Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Drachinifel"
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@mattbowden4996 'Each one of the actions your propose risks the isolation and annihilation of the raiding force by either the Grand Fleet on the not inconsiderable number of RN Destroyers and Submarines operating in the Channel.' The RN wasn't operating submarines in the Channel. Why would they? Moreover, if you are now saying that the HSF shouldn't have been risked in situations where destroyers were present, then exactly when would it have been safe to take any action at all?
Furthermore, if you insist on a policy of despair, by which I mean the WW2 Hitler approach of avoiding risk to capital ships or even cruisers, then all you achieve is, at the end of the war, a more or less untouched High Seas Fleet being handed over to the victorious Allies. Which is, of course, exactly what happened. Yes, of course some risk is involved, as it is in any military operation, but if the course of action taken is the one you suggest, which seems to be 'we can't achieve anything so we shouldn't even try' then you simply confirm my conclusion that, in North Sea terms, after Jutland the HSF was an irrelevance. Scheer might just as well have advised the All Highest to decommission his big ships, send the crews & guns to the Western Front and recycle the steel.
The reality of late 1916 was that the Blockade was beginning to bite into civilian morale. The Blockade was maintained by a couple of dozen AMCs and armed trawlers. Are you really saying that nothing could have been attempted against it? Similarly, the Harwich Force consisted of light cruisers and destroyers. Was it really invulnerable to attack?
'Ultimately, it seems to me that you are determined to damn Scheer for not giving the RN the grand battle of annihilation they wanted.' Not at all. I have never argued that he should have sought such a battle, which could only end one way. I am critical of him for his complete inability to come up with any alternative means of using the HSF to contribute to the German war effort. The Japanese, in a similar position in WW2, came up with actions such as Savo Island. Why do you consider it so laudable that the HSF spent the rest of the war avoiding any sort of risk?
As you have labelled my proposals for potential sorties as unreasonable, might I ask what, had you been Scheer, you would have done with the HSF Fleet after Jutland?
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@tomriley5790 The most fascinating thing about the whole High Seas Fleet saga is that, however one might perceive the merits of the cause for which they fought, in two world wars the German armed forces battled determinedly almost to the end against increasingly impossible odds. U-boats, towards the end of both wars, continued to embark on what were increasingly becoming suicide missions, and even the Kriegsmarine surface fleet,, when obliged to fight, did so bravely.
The only significant German force to which this cannot be applied was the High Seas Fleet. After Jutland, almost two & a half years before the end of the war, Scheer consciously chose to keep it safely from harm, and was allowed to act in this manner. Certainly, the fleet sortied twice, barely going out of sight of land and rushing back home at the merest mention of the Grand Fleet. These were sorties in the same sense as, in WW2, an aircraft flying from, for example, Blackpool in the North West of England to Filey in the East of England on a routine training flight was carrying out a 'sortie,' and had about as much relevance to the war effort of the respective countries.
The final irony, of course, was when the High Seas Fleet, after unloading coal, ammunition, & breech blocks in the ports of a defeated Germany in revolution, nobly presented itself at Scapa Flow to be interned, before (to the secret delight of the British & Americans, who were eager to prevent France & Italy demanding some of the better German warships) scuttling itself.
Thus, after Jutland, no daring raids on the Channel (protected by a force of, in the main, pre-dreadnoughts), no dawn swoops on the cruisers and destroyers of Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force, no genuine sorties by fast cruisers and battlecruisers against the auxiliaries imposing the blockade. In short, nothing, apart from Scheer's insistence on unrestricted submarine warfare, which had the triumphant result of bringing the United States into the war on the Allied side.
At what point, I wonder, did Reinhard Scheer conclude that it was quite nice being moored in the Jade estuary, and much to be prepared to going out into that unpleasant North Sea, where nasty people lurked? The inactivity of Tirpitz in WW2 can be justified, in the sense of the classic 'Fleet in Being' preventing Allied capital ships from being deployed more usefully elsewhere. This cannot be applied to the Scheer's antics in WW1.
The Grand Fleet had one main purpose, which was to protect the blockade. Where else could it have been used? The Mediterranean was an Allied pond, with the Austrian & Turkish navies totally outmatched anyway, although the former Goeben & Breslau did show more activity than their former sisters in the Jade, and the Japanese were allies.
The surprising thing, in many ways is that, when Hindenburg became, in effect, military dictator of Germany later in 1916, he did not question why Scheer had been allowed to turn his fleet into an irrelevance, and decide to transfer some of the crews to the army, the guns to the Western Front, and the coal & steel to industry.
Of course, some would say that the above is nothing but British propaganda, I expect.
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What exactly are you writing about? Just to educate you, Bismarck was on a mission to sink supply convoys. The Home Fleet intercepted her, engaged her, and sank her, before she even saw a supply convoy.
'A true slap in the face to the United States.' This would be the neutral United States, content to leave Britain and her Commonwealth to defend democracy alone, until dragged kicking and screaming into WW2 by events at Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war, I assume?
After which, the head of the US Navy, Ernie King, allowed around 600 merchantmen and most of their crews to perish within sight of the American East Coast by refusing to set up a convoy system, simply because it was a British idea.
It anything was 'a pathetic disgrace' the Second Happy Time and Operation Drumbeat meets the criterion.
When you grow up, perhaps you might buy a book or two to improve your knowledge?
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'Rodney would have had less chances than Hood.' Oh, please!
Rodney :- Belt Armour 14 inches, deck armour 6.25 inches, broadside 18432 lbs.
Bismarck:- Belt Armour 12.6 inches, deck armour 4.7 inches, broadside 14112 lbs
An undamaged Bismarck could be expected to do what German capital ships habitually did when encountering British capital ships (even obsolete R class ones) which was to use superior speed to avoid action. In terms of heavy artillery shots, Rodney fired 340 16 inch shells, & KGV 339 14 inch shells. As Bismarck's armour was proof against anything smaller (such as 8 inch, 6 inch, or 5.25 inch) only these are relevant. All the smaller calibre weapons would do was cause superficial damage. The actual number of hits, despite fanciful comments about British gunnery, is impossible to determine as, for obvious reasons, no one aboard Bismarck was wandering around taking detailed notes.
Rodney, incidentally, hit Bismarck with her third salvo, and had put most of her main armament, her bridge (including command staff), and her internal communications out of action within twenty minutes of the start of the action.
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@ClassicFormulaOne1 I am not defending British actions, I am explaining them, based on my knowledge of the realities of naval warfare in WW2, following extensive interviews with veterans, including a Hood survivor, as part of my degree. Possibly you have never heard the statement 'we fight the ship, not the men' which was common to sailors of most navies (with, of course, the exception of the Japanese) in WW2. The glib and facile statements you make about Dorsetshire might please your prejudices as you sternly pass comments on events of three quarters of a century ago, but they have no basis at all in fact. I doubt you even know that, for many years after the war the survivors of Bismarck & Dorsetshire head regular reunions, and as late as the 1970s some of the last living Bismarck survivors visited Dorchester to lay a wreath to commemorate the loss of Dorsetshire in 1942. Hardly the actions of men who felt their colleagues had been abandoned, I suggest. The U-Boat report, by the way, was not an excuse. Captain Martin stated that on of his officers, Lt.Cdr. Durant, claimed to have seen a smoking discharge about two miles off the leeward beam. Martin himself crossed to the compass platform and observed the same thing. As there was no British ship at that location, and as U-Boats were believed to be in or approaching the vicinity of the action, (Bismarck had previously transmitted a number of signals on a U-Boat frequency, which were believed to be homing signals) Martain really had no choice. When the first U-Boat actually arrived is irrelevant, as the British in May 1941 did not have the benefit of your confident certainty.
Your comment about Scharnhorst is simply nonsense. No U-Boat sightings were claimed. The British searched until no more survivors could be detected. The weather, water temperature, and sea state, all factors which you cheerfully discount, were critical factors.
Incidentally, on 8 June, 1940, the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two escorting destroyers were sunk by the battleships Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in the North Sea. Over 2000 men went into the water, and 1200 died. Scharnhorst & Gneisenau did not stop to pick up survivors. The water was cold, but the sea was calm and visibility good. Would you care to comment?
The facts are that, whatever the realities of the events at North Cape in 1943 or of the Bismarck action in 1941, your personal prejudices will not allow you to accept what actually happened, as you much prefer your own version. Why not read a few of the many excellent accounts of the actions which are readily available? You might try 'The Bismarck Chase' by Robert Winklareth, in particular, as he is an American author, and therefore not troubled, as apparently you believe me to be, by any sense of 'shame.'
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The Hipper class cruisers had boilers which broke down regularly, German destroyer designs had high pressure boilers which were equally unreliable, were poor seaboats, and the later ones were overgunned, making it almost impossible to work their main armament in anything but a flat calm, both the Bismarcks and the Scharnhorsts had incremental armour which was a generation behind US & British designs, obsolete low angle secondary armament, and the Bismarcks had outdated 4 x twin gun main armaments.
As to armour, the Bismarcks had 12.6 inch belt and 4.7 inch horizontal, the Scharnhorsts 13.8 inch belt and 4.1 inch horizontal, and the King George Vs (and Nelsons) 14 inch belts and 6 inch horizontal.
'Better ships?' Not really.
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@JBrandeis1 You don't think that Briggs, who was on the bridge right behind Holland and Kerr, or Tilburn, on the Boat Deck where Prinz Eugen's shell started a fire in the ready use lockers, were reliable witnesses, then? You don't think that observers in Prince of Wales, watching the flagship for tactical signals from Holland, might have known precisely when the ship exploded, or where the fires were? You don't think that observers from CS1 were able to contribute their evidence either? You don't think that Prinz Eugen's War Diary has anything to say on the matter? You don't think that the technical experts who attended both Courts of Inquiry were able to give them the benefits of their specialist knowledge? You don't think that conclusions can be drawn from the known ballistic features of German weapons, even when this became fully available to everyone after 1945? You don't think that Sir Stanley Goodall, Director of Naval Construction, might have known something about the reasons for the loss?
Oh well.
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@BillFromTheHill100 By the time Churchill became Prime Minister, Britain had already been at war for almost nine months. The Phoney War had nothing to do with him, and everything to do with France, who dictated Allied military policy on land, and Chamberlain, who was simply not equipped to be a war leader, and who was already dying of cancer.
Churchill during the so-called Phoney War period was First Lord of the Admiralty, and could influence the way in which the Royal Navy was used, but had no control at all over bombing policy, which was dictated by the Air Ministry and the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood. In any case, there was no bombing of 'sleeping German cities' during the Phoney War period.
You do seem to have a fascinating obsession about Churchill, and you are indeed blessed in that you don't seem to let simple facts get in the way.
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How did Churchill have a month to 'develop his plan?' France had signed the armistice with Germany less than two weeks earlier. The timescale was as tight as it was because the French ships in Mers-el-Kebir had folded awnings and were raising steam ready for sea. The situation of France, by the way, was totally different from those other nations who had been occupied, in that France still had a theoretically independent though collaborationist, government. Moreover, the small navies of these other countries were largely irrelevant with compared in size with the French one.
Somerville could never left his flagship in order to visit Gensoul. Firstly, he would have been rendered completely out of touch with London, and secondly there was the obvious, though unspoken, possibility that once he arrived aboard the French flagship he might have been 'detained.'
The British at the time were in a desperate situation. Their only remaining trump card, at least in the short term, was their fleet, and no Prime Minister, whether Churchill or anyone else, could have countenanced a situation which would have left the third strongest navy in Europe free, potentially, to join with the second and third strongest against Britain.
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@888Longball The captain of a Fleet Aircraft Carrier, who had previously been British Naval Attache in Paris, was known to be a Francophile, spoke fluent French, and knew most of the senior officers in the French naval chain of command, was 'too junior?' Sorry, old chap, but your prejudices are showing. Somerville was under no obligation to leave his flagship. In so doing, he would have lost contact with London when events were proceeding at a rapid pace, and he might even have exposed himself to the risk of being 'detained' had negotiations turned sour.
Ask yourself why Gensoul did not pass the full text of the British ultimatum on to his superiors. By the way, the French were no longer allies. They ceased to be so when they signed their armistice with Germany on 22 June.
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@jugganaut33 Nothing remotely like the Grand Slam existed in May, 1941. Development only began in July, 1943. Furthermore, the two German capital ships already in a French port had already been attacked by Bomber Command, but had only sustained slight damage. Nor, indeed, did the British need even to consider so absurd a possibility, as they caught Bismarck with one new and one middle-aged battleship, and destroyed her, within three days of the sinking of the Hood.
Your use of the term 'raped' is rather peculiar, by the way. Bismarck had embarked on a raiding sortie intended to intercept and destroy Atlantic convoys. The Admiralty was intent upon preventing this. What do you think the Royal Navy was going to do when Bismarck was 'intercepted?' Give Lutjens a stern talking to and send him on his way? The British intention was always to ensure that Bismarck never saw a French or German port again. In view of events currently unfolding around Crete, half measures were never considered, and nor would they have been desirable.
As to vessels capable of catching Bismarck, actually, King George V, Prince of Wales, Repulse, Renown, and every cruiser and destroyer in the Royal Navy could, as well as the two modern carriers Victorious & Ark Royal. The successful Swordfish strike was not launched 'in desperation' by the way. The British already knew Bismarck's position, and launched the strike as soon as she was in range. The weather was indeed poor, but not poor enough to prevent the attack, and no aircraft were lost either taking off or landing. There was never any suggestion that they might not find the Ark after making their attack, and, of course, they all did.
Certainly, losing Hood was a serious setback, but hardly a 'global catastrophe' largely because the British have always understood what the Price of Admiralty means. In practical terms, the impact on British control of the Atlantic was barely affected, and the events of 27 May proved this in full.
As to the casualties from Bismarck's crew, this is what happens when countries get involved in war. Do you think that, when Rodney & King George V closed the range sufficiently, their captains should have declined to open fire because some Germans might have been injured?
As to 'surrender' tell me any occasion when a warship surrendered at sea in WW2. The Germans did have a habit of scuttling their ships, but not one of surrendering them intact.
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@mattbowden4996 I see. Resorting to insults rather than even trying to make a coherent argument. What previous statement have I backtracked upon?
'Truly, you are an intellectual colossus.' I wouldn't claim that, although I do have a first in modern history, my particular period being the naval war in 1940-41. It brings back half-forgotten memories of my arguments with Professor MRD Foot, my tutor, about the Battle of Britain & Operation Sealion. Foot had been an Intelligence Officer in WW2, knew all about Bletchley Park, and never breathed a word to us about any of it, by the way.
If you can make any sort of rational argument which explains how Operation Albion challenged the Royal Navy in the North Sea, please present it. Wasn't sending a battlecruiser, 10 battleships, 9 cruisers and around 50 torpedo boats into the Baltic against a Russian fleet already deeply involved in revolution rather over-kill? I suppose that sinking one of the two pre-dreadnoughts, and an elderly armoured cruiser, that were still loyal to the pre-bolshevik Russian regime as it collapsed must have seemed something of a success, after the various strikes, anti-war meetings and desertions that the HSF had experienced in 1917, but frankly it rather stands comparison with Operation Zitronella, in September, 1943, when the German navy sent two battleships and nine destroyers to bombard what amounted to a large shed on Spitzbergen.
From my reading of the German reasons behind the WW2 operation, it appears that there was concern within the Kriegsmarine about the state of morale aboard the Tirpitz, and Zitronella was invented to, in effect, give a disaffected crew something to do. Doesn't Operation Albion rather resemble something similar in WW1, although perhaps you might consider it to have been worth the effort, as the effect on civilian morale, as these poor people tucked into their turnip slices in their unheated homes, must have been most uplifting?
Oh, and Operation Albion lasted for around 10 days in October. What did the High Seas Fleet do during the rest of 1917?
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