Comments by "Bruce Tucker" (@brucetucker4847) on "Churchill was an idiot" video.

  1.  @gratefulguy4130  And you'd be equally wrong to do so. Like Churchill and MacArthur, Eisenhower certainly had significant shortcomings but they are far outweighed by his crucial contribution to victory. The Anglo-American-Soviet alliance was arguably the most successful coalition war in history and Eisenhower's political skills were vital for keeping the western half of that alliance cooperating and focused on the ultimate goal. MacArthur may have been the most insufferable egomaniac in all of American history but after his mistakes in the 1941-42 Philippines campaign (which would have been a Japanese victory no matter who was in charge on the Allied side or what they had done) he was one of the few leaders in the whole theater who fully understood modern warfare and the coordination of land, sea, and air forces on a strategic scale. Nimitz was arguably the most competent commander in the entire Asia-Pacific war, but he was a naval commander and could never have conducted a successful land campaign on the scale of the 2nd Philippines campaign or the invasion of Japan itself had that proved necessary. The successes on land in his AO were entirely due to the complete isolation of relatively small garrisons by sea and air forces, and battles like Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa show how unimaginative he and his subordinates were when it came to land warfare and how costly and futile a protracted land campaign under their command might have been. MacArthur was wrong from a strictly military POV to insist on an invasion of the Philippines, but it's hard to argue that his conduct of the campaign was anything but extremely competent. MacArthur's postwar overseeing of the occupation of Japan was also nothing short of brilliant, and he deserves much of the credit for Japan's rapid transition from a militarist and violent aggressor to a peaceful member of the community of free nations.
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  7. That plan was for the most part not entrusted to radio communications, though. There were updates on things like diplomatic moves and expected local weather sent by radio to Kidō Butai once it was underway, and of course the famous and completely ambiguous go code "Climb Mt. Niitaka," but the preparation and planning for the mission was generally restricted to more secure methods, which was possible because all of the units involved in the attack remained in home waters until the attack force sailed. AFAIK there's no record that any mention of the task force's objective was ever transmitted by radio, let alone that such a transmission was even detected, let alone decoded, by anyone in the US or UK. And the Japanese were so determined to maintain comms security on the mission that they left the radio operators from the task force's ships in Japan to fake normal radio traffic as if those ships were still in port (which fooled everyone in the USN, including Joe Rochefort, into thinking they were) and physically disabled every last transmitter in the fleet, including those on the planes, until the attack was ready to be launched. I think people today have been given an unrealistic view by Hollywood of how signals intelligence actually worked in WW2. Even with the Midway operation six months later, for which detailed plans had to be transmitted by radio to units scattered across millions of square mile by ocean, the Allied picture of Japanese intentions was extremely unclear and argued about vehemently by various commands. "Code breaking" in this context usually didn't mean reading the other side's messages word for word, it meant trying to assemble a picture from thousand of isolated message fragments and data points out of tens of thousands more that couldn't be decoded. And I find the idea that anyone among the Allies was reading JN-25 word for word at any time in 1941 not just implausible but ludicrous, given the absolute clown show of British response to much more widely expected Japanese moves against their own empire. In fact, Allied estimates of Japanese intentions were harmed in this regard by how much they did pick up on Japanese intentions in Southeast Asia, coupled with the erroneous assumption that Japan had neither the resources nor the inclination to conduct more than one major operation at a time. This assumption was shared by the British as well as American analysts and leaders.
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