Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Drachinifel"
channel.
-
68
-
67
-
45
-
41
-
40
-
35
-
32
-
Piorun was part of Vian's flotilla of Cossack, Maori, Sikh, Zulu, & Piorun (originally a British N class destroyer, Nerissa) which had been escorting a troop convoy, WS8B, when diverted to search for Bismarck. The four Tribals all made (unsuccessful) torpedo attacks during the night. Piorun, however, after exchanging gunfire for a time, actually lost contact and was unable to use her own torpedoes.
30
-
26
-
18
-
16
-
14
-
13
-
13
-
13
-
11
-
11
-
11
-
10
-
10
-
10
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
8
-
Many were landed at Sierra Leone, which was a British Colony at the time and they were, therefore, safe from being re-enslaved.
Between 1808 & 1860, British anti-slavery patrols captured some 1600 slave ships, and freed some 150,000 slaves.
In December, 2017, the British National Archives displayed an early photograph of slaves aboard a Royal Navy warship, HMS Daphne, as symbolic of the 'profoundly oppressive' nature of the vile British Empire.
Actually, the slaves had been rescued from an Arab dhow the previous day, and were on their way to freedom in the Seychelles. This was explained in detail to the National Archives staff by an historian who had the ship's log and the memoirs of her captain, George Sulivan, who also took the photograph.
However, as this wouldn't fit the current narrative in what is rapidly becoming the country formerly known as Great Britain, as far as I know the caption was never changed.
8
-
8
-
8
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
7
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
There is more to assessing the result of a battle than simply counting the corpses. Was Stalingrad, for example, a German victory? The first part of the battle, between the battlecruisers was undoubtedly a German tactical victory. The second, between the main battlefleets, a British one. The High Seas Fleet didn't so much 'leave the field of battle' as run desperately for the Jade, from which it rarely emerged again.
Strategically, the battle was a British victory. The High Seas Fleet never dared face the Grand Fleet again. Nor, indeed, did Scheer even attempt to challenge the British trawlers and armed merchant cruisers of the Northern Patrol, which systematically starved Germany into collapse & revolution. Instead, he argued for unrestricted submarine warfare, which brought the United States into the war on the allied side.
6
-
6
-
6
-
HX 84, River Plate, Renown attacking Scharnhorst & Gneisenau off Norway, Barents Sea, 1st Battle of Narvik, Glasgow & Enterprise engaging (and defeating) 12 German Destroyers & Torpedo Boats in the Bay of Biscay, 28 December, 1943, Li Wo, February, 1942. That is a few to be going on with, although there are others.
The fact is, because the British had a large navy, they were rarely outnumbered in a naval action, but on the odd occasion when they were, they still did not hesitate to engage.
6
-
6
-
You don't think that, just perhaps, there might be a difference between ships on the open sea, with less than impressive AA guns, their aircraft protection down at sea level, and taken completely by surprise, with a battleship in a narrow fjord, with early warning radar, fighter protection in the immediate vicinity, massed AA support, both on the ship and on hills overlooking the fjord, protective anti-torpedo netting, and smoke pots capable of being operated in 90 seconds/
If you don't think there is a difference, perhaps you should?
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
@eriktrimble8784 'The RN built exactly ONE aircraft carrier after WW1 ended and before WW2 started: the Ark Royal.' That wasn't what I wrote. I wrote 'The Royal Navy actually only built 6 battleships after 1928, whereas they built a large number of aircraft carriers.' In any case, you are wrong. Eagle was converted from a battleship building for Chile into an aircraft carrier, Courageous, Glorious, & Furious were all converted from light battlecruisers into fleet carriers between the wars, and Hermes was launched in 1919. After 1928, the RN built 6 Illustrious class carriers, 1 maintenance carrier, and 7 light fleet/maintenance carriers were also built before the end of the war, and a further 11 light fleet carriers were laid down from 1943. The light fleets, by the way, were not primarily intended for ASW work. With a capacity of around 50 aircraft, they were intended to operate with the main fleets, but built quickly and expected to have short service lives. The carriers intended for ASW duties were the escort carriers and, later, the MAC ships. THE RN built/converted 19 MAC ships and 6 Escort Carriers before US built Archer, Attacker, and Ruler class escort carriers from the United States. These, rather than the larger fleets and light fleets, were the vessels which were involved in the Atlantic sea war.
As to Battleships being ' pretty much useless' in the Atlantic, wasn't it battleships which which sank the Bismarck & the Scharnhorst, and deterred Scharnhorst and Gneisenau from attacking convoys by their very presence? Also 'In the Mediterranean, they were more substantially important. But still VERY much second fiddle to the CV, ' wasn't it, in fact, rather the other way round? A Carrier played a subsidiary role at Matapan, and they were important providing the defence of Pedestal from air attack, but wasn't it the presence of Rodney & Nelson during the same operation which deterred an attack by the Italian surface fleet?
Finally, what technology did the RN ignore ? Radar, asdic, all or nothing armour, centimetric radar, hedgehog, squid, HF/DF, Fighter Direction Rooms, dual purpose secondary armament in capital ships, the creeping attack, Blackett's Theory of Convoy Defence? Compared to the Scharnhorsts & Bismarcks, with their low angle secondary armament and their outdated incremental armour, even the Nelsons were a generation ahead, and the KGV, were almost out of sight.
Agreed, the RN was short of Atlantic escorts in 1940 and early 1941, but this was because of the unexpected collapse of France. Pre-war assumptions had expected the French Fleet to play a prominent role alongside the RN in the sea war, but in the event the RN was obliged to find sufficient ships to retain control of the Atlantic and, in the latter half of 1940, to retain around 60 destroyers in home ports for defence against invasion.
The RN was not woefully unprepared for ASW operations. Agreed, like every other navy, they had probably overestimated the effectiveness of asdic, but they could hardly have been blamed for not foreseeing the failure of France.
Finally, Britain did not come close to being strangled in 1939-40. That is, simply, a myth.
As to this :- 'They chose to focus on trophy ships that were obsolete, rather than the ships that would actually be needed in a new war' between 1935 & the outbreak of WW2, the RN launched 4 aircraft carriers, 22 cruisers, 59 fleet destroyers, and 40 sloops/corvettes, but only 2 'trophy' battleships.
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
@mattbowden4996 'Each one of the actions your propose risks the isolation and annihilation of the raiding force by either the Grand Fleet on the not inconsiderable number of RN Destroyers and Submarines operating in the Channel.' The RN wasn't operating submarines in the Channel. Why would they? Moreover, if you are now saying that the HSF shouldn't have been risked in situations where destroyers were present, then exactly when would it have been safe to take any action at all?
Furthermore, if you insist on a policy of despair, by which I mean the WW2 Hitler approach of avoiding risk to capital ships or even cruisers, then all you achieve is, at the end of the war, a more or less untouched High Seas Fleet being handed over to the victorious Allies. Which is, of course, exactly what happened. Yes, of course some risk is involved, as it is in any military operation, but if the course of action taken is the one you suggest, which seems to be 'we can't achieve anything so we shouldn't even try' then you simply confirm my conclusion that, in North Sea terms, after Jutland the HSF was an irrelevance. Scheer might just as well have advised the All Highest to decommission his big ships, send the crews & guns to the Western Front and recycle the steel.
The reality of late 1916 was that the Blockade was beginning to bite into civilian morale. The Blockade was maintained by a couple of dozen AMCs and armed trawlers. Are you really saying that nothing could have been attempted against it? Similarly, the Harwich Force consisted of light cruisers and destroyers. Was it really invulnerable to attack?
'Ultimately, it seems to me that you are determined to damn Scheer for not giving the RN the grand battle of annihilation they wanted.' Not at all. I have never argued that he should have sought such a battle, which could only end one way. I am critical of him for his complete inability to come up with any alternative means of using the HSF to contribute to the German war effort. The Japanese, in a similar position in WW2, came up with actions such as Savo Island. Why do you consider it so laudable that the HSF spent the rest of the war avoiding any sort of risk?
As you have labelled my proposals for potential sorties as unreasonable, might I ask what, had you been Scheer, you would have done with the HSF Fleet after Jutland?
5
-
@tomriley5790 The most fascinating thing about the whole High Seas Fleet saga is that, however one might perceive the merits of the cause for which they fought, in two world wars the German armed forces battled determinedly almost to the end against increasingly impossible odds. U-boats, towards the end of both wars, continued to embark on what were increasingly becoming suicide missions, and even the Kriegsmarine surface fleet,, when obliged to fight, did so bravely.
The only significant German force to which this cannot be applied was the High Seas Fleet. After Jutland, almost two & a half years before the end of the war, Scheer consciously chose to keep it safely from harm, and was allowed to act in this manner. Certainly, the fleet sortied twice, barely going out of sight of land and rushing back home at the merest mention of the Grand Fleet. These were sorties in the same sense as, in WW2, an aircraft flying from, for example, Blackpool in the North West of England to Filey in the East of England on a routine training flight was carrying out a 'sortie,' and had about as much relevance to the war effort of the respective countries.
The final irony, of course, was when the High Seas Fleet, after unloading coal, ammunition, & breech blocks in the ports of a defeated Germany in revolution, nobly presented itself at Scapa Flow to be interned, before (to the secret delight of the British & Americans, who were eager to prevent France & Italy demanding some of the better German warships) scuttling itself.
Thus, after Jutland, no daring raids on the Channel (protected by a force of, in the main, pre-dreadnoughts), no dawn swoops on the cruisers and destroyers of Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force, no genuine sorties by fast cruisers and battlecruisers against the auxiliaries imposing the blockade. In short, nothing, apart from Scheer's insistence on unrestricted submarine warfare, which had the triumphant result of bringing the United States into the war on the Allied side.
At what point, I wonder, did Reinhard Scheer conclude that it was quite nice being moored in the Jade estuary, and much to be prepared to going out into that unpleasant North Sea, where nasty people lurked? The inactivity of Tirpitz in WW2 can be justified, in the sense of the classic 'Fleet in Being' preventing Allied capital ships from being deployed more usefully elsewhere. This cannot be applied to the Scheer's antics in WW1.
The Grand Fleet had one main purpose, which was to protect the blockade. Where else could it have been used? The Mediterranean was an Allied pond, with the Austrian & Turkish navies totally outmatched anyway, although the former Goeben & Breslau did show more activity than their former sisters in the Jade, and the Japanese were allies.
The surprising thing, in many ways is that, when Hindenburg became, in effect, military dictator of Germany later in 1916, he did not question why Scheer had been allowed to turn his fleet into an irrelevance, and decide to transfer some of the crews to the army, the guns to the Western Front, and the coal & steel to industry.
Of course, some would say that the above is nothing but British propaganda, I expect.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
What exactly are you writing about? Just to educate you, Bismarck was on a mission to sink supply convoys. The Home Fleet intercepted her, engaged her, and sank her, before she even saw a supply convoy.
'A true slap in the face to the United States.' This would be the neutral United States, content to leave Britain and her Commonwealth to defend democracy alone, until dragged kicking and screaming into WW2 by events at Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war, I assume?
After which, the head of the US Navy, Ernie King, allowed around 600 merchantmen and most of their crews to perish within sight of the American East Coast by refusing to set up a convoy system, simply because it was a British idea.
It anything was 'a pathetic disgrace' the Second Happy Time and Operation Drumbeat meets the criterion.
When you grow up, perhaps you might buy a book or two to improve your knowledge?
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
'Rodney would have had less chances than Hood.' Oh, please!
Rodney :- Belt Armour 14 inches, deck armour 6.25 inches, broadside 18432 lbs.
Bismarck:- Belt Armour 12.6 inches, deck armour 4.7 inches, broadside 14112 lbs
An undamaged Bismarck could be expected to do what German capital ships habitually did when encountering British capital ships (even obsolete R class ones) which was to use superior speed to avoid action. In terms of heavy artillery shots, Rodney fired 340 16 inch shells, & KGV 339 14 inch shells. As Bismarck's armour was proof against anything smaller (such as 8 inch, 6 inch, or 5.25 inch) only these are relevant. All the smaller calibre weapons would do was cause superficial damage. The actual number of hits, despite fanciful comments about British gunnery, is impossible to determine as, for obvious reasons, no one aboard Bismarck was wandering around taking detailed notes.
Rodney, incidentally, hit Bismarck with her third salvo, and had put most of her main armament, her bridge (including command staff), and her internal communications out of action within twenty minutes of the start of the action.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 I am not defending British actions, I am explaining them, based on my knowledge of the realities of naval warfare in WW2, following extensive interviews with veterans, including a Hood survivor, as part of my degree. Possibly you have never heard the statement 'we fight the ship, not the men' which was common to sailors of most navies (with, of course, the exception of the Japanese) in WW2. The glib and facile statements you make about Dorsetshire might please your prejudices as you sternly pass comments on events of three quarters of a century ago, but they have no basis at all in fact. I doubt you even know that, for many years after the war the survivors of Bismarck & Dorsetshire head regular reunions, and as late as the 1970s some of the last living Bismarck survivors visited Dorchester to lay a wreath to commemorate the loss of Dorsetshire in 1942. Hardly the actions of men who felt their colleagues had been abandoned, I suggest. The U-Boat report, by the way, was not an excuse. Captain Martin stated that on of his officers, Lt.Cdr. Durant, claimed to have seen a smoking discharge about two miles off the leeward beam. Martin himself crossed to the compass platform and observed the same thing. As there was no British ship at that location, and as U-Boats were believed to be in or approaching the vicinity of the action, (Bismarck had previously transmitted a number of signals on a U-Boat frequency, which were believed to be homing signals) Martain really had no choice. When the first U-Boat actually arrived is irrelevant, as the British in May 1941 did not have the benefit of your confident certainty.
Your comment about Scharnhorst is simply nonsense. No U-Boat sightings were claimed. The British searched until no more survivors could be detected. The weather, water temperature, and sea state, all factors which you cheerfully discount, were critical factors.
Incidentally, on 8 June, 1940, the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two escorting destroyers were sunk by the battleships Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in the North Sea. Over 2000 men went into the water, and 1200 died. Scharnhorst & Gneisenau did not stop to pick up survivors. The water was cold, but the sea was calm and visibility good. Would you care to comment?
The facts are that, whatever the realities of the events at North Cape in 1943 or of the Bismarck action in 1941, your personal prejudices will not allow you to accept what actually happened, as you much prefer your own version. Why not read a few of the many excellent accounts of the actions which are readily available? You might try 'The Bismarck Chase' by Robert Winklareth, in particular, as he is an American author, and therefore not troubled, as apparently you believe me to be, by any sense of 'shame.'
5
-
5
-
The Hipper class cruisers had boilers which broke down regularly, German destroyer designs had high pressure boilers which were equally unreliable, were poor seaboats, and the later ones were overgunned, making it almost impossible to work their main armament in anything but a flat calm, both the Bismarcks and the Scharnhorsts had incremental armour which was a generation behind US & British designs, obsolete low angle secondary armament, and the Bismarcks had outdated 4 x twin gun main armaments.
As to armour, the Bismarcks had 12.6 inch belt and 4.7 inch horizontal, the Scharnhorsts 13.8 inch belt and 4.1 inch horizontal, and the King George Vs (and Nelsons) 14 inch belts and 6 inch horizontal.
'Better ships?' Not really.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
@JBrandeis1 You don't think that Briggs, who was on the bridge right behind Holland and Kerr, or Tilburn, on the Boat Deck where Prinz Eugen's shell started a fire in the ready use lockers, were reliable witnesses, then? You don't think that observers in Prince of Wales, watching the flagship for tactical signals from Holland, might have known precisely when the ship exploded, or where the fires were? You don't think that observers from CS1 were able to contribute their evidence either? You don't think that Prinz Eugen's War Diary has anything to say on the matter? You don't think that the technical experts who attended both Courts of Inquiry were able to give them the benefits of their specialist knowledge? You don't think that conclusions can be drawn from the known ballistic features of German weapons, even when this became fully available to everyone after 1945? You don't think that Sir Stanley Goodall, Director of Naval Construction, might have known something about the reasons for the loss?
Oh well.
5
-
5
-
5
-
@BillFromTheHill100 By the time Churchill became Prime Minister, Britain had already been at war for almost nine months. The Phoney War had nothing to do with him, and everything to do with France, who dictated Allied military policy on land, and Chamberlain, who was simply not equipped to be a war leader, and who was already dying of cancer.
Churchill during the so-called Phoney War period was First Lord of the Admiralty, and could influence the way in which the Royal Navy was used, but had no control at all over bombing policy, which was dictated by the Air Ministry and the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood. In any case, there was no bombing of 'sleeping German cities' during the Phoney War period.
You do seem to have a fascinating obsession about Churchill, and you are indeed blessed in that you don't seem to let simple facts get in the way.
5
-
How did Churchill have a month to 'develop his plan?' France had signed the armistice with Germany less than two weeks earlier. The timescale was as tight as it was because the French ships in Mers-el-Kebir had folded awnings and were raising steam ready for sea. The situation of France, by the way, was totally different from those other nations who had been occupied, in that France still had a theoretically independent though collaborationist, government. Moreover, the small navies of these other countries were largely irrelevant with compared in size with the French one.
Somerville could never left his flagship in order to visit Gensoul. Firstly, he would have been rendered completely out of touch with London, and secondly there was the obvious, though unspoken, possibility that once he arrived aboard the French flagship he might have been 'detained.'
The British at the time were in a desperate situation. Their only remaining trump card, at least in the short term, was their fleet, and no Prime Minister, whether Churchill or anyone else, could have countenanced a situation which would have left the third strongest navy in Europe free, potentially, to join with the second and third strongest against Britain.
5
-
@888Longball The captain of a Fleet Aircraft Carrier, who had previously been British Naval Attache in Paris, was known to be a Francophile, spoke fluent French, and knew most of the senior officers in the French naval chain of command, was 'too junior?' Sorry, old chap, but your prejudices are showing. Somerville was under no obligation to leave his flagship. In so doing, he would have lost contact with London when events were proceeding at a rapid pace, and he might even have exposed himself to the risk of being 'detained' had negotiations turned sour.
Ask yourself why Gensoul did not pass the full text of the British ultimatum on to his superiors. By the way, the French were no longer allies. They ceased to be so when they signed their armistice with Germany on 22 June.
5
-
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
@jugganaut33 Nothing remotely like the Grand Slam existed in May, 1941. Development only began in July, 1943. Furthermore, the two German capital ships already in a French port had already been attacked by Bomber Command, but had only sustained slight damage. Nor, indeed, did the British need even to consider so absurd a possibility, as they caught Bismarck with one new and one middle-aged battleship, and destroyed her, within three days of the sinking of the Hood.
Your use of the term 'raped' is rather peculiar, by the way. Bismarck had embarked on a raiding sortie intended to intercept and destroy Atlantic convoys. The Admiralty was intent upon preventing this. What do you think the Royal Navy was going to do when Bismarck was 'intercepted?' Give Lutjens a stern talking to and send him on his way? The British intention was always to ensure that Bismarck never saw a French or German port again. In view of events currently unfolding around Crete, half measures were never considered, and nor would they have been desirable.
As to vessels capable of catching Bismarck, actually, King George V, Prince of Wales, Repulse, Renown, and every cruiser and destroyer in the Royal Navy could, as well as the two modern carriers Victorious & Ark Royal. The successful Swordfish strike was not launched 'in desperation' by the way. The British already knew Bismarck's position, and launched the strike as soon as she was in range. The weather was indeed poor, but not poor enough to prevent the attack, and no aircraft were lost either taking off or landing. There was never any suggestion that they might not find the Ark after making their attack, and, of course, they all did.
Certainly, losing Hood was a serious setback, but hardly a 'global catastrophe' largely because the British have always understood what the Price of Admiralty means. In practical terms, the impact on British control of the Atlantic was barely affected, and the events of 27 May proved this in full.
As to the casualties from Bismarck's crew, this is what happens when countries get involved in war. Do you think that, when Rodney & King George V closed the range sufficiently, their captains should have declined to open fire because some Germans might have been injured?
As to 'surrender' tell me any occasion when a warship surrendered at sea in WW2. The Germans did have a habit of scuttling their ships, but not one of surrendering them intact.
4
-
4
-
4
-
@mattbowden4996 I see. Resorting to insults rather than even trying to make a coherent argument. What previous statement have I backtracked upon?
'Truly, you are an intellectual colossus.' I wouldn't claim that, although I do have a first in modern history, my particular period being the naval war in 1940-41. It brings back half-forgotten memories of my arguments with Professor MRD Foot, my tutor, about the Battle of Britain & Operation Sealion. Foot had been an Intelligence Officer in WW2, knew all about Bletchley Park, and never breathed a word to us about any of it, by the way.
If you can make any sort of rational argument which explains how Operation Albion challenged the Royal Navy in the North Sea, please present it. Wasn't sending a battlecruiser, 10 battleships, 9 cruisers and around 50 torpedo boats into the Baltic against a Russian fleet already deeply involved in revolution rather over-kill? I suppose that sinking one of the two pre-dreadnoughts, and an elderly armoured cruiser, that were still loyal to the pre-bolshevik Russian regime as it collapsed must have seemed something of a success, after the various strikes, anti-war meetings and desertions that the HSF had experienced in 1917, but frankly it rather stands comparison with Operation Zitronella, in September, 1943, when the German navy sent two battleships and nine destroyers to bombard what amounted to a large shed on Spitzbergen.
From my reading of the German reasons behind the WW2 operation, it appears that there was concern within the Kriegsmarine about the state of morale aboard the Tirpitz, and Zitronella was invented to, in effect, give a disaffected crew something to do. Doesn't Operation Albion rather resemble something similar in WW1, although perhaps you might consider it to have been worth the effort, as the effect on civilian morale, as these poor people tucked into their turnip slices in their unheated homes, must have been most uplifting?
Oh, and Operation Albion lasted for around 10 days in October. What did the High Seas Fleet do during the rest of 1917?
4
-
4
-
4
-
To my mind, the one commander on either side who did everything right was her Captain, Frederick Dalrymple-Hamilton.
Rodney's arrival is splendidly described in Ludovic Kennedy's 'Pursuit,' as follows :-
' Now, there was nothing to do but wait. It was an agonising period, but Tovey was not left brooding for long. 'Ship bearing Red Seven-O,' shouted a look out. All eyes on the bridge turned to the port beam, there below the horizon were the unmistakable outlines of a ship's fighting top. Could it be Prinz Eugen?' The alarm bells were sounded, the gun crews ran to their turrets, the great guns swung round.
But now her upperworks were coming into view, and there could be no mistaking them. It was Rodney, for Tovey and his staff a truly wonderful sight. She had made no signals for over thirty hours, had been told by the Admiralty to steer a variety of courses which could have taken her anywhere, and now, like Aphrodite, was rising from the sea to take her place on the stage at the time when she was most needed.'
Perhaps Ludovic went a little overboard comparing her to the Greek Goddess of Love & Beauty, however!
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
@erictaylor5462 Oh dear. You really are a touchy little chap. Try not to get so worked up; it really isn't healthy.
So you didn't say 'Using modern Carrier battle group tactics.' Odd that, did someone hack into your post and add it without your knowledge?
You said 'using carrier deployed Bf-109's' The simple fact is that the undercarriage of the Bf109 made it unsuitable for carrier operations. However, if that isn't enough, why don't you read for yourself the range of which the Bf109 was capable. When you do, you will realise that it was far too short legged for naval operations.
Perhaps you are not fully aware of the strategic thinking behind the construction of the German battleship fleet. If you had been, you would have known that it was not intended to fight the Royal Navy, but the French Navy, in line with the thinking developed by the Weimar republic that any future German war would be against the Soviet Union and/or the Soviet Union. The pocket battleships from the Weimar period had a double purpose, in that they could dominate the Baltic, but still operate against French troop convoys. The French retaliated by, from 1932, building the Dunquerque & Strasbourg. Germany responded by producing the Scharnhorst class, France then laid down Jean Bart & Richelieu, to which the Bismarck class were the counter. In other words, German pre-war naval planning was based entirely on the French navy; The Germans never sought a war with Britain, largely because there was never any possibility, of challenging the Royal Navy, which explains why the Kreigsmarine was so ill prepared in September, 1939.
By the way, if we go along with your suggestion of German carriers operating in the mid Atlantic searching for convoys (using short range aircraft) and protecting, apparently, wolf packs, what is your estimate of the life expectancy of these vessels?
4
-
If they had expended vast sums on a surface fleet, then they wouldn't have been able to build up their army & air force to the same extent. As a result, the conquest of France probably wouldn't have happened, Italy would probably have remained neutral, and the Anglo-French naval resources could have been concentrated in the North Sea, as, of course, the French Atlantic bases wouldn't have been available to the Kriegsmarine as they historically were.
As to modern carrier tactics, the Germans had absolutely no experience whatsoever of naval aviation, the one carrier they half built was, in design, similar to the RNs Courageous & Glorious, which by 1939 were long in the tooth to say the least, and the Bf109, with a very narrow and frail undercarriage, was almost laughably unsuited for use as a carrier based fighter. Just compare it to the Fairey Fulmar, let alone the US carrier aircraft designs of the same period, such as the Grumman Wildcat.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
The radar system had already failed, after Bismarck had fired at HMS Norfolk on 23 May. The blast from Bismarck's forward guns had disabled her own radar, which was rather more 'delicate' than the British type 284.
Bismarck's design was outdated, featuring incremental armour of the type used in WW1, which had been superseded long ago in the US & Royal Navies by the All or Nothing type more suited to longer range engagements. It was also significantly thinner than the armour of either the Nelson or King George V classes. These two classes also fired a heavier weight of broadside.
There was no possibility of salvaging Bismarck. At the end, she was listing by 20 degrees, sinking by the stern, and suffering from serious internal fires. The leaders of both scientific expeditions to the wreck, Bob Ballard & David Mearns, both opined that any scuttling attempt would only have hastened what was inevitable anyway.
You don't consider the losses in Norway of half of the total German destroyer fleet, the sinking of two (out of a total of six) light cruisers, and the crippling of a third in December, 1939, the long term damage to Deutchland/Lutzow, and the damage caused to Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, putting them out of action until November, 1940, to have been significant setbacks, then? Well, I suppose you are entitled to your opinion.
In reality, after the sinking of Bismarck, the German surface fleet was more or less reduced to an irrelevance. Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, & Gneisenau escaped back to German waters. Gneisenau never sailed again, Scharnhorst sailed once more, and was sunk, Prinz Eugen made a abortive attempt to reach Norway, but was torpedoed, and thereafter pottered around the Baltic until surrender to the Allies, and Tirpitz functioned as an expensively maintained Fleet in Being.
4
-
4
-
Prince of Wales' engines were not 'in trouble' and her captain was not injured. Her masin armament was quickly restored, although certainly unreliable.
However, Bismarck had been damaged by a hit in her bows which left her down by the bows and leaking fuel oil. After the action Lutjens signalled Prinz Eugen to proceed at reduced speed.
Aside, of course, from Bismarck's inability to bring PoW to battle (although PoW did re-engage Bismarck later, twice on the same day) was Lutjens' worry about the failure of Luftwaffe intelligence, which had led him to believe that there were no British capital ships in the area. It was, in his mind, a real possibility that following PoW might lead him into other approaching British heavies.
As to sinking Norfolk & Suffolk, how would that be achieved when both were several knots faster than Bismarck, and radar-equipped?
4
-
4
-
4
-
@ricoh.3162 Did HMS Rodney also have a poor output of shells? I wonder if the crew Of Scharnhorst would agree with your assessment of the guns of the KGV class as 'flawed?'
There are indeed many books. Perhaps you haven't read that by Von Mullenheim-Rechberg, the senior surviving officer. To quote from page 211 of the English version, published by the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, in 1980 :-
'Was Lindemann still in charge there? No reports came down to us, nor were we asked what was happening in our area. We had nor heard a single word from the forward part of the ship since the action began but, considering the large number of hits we had felt, there must have been some drastic changes............ Had Albrecht been directing the secondary battery from there? (the forward fire control station). Was his own station serving only as a place of refuge? Those questions were never answered.....
I reached a messenger in the damage control center. The man was in a great hurry, and said only that both the First Officer and the Damage Control Engineer had had to abandon the damage control center, adding that he was the last one in the room and had to get out. Then he hung up. That was my last contact with the forward part of the ship.'
Of course, that was merely an account given by Baron Burkard Von Mullenheim-Rechberg, presumably, in your mind, another British Fanboy?
4
-
@TTTT-oc4eb Oh dear, another wehraboo. Bismarck had been working up for seven months. Exactly how long did she need? USS South Dakota worked up in four and a half, and HMS King George V in three and a half.
Bismarck had outdated incremental armour, a generation behind the all-or-nothing of US battleships, and RN battleships from the Nelsons onwards. She also had outdated low angle secondary 5.9 inch armament, at a time when her contempories, the KGVs, & the Washingtons, had DP secondaries. She also had four twin main turrets, rather than the triples of the Washingtons, the Nelsons, and the KGVs, resulting in unnecessary dispersal of armour. Finally, her internal communications were placed above the main armoured deck. In her last battle (if, indeed, it could even be called a battle) these were put out of action in minutes.
Then, of course, there is the matter of weight of broadside. Bismarck's was 14.112 lbs. A KGV's was 15,900 lbs, a Nelson's 18,432 lbs, and a Washington's 24,300 lbs.
One thing I will acknowledge. however. Her speed when undamaged gave her the ability to avoid action with a Nelson and, perhaps, with a Washington or a KGV.
Again, on the subject of AA atmament, she carried 16 x 105mm guns, 16 x 37mm guns, & 12 x 20mm guns. However, when they were as badly directed as they were aboard Bismarck, they were largely irrelevant in any case.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
During the time Tirpitz was in Norway, there were five Fleet Air Arm strikes ( Operations Tungsten, Mascot, and Goodwood 1-3) involving a total of 187 dive bombers, followed by three separate Bomber Command attacks, using 98 bombers in total. Tirpitz suffered severe superficial damage from the dive bomber attacks, was crippled by the first Bomber Command attack, and destroyed by the third. 'Lots of losses?' Losses were 18 FAA aircraft and 1 Lancaster.
The two strikes that sank Yamato involved 380 US aircraft.
However, you are not comparing like with like. Whereas Yamato was exposed at sea with no air cover (and, moreover, already intent upon a suicide mission) Tirpitz was hidden away in a fjord, with a large array of smoke dischargers, shore based AA positions and radar installations to support her, and nearby fighter bases to intercept incoming attacks. Moreover, her sheltered position, and surrounding torpedo nets, prevented the fleet air arm from using torpedoes at all.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
Hood was one of four planned 'Admirals.' She was redesigned after Jutland to incorporate more armour. The other three were cancelled when priority was given to construction of escorts and merchantmen instead. She did not 'fail' her sea trials, but almost immediately, with Repulse and a cruiser squadron, went on a world tour in 1923-4. The Admiralty never 'demanded it got scrapped.'
'Very poor ventilation below decks so they had to keep the hatches open or the crew below decks would suffocate.' Nonsense.
'She had to stay in shallow water as much as possible to avoid waves bigger than 4 foot.' Nonsense.
'A refit was done to change the design of the bow to make it higher.' Nonsense. This simply did not happen.
'10 refits in 5 years and they all failed to make her sea worthy.' Nonsense. Apart from minor details (removal of range clocks and some searchlights, and fitting of additional secondary armament rangefinders) her first major refit was not until 1929-1931, and her second in 1936.
'Crew were forced to serve on her as most refused once they heard about the problems with her. Mostly it was new recruits who didn't know anything about her. Officers and the captain were on board as pushishment not because they wanted to be there. Most tried to resign rather than serve on her but they were told nope sorry u cant resign cause we cant find anyone to replace u.' Absolute and utter nonsense. A posting to Hood for an aspiring officer was generally a sure way to subsequent promotion. Do you have any idea how many officers who served aboard her between the wars went on to Flag Rank?
'She was what is now called a lemon. not fit for service. An embarrassment to the royal navy.' Absolute nonsense. For almost fifteen years, she was regarded as one of the most powerful capital ships in existence by the navies of the world. She had the armour & firepower of a battleship, with the speed of a battlecruiser.
'The hatches between the gun turrets and the powder room had to be kept open while in action or the powder room crew would suffocate as they got their air from the gun turret above them. That was a big danger and the crew knew it. in the end its what caused her to explode.' Absolute nonsense. Such hatches, as you call them, had never been left open in RN warships since Jutland, when the commander of the battlecruiser fleet insisted upon a high rate of fire, and allowed charges to be stored within the turrets. Hood was sunk when she was hit by well-directed fire from a more modern warship.
'Sparks from firing the guns went down through the hatches into the powder room and bang up she went.' Absolute nonsense. Do you really believe that heavy naval guns gave off 'sparks,' for heavens sake?
Just to state a few facts:-
1). Hood was certainly a 'wet ship' aft because of the installation of additional armour.
2). In common with many ships of the day, conditions aboard did result in cases of TB among the crew, but the idea that there was a risk of suffocation aboard is simply idiotic.
3) She was, by 1941, overdue for complete modernisation, along the lines of similar work already carried out on Warspite, Renown, Valiant, & Queen Elizabeth. Not because of any particular design flaws, but simply because naval technology had moved on, and she was 20 years old.
You seem to have a very odd fixation about Hood. I wonder if you feel able to substantiate any of your claims?
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
@josephkugel5099 The problem with your alleged 'what if' scenario is that you allow Germany to adopt a totally different policy, but insist that Britain must stick rigidly to the policy she, historically, followed. I have pointed this out to you ad nauseam, but you still refuse to grasp the obvious.
You also seem to assume that Germany had unlimited resources, being able to build a vastly improbable huge fleet, and large numbers of U-Boats, whilst at the same time still greatly expanding the air force and the army. This is simply a fantasy, I doubt that you have read, from your Fantasy Island, a report written by the Kriegsmarine's Ordnance Department, dated 31 December, 1938, called 'The Feasibility of the Z Plan.' This pointed out in sobering terms that the organisational difficulties were largely insurmountable, and that the demands in materials and manpower were such that it would leave the other German armed forces starved of resources for years to come. A problem you probably consider minor, the lack of suitable shipyards, also loomed large in the assessment of difficulties. You even seem to think that your fuhrer saw Britain as his main enemy, when that was clearly the Soviet Union. I doubt that old adolf would have regarded vast numbers of fantasy battleships as much use against Uncle Joe, if it meant his army and air force was not fit for purpose.
I'm sorry that you don't seem to know enough about the RN of 1939 to make it worth discussing the true state of the British battlefleet with you, particularly since the modernisation of much of it seems totally to have passed you by.
'You can take this answer or leave it at this point but im done with this discussion.' Congratulations! That is probably the first sensible thing you have written, even if you did forget the apostrophe.
4
-
4
-
South Dakota & Alabama. The photo. was probably taken around 7 July, 1943, when the three battleships, together with HMS Anson, HMS Furious, 8 RN & 5 USN destroyers, were part of Operation Camera, a diversionary mission off the Norwegian coast intended to suggest an allied landing, to draw German attention away from Operation Husky in the Mediterranean, which began on 8/9 July.
At the end of July, Malaya was placed in reserve until used as a bombardment ship at the Normandy landings.
4
-
4
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 I regret that you consider my correcting of your errors to be 'hatred.' This, of course, is your problem, not mine. The BBC World Service account comes from December,2011. It also includes the following comments :- 'We were full speed at 36 knots and going through those mountainous seas' 'It was a full gale blowing. To go through that at full speed, the bow would rise in the air and come down, hover there and come down with a clatter as if on concrete; mountains of water coming all over the ship.' 'It was pitch black and we shadowed with the use of radars.' 'At that point it went pitch black.' 'It (steaming away) seemed a terrible thing to do and it was. But it was the right thing to do.
If we had stayed a moment too long we could have joined those unfortunate men.'
As to Scharnhorst & Gneisenau. Of course they shouldn't have stayed to pick up survivors. It would have been foolish in the extreme to risk Germany's only two battleships, one of which was damaged Devonshire actually received one (corrupt) signal from Glorious, which read ' R.A.A. from Glorious. My 1615 2PB Time of origin 1640.' This was not a distress signal, but a signal addressed to the Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, Admiral Wells. Neither escorting destroyer made any distress signal (at least, none was ever picked up by any British warship,) No other British ship or shore base received anything at all from Glorious, by the way. Admiral Cunningham, aboard Devonshire, concluded that the signal related to routine aircraft carrier signals traffic, and took no action. Indeed, what action should he have taken, given the garbled nature of the transmission? You do seem to have a remarkable ability to put the worst possible construction on every British action, assuming as you do that every British report was falsified, yet you accuse me of 'hatred.'
Perhaps, instead of trawling the internet, you might consider reading the writings of professional naval historians, where you might possibly find out something about the realities of naval warfare. Alternatively, you could simply continue spouting your prejudiced anti-British bile.
4
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 So, we shouldn't accept the words of biased British officers, but should accept your prejudiced opinion without question? Perhaps you might supply credible sources for your claims. One of us needs to be smarter, but it isn't me. Actually, by the way, landing a thousand or so German survivors in a British port would have been seized upon by the British as a wonderful propaganda opportunity, at a time when the war was going badly. Haven't you seen the newsreels of large numbers of surrendered Italian troops in North Africa? The British would have done the same with Bismarck survivors.
As for Scharnhorst, the nearest U-boats were the eight boat Eisenbart pack, which was tracking Convoy JW55B. No boats were reported by any British observer during the rescue operations, and your emotive nonsense about men screaming in the dark is just that, nonsense, which you have made up. However, at least you have admitted that it was dark, even if the freezing seas and the rough weather are still too much for you.
Incidentally, the highest ranking British officer present at either rescue operation was a captain, hardly a high-ranking individual making 'political' decisions, but a professional seaman of many years' service, who would have had instinctive sympathy for the crews of the enemy ships, based upon the principle that 'today it was them; tomorrow it might be me.' Your insinuations insult their memory.
I notice you haven't commented on the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau/Glorious action. Why might that be?
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
@shalaconballard9912 Hood had armour on a par with that of, for example, the Queen Elizabeths, and thicker than the Iron Dukes or the Nagato, and her belt was the same as that of the North Carolinas. That is, simply, a fact.
The post-Jutland redesign changed Hood, from a conventional battlecruiser into a fast battleship, and did result in her being lower in the water, but there was never any intention to add further armour to the ship in her existing form. There was a proposal, never implemented because of the war, for her to undergo a complete modernisation along the lines of Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, or Renown, which would have seen her with new, lighter, engines, and a totally different superstructure. Significant weight savings would result, which permitted installation of enhanced protection without increasing the overall displacement of the 'new' ship.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
@ralphbernhard1757 Which comment doesn't actually make sense, except as a repetition of German wartime propaganda. The British had just lifted around 120,000 French troops out of Dunkirk, and had begun, from 7 June, landing the 'Reconstituted BEF' in Cherbourg.
Until, that is, General Weygand, on 14 June, informed Alan Brooke that the French army was no longer capable of 'organised resistance.' Two days later, on 16 June, Weygand became Petain's Minister of National Defence.
4
-
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
There is a marvellous scene in Tarrant's book about her. In late June, 1944, she had been badly damaged by a mine off Normandy, and was sent to Rosyth for repair. By the time she arrived, at 2130 on 14 June, she was down to ten knots, and drawing 42 feet aft. As she dragged herself under the Forth Bridge, the whole of the Home Fleet, including two battleships, manned ship to cheer as she passed by.
Even then, after two months in dock, down to 15 knots, on three shafts and with one turret out of action, the Old Lady was back in action off the French and later Dutch coasts.
If ever a British battleship from the 20th century deserved preservation, it was Warspite.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@mattbowden4996 'Your initial assertion that the High Seas Fleet August 1916 fleet advance wasn't "serious" is easily disproved.' Indeed? then why haven't you disproved it? Incidentally, I think you will find that what
I actually said was that whether this brief sortie should be considered 'serious' was open to debate. Something you haven't as yet been able to pursue.
You didn't need to remind me, as I already knew about Operation Albion. Perhaps you consider this to have been a triumph on a par with Trafalgar or Midway, but I fear you will be in a minority should this be your view. The relevance to the overall progress of the war, by the way, was minimal, and I ask you to find an historian who thinks that it was.
'Incidentally you also seem to believe that unless a naval operation wins the war single handed then it's unworthy of your notice, which is a ridiculous standard to judge anything by.' Quite. An absurd view, which is why I don't hold it. Indeed, I have been the one suggesting that, after Jutland, Scheer should have undertaken a series of raids against the Royal Navy, as the Japanese did against the US Navy after Midway. You are the one who keeps bleating that this would have entailed risk.
What Red Herrings, by the way? I compared the Spitzbergen raid with Albion because both appear to have been minor operations dreamed up by a German admiralty worried about a collapse in morale following prolonged periods of activity. Can you really not grasp the parallel?
I have already asked you to explain why August, 1916 was serious, but then you post 'so kindly either defend you statement that August 1916 fleet advance was "unserious" and the HSF did nothing of note post 1917 in good faith.' A tricky one, that, as you have already said that 'no one is about to argue that the HSF's forays into the North Sea in 1918 were very serious.' Please feel free to argue with yourself about that one.
By the way, you might wish to consider what the Admiralstab said of the August 'sortie' which was :- 'The sinking of two light cruisers hardly credits the operation as successful. Such sorties might damage the British Fleet, but they will not produce an important, let alone a decisive, result. The stranglehold of the British Blockade has not even been dented, let alone broken.' The report then suggests no further sorties, but the immediate commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare.
3
-
3
-
@mattbowden4996 I think my original post read as follows:-
'The High Seas Fleet did sail twice more, but on the first occasion returned to port when advised that the Grand Fleet was approaching, and on the second occasion returned almost immediately when one of their ships was torpedoed. Whether these can be considered serious sorties is open to debate.' Are you now claiming that the HSF didn't return to port when the approach of the Grand Fleet was reported to Scheer, or that the second 'sortie' was not abandoned when a cruiser was torpedoed? The Moltke incident was much later, in April, 1918, by the way, and therefore irrelevant to the October 'sortie.'
When have I suggested cowardice, by the way?
I know that the HSF fleet managed to find something to do in 1917, but operations again a feeble Russian navy would do nothing to bring about victory on the Western Front, although I don't doubt that reading about such actions would have made the Turnip slices being eaten by the starving and disenchanted German civilian population taste much more palatable.
When did I say that the sole purpose of the HSF was to break the British blockade? I would argue that the prime purpose of the Grand Fleet was to protect the Armed Merchant Cruisers maintaining the Blockade, but that is a different issue.
'What you do think they should have done? Just sailed into the North Sea to be annihilated? What possible good would that have done the German state? Even without considering the potential loss of life, capital ships are expensive national resources that take a significant amount of time to replace.' When did I suggest that? I agree that, as far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, the HSF was utterly outmatched, but other actions could have been taken, possibilities being a raid on the Channel, an attack on the Harwich Force, or a sortie against the AMCs of the Northern Patrol, using battlecruisers and light cruisers.
'You're arguing that Scheer should have wasted his ships and the lives of the men under his command in futile gestures against the Royal Navy. Why would he want to do that? What could he possible gain?' No, I'm not. When did I say that?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@spider love Try again. Repulse and Prince of Wales were sunk by torpedo bombers. The Luftwaffe in May 1941 had no torpedo bombers. Each ship was hit by only one bomb each, and neither penetrated the armour of the ship concerned. If the Japanese had attacked with level bombers, the two ships would have survived, as the failure of Italian level bombers in the Mediterranean had already demonstrated.
Furthermore, at Dunkirk the Luftwaffe had already demonstrated that it was ill-equipped to hit warships at sea or, come to that, even when stopped offshore.
In any case, this is more or less irrelevant. Tovey took his battleships away, after they had reduced Bismarck to a slowly sinking hulk, because they were short of fuel and he knew that U-Boats had been directed to the area. Try reading Ludovic Kennedy's book.
What has Omaha beach got to do with events which took place in May, 1941, by the way?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
The actual damage to Bismarck was rather more serious & widespread than most people actually realise, as follows:-
The fatal torpedo hit the steering area of Bismarck. The full fury of the detonation was vented into the ship and against the shell and rudders. The steering capability of the ship was destroyed. The transient whipping response caused by this torpedo hit was stunning. The hull, according to survivors, acted like a springboard, and severe structural damage was sustained in the stern structure. The steering gear complex, encased in 150 mm thick armor, was rather rigid in comparison to the 10 meter long canoe-shaped stern. The unarmored stern structure vibrated at a different frequency than the main hull just ahead of it. Tears were opened in the side shell and bulkheads adjacent to the damaged area. The two decks in the stern were wrecked by the force of the explosion, and equipment in the quarterdeck area was seriously damaged as the explosion expanded upward. Seaman Helmut Behnke, who was sent to check on the smoke-making machinery and its piping found it completely destroyed. Evidence of the severity of damage can be seen in the videotapes of the stern area of the wreck. The remaining platform decks are badly twisted and the upper portions of the damage can be barely seen just above the sediments.
The rudders were jammed at a position of 12 degrees to port, as the ship was in the process of turning to evade a port side torpedo attack when she was struck. Herculean efforts by the damage control teams could not correct this situation as they were unable to enter the steering compartments. Immediately after the torpedo hit Bismarck commenced turning in circles, out of control. Once speed was reduced, the ship inexorably assumed a course to the northwest, directly towards her pursuers, as the intensity of the storm increased.
Attempts to vary the propeller revolutions on the three shafts, ordered by the leader of the damage control team, Commander Hans Oels, failed to counter the effects of the jammed rudder. With British destroyers now closing to attempt torpedo attacks, Bismarck began a night gunfire action which prevented any further damage-control efforts aft. Stormy conditions, darkness, and gun blast from turrets Caesar and Dora prevented damage control teams from assembling at the stern to try to access the steering gear compartments and repair the damage. Divers reported to Commander Oels, the Executive Officer, that they were unable to enter because of surging water within the after steering gear rooms. One of the divers had to abandon his attempt after his air hose became ensnared in damaged structure, cutting off his air supply. Josef Statz overheard Commander Oels say to the exhausted divers when they entered Damage Control Center: "Only if we had the diving apparatus issued to submariners."
It is believed that part of the stern collapsed onto the rudders, as happened with the Prinz Eugen and armored cruiser Lützow, or was damaged in such a way that it was impossible to steer the ship by either manual or mechanical means. It would have been necessary to cut away structure which was covered by surging water. In any event, the repair of such damage was beyond the capability and material provided aboard the Bismarck, even if weather and battle conditions had been more favourable. The stern structure was massively damaged and eventually failed.
There is remarkable similarity between the Bismarck damage and a similar torpedo hit on the stern of Prinz Eugen on 23 February 1942. Dr. Erwin Strohbusch, who directed the repairs of this heavy cruiser in Norway, wrote that this incident, and an earlier one on the armored cruiser Lützow, whose stern also collapsed from a torpedo hit, indicated a structural flaw in the stern design of German armored ships, heavy cruisers, and battleships. Improvements were made to the stern structures of Admiral Hipper, Lützow, Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer and Scharnhorst during 1942-1943.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@karlheinzvonkroemann2217 'This Rheinubung Operation had NOTHING at all to do with Bismarck.' Of course it did. It culminated in Bismarck being sunk. The Channel Dash was Unternehmen Zerberus, or Operation Cerberus.
Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had one successful Atlantic raid, Operation Berlin.
After they, and Prinz Eugen, escaped to German waters, Gneisenau never sailed again following damage in port, Prinz Eugen never reached Norway, and Scharnhorst, the only one actually to reach Norway, carried out a single mission in company with Tirpitz, bombarding Spitzbergen. Her next voyage, in December, 1943, led to her sinking.
Tirpitz had carried out on aborted operation against convoys PQ12 & QP8 in March 1942, but abandoned it upon the imminent arrival of the Home Fleet.
After that, Tirpitz became a typical 'Fleet In Being.'
'Since your're not really very aware of what happend after May 1941.' Very good. As you don't seem to know the difference between Exercise Rhine and Operation Cerberus, or what happened to Gneisenau & Prinz Eugen subsequently, however, I respectfully submit that it is not I who needs to do a little reading.
You don't need to reply. I will take your apology as read.
3
-
@baltulielkungsgunarsmiezis9714 The video refers to the claim I mentioned earlier, which emerged in 2008 or so, from the son of someone who died in 2004. It is unsupported by any German survivor. The reference to the black flag is anachronistic, by the way. U-Boats in May 1945 were ordered to surface and fly a black flag to notify allied ships and aircraft that they had surrendered, but I have come across no reference to such a use prior to that date. Indeed, in the 17th & 18th century, a black flag generally meant 'no quarter.' I would be interested to know if anyone else has heard of this alleged alternative use.
If you choose to believe one isolated comment in defiance of all other evidence, then that is, of course, entirely up to you.
By the way Crawford was a Lieutenant-Commander, not a Lootenant-Commander, as stated.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Tovey later commented that he had thought of telling Holland to place PoW, a better armoured ship, in the lead, but chose against giving such an order to so senior an officer. I have never seen any suggestion that Leach was so openly critical of Holland.
Holland was unlucky in that Suffolk lost contact with Bismarck & Prinz Eugen at a vital time during the approach of Hood & PoW, which meant that Holland was unaware of their course change, resulting in their approach becoming angled rather than direct, as he had intended.
Certainly, Hood did assume that Bismarck was the leading ship, whereas PoW had identified it to be PE. Holland was aware of Hood's potential weakness in horizontal armour compared to PoW, and attempted to reduce her period of vulnerability to the minimum, but, despite those who still believe to the contrary, the critical hit does not seem to have been caused by penetration of her deck.
In short, Napoleon was said to ask of a commander, 'Is he lucky?' It seems that Holland simply was not.
3
-
3
-
3
-
Bismarcki had 15 inch guns and outdated incremental armour. The Nelsons, Colorados, North Carolinas, South Dakotas, Iowas, and Nagatos had 16 inch guns, and the Yamatos 18.1 inch guns.
Bismarck's weight of broadside was 14,112 lbs. Nelson's 18,432 lbs, and the North Carolinas, Iowas, & South Dakotas 24,300 lbs.
3
-
3
-
@gtifighter It seems you don't know that Bismarck & Prinz Eugen were sent out to attack Atlantic convoys, but were obliged to abort the operation because Bismarck had been damaged by Prince of Wales, and Prinz Eugen, after being ordered to operate independently, developed engine problems. Using your skill and judgement, would you care to estimate how many Atlantic convoys were disrupted, and how many merchantmen Bismarck sank?
Certainly, Bismarck would never have prevailed against such odds, but the fact is that the Admiralty were able to concentrate their forces in order to achieve the desired result, which, put simply, is what the larger navy is likely to do. Leyte Gulf is a typical example of a similar force concentration in the Pacific.
If it is ignorance you seek, look closer to home.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Not really. The Home Fleet was already at sea searching for Bismarck. There were, in addition to Hood, PoW, Norfolk & Suffolk in the Denmark Strait, KGV, Repulse, Victorious, and three cruisers in the Iceland-Faroes Gap. Bismarck & Prinz Eugen were a serious threat to the Atlantic convoy network at a time when the Royal Navy was already hard pressed in the Mediterranean.
German warships rarely appeared at sea, and the opportunity to destroy the biggest one was too good to be missed. Pride did not really come into it, as the Price of Admiralty was well known to the Royal Navy.
Moreover, the lesson of Bismarck's sinking was not lost on the Kriegsmarine. Early in 1942, Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, & Gneisenau fled back to Germany through the Channel, and no German surface ship appeared in the Atlantic for the rest of the war.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@hajoos.8360 When have I even mentioned Baden or Bayern? Incidentally, Baden was actually sunk as a target off Portsmouth, not scuttled at Scapa Flow. I did actually describe Hood as 'much more an improved WW1 fast battleship.' Your comments about Mers-el-Kebir are both gibberish & irrelevant to any assessment of Rodney.
Hood at the Denmark Strait had a well-trained, long service, crew. The reason she and Prince of Wales were sent there is obvious to anyone with any knowledge of the period. They were two of only four capital ships available to the Home Fleet with the speed to catch Bismarck. The other two, King George V & Repulse, were sent to the Iceland-Faroes gap, the other exit point into the wider Atlantic, as it was essential that Bismarck be challenged before she reached the main Atlantic, where she would be harder to track down & challenge. Surely you knew that?
Tirpitz was nowhere near ready. she was only declared fit for operations in January, 1942. Lutjens' orders, by the way, were to carry out commerce raiding in the Atlantic, against British supply convoys, not to risk an engagement against heavy British ships. In the event, he found himself with no alternative and, having abandoned his mission, he detached Prinz Eugen in the (forlorn) hope that she might at least achieve something. After the action, by the way, Bismarck was forced to reduce to a more economical speed because of shortage of fuel. Almost immediately after being detached, however, Prinz Eugen developed engine faults and ran successfully for Brest. I agree, however, that it was a pity that Prinz Eugen did not remain with Bismarck. That would have made it possible for Tovey to have disposed of both German ships on 27 May, not just the bigger one.
As to Renown & Scharnhorst/Gneisenau. Renown was hit twice. Once on the stern and once on the foremast, both by shells which failed to explode. Presumably, the irony of two well-armoured modern German battleships running from one lightly armoured, modernised, battle cruiser, has totally passed you by? I have, by the way, read copies of the Reports submitted by Vice-Admiral Whitworth & Captain Simeon. It seems abundantly clear that you haven't. Neither, in point of fact, refer to galley damage.
Finally, 'So Frenchies and Italians were left in Europe with bbs, beside Britain, there was no competition.' Why then, did you say, in one of your earlier posts, that ' An intact Bismarck, Hood, KGV-class (if the turrets work), French BB, Italian BB, faster Japanese BBs (, not to talk about fast US BBs) would have all out-maneuvered Nelson-class-ships?' Admittedly, I know, as does anyone else with knowledge of the period, that this is nonsense, but it is unusual to come across someone such as you, who seems determined to contradict his original errors with further ones.
3
-
@hajoos.8360 Sorry, but you are misinformed. Hood was armoured in a similar manner to a Queen Elizabeth, with a 12 inch belt and 3 inch deck. She even had integrated armour (in common with the Bismarck, although at least, unlike Bismarck, this wasn't considered obsolete when installed), compared to the more advanced, all or nothing, lay out of the Nelsons and the KGVs.
The American North Carolinas, certainly superior to the 15 year old Nelsons, were not in commission yet, neither were the Richelieus, the Strasbourgs were weakly armoured, and the best Japanese capital ships around at the time were the Nagatos, with 11.8 inch belts, and 2.5 inch decks. Please don't talk ill-informed nonsense about 'outmanoeuvring' the Nelsons. Surely you know that in WW2, capital ships would generally commence an engagement at some 12 - 13 miles distance. Hood, in the Denmark Strait, opened fire at 26500 yards, for example, and on 27 May, Rodney began the engagement at 23400 yards. Individuals who talk apparently sagely in such a manner only expose their lack of knowledge about the subject. I have heard of this WoW to which you refer, but prefer to deal in reality.
As to Rodney's 'miserable' shooting, perhaps you haven't read any studies on naval gunnery techniques by gunnery officers of the time. I have.
The 'Hood Society' is actually called the 'HMS Hood Association' by the way. I use their website on a regular basis. There are no such comments as you suggest on it. There is a lot of affection, obviously, for Hood, but also a knowledge of her weaknesses as well.
All in all, you have made a number of vague, generalised, comments, interspersed with the occasional insult, whilst managing to demonstrate an entertaining lack of knowledge at the same time.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@josephkugel5099 Again, you don't seem able to accept that the British are just as entitled to change policy of the Germans do.
Incidentally, Doenitz adhered to Admiral Holtzendorff's WW1 calculation that, in order to strangle Britain's supply lines, it would be necessary to sink 600,000 tons of British shipping per month. Between September, 1939 and December, 1941, the figure of 300,000 was exceeded three times only, and four times the figure was below 100,000. During this period, apart from a short spell when the RN withdrew most Atlantic escorts to beef up the (already, in most opinions, the more than adequate) naval anti-invasion forces, the RN was handling the U-Boat threat, sinking 69 U-Boats in the process. German actual successes were desperately short of their target.
By the way, the British didn't come 'running to America to trade for fifty old WW1 four stackers.' They were actually offered to the British by the American Ambassador to France, after a similar offer, for a smaller number, had been made to the French Navy. The Admiralty were hardly going to say no, as they saw them as a useful stop-gap until their own new construction arrived in larger quantities.
You seem to base your opinions on myth rather than known facts.
3
-
3
-
3
-
In a word, Nonsense. Two frigates, two destroyers, one landing ship, one merchantman and a landing craft were lost.
The task force itself consisted of 2 aircraft carriers, two landing ships (dock), 1 Type 82 destroyer, 5 Type 42 destroyers, 2 County class destroyers, 2 Type 22 frigates, 7 Type 21 frigates, 4 Leander class frigates, 3 Rothesay class frigates, 1 ice patrol ship, 2 Castle class patrol ships, 2 Churchill class submarines, 1 Valiant class submarine, 1 Swiftsure class submarine, 1 Oberon class submarine, 3 Hecla class survey ships, 5 trawler/minesweepers, 10 RFA Fleet tankers, 6 logistics landing ships, 5 RFA supply ships, 1 helicopter support ship, 2 Royal maritime auxiliary ships, 3 requisitioned liners, 7 Ro-Ro ferries, 4 container ships, 7 freighters, 15 tankers, and 8 repair/support ships.
What did you say, again?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@trevortrevortsr2 No. Belfast and her sister Edinburgh were Southampton class, third group cruisers. At the time the Admiralty were concerned that both the American Brooklyn class and the Japanese Mogami class cruisers carried 15 x 6 inch guns, as opposed to the 12 of the Southamptons. Belfast and Edinburgh were intended to be enlarged Southamptons, with 4 quadruple 6 inch turrets, 6 twin 4 inch AA guns, and improved armour. In the event, the quadruple 6 inch turret never went into production, and the triple 6 inch was fitted instead, with further additional armour being added as a result of the weight saving. Apart from Sheffield, fitted with an experimental set in 1938, radar only began to be fitted to the Southamptons in 1941, by which time Belfast was under extended repair following her mining in November, 1939. When Belfast returned to service in late 1942, she had been extensively modernised.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@avikingman1 I agree with your opinion. Holland was a gunnery expert, and knew only too well Hood's weaknesses, which is why he acted as he did, and those who criticise his tactics are wrong. As the angle of Hood's rudder shows, he was within moments of achieving his objective, and in a comparatively close range slogging match, Hood, supported by POW, might well have given a good account of herself.
Alas, of course, it was not to be, but that does not justify the suggestion that Hood, or at least, the Hood of fifteen years earlier, was a poor design, at least in my view.
3
-
3
-
3
-
You don't consider that the Bismarck's outdated design, involving as it did a low angle secondary armament, four twin main turrets, and obsolete incremental armour, among other flaws, was something of a disadvantage?
Oh, and didn't the Germans have their opportunity to 'eat up' the British in 1940, when France had fallen, Genial Uncle Joe was supplying Adolf with raw materials, and the USA was watching from a distance?
I am sure you have read what actually happened to the cunning plan that was Operation Sealion, so I won't enlighten you further.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@hajoos.8360 I thought you said that US battleships did not engage Japanese battleships? You don't need to tell me about the battle, as I, clearly unlike you, already knew the details. I didn't need to scurry off to wikipedia to find out about it. You might try reading 'The Battle of Surigao Strait' by Anthony Tully, perhaps? If it helps, it was part of a larger battle, Leyte Gulf. I assume that you have heard of Leyte Gulf?
Incidentally, when Hipper engaged HMS Berwick on Christmas Day, 1940, an action in which Hipper came off best but Berwick saved her convoy (WS 5a, a convoy containing a number of troopships) Hipper used 8 inch AP shells for much of the action. Of course, you wouldn't have known that, so look it up on wikipedia.
I don't 'interpret' anything; I simply draw conclusions from documented facts. You might perhaps consider doing the same?
Please feel free to go away, as your ideas of what constitute 'politeness' are decidedly odd.
3
-
@hajoos.8360 Fascinating. You refer to Prinz Eugen closing the range on PoW in order to achieve greater accuracy, I ask you whether you think it would have been a good idea for a lightly armoured cruiser to do such a thing against a battleship, and in response you embark or a barely coherent rant.
The US navy never exposed their BBs anymore to imperial Japanese BBs.'
Really? 25 October, 1944, the Battle of Surigao Strait? Heard of it? Obviously not. Where on earth did you get the bizarre idea that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, & Hipper had the best secondary armaments on the planet?
Your actual lack of knowledge and understanding, combined with your enthusiastic use of insults in your attempt to conceal the fact, is extremely entertaining, but there is only one 'bullshitter' posting on here at the present time, mon brave, and it isn't me.
3
-
@hajoos.8360 Sorry, but it is clear that you haven't read the war diary, whereas I have. After Prinz Eugen returned to port, Vice Admiral Schmundt was critical of Korvettenkapitan Jasper for mis-identifying Hood & PoW as cruisers, commenting that :- The assumption by the 1st Artillery Officer [Korvettenkapitän Paulus Jasper] that he is facing cruisers, is incomprehensible.
Particularly from an artillery officer who must answer the opponent effectively, an accurate identification of the opponent's types is a prerequisite, since the choice of shells, and in some cases for outcome of the battle itself, depends on his decision.' This is from 'Position Statement of the Commander of Cruisers (B.d.K.), Vizeadmiral Schmundt, regarding the War Diary of the cruiser "Prinz Eugen".' The log itself reports the initial contact as 'presumably a light cruiser' at 0537.
I will ignore your insults, but would ask you to explain, once again, why, if Prinz Eugen knew she was facing capital ships, she used HE ammunition throughout. Indeed, she ought, according to German fleet orders, she should have withdrawn from the action. As Schmundt stated in the document I referred to above :- ' Although the conduct of "Prinz Eugen" during the battle against 2 heavy enemy ships is indeed very courageous, it does not meet the common [tactical] views presently in force, according to which, already during the assembly for battle, the cruisers and torpedo boats are to post themselves in the fire-lee of the main body – here undoubtedly "Bismarck".
Although the cruiser had an armament of 20cm guns, with which the artillery officer fired remarkably well and also achieved damaging the opponent, this ship is so poorly armored that it belongs to the light units despite its designation as "heavy cruiser". Every 35 cm or 38 cm hit would have made this ship probably a prize of the pursuing English units or would have forced "Bismarck" to assume extremely unwanted responsibilities for protecting the heavily damaged ship.'
In short, Prinz Eugen, as her log states, used HE shells throughout, because her 1st Gunnery Officer had wrongly identified his opponents. The log confirms this, and Vice Admiral Schmundt agrees.
Presumably, you know better, of course. Do you have any source at all to support your certainty?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@ellsworth1956 Firstly, half of the RN's battleships were not 'outdated hunks of junk.' The earlier classes, such as the Vanguards, Bellerophons, and Neptunes, were at least on a par with the German Nassaus & Helgolands, and the three second generation classes, the Orions, King George Vs, & Iron Dukes, were superior to the German Kaisers and Konigs. Moreover, the British also had ten fifteen inch gunned ships, the Revenges and the Oueen Elizabeths, whereas the Germans only ever managed to produce two. During the phase of the Battle of Jutland when the two main fleets actually engaged, from 7.00 p.m. to 7.45 p.m., there were 30 heavy calibre hits on High Seas Fleet vessels, compared to 2 on ships of the Grand Fleet.
Secondly, after Jutland, Scheer more or less admitted that his fleet could not be risked again. Apart from a couple of brief sorties, both instantly abandoned when reports of the approach of the Grand Fleet reached it, and a foray into the Baltic in 1917, the High Seas Fleet remained a Fleet in Being for the rest of the war. No attempt was made during the post-Jutland period to challenge the Royal Navy's Northern Patrol, which intercepted neutral freighters heading for Germany, and which imposed mass hunger on the German civilian population. There was no urgent need, indeed no need at all, to build a further three battlecruisers/fast battleships, when there was no other naval force around capable of challenging the existing Grand Fleet, but there was an urgent need to produce convoy escorts.
3
-
The battlecruisers lost at Jutland were lost because of foolish practices encouraged by their commanding admiral. Courageous and Glorious are not relevant to the argument as they had been converted to carriers years earlier. Lutzow was scuttled after taking significant damage. Repulse was sunk as a result of several torpedo hits, as was a state of the art battleship accompanying her. The others, other than Hood, were lost well after they had been converted either to carriers or to fast battleships.
In point of fact, the three other 'Admirals' were cancelled not because of concerns about design but because the Germans were no longer building capital ships. Only one battlecruiser, Hindenburg, and two battleships, Baden & Bayern, were completed after Jutland. The RN already had a massive numerical superiority, and priority was given by the British to the construction of small, fast, convoy escort vessels.
The battlecruiser was not, in itself, a horrible idea, providing that it was used as intended, which was to seek out and destroy enemy armoured cruisers (i.e., the Battle of the Falklands) or to drive away enemy scouting cruisers.
3
-
3
-
To a degree. There were 'big ship sailors' and 'small ship sailors,' but it was not unusual to move between the two. Andrew Cunningham, for example, always regarded himself as a small ship sailor, but went on to larger things. Generally, a RN destroyer flotilla between the wars had nine vessels, eight destroyers and a leader, which was usually a slightly larger destroyer. The flotilla would be commanded by a Captain (D) who might well subsequently take command of a cruiser or battleship. One of the other destroyers would be a half-leader, commanded by the second in command of the flotilla, usually of Commander rank, and the remainder were captains were Lieutenant-Commanders. During the RN expansion during WW2, command of smaller RN destroyers such as the Hunt class often went to comparatively junior Lieutanants.
Forbes, C-in-C of the Home Fleet in 1940, on the other hand, never commanded anything smaller than a cruiser. Most RN senior officers, much like US ones, did spend some time in destroyers.
3
-
3
-
The Admiralty believed that the secondary armament of a capital ship should not be restricted to anti-aircraft capability only, but needed to be large enough to be effective against surface targets. The 5.25 rather fell awkwardly between two stools, being too large for effective AA use, but not large enough for surface use.
As, in the event, few British battleships ever used their secondary armament against naval targets, I suspect that the use of the 4.5 inch BD mountings on Valiant, Queen Elizabeth, Renown, & the Illustrious carriers was the better choice.
Hindsight is, however, a wonderful thing!
3
-
3
-
3
-
@jacobopm If, as you say, 'no one is now responsible' then why did you post that' 'The responsibility was totally on the British side?'
'Honour' doesn't enter into the issue, still less your nonsense about 'woke image' whatever you think that means. What mattered at the time was that the British Government feared that the new government of France might turn out to be German lapdogs, and would be prevailed upon to use their fleet to provide support for an attempted cross Channel invasion. This wasn't a matter of 'honour' but a matter of national survival for Britain.
As to your comment that :- 'I do understand this might make you feel better,' please do not try to guess, or second guess, my opinion on the events of Mers el Kebir. In point of fact, I couldn't be more respectful of those politicians in Britain who chose to continue the fight, and were willing to do whatever was necessary to achieve survival and eventual victory. Unlike, I suggest, their opposite numbers in Paris (or, rather, Vichy), who lacked the 'honour' to continue to resist.
3
-
3
-
Holland was hardly 'just a messenger.' He had been British Naval Attache in Paris, and was known and respected by many of the senior officers in the French navy, although not, unfortunately, Gensoul. Somerville was not in a position to leave his flagship, at a time when events were fast developing, as he needed to remain in close contact with the Admiralty, and there was also the unvoiced, but real, fear that, once in Mers el Kebir, he might be 'detained.'
The question which really should be answered, and which never can be, is why Gensoul failed to pass on the full text of the ultimatum to his government. The option of sending the Fleet to the French West Indies, probably under US supervision, was never passed on to Darlan. Gensoul, for the rest of his life, failed to explain his actions.
3
-
@ralphbernhard1757 I agree. The the 10th Army would fail could not be known in July, 1940. However, 10th Army had nine divisions, mainly infantry, whereas there were 23 French divisions in Algeria, Morocco, & Tunisia. The British had three divisions, one of which was armoured, together with a fourth arriving in September.
Do you seriously suggest that the Italians would seek to fight a war with nine divisions against a much more mobile British force in the east, and a much larger French force in the east?
I don't recall mentioning any alliance, still less any 'feelings.' The fact is, if attacked the French would respond whatever the British did or didn't do, unless ordered not to by Vichy.
Haven't you yourself suggested that very fact?
3
-
3
-
3
-
The negotiator they sent was Captain Cedric Holland, commander of HMS Ark Royal. Holland was a Francophile, who spoke French fluently, had been British Naval Attache in Paris before the war, and knew most senior French naval officers, though not Gensoul.
The British regarded attacking the French fleet as their least preferred option. Ideally, the best would have been for Gensoul's fleet to have joined with Somerville's. The second choice was for it to sail to the French West Indies, to be placed under neutral US supervision. They also knew, by the way, that the Armistice required that the French fleet be moved to French Atlantic ports, where it would be placed under German 'supervision,' something the British could not allow.
Firing began well after the deadline had passed, and only then when French ships had been observed to be preparing for sea. The blame which has been levelled at Gensoul, by French as well as British historians, is that he failed to pass on the full text of the British ultimatum to his government, as there is considerable evidence to suggest that the West Indian option might have been acceptable to Admiral Darlan. Why Gensoul failed to pass on the ultimatum in full is unknown, as he never sought to explain his thought processes.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@jpmeunier5595 I haven't shifted to other subjects. I have simply replied to every inaccurate comment you have made with actual facts. Things, by the way, which seem alien to you.
The British action at Mers el Kebir was hardly emotional or irrational. Somerville held his fire well beyond the deadline, and only acted when it was clear that the French force was preparing to leave harbour.
'It was super easy to send British Sailors into the Harbour to seize the ship.' Don't be childish. This wasn't a scene from a 'Hornblower' novel. The French ships were in a defended French harbour, were protected by coastal batteries, as well as their own guns, and were fully manned.
'It is obvious that no French sailors will fight against their Allies.' French sailors would, I am sure, have acted in accordance with the orders given by their superior officers. I have always regarded the French navy of 1940 as a disciplined, professional, force let down by their army and their political masters. You appear to be saying that they were an undisciplined rabble.
In Alexandria, Godfroy acted wisely and sensibly. He and Cunningham came to an agreement, and both kept to it.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@brucetucker4847 Just to answer one particular question, the Blockade was enforced by the Northern Patrol, the 10th Cruiser Squadron, of around 24 Armed Merchant Cruisers, later supplemented by armed trawlers, firstly under the command of Rear-Admiral de Chair, and later Rear Admiral Tupper, in turn the Rear-Admiral Commanding Northern Patrol, under the overall command of the Admiral Commanding Orkney & Shetlands.
According to 'The Blockaders' (1980), until disbanded in December, 1917, the Patrol inspected over 13000 ships, and only 642 passed through without being examined. I leave it to you to determine whether a battlecruiser force including such vessels as Moltke ( range 4200 sea miles at 14 knots) or Derfflinger (5600 sea miles at 12 knots), supported by a few of the more modern High Seas Fleet light cruisers, which had similar ranges, could have carried out a raid against these vulnerable, unarmoured ships which were choking Germany to death, had their admiral had the flexibility of mind to plan such an operation.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
The real mystery is that Scheer seems to have been incapable of devising an alternative strategy which would at least enable his surface fleet to make some sort of relevant contribution to the German war effort. Popping briefly out of port twice, then running home rather than risking a meaningful engagement doesn't really amount to much. How about a raid on the Channel, protected in the main by pre-dreadnoughts, or an attack on the cruisers & destroyers of the Harwich Force, or even a strike by a fast battlecruiser/light cruiser force on the auxiliaries policing the blockade? Sitting comfortably in the Jade estuary, while telling the All Highest that the fleet must not be risked again and that the only answer was unrestricted submarine warfare, wasn't really a credible attitude.
I wonder how Scheer explained the result of his master plan, the entry of the US into the war on the Allied side, to Paul von Hindenburg? Perhaps, echoing the wise words of Britain's greatest military strategist, Captain George Mainwaring, 'typical shabby American trick!'
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Imperium83 How better to demonstrate your peaceful intentions than by invading, without declaration of war, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Belgium. Oh, and two years later, your bestest chum, the Soviet Union?
2
-
2
-
2
-
There were two exits into the main Atlantic. These were the Denmark Strait and the Iceland-Faroes Gap. During Operation Berlin, Tovey concentrated his fleet in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and Scharnhorst/Gneisenau used the Denmark Strait. This time, Tovey, with four capital ships plus one carrier, placed his 2nd & 3rd most battleworthy ships in the Denmark Strait, and his 1st & 4th, plus the carrier, in the Gap. His calculation was that each force was strong enough to prevent Lutjens carrying out his orders, which were to attack convoys in the Altantic.
Tovey was proved correct. During the Denmark Strait action, Prince of Wales inflicted sufficient damage on Bismarck to oblige Lutjens to make for France.
Holland was well aware of Hood's weaknesses. He needed to close the range quickly, as, in a short range slogging match, Hood's belt, which was almost as strong as Bismarck's, put her in a much less vulnerable position. Holland intended that Wake-Walker's cruisers would engage Prinz Eugen, but the action was over before Wake-Walker could do anything.
Protecting the Atlantic Convoy routes was hardly a minor engagement, by the way.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Then the sources are either disingenuous or badly informed. The term would probably have been to attack in divisions. In RN WW2 destroyer terms, a 'division' was a half flotilla, usually led by the second-in-command of the flotilla. Early in the war, it would have consisted of four ships from a flotilla of eight. In Vian's case, as there were four destroyers, it would have been reduced to two.
It is, frankly, inconceivable that any RN officer aboard Piorun would not have known precisely what Vian meant. Moreover, it really does not explain why, alone of the five destroyers, only one failed to attempt a torpedo attack, and only one lost contact during the action.
A gun duel might have seemed gallant, but it was also futile & pointless in the circumstances.
2
-
Not quite. It was Ludovic himself who witnessed the battle. His father, Edward Coverley Kennedy, was captain of the armed merchant cruiser Rawalpindi when she was sunk by Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in the Iceland-Faroes passage on 23 November, 1939. Kennedy was ordered to surrender by the German commander, but instead chose to fight, transmitting an enemy sighting report, and scoring one hit on Scharnhorst. His last words to his bridge personnel were reported as "We’ll fight them both, they’ll sink us, and that will be that. Good-bye".
You are right, by the way. Ludovic Kennedy's book is excellent, written as it was by someone who experienced and understood naval warfare.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Daz-ty6bo Sorry, but you are either an idiot, a child, or simply very immature. The prime evidence in the photograph is that, as other photographs, German records, and drawings all clearly demonstrate, Bismarck never carried any torpedo tubes, and Tirpitz only received two sets later in her career.
As did, incidentally, Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, although in their case they were triple sets removed from German light cruisers.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@TwistedSisterHaratiofales I'm sorry. I didn't realise how little you actually knew about the action. In no particular order :-
1). KGV was rather more than 30 or 40 miles away. There were two realistic exit points into the Atlantic. Hood & POW were sent to cover one, whilst KGV covered the other. KGV, by the way, had the battlecruiser Repulse and the carrier Victorious with her. You can find fuller details in any book on the subject. Perhaps you might care to try 'The Bismarck Chase' by Robert Winklareth, an American author.
2). Norfolk & Suffolk were not 'afraid' to engage, but were intending to take on Prinz Eugen whilst Hood & POW challenged Bismarck. However, the main action was over very quickly, at which point Wake-Walker, now in command of the British force, reverted to the traditional role of the cruiser, that of shadowing an enemy force in order to bring further heavy units ( i.e., KGV, Repulse, & Victorious) into contact.
3). POW broke off the engagement because X turret had suffered a mechanical failure. This was quickly repaired, and she did briefly re-engage.
4). The damage to Bismarck was already serious enough to force Lutjens to abandon his mission. You write glibly about Bismarck, after possibly sustaining further damage, still having 'better chance to run for home.' She was already short of fuel following the loss of her bow tanks, was down by the bows, and had a list. This damage led to her eventual destruction. I cannot see how you can possibly argue that a Bismarck with further damage would have had a better chance.
5). In the final engagement, Prinz Eugen would have been useless, although Dr. Ballard would doubtless have taken some poignant pictures of her wreck when he filmed Bismarck. Lutjens' decision to detach her was undoubtedly correct, given his original instructions, in that she might have carried on operations against Atlantic convoys. Of course, as was usual with the Hippers, she developed engine problems and achieved nothing.
2
-
2
-
@trentxiiib8756 I note that you haven't explained why the Germans, who were apparently still following 'the rules of war' at the time, failed to attempt to pick up any survivors from HMS Glorious. The RN, in the form of Dorsetshire & Maori, did seek to pick up Bismarck survivors, but abandoned the attempt rather than risk being subjected to a U-boat attack, and U-boats had been reported in the area. Lutjens had even signalled for one to collect Bismarck's war diary.
At North Cape, the British picked up those survivors they could find, which were indeed very few, largely because of the darkness and weather conditions. They did not break off until they had completed their task. Do you have any understanding of what life expectancy was in the Arctic in December?
There are numerous books about the Bismarck action, the sinking of Glorious (and, for that matter, of Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy) and North Cape. Why not read them instead of persisting with your ill-informed and obviously prejudiced foolishness.
2
-
I see. Are you really ignorant enough to believe that a U-boat commander would be able to see, let alone read, signal flags or lamps, in such circumstances, even should he be unwise enough to try?
You suggest that the captain of HMS Dorsetshire stops his cruiser, with a crew of 850 men, in mid-Atlantic, and ignores reports of U-boats in the area, because he can be confident that all U-boat captains are honourable humanitarians who would surely refrain from torpedoing an enemy cruiser? I'm sure that, as the second of three torpedoes slammed into his command, Captain Martin's last recorded action would have been a good-natured shrug.
Out of interest, on 8 June, 1940, the aircraft carrier Glorious and her two escorting destroyers were sunk in the North Sea by the German battleships Scharnhorst & Gneisenau. Would you care to tell me whether the two battleships stopped to pick up survivors? Perhaps you would like another example. In September, 1914, the cruiser Aboukir was torpedoed in the North Sea by the German U-boat U9. Two other cruisers stopped to rescue survivors, and the U-boat torpedoed these as well. In point of fact, the German commanders both acted correctly, just as Captain Martin did.
At North Cape, by the way, Scharnhorst was sunk at 1945 on 26 December, 1943. It was pitch dark, and the British battleship had been firing by radar. After Scharnhorst sank, Admiral Fraser sent two destroyers to pick up survivors, but in the darkness, with a heavy, freezing, sea, they only managed to find 36. In the prevailing conditions, it was quite remarkable that even 36 survived.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
The damage was far far greater than that :
The fatal torpedo hit the steering area of Bismarck. The full fury of the detonation was vented into the ship and against the shell and rudders. The steering capability of the ship was destroyed. The transient whipping response caused by this torpedo hit was stunning. The hull, according to survivors, acted like a springboard, and severe structural damage was sustained in the stern structure. The steering gear complex, encased in 150 mm thick armor, was rather rigid in comparison to the 10 meter long canoe-shaped stern. The unarmored stern structure vibrated at a different frequency than the main hull just ahead of it. Tears were opened in the side shell and bulkheads adjacent to the damaged area. The two decks in the stern were wrecked by the force of the explosion, and equipment in the quarterdeck area was seriously damaged as the explosion expanded upward. Seaman Helmut Behnke, who was sent to check on the smoke-making machinery and its piping found it completely destroyed. Evidence of the severity of damage can be seen in the videotapes of the stern area of the wreck. The remaining platform decks are badly twisted and the upper portions of the damage can be barely seen just above the sediments.
The rudders were jammed at a position of 12 degrees to port, as the ship was in the process of turning to evade a port side torpedo attack when she was struck. Herculean efforts by the damage control teams could not correct this situation as they were unable to enter the steering compartments. Immediately after the torpedo hit Bismarck commenced turning in circles, out of control. Once speed was reduced, the ship inexorably assumed a course to the northwest, directly towards her pursuers, as the intensity of the storm increased.
Attempts to vary the propeller revolutions on the three shafts, ordered by the leader of the damage control team, Commander Hans Oels, failed to counter the effects of the jammed rudder. With British destroyers now closing to attempt torpedo attacks, Bismarck began a night gunfire action which prevented any further damage-control efforts aft. Stormy conditions, darkness, and gun blast from turrets Caesar and Dora prevented damage control teams from assembling at the stern to try to access the steering gear compartments and repair the damage. Divers reported to Commander Oels, the Executive Officer, that they were unable to enter because of surging water within the after steering gear rooms. One of the divers had to abandon his attempt after his air hose became ensnared in damaged structure, cutting off his air supply. Josef Statz overheard Commander Oels say to the exhausted divers when they entered Damage Control Center: "Only if we had the diving apparatus issued to submariners."
It is believed that part of the stern collapsed onto the rudders, as happened with the Prinz Eugen and armored cruiser Lützow, or was damaged in such a way that it was impossible to steer the ship by either manual or mechanical means. It would have been necessary to cut away structure which was covered by surging water. In any event, the repair of such damage was beyond the capability and material provided aboard the Bismarck, even if weather and battle conditions had been more favourable. The stern structure was massively damaged and eventually failed.
There is remarkable similarity between the Bismarck damage and a similar torpedo hit on the stern of Prinz Eugen on 23 February 1942. Dr. Erwin Strohbusch, who directed the repairs of this heavy cruiser in Norway, wrote that this incident, and an earlier one on the armored cruiser Lützow, whose stern also collapsed from a torpedo hit, indicated a structural flaw in the stern design of German armored ships, heavy cruisers, and battleships. Improvements were made to the stern structures of Admiral Hipper, Lützow, Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer and Scharnhorst during 1942-1943.
2
-
2
-
The claim of the 'Black Flag' was first made in the year 2008 or thereabouts by someone who told an author that he had been told that by his late father, who served aboard HMS Rodney. Moreover, why a 'Black Flag', whicn in naval history has always been symbolic of 'no quarter?
The oinly occaion U boats, for example, used a black flag was in May, 1945, when ordered by Doenitz to surface and fly one to notify the allies of their surrender.
'With so many British ships around it was doubtful that any U-boat would have attacked.' Why is it doubtful? Dorsetshire (not Dorcester, by the way) was a big fat heavy cruiser, with a crew of around 700. A tempting target for any U-boat commander, few of whom were known for their chivalrous, kind. approach to their job.
2
-
2
-
@malcolmtaylor518 I agree that POW should have led. More relevantly, Tovey thought the same, and subsequently wrote that he had considered signalling this to Holland. Indeed, he was to say that, to the end of his days, he regretted not so doing, deciding instead to leave tactical decisions to the man on the spot. Whether Holland, brought up on the traditions of the Royal Navy, would have so acted will, of course, never be known.
Holland did intend that Wake-Walker's squadron should engage Prinz Eugen, but the reality was that the battle was over before any such action could be taken. The idea of holding back until Tovey's two capital ships arrived seems eminently sensible in retrospect, but at the time Holland felt that his two ships, supported by Norfolk, Suffolk, and his destroyers, when they arrived, were sufficient to engage successfully.
In short, I believe that Napoleon's question concerning a general ( is he lucky?) could have been applied to Holland. He did little wrong, but on 24 May, the fates conspired against him. I hope that the following, which is a condensed version of the action, explains why I say this :-
As Holland approached Bismarck, he was receiving regular reports from Suffolk & Norfolk. By maintaining his course and speed, he could have crossed 60 miles ahead of her track at around 0230. This, however, would have meant undertaking a night action. Therefore, Holland, at 0012, altered course to slightly west of north, and reduced speed to 25 knots, his intention being to meet the German force more or less head on at around 0200. This would have left Bismarck silhouetted against the afterglow, whilst Hood's squadron would have been approaching at a combined speed of 50 knots, from an unexpected direction. This would have minimised the time during which Hood was at her most vulnerable. This intention was signalled to Leach in POW.
Unfortunately, Suffolk temporarily lost contact around 0028, and only regained it at around 0300. During this period, obviously unknown to Holland, the German force had altered course to the west to follow the Greenland ice belt. As a result, Holland lost the bold, head on, approach he sought, and was now obliged to approach from a much wider angle, greatly increasing the period during which Hood's weaknesses were exposed.
The rest, as they say, is history.
2
-
2
-
What controversy? Prince of Wales, despite being far from being fully worked up, succeeded in damaging Bismarck sufficiently to force the abandonment of her commerce raiding mission.
A ship is, by the way, an inanimate object. How it performs depends entirely on the actions of the human beings controlling it. After the Bismarck had been sunk, Churchill did briefly suggest having Leach court-martialled for his actions, until being swiftly disabused of the notion by Tovey, who said that Leach (and, therefore, his ship) had acted correctly. In the event of any court-martial, Tovey said that he would attend as Prisoner's Friend. Churchill immediately dropped the idea.
Phillips' actions were intended to intercept a Japanese invasion convoy, perhaps destroying a Japanese cruiser squadron in the process. What alternatives would you suggest he could have pursued?
2
-
@jessejamesroy0069 You appear to have a lot of 'would haves' in your comment. Firstly, Tirpitz did not become operational for another seven months, by which time the RN had another KGV in commission, and, if Bismarck was still above water, were unlikely to have sent PoW east. Rodney, in addition, would be back from her US refit.
How do you know that Tirpitz 'would have' fought off a Swordfish attack any more effectively than Bismarck did(n't)? Which submarines would come to Bismarck's aid? In may, 1941, there were only two anywhere near her. U-Boats generally were used against merchant shipping as part of a trade war.
'Innocent men?' They were the crew of a warship in wartime, on a mission to attack and destroy merchant shipping. 'Unfortunate' perhaps. Defeated ships in naval battles do tend to be sunk, and the crews suffer as a result. What else would you have had Tovey do? Give the Bismarck a stern talking to, and send her on her way with her tail between her legs?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@SolTerran5050 No.The consolation was that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were unable to break into the wider Atlantic, making them much more difficult to chase down, and ensuring that supply convoys were not threatened by them.
Hood, by the way, was an aging ship, which would have received a major reconstruction along the lines of Renown had war not commenced. There was a degree of affection for her, but her shortcomings were well known within the Navy. She was, however, one of only four capital ships available to Admiral Tovey with the speed to catch Bismarck, and, as there were two exit points into the Wider Atlantic, Tovey positioned two in each of them.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Dudley Pope, in '73 North' had this nice little postcript about the battered Onslow, commanded by Lt.Cdr. T.J.G. Marchant, her second-in-command, arriving back at Scapa on 4 February.
' Onslow arrived back in Scapa Flow to receive more surprises. The battleship Anson, which had provided the wireless link with the Admiralty during the battle, was leaving with Admiral Fraser on board, and Marchant altered course to give her a wide berth. He was startled to get a signal from the battleship saying 'pass close to me.'
As the Onslow approached, they could see that the decks of the great battleship were black with men, and over the loudspeakers they heard: 'Three cheers for the Onslow - hip hip hurray! hip, hip....'
They were still recovering from their gratified embarassment when they approached Switha and met the battleship Malaya coming out. Once again the little destroyer was cheered as she passed. A few moments later came the order that the Onslow was to steam past all the ships of the fleet now at anchor to receive their congratulations.
She had been away for 43 days; she had fought bravely in defence of a convoy. Though only a few men knew it, and they were in Berlin or at Fort Wolf, she had played a great part in defeating the German surface fleet. '
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@glennpickard2239 A Polish destroyer, Piorun, ( actually the former HMS Nerissa ) was part of Vian's flotilla, which carried out night torpedo attacks on Bismarck on the night before her sinking. The RN destroyers made their torpedo attacks, but the captain of Piorun chose instead to engage in a gun duel, firing at Bismarck with Piorun's 4.7 inch guns.
These were incapable of damaging Bismarck, unlike Piorun's 21 inch torpedoes. Unfortunately, in withdrawing after the gun duel, Piorun lost contact, failed to regain it, and thus was unable to carry out a torpedo attack. Certainly, a brave action, but not the right one in the circumstances.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
I would doubt that, simply because Ajax decommissioned in February, 1948. Between July 1945 & October, 1951, Clement Attlee was Prime Minister & a Labour government in power. Whether Churchill disapproved or not was, to be honest, irrelevant. Ajax' sister ship, Achilles, rejoined the RN from the RNZN in September, 1946, and was sold to the Indian Navy in July, 1948.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@hajoos.8360 Don't you remember posting this? :- 'the Hipper-class was maybe the best heavy cruiser class ever built.' Clearly not accurate. The tonnage difference between Counties and Hippers is not relevant to your absurd claim. One thing you might note, though, is that the Counties had much more arduous and successful war careers than the Hippers.
Oh, and Baltimore actually had six TWIN five inch DP mountings as her secondary armament. Each 8 inch gun of Baltimore fired a 335 lb shell. Each 8 inch gun of Eugen a 269 lb shell. Cannot you even use reference books competently?
To install three or four turrets is not a philosophical issue. A three triple turret gun ship needs less length, which means either lesser displacement or greater armour. In the case of the Baltimores greater armament.
Perhaps you might read up on what Lutjens' actual mission, and his orders, actually were. I would have thought you might have done it before now, but evidently not.
Indeed, HMS Mashona was sunk, actually the day after Bismarck, and because she, and HMS Tartar, had been detached because of their lower fuel states, to follow a more direct route which, unlike Tovey's main force, brought them within bombing range. A battleship is, indeed, easier to hit than a destroyer.
Odd, then, that the Luftwaffe consistently failed to achieve either with much frequency. However, the deck armour of, for example, KGV or Rodney, was designed to cope with German 15 inch shells, weighing 1764 lbs each. I leave you to research for yourself the heaviest bomb which could be carried by an aircraft such as a Ju88 flying at maximum range. I assure you, you will be disappointed. Not that it is relevant in any case, as Tovey's heavies were always out of range.
You might ask yourself this :- Even if Eugen managed to get a tow across to Bismarck, what speed would you expect the ships to achieve as they made for St. Nazaire, and what would expect Tovey, with Rodney, KGV, Renown, Ark Royal, and several cruisers to do when he arrived?
Your immature and silly wehraboo comments are becoming tedious, by the way.
2
-
@hajoos.8360 Thank you for educating me. Until this moment, I was totally unaware that Roma was a Royal Navy warship!
You really know little about Baltimore, do you? She carried 9 x 8 inch guns,and 12 x 5 inch DP guns. She had a belt of 4-6 inches, and deck armour of 2.5 inches. Her speed was 33 knots, and she displaced 14,700 tons.
The Hippers had 8 x 8 inch guns, and 12 x 4.1 inch AA guns. Their belts were 2.8 to 3.1 inches, and decks 1.97 inches at their strongest points. They could manage 32 knots. They displaced 17800 tons.
Oh, and the broadside of a Baltimore was 3015 lbs. That of a Hipper 2152 lbs.
Thus, despite displacing 3000 tons less, Baltimore outclassed Eugen at every point of comparison. You say 'So, where is the advantage?' Read the above again, I suggest.
You seem to have missed the point about Lutjens. He detached Eugen because he was still trying to carry out at least part of his mission. Again, you back project what later happened to criticise earlier decisions. Moreover, two ships means double the number of targets, or hadn't you considered that?
Doenitz didn't 'send several subs out.' There were only two anywhere near the action, one of which had expended all her stock of torpedoes. It hardly matters what Kampfgeschwader 77 was or was not doing, as it was out of range.
You seem to be posting largely irrelevant, disconnecte, comments without making any particularly relevant arguments. I have better things to do than simply correct your more obvious errors, and I certainly don't feel inclined to spend my time dealing with the gaps in your knowledge. I am happy to let people read these posts and draw their own conclusions.
I will not, therefore, reply again.
2
-
@hajoos.8360 The Hippers were far from the best heavy cruiser class ever built. Overweight, lightly armoured, and with unreliable machinery, one might have had the edge on a (ten years older) County, built within the 10,000 tons limit of naval treaties, but the more modern US heavies were vastly superior. Put your prejudices aside for a moment and compare Prinz Eugen with USS Baltimore, for example.
Are you seriously suggesting that Prinz Eugen could have towed Bismarck back to St. Nazaire (not Brest, by the way)? What would Tovey have done whilst this was happening? Simply watched and allowed it to happen? The protective Luftwaffe bomber zone? What protective zone? At the time the Luftwaffe did not even have an operational torpedo bomber, and in the whole of WW2 it sank no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
At least, by detaching Prinz Eugen (which, of course, promptly developed engine problems) Lutjens, though inadvertently, saved her from being sunk as well. You say that air defence would have been more effective? Mere supposition, and again you are using hindsight. How could Lutjens possibly know that aircraft from Ark Royal would appear? Group North had told him that Force H was off Crete, hadn't it?
Lutjens, by the way, was not so much splitting his squadron, as detaching a ship still capable of fulfilling a role, from one which was no longer capable of so doing.
Sorry, but much of your post is less than coherent, and you seem to be arguing simply for the sake of it. When judging the actions of commanders in wartime, it is never wise to base opinions on what historians subsequently know about a situation, but to consider what information those commanders actually had available to them at the time.
Would, for example, Nagumo have acted as he did at Midway if he knew the true position of Sprunce's ships?
2
-
@hajoos.8360 'You consider that the Brits had better intelligence than the Germans.' Please do not attempt to put words into my mouth. I simply told you what Group North had told Lutjens about the whereabouts of the Royal Navy's heavy ships.
I do not agree that there was not much difference between PoW & KGV. KGV was a fully worked up battleship, the flagship of the Home Fleet, whereas PoW had only arrived at Scapa a month or so earlier. On 31 March, she had been classified as 'completed,' and she only carried out her full power trials on 8 May. Indeed, civilian workmen were still aboard, working on her main turrets. In WW1 John Jellicoe required a new battleship to go through an intensive working-up period of at least six months before he would even allow her to join a Grand Fleet Battle Squadron. PoW was a raw recruit, to say the least.
The Admiralty were in a difficult situation, in that had Bismarck and Prinz Eugen reached the wider Atlantic, they would have been much more difficult to track down. A similar situation had applied to Operation Berlin, of course. Thus, PoW was attached to Hood, in the hope that Hood would bear the brunt of any action. In the event, the decision was justified, as Lutjens abandoned his mission as a result of PoW's hits on Bismarck.
'A considerable shock sighting Holland's squadron is off limits for a midshipman, but not for an admiral.' What does that even mean? The appearance of two capital ships in the Denmark Strait, when intelligence had identified them as being in Scapa, would have been a shock for Nelson had he been placed in a similar position, let alone Lutjens.
Lutjens detached Prinz Eugen because he hoped still to salvage something from his abandoned operation. Eugen could still operate as a lone raider, if she could be safely despatched, and Wake-Walker would hardly follow her if it meant dividing his force. Bismarck was the main prize, not a lightly armoured heavy cruiser.
You think that Bismarck, still under observation by Wake-Walker, and with Tovey's force approaching, would have had time and space to refuel from a tanker? Moreover, what happens if Bismarck, for whatever reason, missed the tanker? Running out of fuel in mid-Atlantic was hardly desirable, I suggest.
2
-
@hajoos.8360 I do not understand what you are trying to say. Your posts generally seem to assume a vast amount of knowledge was available to both sides which actually wasn't. I assume you know that Prinz Eugen's War Diary believed that PoW was actually King George V, for example, or that the most recent information, from 20 May, Lutjens had from Group North was that Hood, Prince of Wales, & Victorious were still in Scapa Flow?
Indeed, later on 22 May, Group North confirmed this information, based on a Luftwaffe visual observation which seems to have confused two dummy battleships for Hood and PoW, which had, by then, sailed. Furthermore, Group North had reported to Lutjens that Force H was en route for Crete, when it was actually in Gibraltar.
In short, Lutjens had no reason, based on the faulty intelligence he had been given, to suspect that there were any British capital ships anywhere near the Denmark Strait, and the appearance of two must have come as a considerable shock. Furthermore, his instructions, as they had been for Operation Berlin, were to seek out British supply convoys, and to avoid action with heavy ships.
Certainly, Lindemann did wish to attempt to pursue PoW, but Lutjens needed to consider the wider picture, which was that PoW might have been discontinuing the action in order to withdraw on the support of other British capital ships also in the area. In any case, Bismarck's damage had reduced her speed, and left her short of fuel. After the action, Lutjens realised that Rheinubung was a dead duck, and that his only remaining option was to make for St. Nazaire for repairs. A quixotic charge in pursuit of PoW was not even remotely worth considering.
Basing your criticism of Lutjens on facts of which he was unaware is not only unfair, but unjustified. Lutjens did make a number of mistakes during the Operation, but his supposed failure to pursue PoW was not one of them.
I did, by the way, ask you one question in my earlier post. I observe that you have not answered it.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
In many ways, isn't it a pity that Graf Zeppelin, with her Stukas & Bf109s, wasn't completed and put to sea. If she had, there would have been none of the interminable 'would have' posts which tend to appear about these things which never happened.
Such as what the Luftwaffe/U-Boats/mines/coastal batteries 'would have' done to the Royal Navy should Sealion have been attempted. Here, we have what the Graf Zeppelin 'would have' done had she sailed. Destroying convoys, sinking their escorts with her wonderful low angle main guns, and stretching the poor old Royal Navy beyond breaking point, for starters.
Quite an achievement for a carrier of outmoded design, built by a nation with absolutely no knowledge about, or understanding of, naval aviation, and armed with unsuitable guns and aircraft hastily cobbled together from land based types.
I'm sure the US Navy, upon seeing her, 'would have' cancelled construction of the Essexs, which 'would have been' totally outmatched!
Good heavens, I really enjoyed that!!
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@dmunro9076 Have I ever said that Bismarck had NO functioning radar? Only that her forward radar was out of commission. The Baron says (Chapter 13 of his book) in the English translation, that 'It now developed that the jolts caused by the firing of our big guns had put our forward radar out of action and, since Bismarck was in the lead, our Task Force was blind to any threat from ahead. In order to overcome this disability and also to have the ship with the heavier guns near the shadowers astern, Lutjens ordered a 'number change' which meant that the Prinz Eugen, her forward radar intact, would take the lead.'
When Prince of Wales re-engaged later on 24 May, The Baron records that the action was at extreme range, and that the glare of the sun on the water made observation from the main fire control centre in the foretop difficult. If so, why didn't Schneider use his, according to you, working radar? Moreover, why wasn't this radar used during the Hood action?
In chapter 15 of the Baron's book, he discusses Lutjens' reasons for abandoning his mission, stating that 'Furthermore, he (Lutjens) was probably disheartened by the fact that the few salvoes fired at Norfolk the night before had put the Bismarck's forward radar out of action. Shipboard repair of this radar was obviously impossible.'
There is, by the way, an entry in Prinz Eugen's War Diary, at 0028 on 24.05.41, that 'Bismarck's radars are not functioning.' Jasper also records that 'his ship was initially stationed 16,000 yards ahead, but later that night Bismarck's radar did completely pack up and apparently the gap was closed to 3000 m so that PG could scan ahead and astern.'
2
-
2
-
Churchill didn't orchestrate Gallipoli. He suggested the operation as an alternative to the unfolding carnage on the Western Front. Asquith authorised the Operation, but the planning was entirely that of the Admirals & Generals involved.
In 1941, the Admiralty had given Tovey four capital ships capable of catching Bismarck. There were two exit points into the wider Atlantic. Tovey placed his best & weakest ships (KGV & Repulse) in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and his second third best (Hood & PoW) in the Denmark Strait. Hood's deck armour was 3 inches thick, on a par with the Queen Elizabeths, and only in retrospect was what happened to Hood considered inevitable. The fact is that Bismarck needed to be prevented from reaching the wider Atlantic, and so she was.
Incidentally, Churchill didn't send either Prince of Wales or Repulse to a war zone. He sent them in an attempt to deter Japanese aggression. Again, you are applying hindsight, despite your denial. As to the advice of the Admiralty, that was to send slow & unmodernised R class battleships.
Assuming that Churchill wandered around during WW2 making foolish and unjustified decisions seems to be a strange modern trend, presumably intended to denigrate him. As a war leader, he made many decisions, some of which, inevitably, were wrong ones, but in these cases, as I said, he did not plan Gallipoli, he was not involved in the tactical disposition of the Home Fleet, and Force Z, though in the end a flawed judgement, was a justified gamble at the time.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@GreyWolfLeaderTW The use of naval torpedo aircraft to slow down an enemy fleet in order to bring it within range of the Battlefleet had been a staple of British policy for years. Haven't you heard of the concept of 'Find, Fix, & Strike?' Moreover, it had already happened once, less than two months earlier, in the Mediterranean at Matapan. The conclusions you seek to draw from Matapan are, by the way, erroneous. Without the strike on Vittorio Veneto, the battle would simply not have happened.
One battleship at Taranto, by the way, Cavour, was never repaired. The Italian fleet was relocated to Naples, and six months passed before the defences (mainly the addition of additional anti-torpedo nets) at Taranto had been improved. In short, the attack gave the Royal Navy a material superiority at a crucial time, and a psychological one which it retained for the rest of the campaign. To follow your argument, Pearl Harbor must have been equally unsuccessful, because of the ability of the US subsequently to salvage and repair most of the warships there.
The reward for disposing of Bismarck was always immense. The British simply could not allow a German Task Force out into the wider Atlantic, because of the difficulties of hunting it down. Operation Berlin had already demonstrated that. Moreover, Bismarck was the most powerful warship in the German arsenal at the time, and her elimination led directly to the Kriegsmarine abandoning any further attempts to operate large surface ships in the Atlantic. Of course Tovey was willing to risk Victorious' aircrews and aircraft in order to slow her down, just as he was willing to risk those from Ark Royal. His actions were not in any way dictated by the idea of 'revenge' but by an understanding of the situation of the war at sea as it existed in May, 1941.
Oh, and when did Tovey say that he was willing to accept the loss of KGV because Bismarck had sunk Hood? His reactions to Churchill's later order that KGV must complete the sinking of Bismarck, even if this meant her subsequently being towed, show that the loss of KGV was something which Tovey did not for a moment believe acceptable. If you must make this claim, please provide a credible source.
2
-
@GreyWolfLeaderTW 'Unproven Technology?' Taranto? Matapan? Don't be silly. The Fleet Air Arm had had the 'Find, Fix, and Strike' approach since the early 1930s.
Honour had nothing to do with anything. The Germans had four large warships, and the opportunity to sink one of them was too good to miss, especially since they rarely appeared at sea. Moreover, Bismarck had been sent on a commerce raiding mission, and her destruction was of importance for the convoy network.
The British, more than any other nation, understood the price of Admiralty. The knew that, in war, ships would be lost. 'Honour' was not part of the issue, but strategy was, and the result of Bismarck's sinking was the complete withdrawal, thereafter, of German surface warships from the Atlantic.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@McRocket A shame you feel the need to be offensive simply because I chose not to agree with you. Oh, well.
I ignored California because rebuilding a battleship as a battleship was hardly relevant. In any case, California was raised in April, 1942, and returned to service in January, 1944. Whatever work Hood might have undergone would have commenced around nine months before California was raised, or, indeed, around six before she was sunk.
The British did not suspend battleship construction at the start of the war. All five King George Vs were incomplete in September, 1939, and three were only even launched in 1940. In the United States, all four Iowas were launched in 1942 or later, and all four South Dakotas were completed after January, 1942.
If you think the working up process is nothing to do with making a ship fit for duty, then clearly you know less than you confidently believe. Read up on Prince of Wales at the Denmark Strait, or Shinano's whole career, for further information.
A modernised Hood would have been a significant addition to the Home Fleet's screen for Russian convoys, could easily have taken the place of Duke of York at North Cape, and could have acted as part of the RN's anti-Tirpitz dispositions, releasing a KGV for use with the Eastern Fleet or, indeed, could have been part of the Eastern Fleet herself.
Clearly, your knowledge of the RN's intentions for the post-war fleet is somewhat lacking. The Admiralty planned, as late as 1944, for twelve battleships, and were producing design changes for the Lions at the same time. Certainly, construction was suspended shortly after the start of WW2, not because the Admiralty no longer wanted them, but because in the short term the use of the yards for quick repair of damaged ships was deemed more of a priority than the construction of new warships which were at least two years away from completion, and the completion of the KGVs was imminent in any case.
The light fleets, by the way, were only laid down from March, 1942, and the Escort Carriers were, in the main regarded as for convoy protection rather than as fleet carriers, at a time when the Royal Navy had as the main priority the security of the Atlantic convoy system.
By the time the rebuilt Battleship Hood would have appeared, much of the German surface fleet would indeed have ceased to exist. In the main, because it had been destroyed by naval actions, rather than by aircraft.
Your opinion about my level of knowledge does not really concern me but,
if you think that 'I have more than made my point (with facts)' might I be permitted to observe that to justify this claim, the facts need to be correct ones, and, regretfully, many of yours do not appear to fall into this category.
2
-
@McRocket Akagi was not rebuilt from an existing warship, but was converted to a carrier following the Washington Naval Treaty. Even so, her conversion began in November, 1923, and was only completed in March, 1927, after which she did not complete trials until November.
Illustrious was laid down in April, 1937, and completed her work-up in Late July, 1940, rather more than three years.
More to the point, in June 1941 the British did not believe that the era of the battleship had ended. Nor, indeed, did the navies of the United States or Japan, both of whom, like the British, were building new battleships at the time. Indeed, the carrier never attained the prominence in western waters that it did in the Pacific, and a modernised, fast battleship, Hood would have been far more useful to the Admiralty from 1943 than your suggested carrier conversion, however relevant that might have been to any future British Pacific Fleet.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@hajoos.8360 Of course the Nelsons were the result of the Washington Naval Treaty. The British were given dispensation to build two 16 inch gunned battleships, to counterbalance the American Colorados and the Japanese Nagatos. Consequently, the British simply scaled down their G3 battlecruiser design, keeping armour and weight of broadside, but accepting a loss of speed. Even so, at 23 knots, the Nelsons were faster than any other battleship in western waters for over ten years. The G3 turret lay out, by the way, was more or less the same as the one used on the Nelsons. Didn't you know any of this, by the way? So all your 'even Drachifinel' remark demonstrates is that he knows more about the subject than you do.
'Stormy seas did more damage to German ships in common than British artillerie. British artillery was never able to sink German ships.' Really? tell that to the ghosts of the crew of the Scharnhorst, a ship which, incidentally, had a thicker belt than the Bismarcks. Where did Bismarck end up on 27 May, 1941, by the way?
Indeed, Hood had been a fast & fine ship for many years, but by 1941 was showing her age, and desperately in need of her intended reconstruction. In any case, she was much more an improved WW1 fast battleship, with the outdated armour layout of the period. The Nelsons & the KGVs were a class above, in armour and in firepower, though not in speed.
As to the hits achieved by Prince of Wales, of course her gunnery was not first rate. She was far from worked-up, and the problems with her turrets, although resolved quite quickly in fact, were well-known at the time. Even so, her hits on Bismarck forced Lutjens to abandon his mission and run for St. Nazaire, whereas Bismarck's hits on Prince of Wales caused little damage, largely because the shells failed to explode.
As to 'Speed is one significant way to avoid hits.' Only if by avoiding hits you really mean 'avoiding action,' and there are very few actions in WW2 where avoiding action led to success. Furthermore, using speed to avoid action didn't really work with Scharnhorst, did it?
You don't need, by the way, to tell me that I am right about the North Carolinas. I know I am.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@josephkugel5099 The Washington Naval Treaty was agreed in 1922, and effectively stayed in force until September, 1939. The last US battleships, other than the Iowas, were still designed and built within the parameters contained within it, although the North Carolinas and South Dakotas were able to benefit from the escalator clause in the 2nd London Naval Treaty.
Why do you think that the 'big gun' admirals would respond to Germany building large numbers of U-Boats by stepping up battleship construction? 'What if' scenario or not, it simply makes no sense. Moreover, didn't you even read my previous post? The RN had responded to the actual German U-Boat construction programme by ordering and commissioning large numbers of Atlantic escorts. Explain why, in your world, they would not react in a similar manner to increased U-Boat construction. You clearly assume a remarkable degree of stupidity on the part of the British government and admiralty, if you believe that they would have been unable to determine whose sea trade these boats were intended to threaten.
'I feel that when it came down to building hundreds of new destroyers and corvettes OR building lets say twenty shiny new Battleships that the BB lobby would carry the day in Parliament.'
What you feel is irrelevant, and clearly part of a wish-fulfilment fantasy in order to bring about your dream of a German Battle of the Atlantic victory. Even in the real world, the British rapidly extended construction of escort ships, and suspended construction of capital ships. Do you even know how many escorts the British ordered, laid down, and launched between 1939 & 1944? Actually, 932, excluding fleet destroyers and US built Lend-Lease ships. How many battleships? One, HMS Vanguard.
2
-
@josephkugel5099 Please don't rant. Most unedifying! As the world's largest naval power, of course the British monitored the activities of the others. In reality, warship construction was constrained by the Naval Treaties between the various naval powers, which restricted the numbers of capital ships, such as battleships & carriers. Perhaps you haven't heard of the Washington Naval Treaty?
As the Germans in my reality as opposed to your fantasy didn't place any emphasis on U-Boat construction, there was no particular reason for the British to rush through escort construction. The apparent shortage of escorts which actually occurred was due to entirely unforeseen circumstances, the collapse of France and the consequent need for the British to maintain a much larger presence in the Mediterranean than had been part of pre-war planning. Even so, by the way, between 1936 & December, 1939, the British had launched 50 destroyers and 33sloops, and had 106 corvettes ordered. I won't trouble you with the number of destroyers and sloops also on order.
You seem to accuse me of things I haven't said, and don't even think. British naval strategy from the early 1930s onwards made a number of assumptions, among which were that a future naval war would be against, in the worst case, Germany, Italy, & Japan, but that the French navy would play a major role in the Mediterranean. There was absolutely no suggestion that British would attempt to match the rest of the world's navies, because the Washington Naval Treaty had already determined fleet sizes as :-
UK & USA Capital ships 525,000 tons each, Carriers 135,000 tons each.
Japan Capital Ships 315,000 tons, Carriers 81,000 tons.
Italy & France Capital Ships 175,000 tons each, Carriers 60,000 tons each.
You don't seem to know any of this. The RN, by the way, had already built up to the maximum in terms of carrier tonnage, so your comment about 'Big Gun' admirals doesn't really have any relevance either.
Finally, I know how many boats Doenitz had in commission in September, 1939. Again however, you ramble on about what if Germany had ten times the number of boats, without allowing the British the right to respond, and without even considering which parts of the German war machine would suffer if German industry was diverted to U-Boat production.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Barwell was laid down on 6 September, 1939, launched on 13 February, 1940, and commissioned on 26 April, 1940. She was built by Lobnitz, of Renfrew. She appears to have been scrapped in Singapore around 1957.
The Bar class (76 vessels) were 173.75 ft long, by 32.25 ft x 11.25 ft, and displaced 730 tons, full load. Armament was 1 x 12 pounder gun. Usual crew was 32, and they were coal fired.
I believe one still exists, SAS Somerset, (originally HMS Barcross ) as a museum ship in South Africa. There are one or two photos. on her website.
2
-
The first 26 were ordered on 25 July, 1939. To give you some idea of the urgency, the Admiralty held a meeting with representatives of Smith's Dock, whose whaler 'Southern Pride' was the basis of the Flower design, in January, 1939, and the sketch design was approved before the end of February.
Of the first 26, Godetia was completed in 6 months 19 days, and Gladiolus in 5 months 18 days. These two, however, were built by Smith's Dock. Other yards seem to have taken longer, with 10-12 months being about the average.
A naval yard (as compared to civilian builders) such as Harland & Wolff seems to have been quicker. 20 Flowers were ordered from H & W on 19 September, 1939, and all except two were completed in less than seven months. One of this order, Rhododendron, was built in 4 months 26 days, which is the quickest build time I have come across.
I haven't found any building times for the 64 Canadian Flowers, only launch to completion dates.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@conradylee Sturdee was not hated within the Admiralty as such, but by the dominant figure within it. Sturdee became involved, not by his choice, in a feud between Fisher and Charles Beresford, C-in-C Mediterranean fleet, when he was made his Chief of Staff in 1907, Sturdee was told by Fisher to 'keep an eye on Charlie, as he was inclined to be rash,' and to write to him privately about Beresford's behaviour. Sturdee refused, believing that he should be loyal to his C-in-C, and as a result, joined Beresford on Fisher's list.
When Fisher returned to the Admiralty at the outbreak of WW1, Fisher told the First Lord, Churchill, that he would not accept Sturdee as Chief of Staff. Churchill, refused to permit his removal, and the matter rested there, rather uneasily, until Coronel gave Churchill the opportunity to write personally to Sturdee to offer him command of the battlecruisers, after Fisher had informed Churchill that he would not tolerate 'that damned fool' one day longer at the Admiralty.
Even after his success at the Falklands, the antagonism did not abate. When Sturdee returned to the Admiralty with his report, Fisher kept him waiting for several hours in a side room before he would see him, and his own report on Sturdee's performance was riddled with comments about his perceived failures and shortcomings.
Jellicoe, by contrast, thought highly of Sturdee, and, according to Churchill, Sturdee had the reputation within the navy of being 'a sea officer of keen intelligence and great tactical ability, a man who could handle and fight his ship and his squadron with the utmost skill and resolution.'
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Canberra was part of a joint USN/RAN Task Force defeated in a night surface action by the Imperial Japanese Navy in August, 1942, at Savo Island. To this day, there is considerable controversy about the sinking, in that Canberra had her port side to the Japanese when she was attacked, yet the crippled cruiser, before being sunk by US navy destroyers on 9 August, showed torpedo damage from two torpedo hits in her starboard side. The only vessel to Canberra's starboard which fired torpedoes at the time was the destroyer USS Bagley. A book, 'The Shame of Savo,' by an Australian author, argues the case for 'friendly fire' quite cogently.
Canberra, despite being badly damaged, was in no immediate danger of sinking, but around two hours after the action, at 0330 on 9 August, the destroyer USS Patterson came alongside with orders from Rear Admiral Turner, USN, that she would be sunk if engine power could not be restored within three hours. As this was not possible, and Turner seemingly chose not to adopt the alternative, of towing the cruiser to Tulagi for repairs, the crew were transferred to Patterson. As Patterson was taking them aboard, she was fired on by a cruiser, USS Chicago.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 Well, as you haven't presented any arguments, other than your conviction that you must be right, and as you also claimed that rescue operations after the Scharnhorst action were aborted following a U-Boat report, when this is demonstrably false, it seems fairly self-evident that your 'claim' is based entirely on your personal prejudice.
Incidentally, who exactly do you think you are 'proclaiming' your fantasies to? I know of no credible naval historian who would buy in to your evil murdering British hypothesis, based as it is on a quite remarkable ignorance of the realities of warfare.
In short, keep posting your nonsense, or just go away. I really don't care either way, although people like you do provide some amusement for those of us who have professional qualifications in the field of naval history, I suppose.
2
-
2
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 Precisely what sort of evidence would you expect? Whether there was a U-Boat there or not is irrelevant. If the British thought there was then they were obliged to act to avoid being attacked. Actually, post-war German records make it fairly clear that there was no U-Boat but, astonishingly, the British did not have access to post-war German naval records in May 1941. All the British knew was 1). U-Boats had been ordered to concentrate on Bismarck's position. 2). Bismarck had been transmitting signals, possibly homing signals, on a U-Boat, rather than the usual surface ship, frequency. 3). An officer on the bridge of Dorsetshire reported seeing exhaust fumes on the beam of the cruiser. If you can prove that Group West had not ordered U-Boats to concentrate on Bismarck's position, and Bismarck had not transmitted homing signals on 852 meters & 443 kcs, then please present your evidence.
If you really are an historian, as you apparently claim, then you should know that your personal prejudice against Captain Martin is irrelevant.
2
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 Do you know what punishment Midshipman Brooks received for his action? Confinement to his cabin for a few days. Hardly keel-hauling was it? The fact was that Brooks disobeyed orders, and as a junior officer could not escape punishment. He did, however, receive nothing more than a wrist slap. Where is your evidence that Martin was a cold-hearted bully? Should you be interested, he actually joined the navy as a boy seaman in 1908, and retired as a (knighted) vice-admiral in 1947, having, at the end of his career, commanded assault forces ( Force W) from HMS Bulolo during the Arakan campaign.
I note that you 'distrust' the motives of Captain Martin, and blame the British commanding officers on the scene. As a historian, you surely know that personal prejudices should play no part; what matters is evidence based on known facts.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
The Second London Naval Treaty, of March, 1936, limited the size of heavy guns to 14 inches. It was signed by the United States, Britain, & France. Armour protection was actually greater than any other battleship class built (yes, even the Iowas) with the exception of the Yamatos.
As to the effectiveness of the 14 inch guns, at North Cape, Duke of York, firing under radar control in poor weather, scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. Likewise, her shells had little difficulty penetrating Scharnhorst's armour, which was actually superior to that of the Bismarck class.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
It is always fascinating to read comments about the fantasy that was Plan Z. The idea was adopted in late January, 1939. By that time, the German Naval Ordnance department (on 31 December, 1938) had already issued a report, 'The Feasibility of the Z Plan,' which pointed out that requirements in materials and manpower were so great that the whole of German industry would need to be committed to it. In other words, no weapons production for the army, and no aircraft production for the Luftwaffe. At the time the plan appeared, the Kriegsmarine were still sorting out technical problems with the Scharnhorst class yet, apparently, Germany was going to build six 56000 ton battleships, ten 21000 ton battlecruisers, and four aircraft carriers, as well as large numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and U-boats, by 1947.
As Hitler always viewed the Soviet Union as his primary enemy, does anyone really, seriously, consider that he would have regarded devoting Germany's entire industrial potential to building a large fleet as having any merit at all?
Honestly, the very idea is utterly ludicrous.
2
-
2
-
@mel.3687 Where did you get the Lindemann idea from? That was a decision well above his pay grade. The Kriegsmarine was the least nazified of the German armed forces, but because of Admiral Raeder
Erich Raeder was a devout Christian, who retained Jewish, or half Jewish officers, within the navy. Commander Ascher, aboard Bismarck, was half Jewish, for example.
Raeder also ordered the navy to use the traditional, rather than nazi, salute, and even kept chaplains on the larger ships.
Actually, the process of withdrawal from Empire pre-dated WW2 by some years. Canada, New Zealand, & Australia, for example, had become self-governing democratic Dominions many years earlier.
The whole point of Lend-Lease was that the items the US supplied did not need to be paid for until after the war.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Unfortunately, Macksey's book is riddled with inaccuracies. The German surface fleet at the time, for example, in terms of operational ships, consisted of one heavy cruiser, seven destroyers, four light cruisers, seven torpedo boats (the equivalent of destroyer escorts) a handful of minesweepers, and around thirteen S boats. Compared to what the Royal Navy had in terms of the Home Fleet at Rosyth, let alone the 70 or so destroyers and light cruisers within five hours steaming of Dover, the supposed German Fleet would not have caused much, if any, delay at all.
I fear Macksey was rather free and easy with facts, in order to make his idea of a German landing possible.
Oh, and yes, I do have the book, and have read it several times.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Unfortunately, acquisition of aircraft for the Fleet Air Arm was in the hands of the Royal Navy's most intransigent enemy, the Royal Air Force, until 1939. Consequently, the funds available were spent predominantly on bombers (which, of course, would 'always get through') then fighters, with a small amount going to Coastal Command, and, seemingly, what was found in Trenchard's pockets after a night out at his club being devoted to the Fleet Air Arm.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
'Better circumstances?' Would that have been after Bismarck & Prinz Eugen had broken out into the wider Atlantic, and taken a lot more resources to locate?
The British had four capital ships in the Home Fleet with the speed to catch Bismarck, and positioned two of them in each of the choke points from which Bismarck might have emerged. The Battle of the Denmark Strait, and the damage Bismarck received during it, ensured that Lutjens was obliged to abandon his mission and make for St. Nazaire.
Bismarck had a weaker broadside, and thinner armour, than the British Nelsons or the KGVs. Moreover, her armour was laid out in the outmoded, incremental, manner rather than the superior all or nothing of the two British classes. All Bismarck had in her favour was her speed. Once that was lost, she was doomed.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@hajoos.8360 So, you claim that I am making things up? You are deluding yourself. Try reading Vice Admiral Schmundt's Report of 16 June, 1941. Schmundt was, by the way, 'Commander of cruisers' in the Kriegsmarine at the time. More relevantly, I hope anyone else who reads this will also look up the document to confirm the accuracy of my comment. They could also read Busch's 'The Story of the Prinz Eugen' for confirmation of Jaspers' error, although Busch is a less reliable source.
Your comment about using AP 14 or 15 inch shells against heavy cruisers is irrelevant, because both PoW & Hood were engaging (or in Hood's case, believed they were engaging,) Bismarck, and, by the way, their ammunition usage has never been in doubt. What sort of 'success' do you think Prinz Eugen achieved? A hit on Hood's boat deck, which ignited AA ammunition, but had no effect on her operational capability. Seriously, if you believe that 8 inch AP shells are of no use against armour, then what purpose do you suggest they served at all? In other words, why did Prinz Eugen carry them?
Do you know any credible authority who would argue that using 8 inch HE shells against Hood was a matter of choice, and not simply an error arising from a mis-identification of the British ships, as the German records, or at least all those I have seen, clearly state?
As to remaining in line, clearly you do not agree with the German 'Commander of cruisers' of the time, whose assessment I quoted earlier. You know, the one you believe I made up, apparently.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@hajoos.8360 Let's see. Graf Spee, engaged and forced to scuttle, by an 'inferior' cruiser force. Scharnhorst & Gneisenau both damaged during the Norwegian campaign and out of action for six months until November, 1940. Deutchland/ Litzow crippled in April, 1940 and out of service until April, 1941. Karlsruhe sunk on 9 April, 1940. Konigsberg sunk in Bergen harbour by the Fleet Air Arm on 9 April, 1940. Leipzig crippled in December 1939, and only repaired sufficiently to be used as a training ship thereafter. Ten destroyers sunk in the two battles of Narvik, half of the total German destroyer fleet, in fact. Granted, after that, it does get harder, as German surface ships were rarely seen at sea. Bismarck, after failing on her commerce raiding mission, sunk on her first voyage, in May, 1941. Scharnhorst sunk off North Cape, December, 1943, and three German destroyers (of a force of eleven) sunk by two cruisers in the bay of Biscay during the same month. Would you like a list of the occasions when RN arctic convoy escorts groups saw off occasional attacks by German surface forces, even supposedly superior ones as well? The Barents Sea comes to mind, for one.
Odd that most of the above slipped your memory, isn't it?
2
-
@hajoos.8360 As a 'well educated on-paper seaman' may I have the impertinence to correct this :-
'High velocity 11-inch-shells from Gneisenau or Scharnhorst penetrated easily the armor of Renown, which meant cold food for Renown's crew.' I assume you have never read Captain Simeon's report of the action with Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, still less, probably, that of Admiral Whitworth. Well, I have.
Despite your untruths, which I will generously attribute to your ignorance, rather than to a deliberate attempt to mislead, Renown was actually hit twice during the action. One shell passed through the main leg of her forward tripod mast, without exploding, although it did sever some electrical leads, and the second passed through Renown's extreme stern, damaging a fan and some light fittings, again without exploding. Renown's armour was not penetrated, and the damage was minimal, with none at all to her galley. I recall telling you this some time ago. Presumably you did not expect me to read this post, hence your attempt to patronise me.
By the way, Kirishima was never a British ship, although built, in Japan, to a British design. Again, clearly, you cannot possibly be attempting to mislead, but are simply either ill informed or merely allowing personal prejudice to override the facts.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
The point where a shell hit an enemy warship always relied to some element on luck. However well trained the gunnery team, WW2 crews could not aim at a particular area of a ship.
The torpedo hit, however, was the culmination of years of training by Fleet Air Arm crews, in carrying out and executing attacks on enemy warships. The philosophy was based on the fact that RN capital ships were generally slower than new construction or modernisations entering service in the late 1930s. Torpedo aircraft sought to inflict damage which would slow down enemy units sufficiently to bring them to battle. In point of fact, this had already happened once, in the Mediterranean in March, bringing about the Battle of Matapan.
The 'balsa wood' biplane, by the way, actually sank more axis shipping than any other allied aircraft, so perhaps there was some merit in the old Stringbag?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@shalaconballard9912 Very nice. You should look at any proper book on HMS Hood for accurate facts. I would recommend 'HMS Hood - Design & Construction' by Maurice Northcott, or 'British Battleships of WW2' by Raven & Roberts, to begin with, for proper facts about her. These detail, in particular, her re-design after Jutland, and the proposals for the 'Large Repair.' This was the modernisation which never actually happened.
Put simply, Hood was a ship with the armour of a contemporary battleship, and the speed of a contemporary battlecruiser.
As I said, why don't you look up any of the numerous sources which detail her armour, instead of sticking doggedly to your opinion in defiance of the facts?
2
-
2
-
2
-
Holland actually intended to engage at around 0200, when Bismarck & Prinz Eugen would be silhouetted against the afterglow (sunset was at 0151) but Suffolk lost radar contact at 0028, and Lutjens changed course at 0141.
Suffolk regained contact at around 0300, by which time Holland was about 35 nm away from Bismarck, and slightly ahead. This meant that the British approach involved converging at a wider angle, which became even more disadvantageous to them when the Germans altered course again around 0320. This is another of the many 'what ifs' surrounding the Bismarck action, i.e., what if Suffolk had maintained contact, and Holland was able to engage at 0200?
Holland seems to have chosen not to detach Prince of Wales to act independently (as Tovey later did with Rodney) because of a wish to determine the separate fall of shot from his two capital ships, although possibly he had doubts about POW's state of readiness. I doubt anyone can know his reasoning for sure.
The action, to be honest, concluded before Norfolk or Suffolk could do anything, although I believe that was the intention.
As to Prince of Wales leading, Tovey thought the same, and considered signalling Holland to suggest it, before deciding to leave such decisions to the man on the spot. Certainly, POW was far better equipped to cope with Bismarck's shellfire. Probably, Holland did not believe that he should, Duke of Plaza Toro like, lead his regiment from the rear. I have read that, for the rest of his life, Tovey profoundly regretted not making the signal.
2
-
@MrSkillfish Well, Ballard & Mearns, who led two separate expeditions, both attributed the sinking to 'the British.' Moreover, by the time she sank, she had lost her main armament, her bridge and command staff, her internal communications, and was suffering from widespread internal fires. She had developed a serious list, and was settling by the stern.
Hardly scratched, really, I suppose.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@ellsworth1956 Hood was certainly inferior in terms of firepower and armour to the Colorados, but, with 10 knots greater speed, had the ability to choose whether to engage or not. Nagato had a heavier weight of broadside, but thinner armour and four knots less speed. Moreover, both the Colorados & the Nagato were completed after Hood.
Certainly, Hood was outclassed in terms of weight of broadside and armour by the Nelsons, & the King George Vs, as well as by the North Carolinas. Only to be expected, since these were newer classes. In terms of Bismarck, which featured a number of outdated design features, Hood had a heavier broadside, but inferior armour. However, with a similar level of armour to the Queen Elizabeths, Hood was one of only five British capital ships with the speed and firepower to catch & engage Bismarck. Four of these were with the Home Fleet, and Tovey needed to block two exit points into the broader Atlantic.
Thus, he placed his best and weakest capital ships, KGV & Repulse, in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and the second & third best, Hood & Prince of Wales, in the Denmark Strait. Holland was well aware of Hood's weakness against long range plunging fire, which is why he sought to shorten the range as quickly as possible. Had he achieved this, the probability is that, with the support of PoW, sufficient damage would have been inflicted in Bismarck to either sink her, or at the least force her commander to abandon his mission. In point of fact, that is what actually happened.
Only with the benefit of hindsight have armchair admirals waxed eloquent about the foolishness of sending Hood to engage Bismarck.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@hajoos.8360 In point of fact, the driving force behind what some have seen as the harsh terms of the Treaty was France. Both Lloyd-George and Wilson believed that the French terms were too severe. Churchill, by the way, was not a major player in the British government at the time, although, as Martin Gilbert pointed out, he was strongly opposed to the proposed terms, and in particular to the disbanding of the German army, which he saw as a potential bulwark against the spread of communism.
Incidentally, he was only elected as Prime Minister in 1951.
Seriously, if you want a debate about 'facts' perhaps you should try to come up with some.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Churchill didn't hold any political office between 1929 & September, 1939. When in the political wilderness, he argued that nazi Germany was expanding her military resources, and preparing for war. Was he wrong? If not, then how can warning the government of the United Kingdom about this be considered 'warmongering?'
As to the failed operations he planned, I doubt he ever planned a military operation in his life. Certainly, as part of the Asquith/Lloyd George government in WW1, then during WW2, he was closely involved in the strategy the allies pursued, but the planning was left to the supposed 'professionals' and, at Gallipoli at least, the professionals failed badly.
As to Mers el Kebir, certainly it was his decision, and it was the correct one. After the collapse of France, the British Isles relied absolutely upon the Royal Navy for defence against invasion. The German navy was weak, but had Hitler gained operational control of the French navy, then an invasion attempt might have been made. Mers took place only a week or so after the establishment of the Vichy government, and this government's attitude towards the British (and towards their German overlords) was unclear, to say the least.
Do you think that, had Churchill not taken such a decision, the House of Commons and the people of Great Britain would have responded with good-natured shrugs had a German invasion force, protected by the French navy, arrived off the South Coast later in 1940?
2
-
2
-
The France of early July 1940 was not an ally of Britain, and in fact had not been so since the fall of Paul Reynaud and the subsequent 22 June Armistice. To use a more recent comparison, was the Iran of the Shah, and the Iran of Khomeini, the same country?
One of the clauses of that armistice was that the French Fleet should be returned to French Atlantic ports, and placed under German supervision. The British, whose only sure defence at the time was the knowledge that, after Norway, the remaining German fleet was far too weak to support an invasion, simply were not willing to risk the French fleet appearing in the Channel in support of such an attempt.
Furthermore, the British ultimatum provided for the transfer of the French fleet to the French West Indies, to be placed under the supervision of the neutral United States, but this option was never considered by Darlan or the new French government, because, for unknown reasons, Gensoul chose not to pass it one.
Sorry to interfere with your anti-Churchill diatribe, by the way, but Operation Keelhaul was authorised by Clement Attlee, after the 1945 General Election, and Operation Unthinkable was a theoretical study which never became a reality.
2
-
2
-
@whitewolf1298 As I said, I don't intend to indulge you in an argument over the number of deaths. I take it, however, that you haven't read Neutzner, Matthias; et al. (2010). "Abschlussbericht der Historikerkommission zu den Luftangriffen auf Dresden zwischen dem 13. und 15. Februar 1945." Don't, by the way, as you wouldn't like the conclusions.
As best I can tell, you seem to believe that the Germans were innocent of anything even slightly naughty, i.e., 'the Germans were not interested in war crimes per say' whereas the British (i.e., apparently, Churchill) were constantly on the look out for further evils to perpetrate.
If Hitler had no intention of invading Britain, why were there, by late September, 1940, 159 transport ships, 1859 modified Rhine barges, 397 tugs, and 1168 motor boats, in French and Belgian ports? Presumably, the Kreigsmarine were undertaking some sort of pleasant, peaceful, regatta to entertain the grateful French, Belgian & Dutch citizens who had just been liberated by the German army?
Other than that, brief, comment, I really have more interesting and constructive things to do with my time than to debate with people of your sort.
2
-
@whitewolf1298 I'm not going to get into a 'counting corpses' squabble with you, but Germans historians, and even David Irving, have actually estimated the Dresden casualties to have been 25,000.
Obviously, this is horrible enough, but should be seen in the light of a 1953 United States Air Force report, which defended the operation as the justified bombing of a strategic target. Dresden was a major rail transport and communication centre, housing 110 factories and 50,000 workers in support of the German war effort. My own view of the use of bomber command during WW2 is that it was ill-advised, in that greater resources should have been concentrated on long range air cover of Atlantic convoys, rather than the obsession of Harris and his like with Douhet's theories that bombing alone could force a nation into submission. The big four engined bombers had the range to bridge the air gap at least a year earlier than historically occurred, which would probably have resulted in the Royal & Royal Canadian navies winning the Battle of the Atlantic much earlier than May 1943, when they historically did.
However, though I would argue that Harris & the Air Ministry were wrong in their strategy, that does not make them, nor the British Government, guilty of anything remotely resembling a 'war crime.' They believed that their actions would aid the Soviet Union, bring about the collapse of the German war economy, and thus shorten the war.
In the case of the 1943 Indian famine, the British did not divert foodstuffs. There were a number of events which brought it about, including the loss of imports from Burma, now a Japanese occupied territory, the pressure on an agrarian economy from population growth, natural disasters in SW Bengal, the refusal of the US government to agree to the diversion of shipping, and the spread of diseases such as malaria. Indeed, some of the shortages were political in character, caused by supporters of the Congress party in an effort to embarrass the existing Muslim Government of Bengal. The British government give control of food distribution to the military later in 1943, and around 350,000 tons of wheat were shipped direct to India from Australia. Certainly, there were a number of shortcomings in the British response, but largely these were as a result of the pressures of the war situation, and a delay in appreciating the extent of the impending disaster, rather than, as you seem simplistically to believe, merely because the British diverted foodstuffs.
Neither event you cite was a war crime.
Isn't it easy, by the way, to spout 'War Crime' allegations eighty years after the event from a comfortable chair in front of a lap top?
2
-
'It goes without saying that it would have been highly advantageous for Britain to have negotiated its own armistice with Germany.' Then I'm really glad you didn't say it. How can you possibly make such a comment without having the vaguest idea what the terms of such an 'armistice' might have been? Moreover, your apparent confidence that Hitler would abide by the terms of any such agreement is hardly borne out by the facts, as Adolf's record in such matters was hardly impressive.
Certainly, the British government did not trust the Vichy French. Can you explain why they should have been more trusting? Why do you place the blame, should that be an appropriate term, on Somerville? He was a serving officer, acting under orders from his political superiors, and he stretched things to the limit, well beyond the deadline, before actually opening fire when Gensoul's ships had raised steam and were starting to move.
Your various alternatives are, in the main, not credible. The option of sailing to French West Indian or even US ports had been offered, and Spain was a fascist dictatorship which, in July 1940, might well have joined the axis. A skeleton British presence? Would the French have allowed this, and in any case wasn't this simply handing over British servicemen to become hostages in the event of a failure to agree? Anchoring British ships alongside their French counterparts? In a French port, under French guns? In any case, in July 1940 the British government was hardly in a position to immobilise a major part of their fleet. Allowing the ships to go to French colonies? The British government had offered this. Gensoul simply chose not to tell his political masters that the offer had been made. Insist that the French reduce to skeleton crews? In a French naval base? How would the British monitor this? Allow the French to enter into tranquil negotiations? When Gensoul's fleet was raising steam and was preparing for sea, and the British were aware of orders from the French Admiralty to any French warships in the area to proceed to Mers in support of Gensoul?
The capability of the Italian navy at that time was an unknown quantity, by the way, and the fact that the German navy (not, by the way, better on a ship to ship basis, despite your throw away comment) had been largely destroyed during the Norwegian campaign was precisely the reason that the status of the French navy had to be settled. The Kriegsmarine alone could never support any sort of invasion attempt on Britain, but the French navy was strong enough to provide such support. France had, by the way, entered the war with around seventy destroyers, nineteen cruisers, five obsolete and two modern battleships. It was not, by the way, particularly 'crappy' despite your authoritative assessment.
In short, in July 1940, the British depended absolutely on their navy to prevent invasion, and it was widely scattered, having to absorb duties which had not been expected in any pre-war planning. The only card the British government had was the fact that the German navy was desperately weak after Norway. In July, 1940, the attitude of France was unknown, but the British government could not contemplate the possibility that the French navy could be ordered to support a German invasion attempt. Fling about glib terms such as 'war crime' as much as you like, (and isn't it easy to do eighty years after the event?) but the action Churchill took was intended to ensure British national survival. It was not only his decision, it was his duty, to act in the way he did.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@rosesprog1722 Churchill had no guarantees at all. Admiral Darlan, when C-in-C of the French Navy, said he would not let the fleet fall into German hands. That was before he ceased to be a naval officer and joined the new Petain-led French Government. What if the new French Head of State undertook to send the French fleet in support of a German invasion attempt? Similarly, you think Hitler said he didn't want the French fleet? Oh well, if Hitler said it, it must be true, mustn't it? After all, his career to date proved him to have been a man of his word!
Don't be naive. In July 1940, the only thing standing between Britain & an attempted invasion was the Royal Navy, and the fact that the German navy had been maimed during the Norwegian campaign. Churchill had to ensure that the French fleet did not appear in the Channel in support of a German attack, and he acted accordingly.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@jpmeunier5595 Would you like me to recommend a few books, as your knowledge is slightly lacking? I have already told you the facts about the manner in which Fighter Command aircraft were used, so won't repeat them.
Please show me any credible source from the time which demonstrates that the British intended to withdraw from 21 May. The Dunkirk operation was intended to make possible the removal of the trapped troops of the BEF & French First Army in order to land them further west. The British actually began re-landing troops in Cherbourg, from 7 June, but were told by General Weygand that the French Army was no longer 'able to offer organised resistance.' At that point, I wonder if the Admiralty wondered why they had wasted time, ships, & lives evacuating French troops who, when re-landed in France, were simply ordered to lay down their arms by their commanders.
As to Mers-el-Kebir, of course the British were scared. Unlike France, they had chosen to continue to resist, and they feared that an attempted invasion was planned. The German navy had been desperately weakened during the Norwegian campaign, but there was a possibility that the French navy might be used to support an attempt. After all, in early July, 1940, no-one knew exactly how the new French government might behave. Consequently, the British took preventative measures, the extent of which might have been much less bloody had Gensoul acted properly, and told his superiors what the full text of the ultimatum actually contained.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@vonVince Actually, anyone who knows anything about the period knows exactly why the British acted as they did. After Norway, the Germans had virtually no navy left and were never seriously in any position to attempt to invade Britain. However, had the Petainist government chosen to send the French fleet in support, then an attempt might just possibly have been made.
Therefore, the British chose to act to prevent the possibility. Unfortunately, Admiral Gensoul, for reasons never explained, chose not to pass on the full text, including the French West Indies/US supervision option, to his government, which was ironic considering that Darlan would probably have accepted it, but instead began to prepare his fleet for sea.
I wonder if the potential alternative, of French and British warships engaging in a series of actions in the Channel & Mediterranean as the French sought to do the bidding of their conquerors, would have been preferable? I suspect not.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
And the cost estimated by the clueless MoD usually turns out to be about 10% of what the final cost turns out to be. Following which, the MoD announces that the final design is 'more capable' than had been expected, and that, therefore, only 5, rather than 8, will be built. Presumably, in MoD world, the ideal Royal Navy of the future would have one ship, but a remarkably capable one. It would, however, take 40 years to build, presumably in a South East Asian shipyard.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Self-inflicted blast damage is entirely dependent upon the elevation of the guns and how close the 'A' arcs were to being closed. Warspite at Narvik fired at very close range, whereas at Calabria the range was very long. Seriously, if Warspite had suffered a heavy calibre hit, don't you think it would have involved rather more than shelves falling over and a chart being ripped?
The use of the definite, rather than indefinite, in a letter to Pound? Is that really all you have? By the way, HMS Neptune & HMS Gloucester were both damaged in the cruiser action prior to Calabria.
Furthermore, at Calabria, by 1700 hours the enemy was no longer in sight and WARSPITE was within 25 miles of the Calabrian coast. Does that, seriously, sound like the kind of risk Cunningham would have taken with his only modernised battleship had she already been damaged?
The reference to the SKL diary is meaningless, as German liaison officers were simply repeating what the Italians told them. German reports of the same period recorded the sinking of HMS Ark Royal on a regular basis, by the way.
'Does anyone know of that German report from Cairo? Were there German agents there?' Shouldn't you, if you seek to use that as an argument, be answering the question yourself?
Warspite's Ship's Cover, by the way, makes no reference to any damage to her at Calabria. She was regularly at sea immediately afterwards, until undergoing a brief refit in Alexandria in early August.
Your comments, frankly, make clutching at straws comparatively convincing.
Who are these 'researchers' by the way? Perhaps they collaborated with Argentinian 'researchers' who 'proved' that HMS Invincible was sunk during the Falklands?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@BrianSmith-ow9gy As design of the Queen Elizabeths began in 1994, I suspect that what we have is what we will keep. In October 2010 the government stated that the carriers were to be fitted with an electro-magnetic catapult, and placed orders for F35cs. Incidentally, I referred in an earlier post to the F35cs when I meant F35b,. It is the F35b which is the STOL version and which the RAF are supposedly lobbying against.
In December, 2011, the government ordered a catapult system from General Atomics of San Diego. By May, 2012, the cost had doubled, and the supply date had been put back to 2023. The Government then cancelled the order, and reverted to the ski-jump and the STOL aircraft.
The catapult has been installed in the new US carrier, the Gerald R Ford, but a proposal to retrofit it into their Nimitz class has been rejected. It seems that such an operation would be vastly complex, time-consuming, and costly.
In the 1930s, there was considerable disquiet about the estimate of four years to build a King George V class battleship. Don't times change?
1
-
1
-
@BrianSmith-ow9gy Part of the problem with Fleet Air Arm aircraft was that, until April, 1918, the Admiralty had control of naval aviation, and had a Royal Naval Air Service which operated 2949 aircraft and 103 airships. An attack by torpedo bombers (Sopwith Cuckoos) was being planned on the German fleet in the Jade estuary, from aircraft carriers.
Sadly, on that date, the RAF was formed, and the Admiralty did not regain control of Naval Aviation until 24 May, 1939. On that date, as a result of the care and attention lavished on it by the Air Ministry (which was fixated on the bomber which, of course 'would always get through' and latterly, unwillingly, on fighters) the Fleet Air Arm operated 232 frontline aircraft, of which most were obsolete.
It is no wonder the Admiralty built armoured deck carriers, and desperately tried to buy superior American designs. The surprising thing is that, having been betrayed by the Air Ministry, the Fleet Air Arm achieved as much as it did in the early war years.
1
-
1
-
@richardcutts196 Indeed they did, and look at what they saddled themselves with! 27 knots, but 12 inch or 12.6 inch guns, 9.8 inch belts and 3.1 inch deck armour. The British already had 15 capital ships, of which 5 were obsolete, and Iron Duke had been stripped of her armour and two turrets since 1930. Centurion had been totally stripped of her armament and most of her upperworks since 1927 for use as a target ship. In March, 1939, the British did briefly investigate restoring Iron Duke. The work would have involved fitting a new 11 inch main belt, bulges, 4 inch deck armour, two replacement turrets, and new secondary armament of 4.5 or 5,25 inch guns. Boilers & machinery would require complete replacement. The result would have been something inferior to the R class, fit only for second line duties.
Wisely, the Admiralty concluded that the cost, time, and dockyard facilities required would have been better used elsewhere. With five new battleships in the process of construction, the RN, in 1939, did not need to waste resources restoring a museum piece.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Yes, of course. Never mind the fact that Colossus was more than two knots faster, could bring ten, as opposed to eight, 12 inch guns to bear on a target, and had 3 inch horizontal armour, as opposed to Michigan's 1 and a half inches. You might also mention director fire control for the main guns, which Colossus had from the outset, but Michigan didn't receive until December, 1914.
Clearly, not much of a contest.
1
-
1
-
1
-
The following tribute was written by a former member of Warspite's crew, who saw the Old Lady in Prussia Cove, Marazion, after she had broken away from her tow en route to the Breakers. I defy anyone not to be moved by his words:-
"The Subject"
You say you have no subject
And your brushes all have dried;
But come to Marazion
At the ebbing of the tide.
And look you out to seaward,
Where my Lady, battle scarred
Hugs the rock that is more welcome,
Than the shameful breakers yard.
Paint her there upon the sunset
In her glory and despair,
With the diadem of victory
Still in flower upon her hair.
Let her whisper as she settles
Of her blooding long ago,
In the mist that mingles Jutland
With the might of Scapa Flow.
Let her tell you, too, of Narvik
With its snowy hills, and then
Of Matapan, Salerno
And the shoals of Walcheren;
And finally of Malta,
When along the purple street
Came in trail the Roman Navy
To surrender at her feet.
Of all these honours conscious,
How could she bear to be
Delivered to the spoiler
Or severed from the sea ?
So hasten then and paint her
In the last flush of her pride
On the rocks of Marazion,
At the ebbing of the tide.
Lt-Cmdr R A B Mitchell.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Because, from the perspective of 1939/40, the first two Lions wouldn't be ready before 1943. As the biggest bottleneck in building was the production of the 16 inch triple gun barbettes, and as the four twin fifteen inch barbettes taken out of Courageous & Glorious were available in store, the decision was made to place a contract for a ship build to a modified Lion design, with an obsolete, but serviceable, main armament, which (ironically, as things turned out,) could enter service more quickly.
As the war situation developed, design changes regularly delayed construction (at one time, consideration was given to converting Vanguard to an aircraft carrier) resulting in her not being completed until 1946.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Incorrect. On the morning of 27 May, Somerville was unsure whether Tovey's force was actually in contact with Bismarck. Weather on the morning of 27 May was very poor, but by 0926 had moderated sufficiently to enable a force of 12 Swordfish to take off from Ark Royal, should a further strike be needed. By then, however, Rodney & KGV had already been in action for over half an hour, the sound of their gunnery could clearly be heard by the approaching aircraft, and Bismarck had been reduced to nothing more than a helpless target. A further torpedo strike would have served no useful purpose, but would have required that Tovey's ships cease fire to enable it to take place. Accordingly, therefore, the Swordfish were, sensibly, recalled. Ark Royal was already within range of land based German aircraft (one, indeed, attacked her as her Swordfish were landing back aboard), so her presence in the area was not only unnecessary, but put her to avoidable risk.
The suggestion that Tovey's captains would have behaved in such a manner is not only absurd, but also insulting.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@JohnSmith-of2gu I think that the all big gun was an inevitability anyway. Even before Tsushima, in 'Jane's Fighting Ships' of October, 1903, the Italian designer Cuniberti had published a paper entitled 'An ideal battleship for the British navy' which proposed a 17000 ton ship armed with 12 x 12 inch guns, and the Japanese Satsuma class, ordered in 1904, had been designed, though not, in the event, built, with such an armament.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@wazza33racer I'm sure sea power would have been of considerable use against the Soviet Union. The British and Americans could have sent their battlefleets up the Volga, I suppose?
The benefits the Soviets had received in the middle part of the war from Anglo-American aid were, by 1945, of historical interest only, and Patton's opinions, not shared by the more intelligent members of the Allied Senior Command, by the way, are hardly worth considering, given that at the time he was proposing re-arming German army & SS troops for use against the Soviets.
Finally, please explain how Truman and Churchill/Attlee could, even theoretically, have justified an Anglo-American attack on the Soviets, after years of praising gallant Uncle Joe and the valiant Russian people, to the peoples of the US & the British Empire/Commonwealth?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Allied Ships operating with the Riyal Navy usually had their weapons replaced with British weapons. Some older ships were used for secondary roles, such as fleet tenders, depot ships, or training ships. Blaskawica & Grom, two of the three Polish destroyers to join the RN in 1939, were both British built, so parts were not a problem. The third, Burza, and those ships from the French navy which came under British command were more of a problem, being French built, but Burza continued to operate until 1944, when she became a depot ship for Polish manned submarines.
1
-
1
-
1
-
Great News! My ancient historian mate has just been in touch. You have now reached 102 posts, and he has conceded the second bottle of wine.
I did suggest '150 for a case' on a double or quits basis, but he wouldn't rise to the bait, and insists that my 'poking a lunatic with a stick,' as he describes it, should cease at once.
Quite why you are unable to accept that only your opinion is the one that matters, and those of others are driven entirely by malice or prejudice, is a mystery to me. Illness perhaps?
Still, I wish you all the best for the future, and hope that you eventually recover from whatever condition it is that has assailed you.
I will not post again. Delude yourself however you wish about my reasons, even though I have made them plain enough.
I do hope that other people stumble upon this correspondence, as I am sure that they will find you immensely entertaining, if not enlightening!
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral First you complain because I reply, now you winge because I don't. By the way, perhaps you have forgotten, you brought up ABC and what you, in your wisdom, believed he would have thought. Out of interest, he was later to write that, at the Battle of Calabria, he used HMS Warspite 'as a battlecruiser.'
ABC evidently operated his assets on the basis of their capabilities, and was not hidebound, as you appear to be, by mere type names.
'And then me and other real historians like Drac and other reasonably minded individuals.' Discounting your own absurd self promotion, would this be the same Drachinifel with whom you previously claimed you disagreed because he had agreed with the identification of Hood as a prototype fast battleship?
Please note that I had ceased replying for the same reason that John Tovey ceased fire on 27 May, 1941.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral The only time that Hood went into action at sea, she did so as a fast battleship, accompanying another fast battleship. Her armour was indeed obsolete by modern standards, hardly surprising since she was 20 years old, but she carried a heavier weight of broadside than Bismarck, and even in 1941 was capable of 28 - 29 knots, faster than the new KGVs.
Of course between the wars in exercises she was flagship of the battlecruiser squadron. Why would the Royal Navy hamstring a 30 knot fast battleship by attaching her to a battlefleet with a speed of 21 knots? Even the four Queen Elizabeths, capable of 24-5 knots, operated with the Battlecruiser fleet at Jutland. By your perplexing argument that would presumably have made them battlecruisers also, would it?
As I, and a whole host of others, have pointed out, how might a vessel with the armour, and armament, of a battleship, yet also possessing the speed of a battlecruiser, best be termed? As a fast battleship, perhaps?
Your irrational denial of reality, in the face of overwhelming disagreement with your opinion from all sides, would be amusing were it not so perplexing. Why does the term obsess you so? Hood was what she was, not what you insist upon trying to make her.
By the way, you still haven't said when you trod Hood's quarterdeck. Don't be so shy & retiring!
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral 'Siegfried brayer isn't an authority on a British battle cruiser built 6 years before he was born.' Really? Then following that bizarre logic, you must be even less of an authority, unless of course you were born earlier than 1926.
'I can respect that I can respect his own considerations but he doesn't wave his ego like you have on the Queue of a revisionism and says borderline psychotically Hood was a fast Battleship and if you disagree with me you are my enemy.' So, you can respect Dracs. considerations, but not mine, or those of the actual naval historians I have quoted. All of whom, in what passes for your mind, are ignorant, biased, or have agendas. Only you, it seems have ultimate knowledge of HMS Hood. You must find it onerous alone to carry such a great burden, especially when no-one agrees with you.
Oh, and by the way :-
' The basic concept of Hood's design began on 8 November, 1915 when the DNC was asked to prepare a new battleship design along the lines of an improved 'Queen Elizabeth.' To this end, Tennyson d'Eyncourt forwarded the following data : (detailed data list followed).
After some discussions, rwo more modified versions were adopted, when it was hoped that the best of both worlds would be highly advantageous in perhaps having a very fast battleship rather than a slow battleship and a fast battlecruiser.
Work commenced on HMS Hood in May, 1916, but as a result of experience at Jutland it was decided to modify the design to secure increased protection, it having been found possible substantially to improve this by accepting deeper draught and slightly reduced speed. (list of design modifications followed).
The revised design, which represented a merger of battleship and battlecruiser chacteristics, constituted what was then a unique combination of offensive power, protection, and speed. It also marked the final abandonment in the Royal Navy of the original battlecruiser concept, embodied in varying degrees in all the preceding classes, in which protection was sacrificed ro an extent which rendered them unfit to engage other capital ships. ( British Battleships, 1919 - 1939, R. A.Burt).
Let's see now. A ship with the offensive power and protection of a battleship, yet having the speed of a battlecruiser. Can you think of an alternative term for her? I can.
Please tell me what R.A. Burt's agenda is? I look forward to it.
By the way, you haven't yet said when you trod Hood's quarterdeck. I assume, from your disparaging remarks about others who didn't, that you must have done.
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral 'By early 1918, many people in the Admiralty had been querying the reasons for building the Hood as she did not appear to be a great improvement over the Queen Elizabeth battleship design. These queries were answered by the DNC, who stated that Hood had better protection to her sides & barbettes. Taking this further, he also stated that Hood had better deck protection (over the magazines at 30 degrees descent of shell. Hood had the equivalent of 12 inch thickness of decks), and she had complete underwater tybe protection over her vitals, which was entirely additional to the underwater protection of Queen Elizabeth.
As far back as March 16, 1917, it had been noted that, although the 'Admiral'' class were designated battlecruisers, they were as heavily armed and armoured as contemporary British battleships, but with higher speed. In fact, the ships would be more correctly labelled fast battleships.
It is sometimes very difficult to classify a warship with any precision. Perhaps the best manner in which to describe Hood would be as a hybrid battleship/battlecruiser, although this is a rather clumsy term.'
Maurice Northcott 'Hood - Design & Construction.'
Now, I expect you to tell me that Northcott, & Sir Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt, her designer, are not experts on HMS Hood. In fact, in your odd little world, anyone who does not accord with your obsession apparently knows nothing about her either. Are you truly the only person on earth who really knows anything about her?
'she was slower in 1940 then she was in 1920 would you still consider her a fast Battleship if she were doing 20 knots because of deficient machinery.' As Hood was capable of 28-29 knots in 1941, the question is a fatuous one. Moreover, had such a situation existed, then she would simply be an old battleship.
'There is no universally accepted Bible for Naval historians.' You will not find any naval historian who does not acknowledge Breyer as a primary source on the subject.
'As I said, Breyers is of no consequence to me as he was not an authority on her as her Builder's operators and crew certainly were. Did he ever set foot on the battle cruiser HMS Hood ?' I am impressed. When did you board and examine her? Did you meet Captain Kerr & Vice Admiral Holland, and explain their ignorance to them? Perhaps you might try to tell an Ancient Historian not to bother with Edward Gibbin either, as he never even met Diocletian?
You must be very old indeed!
By the way 'Around 1918, American commanders, including Vice Admiral William Sims, commander of US naval forces in Europe, and Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, became extremely impressed by Hood, which they described as a "fast battleship.' They advocated that the US Navy develop a fast battleship of its own.' ( "High-Speed Thoroughbreds: The US Navy's Lexington Class Battle Cruiser Designs". Trent Hone, 2011.)
'Royal Navy documents of the period often describe any battleship with a maximum speed over 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph) as a battlecruiser, regardless of the amount of protective armour. For instance, the never-built G3 battlecruiser was classified as such, although it would have been more of a fast battleship than Hood.' Raven, Alan & Roberts, John (1976). British Battleships of World War Two: The Development and Technical History of the Royal Navy's Battleship and Battlecruisers from 1911 to 1946. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral Brilliant! Siegfried Breyer, just like everyone else (except you) merely had 'incorrect opinions' and was a 'revisionist.' He died in 2010. Didn't you know that? Moreover, the work to which I referred is almost the Bible, where naval historians are concerned. Indeed, it seems that everyone (other, again, than you) is a revisionist.
I wonder if you have ever heard the old joke about the proud mother telling a friend about watching her soldier son marching through her town with his regiment. She said, 'It was very moving. The only thing wrong was that my son was the only one in step.' Perhaps she was thinking of you?
I don't think that you actually read my comments at all. Certainly you don't seem able to dispute them, except by chanting like a demented Minah Bird that' 'The Admiralty called her a battlecruiser. Therefore she must have been a Battlecruiser.' The Admiralty called Warrior a frigate. Did that mean that she really had only the capabilities of a frigate?
Are you, indeed, even capable of independent thought? You certainly didn't seem able to grasp my explanation of the Denmark Strait action.
'If she were a battleship she would have been referred to as such or modified into such from her original configuration that never occurred is that simple they are all.' How many times? The Admiralty class as designed were battlecruisers. Hood was heavily modified from the original design before construction, into something rather different. Are you really incapable of grasping that simple fact?
1
-
@TheDogGeneral 'I have watched Drax video, and he puts out compelling facts and scenarios, but you see they are all subjective and based on his opinion.' I thought you wrote earlier that you had been in contact with him, and he confessed his error? Make your mind up.
You appear now to argue that any opinon which disagrees with yours must be 'subjective.' Only yours is the true one, and not subjective at all!
Actually I, and every other student of the subject, would agree that Hood was CALLED a battlecruiser. Where the vast majority of us would differ is in your refusal to accept that her capabilities when commissioned justified using the term 'fast battleship' for her them. I could quote from a few other authors who agree with Roberts (and, of course, with me) but doubtless you would reject them as 'revisionist' or their opinions as 'subjective.'
Here, however, is one such opinion for you to reject, as I know beyond doubt that you will :-
'After she was commissioned in the spring of 1920, she (Hood) was considered the largest warship in the world, and as the most perfect solution of the battleship problem of her age.' Siegfried Breyer, 'Battleships & Battlecruisers, 1905-1970.
Would you consider Breyer 'revisionist' or his opinions 'subjective' as well?
Put simply, she was something new in capital ship design, and the term for what she truly was had not yet come into general use. Must as the first recognisable battleship, as opposed to ship of the line, HMS Warrior, was described using a term (Armoured Steam Frigate) which totally denied the reality of her capabilities.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral The fact that Hood was showing her age by 1941 isn't the point at issue. To refer you to the evolving design process which resulted in Hood changing for an 'Admiral' into something new, I refer you to John Roberts' book 'Battlecruisers'. of 1997 :-
'On 5 July, 1997, the DNC submitted two revised designs for the Admiral-class ships. The first was a modification of the previous design with slight increases to the deck, turret, barbette, and funnel uptake armour, one-inch protection for the 5.5-inch ammunition hatches and hoists, and the number of electrical generators increased from four to eight.
These changes increased the displacement by 1,250 long tons (1,270 t) and draught by 9 inches (228.6 mm). The second design drastically improved the protection and converted the ships into fast battleships. The vertical armour was generally increased by 50% and the deck protection was slightly thickened as in the first design. These changes would have added another 4,300 long tons (4,369 t) to the original design and increased the draught by 2 feet (0.6 m), but would have cost half a knot in speed.
This design would have been equal to the Queen Elizabeths, but 7 knots (13 km/h; 8.1 mph) faster and with much improved torpedo protection, although it was some 13,000 long tons (13,209 t) larger than the older ships. After the DNC submitted the above designs, he was asked to consider variations with triple fifteen-inch turrets, and these were submitted on 20 July. The Admiralty chose the fast battleship design, and Hood was laid down again on 1 September.'
I refer you to the last sentence of John Roberts' comments. The fact is, that Hood had evolved from a battlecruiser design, but emerged as something rather different.
1
-
@TheDogGeneral You keep drooling on about the South Carolina class battleships. I have never mentioned them, but as tou ask, they were simply first generation dreadnoughts, built in response to HMS Dreadnought, but retaining reciprocating engines rather than Dreadnoughts turbines. Their relevance to the Alaskas (another type which seems to fascinate you) was precisely nil.
'But it was clear that was the future Hood should have been converted into an aircraft carrier just in the instance of the USS Lexington in the USS Saratoga retain her as her battle cruiser was a mistake a mistake.' Again, you demolish you claims that you are an historian. HMS Hood was completed and in commission before the Washington Naval Conference even first met. The resulting agreement restricting the numbers of Capital Ships for each sea power led to the US Navy having two choices, either to scrap the six incomplete Lexingtons or rebuild two as carriers. In the event, of course, they chose the latter option, and scrapped the hulls of the other four. The Royal Navy, faced with similar restrictions, followed a similar path, rebuilding the largely useless Glorious class large light cruisers and continuing the development of their half-sister Furious, all as carriers. Odd that you didn't seem to know that? Had you even heard of the Washington Naval Treaty?
You do seem rather fixated on terminology rather than reality. For example, when HMS Warrior & her sister HMS Black Prince were completed, they were without doubt the most powerful warships on earth, and remained so for ten years. Yet, they were officially termed 'Armoured Steam Frigates' which implied inferiority to traditional ships of the line, such as the French 90 gun steam ship of the line 'Napoleon' from the same period. This was, of course, manifestly not the case.
Would you serously, had there been conflict between Britain and France in, say, 1866, have happily have sent Napoleon into battle against Warrior simply because she was termed a ship of the line, whereas Warrior was merely a frigate? In short, names don't matter, but capability does.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral I don't know why I bother, as you appear to be largely beyond reason, but I recall you claiming to have examined IWM documents about HMS Hood in 2014 or thereabouts. Please look up 'Royal Navy Ships' Covers.' You will find that they are kept in the National Archives at Kew, which actually opened in April, 2003. Aren't facts inconvenient, sometimes?
I don't intend to respond to your ravings about what constitutes a battlecruiser as compared to a fast battleship, but I will reply to this :-
'The corrected source of action if I were to go back in time would be to dispatch Prince of Wales Rodney and King George V with a fleet a squadron the fact that they called in a massive contingent task force after his destruction to sink the German battle wagon is proof enough that strategy was valid and viable.'
Isn't hindsight wonderful, especially in your case? Actually, there were two credible choke points which needed to be occupied by the Home Fleet to ensure that Lutjens' squadron did not reach the wider Atlantic. These were the Denmark Strait and the Iceland Faroes Gap. During Operation Berlin, Tovey had concentrated his fleet in the latter, but Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had used the Strait.
This time Tovey hedged his bets, He had four capital ships available to him with anything like the speed to catch Bismarck. These were, in order of capability, King George V, Hood, Prince of Wales, & Repulse. Rodney was already en route to the US for a refit at Boston Navy Yard, escorting a liner, Britannic. In any case, at 23 knots, she was too slow to keep up with Tovey's other ships.
Tovey chose to position in each location a force he deemed capable of dealing with Bismarck. His second & third most effective ships, Hood & the semi-worked up PoW, went to the Strait, whilst his best and weakest, KGV & Repulse, went to the Gap. There were also two heavy cruisers patrolling the Strait, and three light cruisers in the Gap.
At the time, no-one thought that these measures were flawed. The Admiralty agreed with Tovey that the measures he had taken were appropriate. By the way, they were, alhough not in the way anyone had expected. After the sinking of Hood, PoW inflicted enough damage on Bismarck to force Lutjens to abandon his mission and make for St. Nazaire. Thus, any threat to the convoys by German surface ships was averted.
The rest is history, of course. Now that Bismarck had been located, Tovey could use Force Concentration to bring her to battle, and her destruction was the result.
Normally, I am paid to educate people in this manner. You have been lucky, as you haven't even needed to buy one of my books. If you think Hood was not suitable for the task, then take the issue up with the spirit of John Tovey, who wouldn't have agreed, rather than continue to post rants to me.
By the way, the Maginot Line was not broken in 1940. The Germans went through the Ardennes instead. Surely an historian of your calibre knew that?
'Your denial of her status as a battle cruiser is affront to the man that served aboard her.' Why? Why would serving aboard a fast battleship rather than a true battlecruiser be considered affronting?
Please don't bother posting another rant, which I will probably not bother to read. Just check the facts I have presented above, as clearly you were not previously aware of them.
Oh, and you may wish to think about this comment by Paul Adam, Chief Analyst at Cassandra Defence Consulting Ltd (2015–present):-
'For the US the canonical example would be the Iowa-class, which had the same 9 x 16″ guns as previous battleships, the same thickness of armour, but five knots more speed (on a much larger displacement); for the UK, HMS Hood as completed had the same firepower and protection as the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships but, similarly, was a lot faster (but also 50% more displacement)
A different metric might be the percentage of the ship’s tonnage devoted to armour: for battlecruisers it tended to be 20–25%, for battleships it was 30–35%. (Hood was 33%, again keeping her as a ‘fast battleship’ rather than ‘battlecruiser’).'
1
-
1
-
@TheDogGeneral I didn't make the first reference to the Alaskas, you did. Exactly how referring to them as relevant to HMS Hood is unclear, nor have you made it any more obvious. However, 'when they were operated mentioning any vessel over 25 knots was automatically considered a battle cruiser whether inherent traits were applicable or not serious notwithstanding.' Which is what happened to Hood, the first ever true fast battleship, but called a battlecruiser because of her speed.
'battlecruisers vanished by the time of the second world war there was no new battle cruiser constructed during World War II.' I am surprised that an historian is ignorant of the RN's Renowns, or the IJN's Kongos. By the way, only one battleship was laid down and partly constructed in WW2, HMS Vanguard. Others, such as the Iowas, the South Dakotas, the King George Vs, the Yamatos, the Littorios, and the Richelieus, were ordered and laid down before the war.
Moreover, the battlecruiser concept disappeared as a result of technological development, in that more efficient and lighter engines made it possible for large well armoured warships to steam at 27 knots and over. The battlecruiser concept simply evolved into the fast battleship.
I have explained the British fleet modernisation policy, and why it was suspended from September, 1939. I regret you find the idea difficult to understand.
'The British royal Navy have retained that designation for her and they never altered her in any significant way during her career.' Yes, they did. She was extensively re-designed after Jutland to enhance her armour, and the ship laid down in September 1916 was rather different from the original concept.
Hood 'was completely worn out from overuse showing the flag traveling the world demonstrating British Naval Supremacy and they knew it.' Again, for an historian, you seem to have gaps in your knowledge. Hood undertook one 'Showing the Flag' voyage only, as flagship of the Special Service Squadron in 1924, along with Repulse & a cruiser squadron.
'Hood was utilized throughout the Mediterranean the Atlantic the Pacific Australia I could go on she was present at Mears Al kabeer in France when the French Fleet refused to surrender she took down Pirates and other forms of Raiders as far north as Scandinavia and around the coasts of Africa.' Again, your knowledge is rather lacking. Certainly, Hood was a flagship for much of her career, but her only action other than the Denmark Strait was at Mers el Kebir (I am surprised that you couldn't spell it, by the way), because most of her career was spent in a world largely at peace.
Why do you think, by the way, she has only one Battle Honour, Bismarck 1941? I would like to hear about her hunting down pirates, however. Who was her captain? Horatio Hornblower or Jack Aubrey?
'This conversation would be much like your career if that's the case it's going to go nowhere.' You know precisely nothing about my career. Moreover, insults are a poor substitute for argument.
I had promised myself that I wouldn't reply, and from now onwards I certainly will not.
1
-
@TheDogGeneral Which other fleet actions involved HMS Hood?
Of course Hood didn't feature AoN armour. Her design pre-dated the introduction of the concept into the Royal Navy.
I have been unable to identify a (living) Admiral Fairfax in RN records.
'HMS Hood should never have been sent after a brand new big gun Dreadnought Battleship that had Superior armor protection and much more modern building quality.' Your alternative being? Tovey had four capital ships capable of catching Bismarck. Two were sent to the Denmark Strait, and two to the Iceland-Faroes Gap. You do appreciate the pressure under which the RN was operating at the time, I hope? Should Bismarck and Prinz Eugen simply have been let out into the wider Atlantic unchallenged?
Of course Hood was showing her age. I have already explained the British fleet modernisation policy. The fact is that after September, 1939, a major asset like Hood could simply not be laid up for 18 months to 2 years.
The battlecruisers at Jutland were not blown up because their magazines were penetrated, but because David Beatty had placed rate of fire ahead of accuracy, and tacitly encouraged his captains to store cordite outside the magazines.
The British also referred to the proposed G3s as battlecruisers, despite their planned armour lay out. The fact is, the definition of a battlecruiser within the RN at the time was based on speed.
The Alaskas are not a relevant comparison, but simply red herrings.
'call her a fast Battleship does not give her any justice or credulity for her crew in the families of the men who died.' I met one of Hood's three survivors. I don't think any of our conversation offended, or was disrespectful, to him.
For what it is worth, I have a First in Modern History, and am a naval historian with several published articles and books. That doesn't make my opinion any more or less valid than that of anyone else, but it might suggest that I too are rather more knowledgeable than most people 'on this channel.'
This is going nowhere. I will not, therefore, respond further.
1
-
@TheDogGeneral Bismarck was intended, with Tirpitz, to be the answer to the French Richelieus as part of the Franco-German between-the-wars naval race. The German belief (hope) was that Britain would be neutral. Once that optimistic idea was proven false, the German surface fleet became largely irrelevant, and Operation Rheinubung was a gesture of despair.
You are worrying about nomenclature. Hood had the armour of a battleship, the firepower of a battleship, and the speed of a battlecruiser. What is something that looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and walks like a duck?
If you did speak to the Curator, what makes you think that was an authority on naval architecture?
I simply pointed out that Hood had battleship-level armour when compared to the most modern battleships in the RN at the time of her construction.
'Bismarck should have been utilized in Fleet coordinated action closer to the mainland of Continental Europe with other German warships to throw around.' Which other German ships? Tirpitz was incomplete, and both Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were damaged and in Brest.
If you really are an historian, who would you need to consult a Curator, whose knowledge would inevitably be superficial?
The writer doth protest too much, methinks.
1
-
But Biasmarck was being used as a 'line of battle' ship when she was sunk. The Germans would, moreover, have found it difficult to form a 'line of battle' with only one operational battleship.
Hood was far more a fast battleship than a battlecruiser.After her redesign, her armour was on a par with that of the Queen Elizabeth class battleships. Her 12 inch belt was twice as strong as the belts of the newest conventional battlecruisers, the Renowns.
The British had been modernising their battlefleet, with Warspite, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, & Renown having received full modernisation, but in the political climate of the time only felt able to withdraw two capital ships from service at any one time. Hood, as a newer ship, was likely to have been modernised after Malaya, Barham, & Repulse.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
USS Missouri only commissioned in June 1944, and is therefore irrelevant to any discussion of Bismarck, except perhaps as proof of how AA armaments of battleships had improved over three years of war.
The 'lucky' torpedo hit was achieved by a Fleet Air Arm which had trained for such a moment for years, and had already done it once before, in the Mediterranean. The more you train, the 'luckier' you get.
What have the Java Sea battles got to do with German gunnery skills? By the way, only one, RN (actually RAN) light cruiser was sunk there, and she didn't blow up.
If you choose to ignore what Ballard & Mearns have said about Bismarck, that the British sank her, then feel free. As I am sure the Admiralty of May 1941 would have told you, 'If so, it doesn't make her any less sunk.'
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@walterkronkitesleftshoe6684 Boney used to ask of a General 'but is he lucky?' and I suggest Holland was very unlucky indeed. After successfully, at least in ABC's view) acting as Vice Admiral CS18 at Spartivento, he was promoted to becoms second in command of the Home Fleet, but only joined Hood nine days before she sailed on 21 May. He would have had little time to judge the abilities of his subordinates, especially since his Flag Captain, Ralph Kerr, had himself only joined Hood in mid February.
Holland's battle plan at Denmark Strait was to have Hood and Prince of Wales engage Bismarck while Suffolk and Norfolk engaged Prinz Eugen (which, Holland assumed, still steamed behind Bismarck and not ahead of her). He signalled this to John Leach of Prince of Wales but did not radio Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, Commander of CS1, directed Suffolk and Norfolk, for fear of disclosing his location. Instead, Holland hoped to meet the enemy at approximately 02:00. Sunset in this latitude was at 01:51 (ship's clocks were four hours ahead of local time. The intention was that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would be silhouetted against the sun's afterglow while Hood and Prince of Wales could approach rapidly, unseen in the darkness, to a range close enough not to expose Hood's 3 inch decks to plunging fire from Bismarck. The Germans would not expect an attack from this quarter, giving the British the advantage of surprise.
The plan, essentially correct, The plan's depended on Suffolk maintainingunbroken contact with the German ships. However, Suffolk lost contact from 00:28. For 90 minutes, Holland neither sighted the German ships nor received any further news from Norfolk or Suffolk. Reluctantly, Holland ordered Hood and Prince of Wales to turn south-southwest but he detached his destroyers which continued searching to the north. However, the loss of contact should be understood as temporary and tactical only; and not strategic in terms of the tactical outcome.
Suffolk lost contact with the enemy force in what was essentially a closed, confined rectangular space; aligned generally northeast (the entrance to the Denmark Strait) to southwest (the exit of the Strait into the Atlantic). The enemy units were firmly constrained by the Greenland ice pack to the north, and the extensive Royal Navy minefield to the south along the coast of Iceland. Given the prior warning of the German sortie, there was ample time for the Royal Navy to place armed reconnaissance at both ends of this narrow alignment. Suffolk and Norfolk were at the eastern entrance to the Strait (where contact was made immediately upon Bismarck's entry). Holland was waiting at the western end as the Bismarck force exited the Strait.
The German force, still unaware of Holland's presence, altered course at 0141. Had this not happened, contact would have been made much earlier than it was.
However, Just before 03:00, Suffolk regained contact with Bismarck. Hood and Prince of Wales were 30 nm. away, slightly ahead of the Germans. Holland signalled to steer toward the Germans and increased speed to 28 kn. Suffolk's loss of contact had placed the British at a disadvantage. Instead of the swiftly closing head-on approach Holland had envisioned, he would have to converge at a wider angle, much more slowly. This would leave Hood vulnerable to Bismarck's plunging shells for a much longer period. The situation worsened further when, at 03:20, Suffolk reported that the Germans had made a further course alteration to the west, placing the German and British squadrons almost abeam of each other.
The rest, as they say, is history. Certainly, Churchill's later criticism of the angle of approach did not take account of the factors above, which were beyond Holland's control. I suggest that one error he made was not to have placed PoW, with her superior armour, in the lead. John Tovey later said the same, and commented that he almost signalled the suggestion, but felt at the time that he ought not to interfere in the plans of so senior a commander.
In short, just as Spruance & Fletcher were favoured by good fortune at Midway, so Holland was punished by ill-fortune in the Denmark Strait.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@decimated550 Prinz Eugen's War Diary, which is readily available, claims one hit on Hood, around the area of the mainmast, which agrees with reports of survivors from Hood (Ted Briggs & Bob Tilburn) and those of observers in other British ships.
Briggs, whose action station was on the bridge, within feet of Captain Kerr and Admiral Holland, also recorded that there was a report of one hit only prior to the fatal explosion. This was the one on the boat deck, to which Holland replied 'Leave it until the ammunition is gone.' Moreover, the fire control position was atop a tripod mast immediately above Briggs' position. Do you not perhaps think that he would have noticed a 15 inch shell exploding in such close proximity?
The supposed hit in a 'room' forward is likewise, unsupported by any witness. Prinz Eugen's war diary didn't make any such claim, and neither Briggs, Tilburn, nor Dundas reported it in their evidence at the subsequent enquiry. Moreover, as they were the only survivors, as a simple matter of fact, how would anyone know?
Finally, sketches of Hood as she exploded, particularly the one by Captain Leach in Prince of Wales, as presented to the RN Courts of Inquiry, show Hood's fire control position to be intact. Look it up for yourself, it is available on the internet.
You have a choice. You can believe a single statement, perhaps added for dramatic effect, on the video, without the source being stated, or you can believe the evidence of eye-witnesses, British & German, of the event itself.
Entirely up to you.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Firstly, what part of Nelson's maxim that 'only numbers can annihilate' is beyond your grasp? It you have plenty of naval assets, then you should use them. The United States' Navy did something similar, when they concentrated around 300 ships, including 34 carriers and 12 battleships, against a Japanese force of 67 ships, including 4 carriers, two hybrid carrier/battleships, and 7 battleships, at Leyte Gulf, and more or less annihilated it. What would you have done had you been the Americans? Sent around 230 of your ships away to be more sporting about things?
Secondly, would you care to list the 25 British capital ships involved in the action.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
What Navy? Bismarck did not commission until early 1941, and Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were being repaired following torpedo damage until November, 1940. Prinz Eugen did not become operational until May, 1941, whilst Graf Spee, Blucher, Karlsruhe, Konigsberg and ten of 22 destroyers had already been sunk, with a 'pocket battleship' and a further cruiser seriously damaged.
In fact, in September, 1940, the German surface fleet consisted, in terms of warships actually operational, of one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, a similar number of large torpedo boats, around a dozen S boats, and a small number of minesweepers.
By 'landing ships,' do you mean barges towed by tugs?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Drachinifel Thanks for the reply. I appreciate the point about the ranges of Piorun's 4.7s compared to her torpedoes, of course.
I had always understood that Piorun, although part of the escort of WS8B, had not been part of DF4, and had not previously worked with Vian's ships. Accordingly, I thought that she was operating independently, or at least semi-independently, during the action.
Of course, you are right, but it does occur to me that the actions of Plawski, whilst undoubtedly gallant, were perhaps a trifle quixotic? I wonder if, given several hours of darkness ahead of him, he might possibly have manoeuvred into a more favourable attack position? Still, I have never been keen on 'what ifs' and it is easy to make such comments from a comfy chair 80 years later!
1
-
1
-
1
-
@TTTT-oc4eb None of it true? So, Bismarck didn't have twin guns in four turrets, or low angle 5.9 inch secondaries, or incremental rather than AoN armour, or internal communications that were destroyed at an early stage, as von Mullenheim-Rechberg stated. Or a lighter broadside than any British battleship in service? Which of this isn't true.
Actually, I have a First in Modern History, specialising in naval aspects of WW1 & WW2. I have written a number of books and articles on the subject. Put simply, Naval History is what I do.
However, feel free to challenge any of the above, mon vieux.
Or, at least, to try.
1
-
@ricoh.3162 'there wasnt a Problem with unprotectet comm or Power cables but dead people cant answer.' Well, von Mullenheim-Rechberg thought that there was, and he was in the best position to know. Communications broke down at a very early stage.
The British 16 in never achieved the reliability of the 15 inch, which was classified by the US navy after WW2 as the best capital ship gun of the 20th Century, but it certainly did the job required of it. I refer you to the Bismarck action for further information.
As to North Cape, DoY hit Scharnhorst with her first salvo, and 31 of 52 broadsides were straddles. Again, when called upon, 'the worst guns of all modern WW2 Battleships' seem to have done everything required of them.
I'm sorry you seem to think that the use of Force Concentration by the British at North Cape was rather unsporting. Perhaps the British had not been informed that, in war, the laws of cricket or the rules of tennis did not apply.
1
-
1
-
@williamtyson9503 Why bring up PoW's hits? Because they were the reason Lutjens abandoned his primary mission and made for St. Nazaire. Hood and PoW were in the Denmark Strait in order to prevent a German breakout into the wider Atlantic. Because of PoW's hits, that is what, actually, they did.
As there were two British and only one German capital ships present, it was inevitable that one of the RN Ships would not be under heavy fire at the start of the action. PoW, far from battle-ready, was only expected to play a supporting role, and Leach sensibly withdrew after his ship suffered a number of main gun failures, although he did briefly reengage later on the same day. The fact that Hood blew up could hardly be attributed to PoW.
I do agree, however, that my phrasing earlier was unfortunate, in that I probably should have written:- 'PoW inflicted more damage on Bismarck than vice versa during the course of the action.'
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
There was a tradition in the Royal Navy that 'we fight the ship, not the men,' which was reflected in the tributes paid to the crews of beaten enemies. In particular, those by Tovey & Fraser in WW2, and Sturdee in WW1.
This was reflected in Spee's comment in Valparaiso after the Battle of Coronel. At a dinner given by the German business community, the toast 'Damnation to the British Navy,' was proposed. Spee refused it, and after the rest of the room had sat back down, quietly rose to his feet, raised his glass, and said 'I drink to the memory of a gallant & honourable foe.'
People like Raeder & Lutjens had been brought up in this tradition, and their principles permeated the German surface fleet.
Doenitz, a more committed nazi, was, however, rather different.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Three days later, of course, on 27 May, 1941, the British did indeed celebrate. What the man or woman in the street, or even the average hack journalist, might have thought, is irrelevant, given the remarkable level of ignorance displayed, to this very day, by these people.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@jonathoncopeland7492 I doubt that. Had the American fleet had only one operational battleship, and the Japanese (or Germans, or indeed anyone) had half a dozen, and supporting cruisers and carriers, to oppose it, then do you really think it would have been sent to sea? An American naval Kamikaze perhaps? Tirpitz had a competent captain and crew (although morale, as a result of months of damaged inactivity, combined with the knowledge that the war was being lost, does seem to have deteriorated later on), but the Kriegsmarine high command had realised, from mid 1941 onwards, that to send a heavy surface ship to sea in the face of British naval supremacy was inviting destruction. Their actual use of Tirpitz, as a potential threat (a Fleet in Being) was probably the wisest course.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
The Operation involved 6 X craft. X5, 6, & 7 were to attack Tirpitz, X9 & 10 Scharnhorst, and X8 Lutzow,
X9 was lost en route, with her passage crew, X8 developed serious leaks en route and was scuttled. X10 developed faults, but her attack was cancelled as Scharnhorst was absent on exercises. She successfully met her mother submarine and was towed back to Scotland.
X6 & 7 carried out their attacks. X5 was long believed to have been sunk by a hit from one of Tirpitz's 105mm guns, but more recently it has been suggested that she did indeed complete her attack before being sunk, although there is no conclusive evidence either way.
1
-
1
-
British forces sank 70 ships totalling 138,346 tons.
Australian 13, totalling 31,802
New Zealand 2, totalling 2,095
Dutch/Australian 2, totalling 8,303.
Australian/Indian 1, of 525.
Dutch/Indian, totalling 1, of 10,439.
US/Australian, 11, totalling 44,622.
US/Australian/Dutch 2, totalling 16362.
US/British 5, totalling 8,602.
US/New Zealand 1, of 2,212.
US/British/Dutch 1, of 989.
Of these, 46 were warships.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Not really a fair assessment. Navies had tended to assume that asdic/sonar had largely nullified the submarine threat. Furthermore, RN planning was on the basis that in a future war the French navy would play a significant role, particularly in the Mediterranean should Italy become an opponent.
German U-Boats, and there were only just over 60 in September, 1939, would be forced to sail round the north of Scotland from their German bases in order to reach the Atlantic. Moreover, half of the fleet consisted of small Type II 'Canoes,' only fit for operations in the North Sea.
The collapse of France gave the U-Boat fleet access to Bases bordering on the Atlantic, and deprived the RN of the support of the French fleet. None of these factors could possibly have been part of Admiralty pre-war planning.
The US Navy had some 70 modern destroyers in the order of battle for the Atlantic Fleet in January, 1942. The problem there was not lack of resources, but the refusal of Ernie King to allow the institution of convoys off the US East Coast.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@kevinanderson3849 Blucher didn't have time to have any engine problems, but Prinz Eugen certainly did. After being detached by Lutjens to operate independently against merchant shipping, but before any merchant ship was found, defects in her engines showed and on 27 May, the day Bismarck was sunk, she was ordered to give up her mission and make for a port in occupied France.
On 28 May Prinz Eugen refuelled from the tanker Esso Hamburg. The same day more engine problems showed up, including trouble with the port engine turbine, the cooling of the middle engine and problems with the starboard screw, reducing her maximum speed to 28 knots.
The screw problems could only be checked and repaired in a dock and thus Brest, with its large docks and repair facilities, was chosen as destination.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Paladin1873 Have you read this :- 'Operation Paul – the Fleet Air Arm attack on Luleå in 1940?'( The 22 page document, not the 12 page summary, by the way.)
Peter Hore demonstrates that, firstly, the minelaying in the final draft for Operation Paul involved 18 aircraft from Ark Royal and that, secondly, long range tanks would not have been required. The relevant page, describing the final, much reduced, plan, is numbered 98.
Unfortunately, Glorious' fuel state at the time of her loss is unknown, but whether or not steaming at reduced speed can be explained, the lack of lookouts or air patrols cannot, and the fact that Pound's executive order for Operation Paul was issued in the early hours of 8 June, before Glorious met her end, surely discredits the suggestion that she would have been involved.
1
-
Unfortunately, there are a number of problems with the claim. Firstly, the squadrons assigned to the operation were already there, aboard the other carrier in the area, Ark Royal. At the time, Glorious was being used as a ferry carrier, not an operational one. It makes no sense to bring Glorious back to the UK to load up aircraft for the attack, but even if this was the case, why did she first land on RAF aircraft, and why did she proceed at more or less half speed? If it was intended that she should carry out the raid, and the suggestion that she was more expendable is nonsense (who would accept that one of the few RN carriers should be sacrificed in order to drop a handful of mines in a neutral harbour, for heaven's sake?) couldn't the RAF aircraft have landed on Ark Royal anyway? Certainly, the Hurricanes couldn't have been taken below as Ark had smaller lifts, but they could have remained in deck for the short passage back to the UK.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@abntemplar82 Try again little chap. The first battleship to be fitted with radar was HMS Rodney, with a Type 79m set, in January, 1939. Bismarck did indeed have radar, Fumo 23, which was used to target HMS Norfolk on the evening of 23 May. The concussion of her forward guns disabled her own forward radar, which was out of action for the rest of her short life.
As to her advanced construction. Firstly she was built with incremental armour, inferior to that fitted to every US battleship since Navada in 1912, and to that fitted to the Nelsons and the KGVs. Secondly, she had four twin turrets, at a time when other navies had moved on to multiple gunned turrets. This increased her length and displacement significantly. Thirdly her secondary armament was the more or less useless 5.9 inch low angle gun, when the US and RN had moved to DP weapons in their latest designs. Fourthly, her internal communications were above her main strength deck, and were disabled early in her final action.
'Further it is not just an American, British and Japanese ideology to keep shooting till your enemy is incapable of returning fire.' But that wasn't what I said, was it?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@nickdanger3802 How does any of this bear any relevance at all to the merchant ship losses during Paukenschlag? The British began convoy operations within days of 3 September, 1939, the US (or King) didn't do the same until many months after 11 December 1941, despite having over 70 modern destroyers available in their Atlantic Fleet, despite British Intelligence warning King of the impending arrival of a number of Type IXs, and despite Admiral Andrews begging him to release some of the destroyers. Perhaps you should read Michael Gannon's book on Operation Drumbeat before simply attacking the Limeys! Especially since, in March 1942, those Limeys sent 34 convoy escorts, which they could not really spare, to support Andrews after King refused.
The British carried out 78 Arctic Convoy missions. Only two, PQ17 & PQ18, suffered significant losses. At the time of the Channel Dash, the British Home Fleet was in Iceland and Scapa Flow, providing the cover for those convoys. Why is Royal Oak relevant?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@samstewart4807 Which books have you been reading? Eric Grove makes clear in his account of the battle the importance of the hit which disabled the fuel purification system, as well as the hit which caused a large hole in Spee's bows, rendering her unfit for a long ocean voyage and making her incapable of full speed. Even before the battle, the distance she had covered since August had reduced her maximum speed to 24 knots, from the 28 she had achieved on her trials.
He also refers to the numerous tactical errors made by Langsdorff. Similarly, Correlli Barnett is sharply critical of the manner in which Spee shifted target with foolish regularity. even subsequent reports from Spee's officers were critical of the tactics he employed, even going so far as to claim that the strain of months at sea had weakened his will to fight. Barnett sums up the two opposing commanders as follows :- 'Behind Harwood stood four centuries of victory in close quarters attack; behind Langsdorff a naval tradition barely 40 years old and, with brief & rare exceptions, one of raiding & evading and ultimately of defeat.' The first mistake, of course, was to engage in the first place. Spee spotted Harwood's squadron before she was herself spotted, and Langsdorff's orders from his Admiralty were to avoid action wherever possible.
I find it odd that you claim me to be the only person you have encountered who is critical of Langsdorff's tactics. I, on the other hand, have yet to find anyone with any knowledge who is NOT critical of him. The failure not to finish off the battered Exeter (which would have left Harwood with the problem of what to do about her survivors), and the insistence of shifting the target for Spee's main guns with annoying frequency both demonstrate a lack of judgement, resulting in the fact that, having fired off all but 40 minutes of Spee's AP ammunition, she had not actually managed to sink anything.
As to how much is left of the wreck, I really don't care, but I have read the various articles about it placed on the internet by a number of divers in recent years. May I ask why what is still there interests you so much?
As to communications between Langsdorff and Berlin, try 'The Drama of the Graf Spee and the Battle of the River Plate: a Documentary Anthology.'
Basically, Langsdorff explained his problems and his belief that his ship was not fit for sea, and was told by Hitler & Raeder that he should either set forth and fight heroically to the end, or scuttle his ship. He was told, however, that internment was definitely not an option. The final decision was left to him, although post-war reports from survivors of the Berlin Admiralty rather suggest that Hitler expected to be told of the gallant manner in which Langsdorff had fought to the last against overwhelming odds.
1
-
1
-
@samstewart4807 Sorry, but this information has been widely known for many years, I certainly knew all about the problems as far back as my university days, although my particular field of expertise was and is Operation Dynamo & Operation Sealion. Specialist professional publications on naval history have covered most aspects of the battle in full detail for many years.
The critical factor was the destruction of the oil purification plant, without which diesel could not be processed for her engines. The ship, by the way, was partially broken up in 1942-3, but parts are still visible as the water depth is only 36 feet. Oddly enough, salvage rights were purchased by the British, as they wished to inspect Spee's gunnery directors.
In short, no one is being lied to, and no one ever was, except of course the command staff of the Spee herself, who were fooled into believing that Ark Royal and Renown were waiting for her, just over the horizon, when in fact they were nowhere near. Given the problems with Spee's fuel system, and her shortage of ammunition, I suspect that this didn't affect the German decision to scuttle in any case.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@dmunro9076 You do seem to be peculiarly fixated in this issue. Why do you claim that I am 'admitting' anything, when I have never suggested that Bismarck's after radar was not working? Prinz Eugen's diary uses the plural, suggesting that both forward radars were out of action, and only later refers to use of radar to sweep astern of Bismarck's course. There is no suggestion that any radar forward of the beam was operational after the initial cruiser action..
Moreover, Mullenheim-Rechberg's account of Schneider's actions during the engagement with Hood (I appreciate that you only accept the Baron's account when he agrees with you, and that when he contradicts you it must have been due to a lapse in the old chap's memory, by the way) is that of a gunnery officer using traditional optical rangefinders, not that of one using radar technology to determine distance. A similar description applies to Schneider's last action against Rodney.
Similarly, Mullenheim-Rechberg's description of his brief period in charge of what was left of Bismarck's armament clearly shows that he was not using the radar equipment which was actually a few feet directly above him.
Personally, I suspect that the events of the Operation would have impressed themselves upon the Baron's mind for the rest of his life, not, conveniently for you, have become blurred by time.
Still, if you choose to insist that Bismarck used radar in her last action, because you believe she must have done, and the only survivor from the gunnery team must have forgotten about it, then so be it.
1
-
@dmunro9076 So, the Baron is relable when he makes a reference to radar relating 25 May, but obviously unreliable otherwise.
Actually, you are misunderstanding what Schmalenbach wrote in the War Diary, by the way. After it states that Prinz Eugen was ordered to take the lead, at 2044 on 23 May, and that Bismarck's 'instruments' (plural) are not functioning, at 0228 on 24 May, the next reference, by Schmalenbach, at 0400 on 24 May, states that Prinz Eugen, steering 180, or due south, was to sweep 270 to 90 degrees (i.e., due west to due east, ahead of her course) and Bismarck was to sweep 90 to 270 degrees (i.e., due east to due west, or astern ). This makes complete sense if Bismarck's forward radar was out of commission, but her aft set (right above the Baron's head, by the way,) was still functioning . No other interpretation can be applied.
Q E D, I submit.
1
-
1
-
@dmunro9076 The relevant phrase being 'if she had at least one working radar,' when Prinz Eugen's war diary, which I quoted earlier, said that her radar had failed. Do you consider the diary to be unreliable as well? In view of your lack of any evidence at all to support your claim , comments like ', it is likely that,' and ' this appears to be the case,' are hardly convincing, and nor is your rejection of Mullenheim-Rechberg simply because he disagrees with you. Or rather you disagree with him. How, by the way, do you know that he was 'out of the loop?'
As to your assumption that Bismarck must have been using radar in her final action because she found the range so quickly. Why? Rodney straddled Bismarck with her third salvo, and hit her with her fourth. Rodney did not even have gunnery radar. Schneider, according to the (in your mind, unreliable) Mullenheim-Rechberg, recorded his first three salvoes, using A & B turrets only, as 'short' 'straddle' and 'over.' The Baron even refers to Bismarck's stereoscopic range finding instuments, rather than her radar. Oh, but of course, the Baron was unreliable and out of the loop.
In short, you choose to insist, for reasons which presumably make sense to you if not to anyone else, that Bismarck must have had working radar, even though the only sources available either state that she had no operating forward radar, or in the case of PE's diary, that all her radars were not functional.
There is no purpose to be served in continuing to discuss this matter.
1
-
@dmunro9076 How do we know this? :- 'We know that at 0400 24 May 1841 Bismarck had functioning radar.' Mullenheim-Rechberg was a gunnery officer, and is quite certain that Bismarck had no working forward radar after engaging Norfolk.
Moreover, in his description of the final action, he makes no reference to use of radar at any time, and even comments that his own brief period in command of Bismarck's aft armament ended when the lenses and mirrors of his director were shattered.
Certainly, the first re-engagement with Prince of Wales was at 30,000 to 33,000 yards, according to Leach's report to Tovey, but the second re-engagement, at 0131 on 25 May, was at 20,000 yards. Leach records that POW obtained 'A good RDF range.' If Bismarck's radar was working, shouldn't she have observed POW's approach?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
The guns were all the 15 inch Mk. 1, and the mountings of the ships other than Hood ( i.e, the Rs, the QEs, the Renowns, the Courageous/ Glorious, Vanguard, and the four monitors) were known as Mk. 1s, also. Hood's turrets were of an improved, Mk. II, design, with 30 degrees of elevation. Elevation of the guns in the Mk 1s was limited to 20 degrees, but with modification of some of the battlefleet from the mid 1930s, these ships had their turrets modified to Mk 1(N), which allowed an increase in elevation to 30 degrees.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@WillowEpp Renown paid off for modernisation in late August, 1936, and this was not completed until April, 1939. The work involved was as follows:-
15in Turrets were modified to increase the elevation from 20¼ to 30¼.
Bridge structure redesigned similar to that fitted in NELSON and RODNEY.
Entire secondary armament replaced by ten twin 4.5in HA mountings for air defence.
Three 8 barrelled 2 pounder Pom-Poms were fitted to improve her close range air defence.
New gunnery control systems were fitted AFCC Mk VII for the main battery and HACS Mk IV for the 4.5in HA.
Two quadruple, deck mounted torpedo tubes fitted in place of the two submerged tubes.
Limited improvement of armour protection, 4in over the magazines and 2in over the engine rooms.
The 42 Babcock and Wilcox boilers in 6 boiler rooms with 285 psi working pressure were replaced by 8 Admiralty 3 drum type with 400 psi working pressure in 4 boiler rooms. This saved 2500 tons in weight.
The two Brown Curtis direct drive turbines were replaced by two Parsons single reduction geared turbines supplied by Cammell Laird.
These changes increased SHP from 112,000 to 120,000.
Some of the space saved by reducing the number of boilers was used to increase fuel storage and thus increase her range.
Aircraft catapult replaced with Hangar for stowage and maintenance.
The ship was, in effect, largely redesigned within the existing hull, and what emerged was a new warship, as comparisons of the post-rebuild Renown with the Renown of early 1936 demonstrate.
1
-
1
-
@padurarulcriticsicinic4846 1). A court-martial might have taken place, just as one was suggested for Captain Leach. Had either taken place the C-in-C Home Fleet, John Tovey, would have participated as Prisoner's Friend, and Holland exonerated, simply because he had done nothing wrong. Being defeated in battle is not necessary a reason for shame.
2). Losing one's ship is not a reason for discharge from the Royal Navy. Rear Admiral Stuart Bonham-Carter lost two cruisers in quick succession in the Arctic, but was still promoted to Vice Admiral, becoming Flag Officer, Malta, late in 1942. I doubt that Holland would have suffered from any sort of guilt, as Hood's loss was not the result of any failure on his part.
You seem very eager to attribute blame to Holland. How would you justify levelling such an accusation at him?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@garyhill2740 The British didn't send a QE after Bismarck because the QEs were not fast enough, and were rather busy in the Mediterranean at the time. Your West Virginia analogy is a false one, by the way. Before WW2, West Virginia had had one minor refit, improving her AA fit & mounting an aircraft catapult, whereas Arizona received a major rebuild in 1929 - 1931. In other words, the US navy was following a similar policy to the British, in that older warships capable of improvement were being modernised first.
If British decision-making was poor, then so was that of the US Navy. In point of fact, neither made particularly bad decisions where their capital ships were concerned.
Unfortunately, the Admiralty did not have your advantage, in that no-one told them that a major war was scheduled to commence in September, 1939.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@edtrine8692 The conning tower, her existing secondary armament, the existing bridge and most of her superstructure, and her boilers & engines, among many other things. Replacement of her propulsion system alone would result in a major weight saving which, combined with the other changes, would result in, effectively, a new ship (see Renown and the modernised QEs for details) with improved armour, bridge, and secondary armament on the same displacement.
1
-
1
-
@whydoyougottahavthis Just obtain a copy of Tarrant's book, and read page 98. At the time, the Germans had 33 operational boats, of which 24, on average, were at sea on any one day in 1941. Historically, when U-Boats were sought to be sent to Bismarck's aid, there were only two anywhere near her, one of which had already expended her stock of torpedoes. The waters around Bismarck (and Hood) were hardly 'infested.'
By the way, Hood would have gone initially to Iceland, and then back to a British port, and could have expected an escort of three destroyers (Electra, Anthony, & Icarus) at least back to Iceland, although doubtless additional escorts from Iceland would have been sent, without affecting those already with convoys. The probability is that the Kriegsmarine would not even have known where she was.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Andrei613 You are the one worried about 'point scoring,' and now I observe you feel the need to become offensive. Indeed, the reference to a 1982 Hood was a fantasy (which is rather different from a delusion, as in this case the writer was well aware that it was never 'real') but my original post was about keeping a modernised Tiger instead of one of the 'R's, so your breathless CAPITAL LETTERS are rather wasted, old fellow. You do need to get the CAPS LOCK key on your keyboard fixed, however.
Just to correct you inaccurate recollection of your own posts, you actually wrote :- 'The RN only converted a pair of old cruisers during the war into A/A ships, Caledon and Calypso.' Which was, in fact, untrue. Don't worry, I accept your apology for your error.
You clearly don't know why Effingham was re-armed. I would have expected that someone of your erudition would have heard of the restrictions on numbers of heavy cruisers contained in the 1930 London Treaty. Oh well, look it up for yourself, as it might enable you to understand the reasoning behind the re-arming.
Your posts seem to be degenerating from their initial insistence upon your singular belief in your concept of a 'standard fit' for cruiser AA weapons, to a wide ranging and all-purpose rant about the Royal Navy in general. I observe that the large light cruiser conversions are the latest to incur your wrath, as I also note your inability to provide a source for your idiosyncratic standard fit belief.
As I haven't mentioned the subject of carriers, by the way, what exactly, apart from what seems to be a general need on your part to be insulting, led you to post this? 'I would suggest that you do some actual research on that matter, since you appear to be ignorant of it, as well'
I am sure you will award yourself a few more 'points' as a result of my post, and you are welcome to them. No one else seems to have any particular views on this theme, and therefore I won't waste any further effort posting against your clearly ingrained prejudices.
1
-
@Andrei613 You seem somewhat fixated on point-scoring, rather than having a proper discussion. Quite charming, if rather immature, I suggest.
'The RN only converted a pair of old cruisers during the war into A/A ships, Caledon and Calypso.' Really? Better get the reference book re-written then. Caledon was indeed converted in 1942-3, but Calypso, an early war loss, wasn't. Presumably Curacoa, Carlisle, and Colombo weren't given similar conversions then? Nor Coventry & Curlew, immediately pre-war?
Indeed Nelson and Rodney were slow. In fact, only two knots faster than the fastest US battleship in service until late 1941.
'No doubt this is a part of why the QEs got sent to the Med, and not the Nelsons.' No, actually it isn't.
There are indeed many sources which describe the weapons fits of RN warships at the outbreak of WW2. Only you seem to have issued a dogmatic statement of what the 'proper' weapons fit ought to have been.
Still, if you wish to pursue a tedious argument about what you appear convinced were the manifold failures of the Royal Navy in WW2, then please carry on. Just don't expect me to respond.
1
-
@Andrei613 My mistake on the Arethusas, I agree. However, of the cruisers, Ajax received 2 x 4 pompoms by May 42, Achilles received 4 x4 2 pounders, and 4 x 2 4 inch, in early 1943, Arethusa 2 x 4 pompoms by March 41, Aurora 2 x 4 pompoms in June 1940, Galatea 2 x 4 pompoms by Jan. 41, Hobart 2 x 4 pom poms by Oct 42, Orion 2 x 4 pompoms by Feb 42, and Penelope 2 x 4 by July 41. The ones which didn't receive upgrades were Neptune, an early war loss, and three (Sydney, Perth, & Leander) operating in the Far East. Incidentally, of these 12, how many were actually lost to the air attack for which you claim they were ill prepared? None. Incidentally, I haven't made any point for you. You have simply stated that RN warships fell short of what you yourself have asserted ought to have been their minimum AA fit. Have you any contemporary sources which agree with you?
Which warships would you suggest the RN should have rebuilt after the war began? Both Valiant & Queen Elizabeth were still rebuilding, Warspite and Renown had been rebuilt, and Nelson & Rodney were the most powerful ships in western waters in any case. British shipyards were busy building new escorts, converting older cruisers to AA ships, and repairing damaged vessels. Moreover, the three US ships you name were not modernised out of choice, but because of their Pearl Harbor damage. Certainly the US had the greater manufacturing & repair capability, but there was also the advantage of having safe yards, far removed from the danger of air attack.
1
-
@Andrei613 I appreciate that the Omahas were older than the Leanders, but they were still the nearest US equivalent, given that the next US construction was the Brooklyns which more properly related to the Southamptons.
I didn't realize that you wished me to discuss all 27 British cruisers between the Kents & the Arethusas, which is why I only referred to light cruisers. However, of the thirteen Counties, five still had single 4 in guns as their primary AA weapons at the outbreak of war.
Two of these were the RAN ships, and the other three had been upgunned, in that Sussex, Shropshire, & Devonshire mounted eight four inch guns each. Australia had twins fitted in late 1940, and Canberra by early 1941. Shropshire had her singles replaced by four twins in late 1941, when two eight barrelled pom poms were fitted, Devonshire also received two eight barrelled pom poms in 1941, and had her singles replaced with four twins in 1942. Sussex was badly damaged in port in Glasgow and not returned to service until late 1942, having been re-armed in line with her sisters. All except these five had also received pairs of either eight or four barrelled 2 pounders by the outbreak of war. The other two heavy cruisers, Exeter & York, did also retain single 4 inch, although Exeter received twin 4 inch mountings, together with two eight barrelled pom poms, when reconstructed after the Plate.
Of the light cruisers, four of the five Leanders had received twin mountings by the outbreak of war, as had two of the three Amphions, & four of the five Arethusas.
I don't recall giving a completion date for the modernisation of the two QEs. The point was that both began their rebuilds before September, 1939, actually in 1937, and that after their completion no further capital ships could be set aside for the same procedure
1
-
@Andrei613 Easy to say with the advantage of hindsight. In 1939, RN cruisers & capital ships had AA fits on a par with similar ships in the US navy. Compare, for example, the Southamptons & the Brooklyns. A Southampton had 2x 4 4 inch HA, 2 x 4 2pdrs & 2 x 4 0.5 inch machine guns. A Brooklyn mounted either 8 x 1 5 inch, or 4 x 2 5 inch, with 8 x 1 0.5 inch machine guns.
Of the older cruisers, USS Marblehead of the Omaha class in 1941 mounted 7 x 1 3 inch AA, supplemented by 8 x 1 0.5 inch machine guns. The nearest British equivalent, the Leanders, all except Achilles had been rearmed with twin four inch AA by 1938 (Achilles was due to receive these at her next refit in 1940), giving them 4 x 2 4 inch AA & 3 x 4 0.5 inch machine guns. The British were also building ( the Didos) or converting (the 'C's) a number of specific AA cruisers for fleet defence. At the time, the level of AA defence of both the British & U.S. cruisers I have mentioned was regarded as adequate.
In terms of Repulse, certainly a rebuild along Renown lines would have been desirable, but the RN were in the process of modernising their fleet by rebuilding two at a time. After the second pair, Valiant & Queen Elizabeth, had completed, two of Malaya, Hood, or Repulse were next in line, but this programme had, obviously, to be abandoned in 1939. Again, though, Repulse's AA armament is comparable to, for example, a Colorado class battleship.
Finally, selecting Sydney is perhaps a little unfair. Her two sisters Hobart & Perth, had received their twin mounts upon refit in 1939. Sydney's was deferred as a result of the outbreak of war. Of the Auroras, only one, Arethusa, had not received her twin mountings by the outbreak of war.,
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ffsForgerFortySeven.9154 Where in the Report does it state that explosion of 4 inch rounds stowed outside the magazine was a 'possible factor?'
Have you read the evidence of Dr. Godfrey Rotter, the Director of Explosives Research at Woolwich, given on 2 September, 1941? (Admiralty Record ADM 116/4352, pages 364 - 369). Dr. Rotter was asked a number of questions on the nature of cordite explosions, and what their effects might have been on the structure of the ship. He gives particularly detailed information on the effects of an explosion of the 4 inch magazine.
As part of the evidence, the detailed stowage of 4 inch ammunition is stated, as follows:-
'The 4” magazines in the after group contained the number of rounds, and the weight of cordite, indicated. The stowage was in bottle racks
Hold 280 – 290 539 rounds 2.17 tons.
Hold 290 – 302 830 rounds 3.32 tons
Lower Platform 280 – 296 1001 rounds 4 tons
Lower Platform 296 – 302 540 rounds 2.17 tons
Upper Platform 280 – 294 467 rounds 1.88 tons
Upper Platform 296 – 306 1232 rounds 4.96 tons
Total about 18 ½ tons.'
What isn't here is any suggestion that rounds were stowed outside the magazine.
Have you read Jurens, Garske & Dulin, 'Battleship Bismarck: A Design and Operational History' published in January, 2019, which states 'Hood's destruction was most likely caused by a 380-mm shell from Bismarck that penetrated the deck armor and exploded in the aft 102-mm magazine, igniting its cordite propellant, which in turn ignited the cordite in the adjacent aft 381-mm magazine. Rapid expansion of the resulting combustion gases from the conflagration then caused structural failure, passing out through the sides of the ship as well as forward and upwards via the engine room vents, expelling the aft main battery turrets and causing the stern to be detached from the rest of the hull at the aft armored bulkhead.' I don't see any reference to 4 inch munitions being stored outside the magazines here, nor in either Admiralty report. In fact, the only reference I have ever come across is a single, uncorroborated claim by Anthony Preston in 1979, in support of his pet theory that Hood was sunk by Prinz Eugen.
1
-
1
-
@ffsForgerFortySeven.9154 Your first post said :- 'This is what happen on the Hood ...someone left the door open on the rear AA mag'
Your second post said :-
'The door and the fire seal was open. I have a few accounts of the door being left open and that... pressure and fire from the explosion.' I asked for details of the sources of these accounts. All you have done since is made vague references to observers, rather than witnesses to 'open doors.'
Of course, there were hundreds of witnesses to Hood's sinking. I have read them, from both the text of the first Inquiry, of 30 May, and the subsequent, more detailed, Inquiry, of 27 August. None of them contain the slightest suggestion that any doors were left open, largely because the only witnesses who could have confirmed or denied this died aboard their ship.
Are you really going to suggest that observers from Norfolk, Suffolk, Prince of Wales or even (at the second Inquiry) Bismarck could have had any knowledge whatsoever. All they were able to do was to give their varied interpretations of Hood's destruction, and no-one has ever doubted that this came about because of an explosion in the 4 inch magazine, which detonated the 15 inch magazine. You are going much further than this, in that you are attributing the loss of Hood to slipshod procedures aboard the ship. As no Royal Navy capital ship had stored cordite in such a manner since the battlecruisers at Jutland, and as the Grand Fleet battleships had never used this method of storage at any time, you will need to prove your allegations. Can you produce any statement by a credible witness that such actions took place aboard any Royal Navy capital ship in WW2? Perhaps a crewman who had been transferred away from Hood a few weeks before she sank, or someone who saw this happen aboard one of the other RN capital ships? As to Anthony Preston, I have a copy of the book in which he made this statement ( Sea Power: A Modern Illustrated Military History, 1979) in which he makes the (unsubstantiated) claim in order to justify his belief that Hood was sunk by Prinz Eugen. Needless to say, he was, and is, in a minority of one where this opinion is concerned.
As to: 'Please bear in mind the crew of the Hood was an Older crew They or some of may have been stuck with bad habits.'
They would have to have been an old crew indeed, as Jutland took place 25 years earlier. Do you really believe that the crew of a warship, in the middle of a war, wandered around ignoring safety procedures aboard the ship? Do you really believe that their officers would have tolerated such behaviour?
Please feel free to present your 175 sources, by the way.
1
-
Beatty was extremely wealthy, married to an even more wealthy American heiress, and very well connected. Subsequently, as First Sea Lord, he was able to 'doctor' the official report on Jutland.
In his favour, however, as FSL, he argued strongly, though ultimately in vain, against the foolish decision to hand over control of naval aviation to the Royal Navy's most intransigent enemy, the Royal Air Force. As a result, the RAF systematically destroyed the Fleet Air Arm between the wars.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
German building up to and including the Bismarcks was part of the Franco-German naval race, based on the assumption that Germany's next war would be against France, or France & Poland.
The fantasy that was Plan Z was, however, intended directly as a challenge to the Royal Navy. As early as December, 1938, the Kriegsmarine's own Naval Ordnance Department had produced a report 'The Feasibility of the Z Plan,' which doubted that, given the resources already being devoted to the army & air force, the plan had any credibility.
Of course, it didn't.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@R.C.A.F.V.R. operation Aerial certainly deserves to be better known than it is. It involved evacuations from Cherbourg & St. Malo by the RN's Portmouth Command, and from a number of other ports on the French West Coast, as far south as Bayonne & St. Jean de Luz, by Plymouth Command. By the time it concluded, on 25 June, 191870 troops had been lifted, together with 360 artillery pieces, 2292 vehicles, & 1800 tons of stores.
The operation, because of the distances involved, required the use of large freighters and liners, and on 17 June the liner Lancastria was sunk by bombing, with losses possibly as high as 5000. The disaster was not disclosed at the time, and is still not widely known today.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@vanmust Actually, it is quite obvious. As Napoleon said ' How can an Elephant fight a Whale?' It really doesn't matter how large the German army was, their navy was virtually non existent. The plan devised by the Kriegsmarine depended entirely on the number of tugs that could be assembled, as each one could two two barges. By late September, for example, they had assembled 1859 barges, but only 397 tugs (in which I include trawlers and small coasters.) They had, literally, no reserves of tugs. They could not replace any which were lost. Similarly, in late August, 1940, the Luftwaffe had only 226 operational transport aircraft which, assuming 16 paratroopers per aircraft, could only transport some 3340 men. The naval plan, as submitted by Raeder, ludicrously assumed that, in some wondrous manner, the barges would not be intercepted by the Royal Navy, whereas the reality always was that, given the fact that the barge trains would have taken over a day to assemble into formation outside their ports and cross the channel, and would have been observed at an early stage either from the shore or by the regular RN nightly destroyer patrols from Portsmouth of the Nore, the RN's anti-invasion forces would have engaged the almost helpless columns long before they reached anywhere near their supposed landing grounds. It really doesn't matter how vast the German army was, as the German armed forces had absolutely no experience of amphibious operations, and the German navy lacked both purpose built assault vessels, and the means to escort the ramshackle assembly they had put together. The Channel Islands are irrelevant, as a simple glance at a map demonstrates, and the idea of landing on the Isle Of Wight, which is almost within spitting distance of one of the main RN bases, can be discounted at once.
The fact is that, in the early 19th century, France was in much the same situation as was Germany in September, 1940. In either case, had the armies been able to get ashore, they would have succeeded, but, as St. Vincent said in the House of Lords "I do not say the French cannot come, I only say they cannot come by sea". Dudley Pound could have said exactly the same as St. Vincent, with reference to the Germans, in September, 1940.
1
-
@vanmust Firstly, the RN capital ships would never have gone anywhere near the Channel in September, 1940. They were based at Rosyth, from where they could act against either a sortie by German heavy ships into the Atlantic, or against those same ships had they headed towards the southern part of the North Sea in support of an invasion attempt. The RN had assembled an anti-invasion force of some seventy destroyers and cruisers, all within five hours steaming of Dover, together with several hundred smaller vessels, such as fleet minesweeper, armed trawlers and drifters, corvettes, and gunboats.
Secondly, the troops to board the barges did exist. The first wave alone consisted of XXXVIII army corps ( 26 & 34 infantry divisions ) VIII army corps ( 8 & 28 infantry divisions, plus 6 mountain division) plus a weak, less than half strength, parachute division, and 22 airlanding division.
Thirdly, there is all the difference in the world between rushing three fast, modern, warships, through the Channel in a few hours, and landing the above forces from towed barges moving across the Channel at little more than walking pace. The Kriegsmarine plan anticipated that it would take eleven days to land this first wave, and even then it would be without both field artillery and motorised transport. This would inevitably mean that the barges and their tugs would sit more or less helpless off the coast and in the Channel throughout this period, largely unprotected during the day, and completely unprotected at night.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Yes. She was slowly returned to Plymouth, arriving there in early February, 1945. She then underwent an extensive refit, involving the fitment of more advanced radar, among other features, which took until August, 1946. After that, she became a harbour training ship, renamed HMS IMPERIEUSE. She was placed on the disposal list in 1948, and arrived at Cairnryan for scrapping in August, 1948.
Why she was so refitted, at considerable expense, at that period of the war, is baffling, to be polite about it!
Warspite was very badly mined off Normandy in June, 1944. One turret and two shafts were put out of action and she was sent to Rosyth to be patched up. When she arrived, she was drawing 42 feet aft. As she limped up the Firth of Forth, the warships of the Home Fleet, led by the battleships Anson & Howe, all manned ship to cheer her as she passed.
She was repaired sufficiently to operate as a bombardment ship, although down to 15 knots and three turrets. On 25 August, she shelled Brest in support of the US VIII corps, followed by Le Havre in support of the British 49th & 51st Divisions.
Finally, on 1 November, 1944, she shelled Walcheren.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Not really. The Stirling was also intended to be a troop transport, intended to move troops to far flung areas, with limited airfields, from which it would then supply bombing support. As a 1936 design, the Stirling was a leader in its field.
The tanks were not designed to fit onto carriages, but onto the British loading gauge, which was smaller than European or American ones. Again, a down-side to being the first in the field. Carriages could easily be modified, but tunnels, platforms, and lineside features couldn't.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@blogsblogs2348 At the time Drew gave the order to scuttle, 0250 on 13 August, he believed that the ship was unable to move, and Drew reasoned that she needed to reach deep water by dawn, which was three hours away. The initial estimate was that power would not have been restored by then. In fact, power and steering was restored at about the same time as the order to scuttle was given.
Drew's evidence at court martial placed great emphasis on his concerns that, had Manchester been attacked again , she might have fallen into enemy hands.
Although it is easy to be judgement at this distance in time, when efforts made by other RN commanders to save, or even keep in action, badly damaged vessels (Exeter & Edinburgh, as typical examples) the result of the subsequent Court Martial, a severe reprimand and prohibition from any subsequent sea command, seems justified.
Rather oddly, in 1948, one of his subsequent duties was to be appointed as ADC to King George VI.
1
-
1
-
'KGV`s ! Unsinkable ( as long as they don`t face an enemy ); Well, Duke of York sank Scharnhorst, Prince of Wales caused sufficient damage to Bismarck to force Lutjens to abandon his commerce raiding operation, and King George V, with Rodney, rapidly disposed of Bismarck. Incidentally, I don't think 'some britains' (whatever that is supposed to mean) have any problems with German ships, any more than the wartime Royal Navy did. Cases in point : Graf Spee, Konigsberg, half the total German destroyer force (1st & 2nd Narvik), Bismarck, and Scharnhorst.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Aelvir114 Cavalier was preserved simply because she was the last of her line. There is another RN warship crying out to be preserved, HMS Whimbrel, now an Egyptian vessel in Alexandria harbour. She ticks every box. She is a Black Swan class escort sloop, which operated in the Atlantic, in the Arctic, was part of Walker's 2nd Support Group, and was present at the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. A few years ago, an attempt to purchase her almost succeeded, until the Egyptians upped the price.
Needless to say the British Government was never, at any time, even vaguely interested in supporting the venture, and to the best of my knowledge still isn't.
1
-
1
-
@swunt10 So, All or Nothing Armour is 'Bullshit?' Clearly you are better informed than every naval designer for the last 100 years. By the way, simply quoting from Wikipedia doesn't impress anyone, especially when by so doing you merely suggest that you don't understand what you are quoting. Look up a proper book on the subject, and you will perhaps begin to grasp what 'All or Nothing' armour is, when compared to 'incremental.' You could start by reading Norman Friedman (US Battleships - An Illustrated Design History), followed by Willian Garzke & Robert Dulin (Battleships - United States Battleships in WW2). I have given you American sources, because I suspect that British ones, in your eyes, would probably be tainted. Failing that, read up on what happened to Hiei & Kirishima ( both 'incremental' ships) at Guadalcanal, compared to what happened to USS South Dakota, an 'all or nothing' ship.
Indeed, Bismarck survived her battle against Hood & Prince of Wales, but in so doing sustained sufficient damage to force her to abandon her mission. Prince of Wales, by the way, withdraw because of the known problems with her quadruple turrets, but re-engaged later in the day once these had been repaired. Once Bismarck had lost her ability to escape, her design left her unable to resist Rodney's 16 inch shells, which reduced her to a defenceless wreck in around 20 minutes, as every book on the subject will confirm.
1
-
@swunt10 Bismarck was disabled by an aerial torpedo late on 26 May. By 'crippled' I was referring to the fact that her fighting ability was reduced almost to nothing within 20 minutes on the morning of 27 May. A battleship which is reduced to impotence so quickly is less impressive than you would have us believe. Are you aware of the weaknesses in her design? Outmoded incremental armour (which hadn't been used in British or American design for around 20 years) which resulted in widespread internal fires, just as it was subsequently to do aboard Scharnhorst, Hiei, & Kirishima, outmoded, low angle, secondary armament, and outmoded, twin turret, main armament. In short, an enlarged Baden, and not much more.
1
-
Bismarck was crippled as a warship after 20 minutes on 27 May, 1941. Certainly, she took around 90 minutes to sink, but as a warship, she was quickly rendered helpless. Scharnhorst was overwhelmed by Duke of York, and Graf Spee couldn't cope with three small cruisers. Blucher was sunk by the Oskarsborg Fortress, using weapons which were over 40 years old in 1940. It is difficult to comment on the rest. Karlsruhe was scuttled after being crippled by a torpedo from HMSm Truant in 1940, Konigsberg was hit and damaged by Norwegian coastal batteries, before being finished off by dive bombers in 1940, Leipzig was damaged, in December, 1939, by a torpedo from HMSm Salmon, and never returned to front line service, and, again in 1940, 10 of 20 German destroyers were sunk by the RN at Narvik.
Are you sure that German ships, at least in WW2, were 'well balanced & just work?'
1
-
1
-
Actually, the most effective commerce raiders the Germans produced were merchant ships with concealed guns. Unlike ships such as the Deutschlands, which were immediately recognisable, such ships had the ability to fool allied observers into thinking that they were indeed innocents. After spending months of effort in intercepting one merchantman or another in distant waters, cruiser captains could, inevitably, become less than thorough, and either let a raider pass, or, in the case of Sydney, simply get too close.
All in all, they were cheap to produce (armed with 6 inch guns from the old Schleswig-Holstein, or Schliesen), capable of carrying mines, and generally with crews mainly of ex-merchant navy men. Obviously, they weren't ever going to win the war at sea on their own, but they were far more cost-effective at tying up allied naval resources than 'regular' warships ever were.
1
-
Very good. Unfortunately, to build such a navy, it would have been necessary to starve the army and air force of the materials and workers necessary to build them up to a level capable of successfully invading France. As a probable result, Italy remains neutral, the French navy remains active on the Allied side, and whatever ships the Germans do build remain trapped in the North Sea or, more precisely, the Jade estuary. You should read a report produced by the German Navy's Ordnance Department, entitled 'The Feasibility of the Z Plan' as this basically said that the whole idea was an impossibility, unless the whole of German industry was devoted solely to naval production.
You seem, moreover, to view the Royal Navy in terms of big ships only. Instead of indulging in fanciful 'would haves' you might have done better to have actually found out what resources the Royal Navy had available to it in 1939. Ignore the capital ships, just start with the 64 cruisers, then add 193 destroyers, then total up the hundreds of smaller warships for yourself.
1
-
1
-
As early as December, 1938, a senior marine architect in the Kriegsmarine's naval ordnance department published a report 'The Feasibility of the Z Plan' demonstrating the impossibility of the whole thing. Whoever produced the Plan seems to have assumed that the whole of German industry, in terms of resources, raw materials, and production capacity, would be devoted solely to warship production for around ten years. So, there would be no expansion of the army or air force, therefore no successful campaign in the west, no French bases from which to operate and, most significant of all where adolf was concerned, no possibility whatsoever of a campaign in the east.
The whole thing, start to finish, was nothing more than fantasy.
1
-
@熊掌波清波 The bridge/forward superstructure, together with both forward turrets were destroyed very early in the action. Of course Bismarck was never going to survive, but I am not talking about radar (which, in Bismarck, wasn't working anyway) or optical rangefinders, but about the internal communications between departments within the ship. The senior survivor von Mullenheim-Rechberg, who was in the aft gunnery position, recorded in his book that communications with his superior, Schneider, in the main fire control position, was lost within 20 minutes, and that the gunnery plotting officer, Cardinal, contacted him shortly afterwards to say that he should take over the direction of the aft turrets, because contact with the main gunnery position had been lost.
By 0930, Rechberg wrote, he knew little about what was going on within the ship. He had received no reports, nor had anyone asked him about his own situation. He writes that he used his telephone circuits to ring for information all round the ship, but only managed to get one answer, from a messenger in the damage control centre. From his account, it is clear that internal communications failed at an early stage.
Bismarck's problems arose because of her outmoded, incremental, armour lay out, which, in effect, detonated incoming AP shells above the lower, second, belt, thus resulting in widespread fires and the destruction of internal cables. Similar things happened to other ships with this layout, such as Scharnhorst, Hiei, & Kirishima. The KGVs had the superior, all or nothing, armour, with all communications below it.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@carlpolen7437 I did not claim that Enigma was the only source of intelligence information. If you care to read my post again, you will realise that I was explaining a fact to someone who had claimed that the date of the Dash was known via Enigma, when it was not.
What resources do you suggest the Admiralty had available? Let's see. In February, 1942, were were the heavy units of the Royal Navy :-
King George V - Hvalfjord.
Duke of York - Scapa Flow, working up.
Rodney - Hvalfjord.
Nelson - Refitting at Rosyth.
Queen Elizabeth - Alexandria under repair.
Warspite - Eastern Fleet.
Valiant - Alexandria under repair.
Malaya - In the Clyde. Escort for Troop Convoy WS16
Royal Sovereign, Ramillies, Resolution, Revenge. - Eastern Fleet.
Renown - Hvalfjord.
Where were these 'plenty of resources available' of which you speak? Would you like me to list the locations of the RN's heavy cruisers, perhaps?
The fact is that the priority at the time was maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean, with what was largely a Fleet in Being of four obsolete battleships, one modernised battleships, and two aircraft carriers, and at the same time providing heavy cover for Russian convoys, in the knowledge that Tirpitz was now fully operational, and had been in Trondheim for around a month, along with Admiral Scheer and several fleet destroyers.
Please explain which of the Admiralty's perceived priorities was less important? Especially since Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been in Brest for eleven months, and Prinz Eugen for nine, during which period Bomber Command had regularly attacked them without success. There were 63 raids on Brest from March 1941 to the end of the year, by the way.
THe fact is that Bomber Command was given the task of dealing with the three German heavy ships in Brest, and, as Churchill himself remarked, the inability of Bomber Command to do this was a serious failure.
By the way, 'thin-skinned?' Not at all. I simply know far more about the actual facts and details of Operation Cerberus than most do.
1
-
@TexasSpectre Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had been in Brest since 22 March, 1941, and Prinz Eugen since 29 May, 1941. Bomber Command had been responsible for their neutralisation, and had failed consistently.
The Kriegsmarine introduced a 4th rotor to their Enigma machines on 1 February, 1942, and the revised machines could not be broken by Bletchley Park until the capture of a machine and code books from U559 by HMS Petard in October. Effectively, after 1 February, 1942, the British did not have access to naval Enigma.
The British did, however, expect an imminent breakout, and local forces were alerted of this. When the ships & escorts sailed at 2245 on 11 February, a British submarine, Sealion, patrolling the entrance to Brest, had withdrawn to charge her batteries, and the RAF's 'Stopper' patrol, a Hudson of 224 Squadron, failed to make contact with her ASV radar. Furthermore, the next patrol in line, 'Line South East' had been withdrawn by the RAF because of radar faults, and no replacement aircraft sent. The third patrol line, 'Boulogne' was also withdrawn by the RAF when the ships were still west of it, at 0630, apparently because of fog, and because no imminent operation was expected, as 'Stopper' had detected nothing.
The only other patrol over the Channel was the routine dawn patrol by Fighter Command from Ostend, south to the mouth of the Somme, which the Brest Group passed at 10:00 a.m. From 8:25–9:59 a.m. RAF radar operators, using an un-jammed radar frequency, noticed four plots of German aircraft circling in places north of Le Havre, which at first were thought to be air-sea rescue operations.
At 10:00 a.m. 11 Group RAF Fighter Command realised that the plots were moving north-east at 20–25 kn (23–29 mph; 37–46 km/h) and sent two Spitfires to reconnoitre at 10:20 a.m., about the time that news reached Fighter Command headquarters that radar-jamming had begun at 9:20 a.m. and that the station at Beachy Head was detecting surface ships. Radar stations in Kent reported two large ships off Le Touquet at 10:52 a.m. and when the Spitfire patrol landed at 10:50 a.m., having kept radio silence, the pilots reported a flotilla off Le Touquet (near Boulogne) but did not mention capital ships.
News of the sighting was rushed to 11 Group, and the Navy at Dover, by 11:05 a.m. Asecond flight of two Spitfires found themselves over a German flotilla of two big ships, a destroyer screen and an outer ring of E-boats. The Spitfires were dived on by about 12 German fighters and escaped through anti-aircraft fire from the ships, strafed an E-boat and made off at wave-top height. After they landed at 1109, the pilots reported that the German ships had been 16 nmi (18 mi; 30 km) off Le Touquet at 1042. By 11:25 a.m., the alarm had been raised that the Brest Group was entering the Straits of Dover with air cover.
At 1127, Bomber Command was alerted that the Brest Group was near Dover and warned the groups to be ready. Including aircraft that had flown the night before and those at four hours' notice, Air Marshal Richard Peirse had about 250 aircraft but the 100 bombers on two hours' notice had been loaded with semi-armour-piercing bombs which were effective only if dropped from 7,000 ft (2,100 m) or higher. Visibility was poor with rain and 8/10ths to 10/10ths cloud cover, down to 700 ft (210 m) and unless there were breaks in the cloud just when needed the task was impossible. Peirse ordered general-purpose bombs to be loaded, which could only cause superficial blast damage and attacks at low altitude, in the hope that the attacks would distract the Brest Group as Coastal Command and the Navy made torpedo attacks.
At 1219, the coastal batteries at Dover fired their first salvo but with visibility down to 5 nmi, there could be no observation of the fall-of-shot. The gunners hoped that the radar would detect the shell splashes and allow corrections to be made, although this method had never been tried before. "Blips" on the K-set radar clearly showed the ships zig-zagging but not where the shells were landing. Full battery salvo firing began and the four 9.2-inch guns fired 33 rounds at the German ships, which were moving out of range at 30 kn (35 mph; 56 km/h) and all missed.
German sources state that the fleet had already passed Dover when the coastal artillery opened fire and that the shells landed well astern of the major German units. The coastal guns ceased fire when light naval forces and torpedo-bombers began to attack and by 1321 the German ships passed beyond the effective range of the British radar.
Five operational MTBs left Dover at 1155, and sighted the German force at 1223. RAF fighter cover for these boats had not arrived (it hadn't actually taken off).
Six Swordfish torpedo bombers of the Fleet Air Arm left Manston at 1220. An escort of Spitfires from 72 Squadron failed to arrive, having been intercepted by Fw190s. The Swordfish made their attacks, therefore, unsupported, and all were lost.
Four Beauforts left THorney Island at 1325 were late to meet their fighter escorts at Manston and the torpedo-bombers and fighters were ordered independently to attack the German ships. The position, course and speed of the Brest Group was given by R/T to the Spitfires and Morse W/T to the Beauforts. The torpedo-bombers failed to receive the orders, because 16 Group forgot that they had been fitted with R/T for Operation Fuller. When the Beauforts reached Manston they circled with numerous fighters which appeared to ignore them. Two Beauforts flew to the French coast, found nothing and landed at Manston where the confusion was resolved.
Finally, the destroyers HMS Campbell, Vivacious of the 21st Flotilla and HMS Mackay, Whitshed, Walpole and Worcester of the 16th Flotilla (Captain Charles Pizey), from Nore Command, which were First World War-vintage and used to escort east coast convoys, were practising gunnery off Orford Ness in the North Sea when alerted at 1156. The destroyers sailed south to intercept the Brest Group but it steamed much faster than expected and to catch up,
Pizey took the destroyers over a German minefield and at 1431, just before the destroyers attacked, north of the Scheldt Estuary, Scharnhorst had hit a mine and was stopped for a short time, before resuming at about 25 kn. At 1517 the destroyers made radar contact at 9 nm, and visual contact at 4 nmi at 1543 . Walpole had already dropped out with engine trouble; as the other five emerged from the murk, they were immediately engaged by the German ships. The destroyers pressed on to 3,000 yds. and two destroyers fired torpedoes; Worcester closed further and was hit by return fire from Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen, then the last two destroyers attacked but all their torpedoes missed.
By the way, the German force consisted, in addition to two battleships and a heavy cruiser, 6 destroyers, 14 torpedo boats, 26 'S' boats, 252 fighters, and 35 bombers. Do you really think that an 'ambush' by five MTBs and six V & W class destroyers was ever a realistic possibility?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@simonpitt8145 Pound did have a reputation for 'back seat driving.' I wouldn't doubt for a moment that Andrew Cunningham would have left the decisions to the men on the spot. Indeed, Pound's own staff were convinced that Tirpitz was not at sea. Furthermore, whilst scattering a convoy was effective in the Atlantic against a single enemy warship, HX84 being a case in point, it was precisely the wrong thing to do when the enemy consisted of a number of enemy submarines and aircraft.
The irony was, as the convoy began to scatter, and Broome sent those of his destroyers with torpedoes to join Hamilton's cruiser squadron, they were cheered by many of the crews of the merchant ships who, like Broome's own crews, believed that they were heading for a desperate battle against odds.
At the time, Dudley Pound was suffering from the early stages of a brain tumour which was eventually to kill him, which may perhaps explain his unwise decisions.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@MAAAAAAAAAA123 When did you give me the list of actions? Please remind me by repeating it. I did, by the way, refer to Bismarck in the Denmark Strait as 'successful' although Bismarck & Prinz Eugen's actual task was to sink merchant shipping and disrupt the convoy network. Remind me again how many merchantmen they sank, and how many convoys they disrupted. As to the Glorious episode, the convoys to which I referred were actually troop convoys, and it wasn't me who judged Admiral Marschall, but Raeder, who dismissed him for his failure.
The fact that Renown inflicted sufficient damage to force Lutjens to withdraw at high speed, and abandon the destroyer force in Narvik, resulted in the loss of all ten German destroyers, by the way. Lutjens had two alternatives available to him, which were to achieve a significant victory over a modernised battlecruiser, or to screen the withdrawal of the Narvik destroyers. He managed neither. Hipper, by the way, sank a tanker, a small transport, and an armed trawler.
Finally :- 'Your standards of success change without rhyme or reason.' Where & when?
1
-
1
-
@MAAAAAAAAAA123 'They only lost one large warship in the invasion?' So, you either don't consider, or haven't heard of Karlsruhe (sunk on 9 April) and Konigsberg (sunk on 10 April), or 50% of the German destroyer fleet at Narvik, to be large warships. Likewise, neither battleship was back in service until November, 1940, and Deutschland not until April, 1941, all as a result of the Norwegian campaign.
I am glad you have read my earlier replies, even though they don't seem to have penetrated your pre-existing prejudices. Perhaps you might consider trying to present credible arguments demonstrating occasions when the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet performed well. Bismarck, when forced to engage an aging fast battleship, was certainly successful, although utterly failing in the mission she had been set, and Scharnhorst & Gneisenau sank a carrier, but in so doing missing the evacuation convoys they were supposed to intercept, thus resulting in the dismissal of their admiral.
They had previously failed to challenge Renown on 9 April, 1940, and subsequently avoided action with elderly, unsupported, British capital ships during Operation Berlin. After that, of course, neither achieved anything at all. Incidentally, one of the people who believed that the surface fleet performed badly was one Adolf Hitler, who effectively disbanded it after the humiliating defeat in the Barents Sea in December, 1942. Actually, he could just as easily have taken the same action after the Channel Dash, as it really achieved nothing of relevance thereafter.
There is an easy way to demonstrate my ignorance. Simply provide a list of occasions when the German fleet did achieve something of note, after acting as, effectively, ferry boats for troops during the invasion of Norway. By the way :- 'Allied naval losses were similarly heavy, in fact a bit higher.' Really? One carrier, nine destroyers, and two light cruisers, compared to one heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers. A bit higher? Exactly how rose-tinted are your spectacles?
For all your bluster, you have presented precisely no arguments to contradict Mr. Browne's original contention that 'Apart from it's U-boat arm the German navy seems to have been more of a burden than a weapon during WWII, tying up more resources instead of effectively attacking Allied targets.' Instead of simply posting insults, why don't you present some credible, reasoned, arguments?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@donfelipe7510 She could, but Tovey only had four capital ships to block two Atlantic exit points, so kept his strongest and weakest (KGV & Repulse) in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and sent the middle two to the Denmark Strait. He hoped, by so doing, to have an adequate force in both locations to prevent Bismarck breaking out. He was proved right, but hardly in the way he expected.
Previously, when Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had broken out (Operation Berlin, also commanded by Lutjens) Tovey had gambled on this being through the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and had placed his capital ships there. He had been proved wrong. This time, he hedged his bets.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@hajoos.8360 Do you think it would have been a good idea for Prinz Eugen to have closed the range? Oh well, possibly fortunate for her that someone more sensible was making the decisions on her bridge. Why do you have such a problem with accepting what everyone else with any knowledge already knows, which was that Jasper believed Hood & PoW were cruisers?
As for the Report from Schmundt which, apparently, you believe I have invented, simply search for :- 'Position Statement of the Commander of Cruisers (B.d.K.), Vizeadmiral Schmundt, regarding the War Diary of the cruiser "Prinz Eugen".' It is followed by further comments by Admiral Carls, Head of Naval Group North. Unless, of course, you now wish to suggest I made that up as well? Carls concluded by writing that 'The criticism of the assumption by the 1st Artillery Officer is not warranted, namely, that at very far distances of the opponent, particularly at sharp angles, the identity of a ship's type, even with the most accurate knowledge, cannot be demanded with absolute certainty.' In other words, Carls, like everyone except you, accepts that Hood & PoW were wrongly identified.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@28pbtkh23 He seems to make a habit of it, and he has already demonstrated that he is often a stranger to the truth when it conflicts with his ill-concealed prejudices. Please read my reply to him on another subject, as follows:-
As a 'well educated on-paper seaman' may I have the impertinence to correct this :-
'High velocity 11-inch-shells from Gneisenau or Scharnhorst penetrated easily the armor of Renown, which meant cold food for Renown's crew.' I assume you have never read Captain Simeon's report of the action with Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, still less, probably, that of Admiral Whitworth. Well, I have.
Despite your untruths, which I will generously attribute to your ignorance, rather than to a deliberate attempt to mislead, Renown was actually hit twice during the action. One shell passed through the main leg of her forward tripod mast, without exploding, although it did sever some electrical leads, and the second passed through Renown's extreme stern, damaging a fan and some light fittings, again without exploding. Renown's armour was not penetrated, and the damage was minimal, with none at all to her galley. I recall telling you this some time ago. Presumably you did not expect me to read this post, hence your attempt to patronise me.
By the way, Kirishima was never a British ship, although built, in Japan, to a British design. Again, clearly, you cannot possibly be attempting to mislead, but are simply either ill informed or merely allowing personal prejudice to override the facts.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Newie67 I wrote that the Bismarck did not have AIR SEARCH RADAR, because she didn't. Show me where I wrote something to the contrary, please. She was not state of the art, despite what your 'documentary' says. For example, she had four twin turrets, when other navies had moved to three multiple gun turrets. This made her much longer, and requiring more armour, than contemporary British & American capital ships. She was, by the way, 251m long, compared to the 227m of the King George Vs, and the 222m of the North Carolinas. Next, she was given low angle secondary armament, at a time when British & American ships were fitted with dual purpose secondary armaments. The British 5.25 inch and the American 5 inch could engage approaching aircraft; the German 5.9s could not. Thirdly, she still retained the outdated incremental armour system, which all other major navies had discontinued after WW1, in favour of the superior All-or-Nothing design pioneered by the US navy. As a result, she, in common with other 'incremental' ships, was far more vulnerable to internal fires. Look up the ends of Hiei, Kirishima, & Scharnhorst, as well as Bismarck, for proof of this, and compare them to the South Dakota, which suffered considerable damage, but no serious internal fires. Finally, her lower belt was positioned too low in the ship. This made her difficult to sink, but comparatively easy to reduce to impotence. As a result, she was reduced from a functioning warship to, in effect, a helpless target, in about 20 minutes on 27 May. Combine all that with her internal communications network, which was positioned above her main armour, and thus was destroyed right at the start of her final action, and you have an impressive looking, but rather outdated, capital ship. Finally, her belt, at 320mm, was 36mm thinner than those of the Nelsons or the KGVs, her deck armour, at 120mm was 32mm thinner than the KGVs and 39mm thinner than the Nelson, and her weight of broadside, at 6400 kgs, was lighter than either the KGVs (7212 kgs) or the Nelsons (8360 kgs). You thus have a warship which has only one advantage, which was the speed to avoid action. Once that was lost, she was doomed.
You might want to print off the above, rather than sticking to simply watching superficial and inaccurate documentaries on TV. There are academic studies of the naval war of WW2 available for adults, you know.
I agree, we do have different ideas about 'healthy discussion.' Mine involve presenting facts and drawing conclusions from them, whereas yours seem to involve refusing to read things you don't like, and then calling people 'nobs' and 'dum.' I suppose I should have realised the extent of your lack of knowledge when you, absurdly, referred to Bismarck as a 'pocket battleship.' Please feel free to go away and watch a few more 'documentaries' if you find proper studies beneath you.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Newie67 Certainly, Bismarck had three FuMo23s, or, to be strictly accurate, three radars known as FMG 39G (gO)s, of a type which later were renamed long after Bismarck had settled in the sea bed. However, in her initial encounter with Wake-Walker's squadron, she fired a few rounds at HMS Norfolk from her forward turrets, and the shock effect disabled her forward radar, probably both sets if Prinz Eugen's War Diary is correct. Bismarck's senior survivor, von Mullenheim-Rechberg, was actually her 4th Gunnery Officer, in command of her aft director, and he does not refer to use of radar in the last action at all, even when he briefly took command of what was left of her armament until his optical equipment was smashed.
You have, at least, got something right. The bulk of the initial damage, including the destruction of Bismarck's forward armament and her bridge & command staff, was the work of Rodney, in the first 20 minutes of the action.
If the British did not use radar for range, how do you explain the fact that, among others, Hood, Suffolk, & KGV, had main gunnery, Type 284, radar, and used it during both actions. Type 284 had both search & ranging capability, by the way. The reference to radar at 10.15 in your rather poor YouTube presentation is irrelevant, in that it only refers to the main radar, not to supposed AA gunnery radar which you mentioned earlier, and is, frankly, wrong, for the reasons I have explained earlier. The British by May 1941 had gunnery radar on most of their larger warships, and many also had effective air search sets as well. If you wish to discuss naval history with people who are professional historians, with Firsts in the subject and access to a vast array of archives, you really need to up your game, old chap. Incidentally, 'dum' is actually correctly spelled 'dumb.'
As to your rather infantile comment :- 'France was defeated so why build a ship for somebody that was defeated?' Are you really so ill-informed that you are unaware that Bismarck was laid down in 1936, and launched in February, 1939? Was France defeated in 1936 or, indeed, in 1939?
What if the American vessels were built after the sinking of Bismarck? What relevance at all has this to the lengths of their work-ups, or to that of the British KGVs? I will ignore your anti-American rant as irrelevant, and end by saying that the British only became a naval enemy of Germany when Kaiser Bill embarked on a building programme specifically intended to challenge the supremacy of the Royal Navy. Prior to that, the French had been the main potential opponent, but Wilhelm's actions were something no British government of the time could ignore.
I do, by the way, regularly discuss history with others, but they do tend to have rather more knowledge than you appear to have, possibly because, unlike you, they do not acquire their information from rather dubious sources, such as questionable YouTube programmes.
1
-
@Newie67 Firstly, Bismarck was not rushed into action. After commissioning, she had six months working up in the Baltic. British and, later, American heavy ships could only dream of such a leisurely work up timescale. Secondly, the German navy did not have an air search radar, even less a radar capable of directing AA fire. Even Tirpitz never received anything more than the FuMo 23 main gunnery sets.
Instead of looking at the hits it took to sink Bismarck, why not look at how quickly she was reduced from a warship to a helpless target. On 27 May, about 20 minutes. By comparison, USS South Dakota at Guadalcanal received 27 heavy hits and remained in action. Warships were expected to achieve rather more than simply being hard to sink, and Bismarck didn't.
Bismarck was never called a 'pocket battleship.' The only three to which this term might be applied were the Deutchlands, supposedly 10,000 tons, but actually nearer 15,000. Bismarck was built well after Hitler had chosen to ignore any treaty limitations, and actually displaced almost 50,000 tons.
Bismarck, by the way, was built to take on the French Jean Barts, in a potential war between Germany & France/Poland. The German navy never gave any consideration at all to the sheer impossibility of challenging the Royal Navy.
Seriously, there are so many errors in your comments about Bismarck that I wonder why you bothered to post at all. Why not just buy a book or two in order to correct the gaps in your knowledge?
1
-
@Newie67 Hood was completed in 1920. Bismarck had been commissioned in August, 1940, and then spent six months working up in the Baltic. Hardly hurried. Moreover, her AA guns were all modern, even if in the event they failed her.
Bismarck's flaws were more basic. She had four twin turrets, (at a time when every other major navy had moved to three turret designs,) thus requiring a greater length and therefore more armour. Her armour itself still followed the WW1 incremental layout, which other navies had long abandoned in favour of the superior 'all or nothing' design, and she retained an outmoded low angle secondary armament when other navies were installing Dual Purpose secondary systems. Finally, internal communications were placed too high in the ship, and were disabled almost at once in her final action.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@elrjames7799 No. Hood was 20 years old, and was less well armoured than Bismarck. Bismarck had superior optical rangefinders, although Hood had gunnery radar. Both had obsolete incremental armour, compared to the all-or-nothing of more modern ships such as the Nelsons, the KGVs, or the Washington.
However, if Hood could have closed the range, she was well enough armoured to have inflicted considerable damage on Bismarck. A damaged British ship, of course, could expect support after the action from other British ships. No similar support would be forthcoming for Lutjens' squadron.
Furthermore, Hood was not alone. She had the support of a modern, though not worked up, Prince of Wales. The fact was that, had the action gone as the British expected, either Bismarck would have been forced to divide her main battery in order to engage both British ships, or would have concentrated on one and allowed the other to fire on her unchallenged. In a longer action, also, Wake-Walkers two Counties could have been expected to act against Prinz Eugen. Incidentally, Lutjens, throughout the action, thought that the battleship with Hood was King George V, not Prince of Wales.
The point I have been trying to make is that those people who harp on about the sort of British arrogance which could have sent an old battlecruiser with eggshell armour against a state of the art super-battleship are writing nonsense. Hood was well armoured, and Bismarck was far from state of the art.
Tovey had every right to expect Hood & Prince of Wales to have been capable of preventing a break out by Lutjens into the wider Atlantic. Indeed, stripped of the emotion involved, that is exactly what they managed to do.
Hindsight, however, is a wonderful thing, as many of the people who post one here efficiently demonstrate every day.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@montanabulldog9687 I have detailed accounts of every refit carried out on Hood between 1929 & 1941. the took place on:- 3 June, 1929-28, May 1931, 1 August to 5 September, 1934, 26 June to 10 October, 1936, 8 November to 16 December, 1937, February - June, 1939, July-August, 1939, 29 March & 27 May, 1940, and 16 January to 15 March, 1941.
There is no suggestion anywhere that armour plate was removed from the boat deck & not replaced. There was, as I wrote earlier, a proposal to fit thicker armour over the magazines & machinery spaces, but in view of the increase of weight this would inflict on an already overweight ship, it was not undertaken. Hood was scheduled for complete modernisation after the completion of work on Queen Elizabeth, but, of course, world events intervened.
Seriously, do you really think that large sections of armour plate could possibly have been removed, and then 'forgotten about?'
1
-
@montanabulldog9687 Hood never carried a 4.5 inch gun, single or twin, during the course of her entire existence.
In addition, as I wrote earlier, this :- 'her primary DECK ARMOR PLATE had been "Removed", to have been "Replaced", by a THICKER plate ,. but during the installing of the "New" guns, she was RUSHED back into service, having "Omitted" the deck armor plate, an what ended up happening was that it was simply . . . "Forgotten" about . . .'
was simply not true.
1
-
@montanabulldog9687 No, you didn't. I doubt any official RN document would refer to Hood's 4.5 inch secondary armament being replaced by 4.5 inch twins. Largely because Hood's 5.5 inch low angle secondary armament was removed completely, and a secondary armament of seven twin 4 inch AA guns were fitted in completely different locations on the boat deck.
This, however, did not happen during the course of one refit, but in a series of stages. Initially, the shelter deck 5.5s were removed, and four twin 4 inch mountings fitted. Later, the remaining three single 4 inch were also replaced by twins. Twin searchlight towers between the funnels were removed, and the old HACS control system replaced by a new one. No deck armour or plating was removed.
There was a proposal to replace protective deck plating with 4 inch armour over the magazines and 2.5 inch armour over the machinery spaces, but this was not 'forgotten about.' The additional weight involved, 1410 tons, was regarded as having too adverse an effect on a ship whose displacement had already increased significantly over the years.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@willosee Certainly, the 'Battlecruiser' term has been over-used. Her design was extensively altered after Jutland to improve her armouring. For example, her predecessors, the Renowns, had 6 inches of belt armour, and the Lions & Tiger had 9 inches. Hood, by contrast, had a 12 inch belt, the same as the WW1 Orion, King George V, and Iron Duke class battleships, and only 1 inch less thick than the Queen Elizabeths. Hood should more correctly be described as a fast battleship than as a true battlecruiser. Her horizontal armour, at 3 inches, was the same as that of the QEs, and actually thicker than that of the Iron Dukes.
That said, in 1941 she was 20 years old, and had the war not intervened she would have been in the middle of a reconstruction along the lines of those given to Warspite, Valiant, Queen Elizabeth, and Renown. Even so, the assumptions in many posts that 'Hood was a battlecruiser and didn't have a chance against Bismarck' show a lack of knowledge about her design, and are made, I suspect, from ignorance and with the benefit of hindsight.
Certainly, at the time, whilst the RN were fully aware of Hood's limitations, there was no suggestion that to put her up against Bismarck, especially with the semi-worked up Prince of Wales in support, was in any way a suicide mission.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@davidcolin6519 'a strong odour of politics, cover-up and vested interest.' I take this to mean that, because you choose not to accept the conclusions of the two enquiries into Hood's loss, then clearly there must have been sharp practice involved, because the conclusions cannot possibly be correct if they do not meet your requirements. In other words, exactly the same argument that every other 'cover up' enthusiast deploys. The other possibility, that the Admiralty actually wanted to know the reasons for Hood's loss, clearly you consider too far fetched.
As to carriers. Have you never heard of the Washington Naval Treaty, which set restrictions in capital ship construction? From the RN's point of view, the Treaty allowed for 137,000 tons total in terms of operational carriers. The seven carriers in service with the RN in 1939 displaced, in total, 137,900 tons. The Royal Navy, therefore, had built up to the allowed limit. As, indeed, had the United States' Navy, which had actually, six carriers totalling 147600 tons. If you accuse the RN of 'ignoring' carriers, then would you level the same charge at the United States Navy?
Surely you aren't seriously asking me to produce a list of technological developments? This from someone apparently unaware of the ramifications of Washington? If you aren't aware of them yourself, there are plenty of books available to educate you. However, in terms of capital ship development after WW1, read up on the RN's various new designs, and in particular the designs from K3 to I3. All these were subsequently, like the US Lexingtons, cancelled because of Washington, but they hardly suggest that 'UK capital ship development pretty much froze after WWI,' any more than US development did. Even the two which the RN did build, the Nelsons, had superior armour and weight of broadside to the much later Bismarcks, and were arguably the most powerful warships on earth until the arrival of the North Carolinas.
'As for politeness; your unsurprising condescension as to my reference to Wikipedia simply and entirely misses the point; that it was a significant theory at the time, and still continues to be.' I didn't think I was being particularly condescending. I simply asked you to refer me to my earlier post to which you considered this to be a reply. You still haven't, incidentally.
You do, by the way, appear to have ignored another reason for Bismarck's eventual fate, which was that at the Denmark Strait she was damaged by surface gunfire, lost access to around 1000 tons of fuel, and was forced to abandon her mission in order to make for St. Nazaire.
As to Tirpitz. You have been arguing about the role of the carrier. I chose not to include Tirpitz, but instead kept my comments to warships lost during actions at sea, because neither Tirpitz nor, indeed, Konigsberg, Gneisenau, or Scheer, were lost as a result of either carrier of surface ship attack, and were not therefore illustrative of the respective importance of either.
I notice that you seem to consider the Admiralty & the Royal Navy to be separate entities. Bizarre!
Finally, you apparently consider me to be ' a dyed-in-the-wool supporter of all things RN...... who clearly sees no fault anywhere in anything that the RN has ever done or will ever do.' I am far from that, but I do choose to respond to ill-informed comments from someone whose prejudice is only exceeded by his lack of knowledge about the subject upon which he pontificates so apparently sagely.
1
-
@davidcolin6519 Actually, I was referring to the 'unconsidered' part of the comment, although it could be pointed out that the Swordfish was, at the time, probably the only carrier aircraft in the world even capable of getting off the deck in the sea conditions prevailing. By the way, the Albacore, which was used at Matapan, was also a biplane.
'In action' does not mean whilst inactive in port, by the way, and didn't you notice my reference to Matapan? Accuse me (wrongly) of not knowing what I am talking about, but at least have the manners to read what I am saying first.
A further example. You say 'And yes, the view that it was Hood's flash protection was definitely the dominant theory when I first looked at this part of Naval History in the 1970s, so I'd suggest that you try provide evidence that this was never a post-battle theory.' As I have restricted my comments to Bismarck & to carrier operations, I would be grateful if you would enlighten me as to when I made such a comment.
I am fortunate enough to have access to ADM 116/4352, the record at Kew of the Second Enquiry. The two experts, D.E.J. Offord, & Dr. Rotter, the Director of Explosives Research at Woolwich, both gave extensive evidence, and both considered the explosion to have been the result of a 15 inch magazine explosion, probably triggered off by the 4 inch magazine.
Your touching conviction that it says so in wikipaedia so it must be true is charming, but neither the exploding gun, nor the failure of safety measures is supported by any professional source.
Finally, your 'catch all' general comment about RN complacency seems totally to ignore the fact that most major developments in naval warfare during the period you disparage were from the RN in origin.
'The very fact that most German Capital/Heavy ships were lost due to surface engagements does nothing to prove your point. If you have only very limited numbers of carriers, then the likelihood is that result.' The Royal Navy didn't have a limited number of carriers. In May, 1941, for example, there were eight in commission, and a ninth (the first escort carrier) almost complete. The reality is that fleet carriers were not suited to convoy escort duties, which is why the RN had begun building Audacity, and had ordered improved Audacities from the United States in early 1941.
1
-
The events of 27 May actually showed that, however difficult to sink, Bismarck had been reduced from a warship to a helpless target in little more than 20 minutes.
As to 'the carrier's unconsidered and obsolete Swordfishes!' Sorry, but nothing could be less true. FAA doctrine since the mid-1930s had seen carriers as a means of slowing down an enemy fleet in order to bring it within range of the British battlefleet. Indeed, this had already happened once, at Matapan, only two months earlier.
I submit that you have a Pacific-centric view of naval warfare in WW2. However important carriers might have been there, they never attained a similar importance in the west. The carrier there was an integral part of the fleet, not the centre of it. The three German heavy ships sunk in action were all destroyed by surface ships, the Italian fleet was repelled in the Mediterranean mainly by surface ships, and for much of the year carriers were unable to operate effectively in the Arctic.
Oh, and there has never been any suggestion that Hood succumbed to a repeat of Beatty's Jutland foolishness.
1
-
@briandickinson9383 Just to correct one or two points. No battleship ever hit another battleship at '14 miles.' The best recorded was 26000 yards., by HMS Warspite on Giulio Cesare on 9 July, 1940. Bismarck's hit was from around 15000 yards.
Bismarck was hit during the action by Prince of Wales. Her forward fuel tanks were no longer accessible, she was down by the bows, listing by 9 degrees (although this was reduced by counter-flooding) trailing oil, and reduced to 28 knots. At that point, by the way, her mission was abandoned and she made for St. Nazaire.
Two naval enquiries concluded that Hood was sunk by a hit which ignited her 4 inch magazine, which in turn triggered off a 15 inch magazine. There was no suggestion that any magazine doors were left open, largely because this particular folly, the idea of Admiral Beatty, was discontinued after Jutland, and had never happened in the Grand Fleet at all.
Finally, Hood was one of only four capital ships available to Tovey with the speed and firepower to challenge Bismarck. Tovey sent two to the Denmark Strait, and two to the Iceland-Faroes Gap. Hood, though aging, was as well armoured as a Queen Elizabeth class battleship, and Tovey had every right to believe that, together with Prince of Wales, the combined squadron was capable of preventing Bismarck & Prinz Eugen from breaking out into the wider Atlantic. In fact, that is what they did.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@manilajohn0182 Marder's death is relevant, in that it makes it impossible to determine his source for the comment.
'He came to believe that it "endangered the safety of the ship" ' If he did say that, it doesn't appear in the Enquiry findings. Whilst he may not have been asked that specific question, it seems odd that he would have expressed tho opinion to the commander of HMS Kent, but not to any of the members of the Enquiry panels.
'It's understandable why the enquiry didn't go down that path.' Not really. The Enquiries were set up to determine what led to the loss of the ship. The Board for the first one consisted of a Vice-Admiral and two Captains, and for the second one a Rear-Admiral & two Captains. Both Enquiries were confidential, Admiralty, affairs. At the time, there was no suggestion that any of the hits had been from Prinz Eugen, so the idea of concealing anything did not apply.
I will, however, get hold of the book as soon as possible.
1
-
@manilajohn0182 Sadly, Marder died over 30 years ago, so what Leach allegedly said to Oswald cannot be verified.
Neither of the Enquiries into Hood's loss attributed it to the explosion of ready use AA ammunition. Indeed, Briggs stated that the fire on the boat deck was reported to Holland, who said 'leave it until the ammunition is gone' and Tilburn, who was actually on the boat deck, stated that the 4 inch ammunition hatch on the boat deck was 'definitely closed' during the action.
Jack Leach also gave evidence, stating that the explosion was 'before the mainmast' as did his navigator, Lt. Cdr. Rowell. Neither made any reference to the "explosion of the ready use cordite penetrating the flash proofing of X turret". The Enquiry did state that, as PoW was in action at the time, this fact may well have prevented observers aboard her 'from giving a clear cut impression of the occurrence.'
The evidence of technical experts led to the conclusion that :- 'The fire was not in itself the cause of, and was distinct from, the explosion that destroyed the ship. The fire which was seen on Hood's Boat Deck, and in which UP and/or 4 inch ammunition was certainly involved, was not the cause of her loss.'
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ellsworth1956 What do you believe these 'drastic flaws' to have been? The British Director of Naval Construction was informed (actually, wrongly) that the losses at Jutland were due to penetration of their armour, rather than the actual reason. He was requested to 'beef up' Hood's protection, which ended up on a par with that of the Queen Elizabeths. She became, in effect the world's first fast battleship, rather than a traditional battlecruiser.
I have already explained why the other three Admirals were not completed. After Jutland, the High Seas Fleet rather abandoned the idea of challenging the Grand Fleet again, and completed only one of eight planned battlecruisers either under construction or projected. Hood was far enough along to justify completion, but the other three had barely been started.
As, from 1 February, 1917, the Germans concentrated on unrestricted submarine warfare, construction of the three Admirals was almost immediately (early March, 1917) suspended in order to concentrate on escort vessels. The ships were not cancelled until February, 1919, largely because warship design was developing as such a pace that a new generation, capable of matching the speed and firepower of the proposed US Navy Lexingtons, was being designed.
Undoubtedly, if, for example, Mackensen & Prinz Eitel Friedrich had been constructed, then the three Admirals would also have been built along the lines of the redesigned Hood.
1
-
1
-
@dillonpierce7599 Well, both Ballard & Mearns have gone on record as saying that the British sank Bismarck. Mearns, incidentally, documented the holes from Dorsetshire's torpedoes. By the time of her sinking, Bismarck's main armament had been destroyed and her bridge blown away. Internal communications had ceased, and she was extensively on fire.
Rodney was heading for Norfolk for re-fit in any case, but her only damage was some internal pipework and a jammed torpedo tube. No main guns were damaged at all. Dorsetshire only became involved late in the action, long after Bismarck had ceased to be anything more than a target.
As to your last comment, you seriously suggest that Bismarck, faced by two better armoured, heavier gunned, opponents, would sink one with her two forward turrets, cripple the second with her aft turrets, whilst at the same time sinking a heavy cruiser with her 5.9s. Congratulations! Probably the silliest suggestion I have ever come across, although well in line with the idea of Ark Royal indulging in a surface action with the full might of her 4.5s!
Why not go the whole way? 'Fire Photon Torpedoes at Rodney, Mr. Chekov!'
Alternatively, you might read a book which analyses the Bismarck action in a rational, sensible, manner, perhaps?
1
-
@dillonpierce7599 Firstly, there wouldn't have been a final battle. Tovey would not have caught up with Bismarck, which would in all probability have reached St. Nazaire. Secondly, however, had Bismarck been forced to engage, then the final action would almost certainly have ended much as it did. Both Rodney and KGV had better laid-out, thicker, armour than Bismarck, heavier broadsides, and in a two to one action, one (probably KGV) would be able to target Bismarck whilst being unengaged herself.
What leads you to make the claim you have made, given Bismarck's many & known inferiorities to her opponents?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@davidmcintyre8145 Geoffrey Bennett says that Otranto was fired upon by Dresden, but not hit. It seems that Cradock's last signal to her, before the action began, was incomplete ( 'There is danger. Proceed at your best...'), so Otranto's captain took a pragmatic course of action, in that he edged away from the rest of the squadron and subsequently escaped.
What point is served by even talking about the Averoff? What relevance has a ship belonging to a neutral country, far away in the Mediterranean, to Coronel?
More relevant would be the influence that Defence, Australia, or even, stretching the point, Hiei, might have had, had one of them been present.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@kennethgarland4712 Sturdee, before the First World War, became involved in a feud between Fisher and another Admiral, Sir Charles Beresford. Opposition to Fisher among a number of senior officers was referred to as the 'Syndicate of Discontent' by Fisher.
When Sturdee became Beresford's Chief of Staff in the Mediterranean & later the Channel Fleet, Fisher asked him to send confidential reports about him. In other words, to spy on him. Sturdee refused, and Jackie Fisher, as a result, regarded him as an enemy thereafter.
There is a book, 'Coronel & The Falklands' by Geoffrey Bennett, published as far back as 1962, which discusses the relationship between Fisher & Sturdee in some detail. Sturdee had been Fisher's Chief of War Staff from the outbreak of WW1, and probably bore some responsibility for the defeat at Coronel. Fisher, however, was eager to get rid of Sturdee, and appointed him to command of the Battlecruiser squadron which was sent to seek out Von Spee's ships. Ironically, it was probably the making of him!
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Carmine Paola There are 11 reviews on the Amazon UK site. 83% are five stars, 17% four stars. On Amazon US there are 78% five stars, 16% four stars, and 6% 3 stars. You have taken your comment from the single 3 star review. The reviewer in that case should have read the bibliography, which includes a number of German & Italian authors.
The difference here is that I have the book, one of over thirty on the campaign on the Mediterranean, in my library, whereas you clearly don't. It happened to be the one I recommended in the hope that it might educate you; I could have recommended a host of others.
Do you really believe that it in any way supports your arguments when instead of attempting to defend Bragadin, you erroneously seek to attack another book on the subject, in the odd belief that this justifies his prejudices? Especially when there are a large number of others which support my assessments, and disagree with yours?
I would offer to give you a list of these books, but doubtless if I did you would claim conspiracy. As, indeed, you already have.
Anyway, definitely no more. I am sure anyone who reads these posts can make his or her mind up who has the more valid and historically accurate argument.
1
-
1
-
Carmine Paola One final comment. The nearest thing I can find to a fully detailed academic review of Bragadin's work is in an American naval magazine, as part of a larger study on the relative merits of the various types of naval artillery used in WW2. The author makes brief comments on each of the sources he used, and he actually refers to Bragadin, who seems to have been a Commander in naval intelligence rather than a seagoing sailor, by the way. The review is as follows :-
'Marc Antonio Bragadin's The Italian Navy in World War II (Bragadin 1997) is bewildering. Their ‘greatest’ victory was Pantellaria, in which a British destroyer and several transports were sunk. But given the correlation of the forces involved, they should have exterminated the entire convoy to the last vessel!
And the ‘super fast’ Italian ships could never catch the much slower British vessels; Bartilomeo Colleoni, supposedly capable of 40 kts, was savaged by HMAS Sydney, which on her best day made only 32 kts.
How could it be that with the larger fleet, magnificent artillery and well trained crews the Italian Fleet suffered one shattering defeat after another?'
Richard Woodman (Malta Convoys) doesn't use him as a source at all by the way, and the only other mention I can find are the views of American readers of his work, as follows :-
'While I did find the book useful and interesting there was too much of a pro-Italian bias for me to really enjoy or trust it. The author tends to distort generally accepted facts in ways to forward as positive an impression on the Italian war effort and on the Italian Navy in particular. It is understandable as the author did serve in the Italian Navy during this time period.'
'The author's service in the Italian Navy during the war gives him insights into the thinking of the naval leadership. Unfortunately, his service also reveals itself in more partisanship than should exist in what is intended as an objective history. Too many Italian actions are "superhuman.'
As you seem to rely so much on such a source, this probably explains your lack of accurate knowledge on the subject, as well as your determination to distort, and even invent 'facts.'
Goodbye.
1
-
Carmine Paola I did, for what it was worth. Wikipedia actually says of him :-
'Besides dealing with specialist topics, in 1949 he wrote the educational work Che ha fatto la Marina? 1940–45 (What did the Navy do? 1940–45) to make the navy's actions during World War II better known – they were then little known due to censorship. He had planned it in 1942 whilst serving in the Supermarina.
He was also the advisor, screenwriter, production manager, consultant and assistant director on four 1950s Italian war films – three directed by Duilio Coletti (I sette dell'Orsa maggiore, Divisione Folgore and La grande speranza) and one by Antonio Leonviola (Siluri umani, 1954).
No references at all to his naval career or to his academic qualifications, if any.
You really do appear to be floundering around increasingly incoherently old chap. It was amusing correcting your idiocies at first, as I had already done on a number of previous occasions, but I am finding that your evasiveness and lack of knowledge is becoming increasingly tedious, and won't waste any further time on you.
1
-
1
-
1
-
Carmine Paola Ike commanded the land forces. Cunningham commanded the naval forces which put them ashore in the first place.
First Sirte? You mean when 5 RN light cruisers and 14 destroyers held off an Italian force of 4 battleships, 7 cruisers, and 13 destroyers, and delivered the supply convoy they were protecting to Malta? Perhaps you are referring to M41 & M42, the supply convoy to North Africa? Originally 8 merchantmen, but reduced to 4, after HMS Upright sank two, and two more collided and returned to port. M42, as it was renumbered, had an escort of 4 battleships, 5 cruisers, & 21 destroyers. The supplies were indeed delivered to Tripoli and Benghazi, although those in Benghazi were lost when the British captured the town five days later.
Oh, and Gazala didn't happen until late May, 1942.
You haven't supplied any of the sources you claimed, and for which I asked, by the way. I wonder why that might be?
1
-
Carmine Paola As you ask, I do have a degree in modern history. A First actually, and my particular specialism was, and is, naval aspects of WW2. The commander of the naval forces for Operation Husky, by the way, was Sir Andrew Cunningham.
You think Rommel was 'successful?' What a novel idea. Doesn't it occur to you that losing so many ships rather suggests that the Italian navy was not really very effective at transporting supplies to North Africa, despite your moving conviction that the British & Germans conspired to slander Italian efforts.
Husky, by the way, involved 1365 Allied warships. The US contingent consisted of 5 cruisers, 48 destroyers, 94 troopships, 98 other warships and 190 landing craft. The RN contingent consisted of 6 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers, 80 destroyers, 26 submarines, 250 other warships, 237 troopships, and 319 landing craft.
Despite my research, I have not been able to find out much about the efforts the Italian surface fleet made to defend Sicily, although doubtless you will claim that they were significant & successful.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Carmine Paola Oh, you wish to talk about 15 June? Oh well. We could start with the sinking of the cruiser Trento, I suppose. Crippled at 0610, and finished off by HMS Umbra at 1106. Vian had been ordered by Harwood to delay any action until an attack by British & American bombers had taken place, which was at around 0900, when Littorio was hit. At 1115 Harwood, believing the exaggerated claims of the aircrews, ordered Vian to turn again for Malta, after which, at 1215, Harwood gave Vian permission to act as he thought fit.
At dawn, of course, you are probably aware that in a separate action, a force of RN destroyers with the Harpoon convoy had engaged an Italian cruiser squadron, until the Italian squadron broke off at 1000, although it did briefly reengage later.
Vian's force, and his convoy, had been under (German) air attack since 1150, with a stronger attack by 36 Ju87s taking place at 1520. At around the same time, when Iachino's force was around 100 nm from the convoy, he turned away to the North-West, receiving instructions, after the event, from Supermarina to turn away if Vian's force hadn't been encountered by 1600. Vian turned his force and the convoy back towards Malta at 1625, but came under heavy air attack from German aircraft soon afterwards and, with only 1/3rd of his AA ammunition left, and Iachino's force far away, at 2053 Harwood ordered Vian and the convoy to return to Alexandria. Further German air attacks took place on the night of 15/16 June and on 16 June. Put simply, a victory of German air power over British sea power, with a powerful Italian battle fleet observing proceeding from a distance.
You should read 'Malta Convoys, 1949-1943' by Richard Woodman, should you be interested in the facts, although it is fairly clear that you aren't.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Somerville sent Captain Cedric Holland, commander of the carrier Ark Royal, to negotiate with Gensoul. Holland spoke fluent French, was known to be a Francophile, had been British Naval Attache in Paris, and knew most of the senior officers of the French navy personally. How much more suitable could he have been?
As to 'coveting the forces at Mers-el-Kebir' do you truly not understand the situation facing the British government in July, 1940? The alliance with France no longer existed following the collapse of the Third Republic, precisely how the new, Vichy, regime would behave was unknown, the British army had been withdrawn and was in the throes of re-equipping, and the only force capable of defeating a German invasion was the Royal Navy, currently overstretched by additional, unexpected, commitments. The one trump card that the British held was the fact that the already tiny German navy had been savaged during the Norwegian campaign, and little remained to protect an invasion force. However, the French navy, the second largest in Europe, could have provided such protection, which would make an invasion attempt at least possible. The British did not covet the French fleet, but they wanted to be sure that it would not be committed against them. Transfer to neutral West Indian ports, or to the supervision of the United States, would have been acceptable to them, but the uncertainty which currently existed was not.
'The British forces claim that they were willing to escort the French to American waters was probably an empty promise should the French have chosen to leave the port. They more than likely would have claimed that the French (neutral entity at this point) had sortied against them.' Your evidence for this is? Actually, non-existent, presumably based on prejudice?
Finally, please don't post piously, 80 years after the event, about 'honor.' In July, 1940, honour was irrelevant, but national survival was vital. The British government was willing to do whatever was necessary to improve the chances of survival after the French & Belgian collapse, and they acted accordingly, as Roosevelt was the first to acknowledge. Gensoul was given options; sadly he chose not to pass on the full text of the British ultimatum to his political heads.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@MostHigh777 Clearly, you don;t remember your original post, so here it is again :- 'One can understand French anger at British behavior. First, the British convinced them to give up Czechoslovakia. Next the British got them involved in a fight with the Germans in which the British army simply retreated. Finally, the British bombed the French fleet killing a lot of Frenchmen.'
There are three separate issues. 1). The Sudetenland. I have answered this in some detail, although I suspect the answer was wasted, as I would not be surprised if you had never previously heard of the Little Entente, the Franco- Czech. military alliance, or even Daladier. The assessment which French Intelligence gave to their leaders may well have been an underestimate of Czech. capabilities, but it was what was believed at the time, and upon which the French government based policy. For further information, there is a detailed account in 'Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.5 No.1, Pages 81-106, of March, 1994. This relies to a large extent upon 'French Military Intelligence & Czechoslovakia, 1938' by Peter Jackson, by the way. The historian Harindar Aulach, in "Britain and the Sudeten Issue, 1938: The Evolution of a Policy" pp. 233-259 from The Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 2 April 1983 p. 238, states that the Anglo-French summit represented a British "surrender" to the French, rather than a French "surrender" to the British. I don't post falsehoods. I do not need to, as I am certain of my facts, and I have access to a University archive and a military/naval archive. One of the perks of being an academic with a First in Modern History, I suppose.
2). 'Next the British got them involved in a fight with the Germans in which the British army simply retreated.' How did Chamberlain, who has just been accused by you of convincing the French to appease Hitler by giving up Czechoslovakia, suddenly turn into a warmonger? The declaration of war was a joint decision, arising from the German invasion of Poland, and strategy on land was entirely dictated by the French General Staff. Of course the British retreated after the collapse of the French front at Sedan. So did the 1st & 7th French armies, which were the best equipped French units at the time, which had accompanied the BEF into Belgium, and which significantly outnumbered the BEF. The BEF was under French orders, and followed these orders when instructed to withdraw. Subsequently, General Weygand informed Sir Alan Brooke that the French army was 'no longer able to offer organised resistance.' Exactly what alternatives did Gort have?
3). 'Finally, the British bombed the French fleet killing a lot of Frenchmen.'
I have asked you where and when. Your nebulous response was
Highlighted reply 'By the way the British did bomb the French fleet at its anchorage in southern France.' I'll try again. When did this happen, what base did the British aircraft fly from, which vessels were targeted, and where were they?
1
-
@MostHigh777 There is only one person jumping around irrationally, and it isn't me. Indeed, Chamberlain wanted the Sudetenland transferred to Germany peacefully, because of his belief in the policy of appeasement inherited from Stanley Baldwin, but Edouard Daladier was a party to the talks held on 29 September, 1938 with Hitler, Mussolini, and Chamberlain. Daladier was as determined as Chamberlain to avoid war, he needed no inducements. However, since the Little Entente, France had had a military alliance with Czechoslovakia, and should the British & French reject any compromise with Hitler, then the only action which could be taken would be by the French alone, in the form of military action against Germany's western border. The British, with a tiny standing army, had no such alliance with the Czechs, by the way. Once Daladier informed the Czech. government that France would not take any such action in the event of a German invasion, then the issue was settled. Chamberlain was, at this point, little more than a bit part player.
When did the British bomb the French Fleet 'killing a lot of Frenchmen' in France, by the way? I keep referring back to your original post, even if you have forgotten it.
1
-
1
-
1
-
In 1938, the Intelligence section of the French General Staff reported to their government that there was nothing that France could do to prevent the German military conquest of Czechoslovakia. Read 'French Military Intelligence & the Czechoslovakia, 1938,' by Peter Jackson. Certainly, Chamberlain's government sought to avoid war, but they hardly 'convinced' the French, they were pushing at was an open door.
The British didn't get France 'involved in a fight with the Germans in which the British army simply retreated' because the allied military strategy on land was determined by France, with 90 divisions, and supported by the British, with 10. Neither did the British force upon France a declaration of war which was a join decision. The British didn't 'simply retreat' they advanced into Belgium in support of the previously determined French strategic plan, although you are probably correct about the British strangely failing to attempt to storm through the 120 German divisions to Berlin with their 10 divisions.
Finally, the British didn't bomb the French fleet; they shelled it.
1
-
1
-
1
-
Why was it a betrayal? There was a new French government, which no longer regarded Britain as an ally, and the Armistice agreement required that the French fleet be placed in French Atlantic ports, under German supervision. The possibility that the Fleet might end up in German hands, or, at least, operating in support of the German war effort, was something that the British government could not allow. The British government would have been happy to accept the re-location of the Fleet to the West Indies (indeed, Darlan might well have accepted the proposal) but Gensoul chose not to mention this part of the Ultimatum to his government.
Somerville could not leave his flagship, as that would have left him out of contact with London at a critical time. Indeed, it might have led to him being 'detained.' Holland had been British naval attache in Paris, spoke excellent French, and was both known and liked by many of the higher ranks in the French navy, though, unfortunately, he had never met Gensoul. What could Somerville have said through a translator that Holland couldn't say directly. The reality is that Somerville wasn't there to negotiate.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@whitewolf1298 'There is no way no how the Kreigsmarine was going to be able to best the British navy on the high seas.' The Kriegsmarine didn't need to do this. If they could have controlled, or, at, least, prevented the British from controlling, the Channel for around ten days, that would have been sufficient to attempt a large scale landing, even using the amateurish plans the Kreigsmarine had made. The British concern was not that the Germans would seize and crew the French ships, but that the French navy, with French crews, itself would operate in support of an invasion attempt. The fact is that the British government had no idea how the Vichy government would behave. Certainly, as head of the French navy, Darlan had given his word that it would not work with the Germans, but Darlan subsequently moved from a military to a political position within Vichy, and was known to be under pressure from Weygand not to let what Weygand called his 'little boats' scupper the armistice agreement.
'Hitler allowed the British to evacuate from Dunkirk.' Another throwaway line which cannot pass. Hitler did no such thing. The famous Halt Order on the Aa canal did not come from Hitler, but from the commander of Army Group A, von Rundstedt, who was concerned that his tanks, although they had not seen much actual combat, had travelled a considerable distance on their own tracks, and needed a brief period of maintenance before the second phase of the invasion of France commenced. Hitler was at von Rundstedt's HQ when the order was issued, and didn't query it, firstly because from his own WW1 experiences he knew how unsuitable for tank warfare the area was, but mainly because, on 23 May, Goering had approached him with the comment that the destruction of the allied troops in the Dunkirk pocket, and any evacuation fleet, 'is a special job for the Luftwaffe.' Fortunately, the Luftwaffe at the time was almost as incapable of hitting ships at sea as was the RAF. Seriously, if Hitler hoped for a peace with Britain, wouldn't he have had a better chance of getting it with the BEF in German prison camps, rather than allowing the Royal Navy to rescue it?
Certainly, Hitler saw the Soviet Union as his true enemy, but if you had read the full extent of the Kreigsmarine planning for Sealion (and I have) you would not so blithely dismiss the idea. Raeder certainly thought Hitler was serious. Indeed, he became increasingly desperate to find reasons to stop what he believed would have been a disaster, until he hit upon the failure of the Luftwaffe as his 'Get out of Jail Free' card. The reality, of course, is that, if ordered, the Luftwaffe should have been able to maintain control of the air space over the Channel. The problem, however, was that control of the surface of Channel itself was what really mattered, and that remained throughout entirely with the Royal Navy.
For his part, Hitler, as Trevor-Roper argued so cogently so long ago, sought to neutralise France, and to persuade Britain to remain inactive, as he undertook his attempt to achieve lebensraum in the east. That the British government did not acquiesce in his plans was his first major miscalculation.
None of which, by the way, has much relevance to Mers-el-Kebir, except as part of the explanation as to why the British government acted as it did and, of course, why they were justified in so doing.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@rosesprog1722 The French navy had 70 destroyers at the start of the war, together with a number of modern cruisers. Are you seriously suggesting that, because of the size of the RN, it was unsporting in some way to take action to make a potential German invasion less likely? Any such invasion would not depend on the size of the respective navies, but on whether sufficient force could be concentrated in the Channel area to stop the RN breaking into the barge convoys and destroying them. Your actual lack of understanding is, frankly, phenomenal.
As i have already explained, at the time the U-Boat fleet was tiny, and not relevant to any proposed invasion. The Germans actually sent three boats into the Channel in October, 1939. The boats, and their crews, are still there.
Where do you think I have apologised? I really haven't. As to :-
'There was many other ways like escort them away, evacuate the ships before sinking them, attacking only one at first as a warning, send a torpedo that would sink a ship slowly, etc..' This is so ludicrous that it is barely worth comment, so I won't lower my standards far enough to respond. Finally:-
'Churchill was a savage beast who showed again and again how little he cared for human life, Gallipoli, fire bombing German cities, the Bengal famine etc...' I could try to make you grasp that it is easier to make pious condemnations many years after the event from the comfort of your living room, but it wouldn't work. However:-
1). Churchill suggested Gallipoli, but didn't plan it. He believed it was an alternative to the unfolding slaughter on the Western Front. He proposed it to Herbert Asquith, who sanctioned. The fault lies with the senior officers who produced a flawed plan.
2. Fire-bombing German cities. Indeed he did, because German cities were the manufacturing centres for the weapons and equipment without which Germany could not prosecute the war. You make the common mistake that, in the 20th century, there were such things as civilians. Could you explain to me, for example, why the man or woman who produces a shell which kills a British, American, or Soviet soldier is any less of a combatant that the German soldier who fires it? As Admiral Sir John Fisher wrote 'moderation in war is imbecility.' The simplest answer is to avoid war in the first place. In this case, don't invade Poland!
3). Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit your agenda.
I can give you a whole list of errors made by Churchill in WW2, just as I can for FDR and Uncle Joe. Hitler's would need a much longer list, as would those of the Japanese, but this bizarre fixation you appear to have about Churchill is beginning to look like an idee fixe.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@southerneruk Did this Log Book also explain how Ramsay MacDonald, in your (largely gibberish) words 'turncoats the people he was to representing backs Churchill dictatorship' in May 1940, when he had been dead since November, 1937? Did he do this by means of a medium, or through a ouija board? Does it also explain what confused Arthur Henderson into thinking he was Labour Party leader from August, 1931, George Lansbury from October, 1932, and Clement Attlee from October, 1935? Don't you consider it slightly odd that the entire Labour Party, indeed the entire British political establishment, thought these were the facts, and every historian writing on the subject thought & thinks the same, when in truth this was all smoke and mirrors and only you know the truth?
Clearly, in your world, you are the only one in step.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@southerneruk Clem Attlee became leader of the Labour Party on 8 October, 1935, after George Lansbury stood down. Churchill had been a member of the Conservative party since 1925. He had been a Tory MP between 1900 & 1904, when he joined the Liberal Party. He switched twice, not four times as you wrongly claim.
Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty in both WW1 & WW2, but this is not the same as your incorrect statement that he was First Sea Lord. The First Lord of the Admiralty was always a politician, not a professional naval officer.
Oh, and Churchill was not 'at fault' for Mers el Kebir. No one was at fault. It was a military decision taken in a time of crisis to prevent the powerful French fleet from falling into the hands of Hitler's Germany, with all the implications that would have had for the possibility of a German invasion of Britain.
Finally, Churchill did not lose the 1945 election because the British public say him as no better than Hitler. Perhaps you didn't know that one Labour election slogan used at the time was 'Cheer Churchill, vote Labour.' Your statement is, frankly, rather asinine.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@yingyang1008 'needless slaughter of innocent men, fairly simple concept.' Isn't it nice making pious condemnations from a comfy chair, over 80 years after the event?
Try to understand. The only powerful force available to Britain at the time was the Royal Navy, which was massively superior to the Kriegsmarine. However, had the French Navy been sent into the Channel to protect an invasion attempt, then a successful German landing might, just, have been possible.
The British, unlike the French, had chosen to continue to fight. The French navy in the Mediterranean was given the option of also continuing the fight, or going to the West Indies to be immobilised, under US supervision. Admiral Gensoul chose not to notify his own government of the full text of the ultimatum. The British had made plain, from the outset, that Gensoul's fleet would not be permitted to return to France, to be placed under German 'supervision.'
Oh, and Dresden. Perhaps you would explain why it is that the soldier who fires the shell which destroys a tank and kills the crew is a legitimate target, but the 'civilian' who makes the shell, or provides the soldier with the food without which he would be unable to continue the fight, is not?
In other words, however much it may offend your noble principles, THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN MODERN INDUSTRIAL WAR.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ralphbernhard1757 So, after declaring war on Britain, and concurring with Germany in the armistice of 22 June, which did not hand over any French territory in North Africa to Italy, by the way, you seriously suggest that Mussolini would indulge in a two front war, facing in opposite directions, even after his attempted attack on southern France, against a demoralised French army, had been soundly defeated?
Sorry, but I haver been fortunate enough to have a sense of reality, and am not trying to invent reasons for Gensoul's inexplicable actions.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@MrRikouz What 'contempt?' Are you suggesting that most of the French troops evacuated from Dunkirk did NOT return to France?
The RN at Dunkirk assumed that the French Navy was making arrangements to evacuate French troops. Once the real state of affairs became known, the French were lifted alongd with the British. Would you like exact details? I have the official, Staff History.
The failure at Dakar was because de Gaulle had convinced Churchill that he was able to persuade the forces there to reject Vichy and join the Free French cause. Perhaps Churchill wanted to believe this because the gold reserves of the Polish government in exile and of the Banque de France were there.
Once it became obvious that de Gaulle was unable to match his words with deeds, and his 13th Demi-Brigade of Foreign Legion troops would meet serious resistance, the operation no longer made military sense, and Admiral Cunningham called it off, after only around 48 hours. De Gaulle's credibility with the British, and later the Americans, was seriously dented for some time.
You seem a very bitter little person, considering 80 years have passed since the Americans, British, and Canadians rescued France from occupation.
1
-
@gandigooglegandigoogle7202 The French Armistice/Surrender was signed on 22 June. Mers-el-Kebir was 3 July, when France had ceased to be an ally, and had become a country whose neutrality was, at best, questionable. Didn't you even know these two dates?
The 'real' government in France was that of Petain & Laval. They commanded the remnants of the French army, and almost all the navy. The French forces under de Gaulle were a tiny minority. If they represented France, what happened at Dakar in September, when the Vichy French forces their defeated the Free French?
'Very likely' isn't really a credible claim. Supposing the British had allowed the French Fleet to assemble in Atlantic ports, and found it operating in support of a German invasion attempt two months later? Darlan's word counted for nothing, as he had joined Petain's government, and changed from a military to a politrical role. The certainly is that the French fleet would have obeyed any orders given to it by those the French Admiralty regarded as the legitimate government of France. In July, 1940 that was the Petain administration.
Didn't Gensoul have the opportunity to 'rally,' as you put it? What did he actually do?
1
-
Who were these 'Allied' soldiers. The French had broken their alliance with Britain when they signed the Armistice/Surrender which, incidentally, committed them to returning the bulk of the French Fleet tro Atlantic ports, where it would be placed under German 'supervision?'
Yes, the French ships in Toulon were scuttled. But the war situation in November 1942 was rather different than that of July, 1940, I suggest. Moreover, the British government had no idea how closely a Petain administration might choose to work with their new overlords, and were not willing to contemplate the possibility of the French Fleet acting in support of a German invasion attempt.
Oh, and the British Royal & Merchant Navies actually rescued around 120,000 French troops from Dunkirk, only to see the bulk of them return to France to surrender shortly afterwards.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@rosesprog1722 It is always pleasant to read a reasoned, well argued response. What a shame yours isn't one.
Indeed, there were other ways. Gensoul could have given his superiors the full text of the ultimatum, but chose not to. Once he rejected this option, and ordered his ships out to sea, the end was inevitable.
How could the ships have been sunk but the men saved, for heavens sake? They were armed warships, in a major French naval base, with heavy defensive shore batteries and regular troops immediately available. Do you, even with your entertaining obsessions, believe that Gensoul would have invited the British ashore and quietly allowed them aboard his ships in order to sink them, perhaps offering them lunch first?
The rest of your post is a repeat of your regular all purpose rant. Might your real problem with Churchill be that he refused to allow Britain to surrender?
You have missed one or two details, by the way. He was also responsible for the Black Death, the Hundred Years' War, was the man on the Grassy Knoll when Kennedy was shot and, as a teenager, was Jack the Ripper.
1
-
@rosesprog1722 Actually, in July, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had 53 commissioned U-Boats, of which only 30 were Frontboote. On any one day, there were 11 at sea. 'Surface Scuffles?' Do you really not know of the hammering the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet took in Norway?
'If Hitler had wanted those ships once decommissioned it took 6 months to rearm again, useless.' Again, you assume that, once back in French metropolitan ports, the ships would be decommissioned. In July, 1940, was the British government supposed to take this on trust?
Of course Churchill wanted the French fleet to come over to the British side, but his main concern was that it should not go over to the German side, as the option for it to be taken to French West Indian ports, perhaps under the supervision of the United States, made clear. Unfortunately, Gensoul did not pass on the full text of the ultimatum to his superiors, but ordered his ships to raise steam and prepare for sea. Would you suggest that Somerville should have behaved sportingly and allowed them to sail before engaging?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ManuelGarcia-ww7gj Holland was not a 'mere captain' he had been British Naval Attache in Paris, and was familiar with many of the senior figures within the French navy, including Darlan, de Laborde, and Abrial, but not, unfortunately, Gensoul. Somerville did not visit Gensoul himself mainly for the reason I have previously stated, but also because to have done so would have obliged him to have used a motor launch in order to pass through the Mers el Kebir boom. Gensoul had already denied Holland permission to enter the port aboard the destroyer Foxhound, merely instructing Lieutenant de Vaisseau Bernard Dufay, his flag lieutenant, to inform Holland that he would not speak to him, but that he would send his Chief of Staff instead. Not to put too fine a point on it, Somerville did not wish to place himself in a position which might result in his being 'detained' in Mers el Kebir, out of contact with his fleet. Perhaps you might ask why Gensoul himself did not offer to visit Somerville aboard Hood. Actually, when told that Holland wished to meet him confidentially, Gensoul's response, which shocked Dufay (a close friend of Holland's) was 'You see how it is. Last week they sent me Admiral North, today they send me a Captain. Next time it will be a Petty Officer.'
You really should get hold of a copy of 'The Deadly Stroke' by Warren Tute, for a fully detailed account of the events.
1
-
@ManuelGarcia-ww7gj Oh yes. I ignored it because it seemed utterly irrelevant in terms of the actual situation. Somerville had sent a fluent French speaker, a senior captain well known to, and liked by, the French, to communicate with Gensoul in Gensoul's native tongue. Somerville probably assumed that Gensoul, as a full Admiral, would have understood how critical the situation was and would act with the maturity to be expected of a man of his rank and experience. Instead, he behaved like a prima donna, apparently refusing to meet Holland for several crucial hours because he was 'only' a full captain. As Somerville was 'only' a vice-admiral, and therefore junior to Gensoul, would even he have been deemed worthy of Gensoul's time? Actually, we will never know, because Gensoul never suggested that he would meet with Somerville, just as he never forwarded the full text of the British proposals to the Vichy government.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ManuelGarcia-ww7gj Actually, the British would have been delighted if the Mers el Kebir force had come over to their side. This was always unlikely, but the British would have been satisfied if it had been taken to the French West Indies, or to the United States. The British, in July 1940, were willing to take whatever action was necessary to avert the possibility of a cross-Channel invasion. Furthermore, Somerville sent Holland to negotiate because, firstly, Holland spoke fluent French, secondly, he was an enthusiastic Francophile, and thirdly Holland had numerous friends and acquaintances within the French staff at Mers-el-Kebir. Perhaps Somerville had underestimated how 'touchy' Gensoul was about status, but anyone reading Somerville's communications with the Admiralty, and his subsequent writings on the matter would appreciate the effort he made to avoid bloodshed. Perhaps you might care to read what he actually wrote before making simplistic judgments?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
So, in you opinion, no British commentator can ever be impartial? Would you apply a similar judgement on statements by, for example, French, German, Italian, Spanish, American or Turkish commentators. If you do, then there can be no such thing as history. If he, or any other, commentator is biased, then the correct response should be to state the reasons which led you to this conclusion.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@yingyang1008 'Surely you agree it was an extremely controversial decision.'
It was a very brave decision, demonstrating to the world, and to any wavering allies, that Britain intended to continue to resist.
'A man generally despised by his own generals, admirals and staff.' As that simply isn't true, it isn't worthy of much comment. When Churchill announced the action in the Commons, he expected serious criticism, but in fact was cheered to the rafters by the members of all parties.
Certainly, some of his commanders became exasperated with him from time to time, but if you want to know how they really felt you should read Alanbrooke's memoirs.
I doubt you could recommend any reading material on these subjects to me, although it appears the reverse would apply.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@shikeqin I think that a complete collapse of morale played an important part. The French army dominated military planning (with over 100 divisions, compared to the 10 or so British, how could they not?) and assumed that a second war would be a re-run of 1914-1918. The allies would remain on the defensive initially, building up their forces gradually from conscription and from their overseas possessions & dominions, with their best-equipped troops in Belgium and the rest of France safe behind the Maginot Line. As the allies increased their strength, and the naval blockade began to bite, they could then take the offensive.
There doesn't seem to have been a Plan B, and once the German Ardennes offensive had split the best allied forces from the rest, and reached the Channel coast, Weygand in particular seems to have thrown in the towel.
I don't think any criticism can be attached to the French Navy, which had done nothing wrong, but the political leadership seems to have failed.
1
-
@shikeqin I believe that the French ships were fully manned, fuelled, and munitioned, although they were not expecting to be attacked and had awnings on their quarterdecks. The process of removing these and raising steam began when Force H arrived. Mining began following an order from Somerville at 1105, by which time the French fleet had been seen to be raising steam, and the British ultimatum had been rejected. Holland was able to persuade Somerville to delay opening fire until well after the deadline imposed by Churchill, and despite the fact that French naval forces had been ordered to Mers el Kebir.
Certainly, Darlan had given Churchill a letter stating that the French fleet would not be allowed to fall into German hands. However, that was before he became a member of the Vichy government. Subsequently, Churchill had serious doubts about his sincerity. In an attempt to obtain the release of French ships in British ports, Darlan ad provided the British with a version of the armistice terms which they knew to be inaccurate. In short, Churchill was not convinced that Darlan intended to abide by his promise or, even if he did, whether he might be over-ruled by the new Vichy administration of which Darlan was a part.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@treyhelms5282 How many times? The Anglo-French alliance did not exist after 22 June. The French administration which agreed it was no longer in power.
How many times? The fleet at Mers. was loyal to Petain. The Free French wished to continue to resist, Petain didn't.
The British concern was not that the French would hand the ships over, but that Petain would send the ships of the French navy, with their crews, to operate in support of the Germans. Whatever you may choose to believe in pursuit of what appears to be your anti-British agenda, the British considered this risk, or the similar one that the Mers. fleet would join the Italian one, to be a genuine one. You have the comfortable advantage of a gap of 80 years to make you after the event assumptions. The British didn't.
Do you not understand the difference between the Free & Vichy French?
I know Gensoul did not ask the British to capitulate. Why did you post that he did?
Well, I did not make the statement about Dunkerque. de Gaulle did. Similarly, I am simply quoting from Lacouture's biography of de Gaulle. Clearly, you know better than both. I am not making any point about Bizerte; Lacouture did.
Why is Toulon relevant? Do you seriously believe that in July 1940 the British should have known that the French would scuttle their ships in November, 1942? Perhaps, also, you might ask yourself whether the war situation had rather changed between July 1940 and November, 1942.
'Well, I hope you agree we've proven the British attack at Mers-El-Kebir was dishonorable.' Well, you have the right to hope, but I regard the attack as a distressing necessity, taken in a time of huge crisis.
Please stop posting the same thing time after time. You are adding nothing to any debate, except that you now seem to believe me to be paranoid as well. Frequent repetition of words like 'murder' 'evil' 'backstabbing' and 'paranoia' are poor excuses for reasoned arguments, and, for the very last time, please try to understand that Petain's French & de Gaulle's French were entirely different entities.
Going round in circles in this manner is becoming tedious, therefore I no longer intend to bother.
1
-
@treyhelms5282 I don't recall the Japanese giving the Americans several hours notice of their intentions.
The Free French had, as I have said before, nothing to do with Petain's government. Indeed, both viewed the others as traitors, as Operation Menace clearly demonstrated.
Your paragraph B is simply emotional rhetoric. It is important to understand the military situation as it existed in July, 1940. Why do you consider an action intended to strengthen Britain's fairly desperate military position to be 'evil?'
Claiming that the British Fleet's strength meant that the attack was 'paranoia' is on a par with the posts I read regularly that it was, somehow, unsporting of the British to concentrate a major force to dispose of the Bismarck. If taking the action they did ensured that the French Fleet did not support an invasion attempt, or even join the Italian Fleet in the Mediterranean, as London believed at the time, then the action was justified.
French forces had been ordered to Mers. before the British opened fire. Again, you call the French forces in Mers. 'allies,' when they had not been since 22 June. Can you imagine a potential alternative situation where, after a successful German landing in southern England, supported by Vichy French warships, Somerville turned up at the Admiralty and said, in effect, 'By disobeying your orders I may have lost us the war, condemned many of our people to the gas chambers and to slave labour, but at least I have kept my honour.' The precedent of Admiral Byng comes to mind.
Your paragraph F 'Gensoul didn't ask the British to capitulate' was what you said in your previous post. What I posted wasn't a speech. It was the text of the ultimatum which Somerville had been ordered by his political masters to present to Gensoul. Somerville kept London informed of events as they unfolded. Part of the tragedy was that Gensoul chose not to do the same with his own superiors.
Incidentally, de Gaulle, in a speech broadcast on July 8th 1940, De Gaulle described the attack as an “odious tragedy”, while admitting that this act was actually understandable on behalf of Britain – sure enough, he asserted that he preferred to see the Dunkerque sinking rather than see it at the hands of the Germans. De Gaulle's biographer, Jean Lacouture, blamed the events on a breakdown in communications, and believed that had Darlan been informed an agreement could have been reached. More importantly, Lacouture also accepted that there was a danger that the French ships might have been captured by German or more likely Italian troops, as proven by the ease with which the British seized French ships in British ports or the German seizure of French ships in Bizerte in Tunisia in November 1942.
There is no point in continuing. You are seemingly not willing to view the events leading up to the attack from the British viewpoint, and, moreover, seem determined to view every British action in an unfavourable light, based on 'evil,' paranoia,' and a determined desire to 'murder' French sailors.
1
-
@treyhelms5282 The Free French continued to fight against the Germans, but, as they were not the Government of France, they did not continue the alliance. In any case, the ships at Mers el Kebir were loyal to the new French government, the one which had just surrendered to Germany.
The British presented clear options to Gensoul, the man on the spot. At the time, there was no obvious means of contacting the French government through diplomatic means. After the armistice of 22 June, until Petain was given, in effect, dictatorial powers on 10 July, there was no clear government to government channel available. Gensoul, however, had direct links to his superiors, but chose not to use them in full. You can hardly blame the British for responding swiftly to French collapse.
I didn't say that the French gave their warships to Germany, only that there was in London's mind the possibility that they might send them in support of a German seaborne invasion. The fact that the Royal Navy in Home Waters was still superior was hardly a reason to run the risk of it happening.
The French had done more than simply raise steam. The British knew that signals had been sent to other French units to proceed to Mers el Kebir, and some ships had started to move. You continue to refer to this 'alliance' which ceased to exist after 22 June, and in wartime the nebulous concept of 'honour' has of necessity to take second place to necessity. Somerville had his orders, did not, of course, know the nature of the Franco-German armistice terms, and was obliged to act before Gensoul's ships put to sea.
Your reference to the Spanish fleet is irrelevant. Spain had not just surrendered to Germany. I don't doubt for a moment that, had Spain proved to be a threat, the Spanish fleet, such as it was, would have been the subject of similar action. As Gensoul had not made any response, and as French aircraft had already attacked Fleet Air Arm ones, Somerville was entitled to consider the French actions to have been threatening.
Why would Gensoul have asked the British to capitulate? Have you seen the full text of Somerville's message to Gensoul, by the way:-
'It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;
(a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.
(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.
If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.
(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans unless they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance — where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.
If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have the orders from His Majesty’s Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German hands.'
Where does the message order Gensoul to 'disobey orders and surrender his command?'
1
-
@treyhelms5282 Indeed. Many French did continue to fight alongside the British. They were known as the Free French, and were disowned by the Vichy government when it was established. The alliance ended when the French made a separate peace. Please, read any history book on the subject.
Gensoul was given time to contact his own government, and, in fact, did so. What he did not do is pass on the full text of the British ultimatum, but simply chose a course of action himself.
Can you really not grasp that, in July 1940, the only force preventing a German invasion attempt, at least as London saw the situation, was the Royal Navy? The German fleet was weak and in disarray after Norway, and had no hope at all of successfully convoying an invasion force across the Channel, but the view in London was that, should the French fleet be used in support, then such an attempt might just be attempted. Of course national survival was at stake. The orders, as Churchill said at the time, were regrettable but necessary. Perhaps, 80 years later, you have the luxury to make dismissive comments; Churchill could not afford to be so generous at the time.
At least you seem able to grasp the reason the French were raising steam. As Gensoul had refused to negotiate, and had failed to take instructions from his political masters, what would you suggest that Somerville should have done? Let the French put to sea in order to be more sporting?
Why do you think the British were 'backstabbing' the French? Notice of British intentions had been given to Gensoul well in advance. It was hardly Copenhagen or Pearl Harbor.
The French comment was correct, especially the use of the word 'if.' Gensoul seems to have been unable to grasp the fact that, simply because France had capitulated, that did not mean that Britain would automatically do the same. Interestingly, Godfroy, in Alexandria, seems to have had more political nous.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ringowunderlich2241 Do you really think that 'hoping for the best' is a wise course of action in wartime? Certainly, Britain acted in her own interests when action was taken against the French fleet. She would have been foolish not to have done so.
In point of fact, on 3 July, Darlan played no part in what happened at Mers el Kebir, as, apparently he could not be contacted, and Gensoul failed to pass on the full text of the British ultimatum to the Vichy Government, only the apparent alternatives of internment or battle. The British needed to be sure that they would not suddenly find the French fleet acting in support of Germany, and if you feel that their action was a war crime then that is your opinion, but it is a less than pragmatic one .
Roosevelt intended to act in a manner had the British navy been in a similar position, and, in putting the defence of his country before any other consideration, he, like Churchill, would have acted rightly.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1