Comments by "Gregory Wright" (@gregorywright4918) on "The Development of Night Fighting in the USN and IJN - The Interwar Period" video.

You cannot counter what you don't know (or don't believe to be true), and the oxygen reduced some of the bubbling wake of the torpedo so they were harder to see coming. Again how prewar doctrine dominated, they were designed to be fired at the battleship line, not destroyers and cruisers, so long range and big warheads were key. Many IJN destroyers and cruisers had one reload for each tube, and trained hard on fast reloads. It was not designed for the close-in, sudden night encounters in the constricted waters of Solomons, but it did work. What it also did was lead to massive use of them in 42, depleting their stocks.
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@Justin-rv7oy From what I've read the Japanese university researchers were investigating radio waves interwar, but the IJN was not paying much attention till it was highlighted by a naval attache in Berlin in 1939 (?date). The big problem they had was their indigenous electronics industry was small, low quality and focused around a few research universities. The really good stuff was imported from Europe or USA. What they saw happening in the European theater in 1939-40 forced them to try to catch up, but those sets being deployed in 1942 were experimental sets and had the A-type scopes rather than PPI. Experience in the Solomons in later 42 was not good, since the early scopes could not distinguish the background clutter very well, and IJN night vision was so much better, that commanders did not see the benefit and push for it. Yes, they were ahead of the Italians, but a lot of what they were fielding was experimental or not very sophisticated and the commanders did not rely on it.
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@Aelxi The Slot was the quickest, most direct path. Once the US got Henderson field operational the IJN started getting hit by air during daylight hours. At max speed, starting from around Bougainville near dusk, you could dash down to Guadalcanal, offload something, then dash back by sunrise only if you were using the Slot. The other ways took too long in one night.
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@davegoodridge8352 The IJN did put a submarine force around Hawaii, but that was only one of their assignments and USN anti-sub measures improved as more air assets were devoted to it. IJN doctrine for subs was that they were supposed to be fleet scouts and part of the first line of attrition during main battle, so they were increasingly assigned to the Solomons and the Marshalls. Commerce raiding was not high on their list of priorities.
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@oligoprimer Radar was being improved throughout the war, on both sides, but quicker and with greater manufacturing capacity on the US side. The early war was more an optical than radar centered environment, but things changed during the war as US & UK radar got better. Fire control was the second step for radar, after basic search was mastered. But other parts of the system were important too, like training and the appreciation of commanders, all of which lagged in 1942.
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The "wait" part is the nerve-wracking part. You are probably doing 25-35kts, and so is he, and you expect him to notice you at some point, but the issue is not to alert him that torpedoes are on the way so that he does not change course and ruin your fire control solution. Your most powerful weapon is the torpedo, but it does not hit very well in a weaving gun battle. It works best before the guns go off, or after major damage has been made by guns as a finish-off.
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The Brits were actually the first to experiment with oxygen, and the US did too. They both realized it took a great deal of work to master and did not think it worth the effort. The IJN was looking for an edge and was willing to spend a lot of time and effort achieving it, including the expense of realistic training and live-fire trials (compared to USN neglect of testing!). As to optics, the IJN got manufacturing advice from the Germans but did not stop there. They realized that some people naturally are better at seeing things at night, and they tested rigorously for it. They then trained them carefully, reserved them for night watches, stationed them at good vantage points, equipped them with good glasses, and trusted their reports (again, unlike some USN admirals...).
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@johnbuchman4854 Fletcher was in command until the Yorktown got hit, then he allowed Spruance to do his own thing.
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Did you mean '43? Yes, there were some USN captains who thought they were hit by sub torpedoes rather than surface ship, and questions to sub forces as to how they could be getting firing solutions at night in the Slot. The size of the explosions should have tipped them off that it was not a sub torpedo, but when you are mystified you grasp at a very unlikely straw rather than the completely unthinkable option.
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@davidncw4613 I know there was "blind" torpedo fire into unloading ships in the Sunda Strait battle, but I don't recall a specific instance like that at Guadalcanal.
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@washingtonradio The US was also forced to spend more planning time on logistics, maintenance and repair, which stood it in very good stead when they had to fight multi-step campaign to advance across the Pacific. The IJN missed that lesson as they thought the Decisive Battle would only be a week or two and so losses would not be able to be repaired or resupplied in time.
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Curious what the date you are referring to in the first one; the second was the 6 that took out the Wasp, O'Brien and hit the North Carolina on 9/15. Anti-sub screens had to expand after that long shot.
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@rohanthandi4903 How many battleships did a handful of Swordfish disable at Taranto in 1941? We like to indulge in wondering what would have happened if TF 34 had been on station off Samar, why can't the Brits wonder what would have happened if things had gone a little differently during Operation C?
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@rohanthandi4903 It was during the Indian Ocean raid in April of '42. There was a night when the forces were very close to each other and the IJN was unaware the RN was close. Drach was hypothesizing what might have happened if the RN had sent in a night air attack, which if successful could have set up a dawn or morning surface battle. I can't find a specific episode about it, so it may have been mentioned in one of the Drydocks. I get the feeling he is continuing research and may do a feature on the "what-if" at some point in the future. I hope...
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@rohanthandi4903 The "opportunity" was for a night air strike on carriers, crippling them and leaving opening for surface action later or in morning. As I recall the KB was only accompanied by two Kongo class, plus C&D. The range of the IJN torpedoes would probably have been a surprise to RN at that point, but the rest might have been even money.
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And anti-radar like stealth...
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Nothing to do with torpedoes, or any such doctrine...
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IJN did have and practice rapid reloading, and tactical doctrine was designed around curving in to fire, curving out to reload while maintaining LOS to targets, then curving back in again to make second strike. Hara talks a bit about this in "Japanese Destroyer Captain".
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For one thing, a lot more convoys get through without worrying about big raiders...
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One reasoning behind the Atlanta's was as "destroyer leaders"...
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One issue I hope is covered in Part 2: IJN developed night air support tactics for surface actions interwar, relying on the cruiser float planes dropping flares and markers. I would like pointers to more sources about those tactics.
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Note that that book was written by the co-editor of this one...
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They were a fascination in the '30s, along with studying Jutland. The arguments at Washington over 10:10:6 were backstopped by thoughts of power ratios. All three primary navies were trying to find ways to influence them, either by more powerful individual ships or by greater numbers.
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Part 2 coming?
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