Comments by "Gregory Wright" (@gregorywright4918) on "The Impact of Mahan on Naval History - Decisively more than just battles" video.

You just outscored all the cadets of the pre-WW2 Japanese Naval Academy.
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You could make a case to say the the RN had been using Mahanian concepts since the 1600s...
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@thekinginyellow1744 The point was not to predict technology, but to create a theory and doctrine that is independent of technology. "Control of the Seas" is the goal, subs or airpower or nukes or missiles are the means.
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Technology is the means by which you accomplish the goals. Mahan could only illustrate his theories by using older battles, so he did not predict future technologies like subs or air power. The question is whether you can use those technologies to fulfill the goal of Control of the Seas. The USN has shown in the last 75 years that you can.
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They could have done better, if they had listened to the OTHER parts of sea control theory, not just the Decisive Battle. They put such low priority on building reserves, particularly in pilots, and protecting their merchant fleets, that their dominance at actual fighting was whittled away by their few numbers and lack of supplies.
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@bgclo Another good source on that would be "Seacoast Fortifications of the United States" by Emanuel Lewis.
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They call that "Victory Disease". You learn more from your failures than your successes.
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A good theory is independent of the means or technologies used to accomplish it. Subs and aircraft have been the mainstay of USN "control of the seas" for the last 75 years.
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You cannot fight assuming that all your communications are read by your enemy. It just won't work if there are more than two of you. What you must do is put good people in charge of communications security, and look for indications that it may have been compromised. Have a backup system, or a code change system ready to go. There are ways to use a compromised system to confuse the enemy, but you are better off if it stays secure. Training and vigilance are the keys.
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@deaks25 The battle of Midway was a crucial victory in stopping the rampage of the Kido Butai, but it only brought parity rather than outright superiority between the IJN and the USN in the Pacific in 1942. The Japanese failed to realize that the battle for Guadalcanal developed into a decisive battle, and thus fed their forces into it piecemeal. While Midway led to some losses in the crucial bottleneck of the IJN, their cadre of trained and experienced pilots, Guadalcanal became a meatgrinder for IJN airmen due to the long distances they had to fly to get there, in addition to the increasingly-experienced American and Australian pilots they faced. Afterwards the IJN was on the retreat, and despite avoiding battle for a year and a half to rebuild their air forces, they suffered calamitous defeats at Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf.
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Must have been some bad weather in England the last week...
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@Drachinifel And it was not copy-protected?
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Midway brought the USN back to parity with the IJN, but neither side had supremacy. The campaign for the Solomons whittled down the most crucial element of the IJN - their land and sea-based air crews. The flights from Rabaul to Guadalcanal were so long and weather was such an unknown that many planes were lost, even without combat, and IJN had a very poor aircrew recovery system. After the campaign the IJN began a long retreat to Tokyo, and the romps at Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf just showed how superior the USN had become.
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@jager6863 Recommended book: "Agents of Innovation: The General Board and the Design of the Fleet that Defeated the Japanese Navy" by John T Kuehn.
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Midway was a crucial early-war victory for the US, but it only brought parity with the IJN, not supremacy. The Japanese still had a strong naval air arm (and their land-based naval air was still superior). The campaign for Guadalcanal would be a better candidate for "decisive battle". The USN threw everything they could into it, while the IJN fed their forces in piecemeal, not recognizing how that led to increasing losses. The cream of IJN air power that survived Midway was whittled down, while US forces gained experience and strength over time. Afterwards the IJN started retreating all the way to Tokyo, and the romps at Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf just confirmed the USN superiority.
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@stevewindisch7400 Interesting; I thought the Nautilus used sodium and mercury batteries. Have not read it in a while.
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@dagdom1280 Although he was confined to using examples of past battles to illustrate his theories, ideally Mahanian doctrine should be independent of the type of craft used to impose "sea control". The other missing element, which has grown even stronger since WW2, would be the submarine. Perhaps in the future some sort of space-based system may be used to control the seas.
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@Kuristina_M It might be better to consider whether the IJN was "obsessive" about the Decisive Battle and dismissive of all the rest, particularly the importance of preserving trade across the seas.
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@robertohlweiler8463 In most national militaries the army and the navy forces grew up as separate, often competitive worlds, with different requirements and supply systems. Obviously (as Drach likes to say), the navy needs equipment that can stand up to strong saltwater corrosion, and the motion of ships leads to different requirements for fire control. Ammunition supply to the guns is much different as well, particularly if the army guns are in a muddy field. One of the big mistakes of the US Department of Defense has been to insist that if anything a different service does looks similar, they should develop and share a "joint" system to satisfy the requirement. This has led to multiple disastrous procurement failures, such as the F-111 in the '60s and the JSF/F-35 currently. The USN also had some bad experiences trying to use Army/AirForce developed bombs and rockets during and after WW2.
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@stevevalley7835 The US Asiatic Squadron used Manila as it's home port, hence the movement of the floating drydock Dewey to Subic Bay in 1906. Interesting what-if about the Germans and the Philippines. Doubt they would have been as timid about suppressing the Philippino guerillas. If Japan had taken the Philippines in 1914, the US may have supported the insurgents there just like they did the nationalist Chinese in the 30's, in which case they could have been a stronger long-term ally after WW2.
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@SuperCrazf Recommended reading: "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War" by John A Adams.
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@Drachinifel But you lost France! (but then you imported a lot of French chefs...)
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You mean instead of the Harvey Milk or the Sojourner Truth?
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Pearl Harbor gave Japan temporary "control of the seas", so that they could accomplish their conquest of the Dutch East Indies. Midway allowed the USN to achieve rough parity with the IJN, but neither had outright supremacy. The problem with your proposed strategy was the short ranges and logistics of the IJN. Getting to Pearl took a lot of effort for them, and they could not stay long or re-supply there. Neither could they bring an invasion force. In order to take their strategic priority, the DEI, they did not have enough tankers or transports. Going all the way to the West Coast in strength was completely impossible for them. And the Panama Canal was even further. A couple subs with 5" deck guns was all they could manage. If you are interested in some strategy books that examine these ideas I would recommend you look at some by Wilmott, Lundstrom, Evans and Peattie. Adams also has a book "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War", but I don't remember if he discusses IJN strategy as much as US.
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Just like Japan in WW2, China is dependent on imports for many crucial resources, particularly oil. The difference for the US is that it has strong bases close to China, in the form of Korea, Japan, and Guam. There are also a number of friendly allies such as Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines (sometimes), and Australia. The classic naval strategy of blockade would serve well again, with the US fleet using submarines to get in close to hunt the Chinese fleet while the CVBGs stand off till air and missile power is reduced. Unlike the Chinese fleet, the US fleet can sustain itself at a distance, and US SLOCs are far enough away that they will not be threatened by Chinese forces unless they use ICBMs.
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Germany needed food and oil. They could import them from Argentina and Iraq, or take them from the Ukraine and the Baku area. After recovering from WW2 they learned the benefit of importing over taking. Unfortunately now they are becoming dependent on Russia for natural gas.
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Yeah... Secretary of War = head of the Army...
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Naval and military theory converge in several areas, such as the "center position". You can fund such thinking in Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Other concepts are Seizing the Initiative, Concentration of Force, Use of Surprise, and so on.
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