effective because the enemy assumed they were safe and did not change course. They were hideously inaccurate at long range and had to be expended in great numbers to get hits. They had the bonus of being very hard to spot because they did not leave big air bubble tracks behind them. Also the IJN used the tactic of launching torpedoes first and holding gunfire back until the torpedoes hit; the USN would go to gunfire first and lose the element of surprise. They learned the IJN tactic the hard way and used it to great effect later, like in Burke's battles.
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  11. You presume that Somerville does not turn tail or launch a strike of his own in the interim? That was the conundrum at Midway, and it shows up again here.
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  12. HMS Audacious?
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  13. Also depends on day or night. At night, RN air strikes rule. Daytime, IJN mass and coordinated strikes rule.
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  14. "Retreating in the direction of the enemy..."
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  15. The other problem is long range at night usually converts to poor accuracy. Around Java they were dumping dozens in the water to get a few hits. Yes, the R's were vulnerable, but they were coming up from behind and would probably arrive after the LLs were expended.
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  16. Dorsetshire and Cornwall were County-class heavy cruisers, with only 1 inch belt or deck protection except alongside the magazines, which was 4 inch. The Illustriouses had 3 inch deck armor between the lifts, and managed to deal with much heavier bombs dropped by the Luftwaffe in the Med. As for radar detectors, there is no indication of them in IJN inventory at all in 1942, doubtful to questionable in 1943, and likely but not plentiful in 1944.
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  17. Only first option has Force A found before Vals hit C&D.
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  18. Maybe, but not necessarily. You are glossing over most of Drach's estimates. And the loss of CarDiv 2 would be CATASTROPHIC for the IJN at this point.
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  19. Presuming the torpedoes are aimed only at the carriers, and he manages a max strike or two close waves, say 6-10 hits would probably put down one or two Soryus and damage but not cripple the other three. Nagumo would be forced to pull back if he lost air superiority, but he might have enough left to be able to launch a small strike in the morning. He would probably be able to get a CAP up, frustrating any morning follow-up attack.
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  20.  @Libarate17 I don't know enough to categorically refute "nothing like it occurred in the war". I recall some night air actions in the Gilberts where IJN 2Es used similar tactics to launch torpedoes at USN ships. Might have been one or two in the Solomons as well. Need to dig out some books.
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  21. The only American raid in April was the Doolittle raid, which was on the 18th.
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  22.  @johnshepherd9676 Somerville knows about the IJN strike on Columbo, so there is obviously more than two carriers around. You were positing that Nagumo could wait and launch a big strike "later in the day", but then you say "There would not be time to do more than launch a few aircraft before the Japanese strike arrived". That is contradictory. Either he sends the Val-only strike against Force A immediately or he waits to land and rearm the Colombo strike later in the day, which Somerville will be expecting and have all his fighters up to disrupt. As to the "other possibility", if Nagumo goes "East for the night", Somerville will be going west and the two forces will be hundreds of miles apart. Somerville will clear out the Addu Atoll base and head for East Africa knowing he cannot face 4+ carriers. If he gets some decent scouting reports he MIGHT try to slip back and do a night strike, but he will have to time that carefully so he can slip westward again the rest of the night.
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  23.  @digitalcommunist6335 You sound a bit disparaging toward RN carrier capabilities. Remember these guys have been doing it for three years now in the Atlantic and Med against pretty good Luftwaffe opponents. Yes, their aircraft are not the best, but they have training, doctrine, and experience that integrates radar with fleet operations which the USN lacks and the IJN has no clue about. The IJN does not cruise at high speed at night. They are very fuel-conscious, they would not be expecting attack and would be cruising in the 15-18kt range. I suggest you visit the ArmouredCarriers website and Youtube channel, lots of good info there about what RN was doing with carriers.
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