Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Mers-el-Kebir - Tragedy on a Grand Scale" video.
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How did Churchill have a month to 'develop his plan?' France had signed the armistice with Germany less than two weeks earlier. The timescale was as tight as it was because the French ships in Mers-el-Kebir had folded awnings and were raising steam ready for sea. The situation of France, by the way, was totally different from those other nations who had been occupied, in that France still had a theoretically independent though collaborationist, government. Moreover, the small navies of these other countries were largely irrelevant with compared in size with the French one.
Somerville could never left his flagship in order to visit Gensoul. Firstly, he would have been rendered completely out of touch with London, and secondly there was the obvious, though unspoken, possibility that once he arrived aboard the French flagship he might have been 'detained.'
The British at the time were in a desperate situation. Their only remaining trump card, at least in the short term, was their fleet, and no Prime Minister, whether Churchill or anyone else, could have countenanced a situation which would have left the third strongest navy in Europe free, potentially, to join with the second and third strongest against Britain.
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@888Longball The captain of a Fleet Aircraft Carrier, who had previously been British Naval Attache in Paris, was known to be a Francophile, spoke fluent French, and knew most of the senior officers in the French naval chain of command, was 'too junior?' Sorry, old chap, but your prejudices are showing. Somerville was under no obligation to leave his flagship. In so doing, he would have lost contact with London when events were proceeding at a rapid pace, and he might even have exposed himself to the risk of being 'detained' had negotiations turned sour.
Ask yourself why Gensoul did not pass the full text of the British ultimatum on to his superiors. By the way, the French were no longer allies. They ceased to be so when they signed their armistice with Germany on 22 June.
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@ralphbernhard1757 Which comment doesn't actually make sense, except as a repetition of German wartime propaganda. The British had just lifted around 120,000 French troops out of Dunkirk, and had begun, from 7 June, landing the 'Reconstituted BEF' in Cherbourg.
Until, that is, General Weygand, on 14 June, informed Alan Brooke that the French army was no longer capable of 'organised resistance.' Two days later, on 16 June, Weygand became Petain's Minister of National Defence.
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@jacobopm If, as you say, 'no one is now responsible' then why did you post that' 'The responsibility was totally on the British side?'
'Honour' doesn't enter into the issue, still less your nonsense about 'woke image' whatever you think that means. What mattered at the time was that the British Government feared that the new government of France might turn out to be German lapdogs, and would be prevailed upon to use their fleet to provide support for an attempted cross Channel invasion. This wasn't a matter of 'honour' but a matter of national survival for Britain.
As to your comment that :- 'I do understand this might make you feel better,' please do not try to guess, or second guess, my opinion on the events of Mers el Kebir. In point of fact, I couldn't be more respectful of those politicians in Britain who chose to continue the fight, and were willing to do whatever was necessary to achieve survival and eventual victory. Unlike, I suggest, their opposite numbers in Paris (or, rather, Vichy), who lacked the 'honour' to continue to resist.
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Holland was hardly 'just a messenger.' He had been British Naval Attache in Paris, and was known and respected by many of the senior officers in the French navy, although not, unfortunately, Gensoul. Somerville was not in a position to leave his flagship, at a time when events were fast developing, as he needed to remain in close contact with the Admiralty, and there was also the unvoiced, but real, fear that, once in Mers el Kebir, he might be 'detained.'
The question which really should be answered, and which never can be, is why Gensoul failed to pass on the full text of the ultimatum to his government. The option of sending the Fleet to the French West Indies, probably under US supervision, was never passed on to Darlan. Gensoul, for the rest of his life, failed to explain his actions.
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@ralphbernhard1757 I agree. The the 10th Army would fail could not be known in July, 1940. However, 10th Army had nine divisions, mainly infantry, whereas there were 23 French divisions in Algeria, Morocco, & Tunisia. The British had three divisions, one of which was armoured, together with a fourth arriving in September.
Do you seriously suggest that the Italians would seek to fight a war with nine divisions against a much more mobile British force in the east, and a much larger French force in the east?
I don't recall mentioning any alliance, still less any 'feelings.' The fact is, if attacked the French would respond whatever the British did or didn't do, unless ordered not to by Vichy.
Haven't you yourself suggested that very fact?
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The negotiator they sent was Captain Cedric Holland, commander of HMS Ark Royal. Holland was a Francophile, who spoke French fluently, had been British Naval Attache in Paris before the war, and knew most senior French naval officers, though not Gensoul.
The British regarded attacking the French fleet as their least preferred option. Ideally, the best would have been for Gensoul's fleet to have joined with Somerville's. The second choice was for it to sail to the French West Indies, to be placed under neutral US supervision. They also knew, by the way, that the Armistice required that the French fleet be moved to French Atlantic ports, where it would be placed under German 'supervision,' something the British could not allow.
Firing began well after the deadline had passed, and only then when French ships had been observed to be preparing for sea. The blame which has been levelled at Gensoul, by French as well as British historians, is that he failed to pass on the full text of the British ultimatum to his government, as there is considerable evidence to suggest that the West Indian option might have been acceptable to Admiral Darlan. Why Gensoul failed to pass on the ultimatum in full is unknown, as he never sought to explain his thought processes.
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@jpmeunier5595 I haven't shifted to other subjects. I have simply replied to every inaccurate comment you have made with actual facts. Things, by the way, which seem alien to you.
The British action at Mers el Kebir was hardly emotional or irrational. Somerville held his fire well beyond the deadline, and only acted when it was clear that the French force was preparing to leave harbour.
'It was super easy to send British Sailors into the Harbour to seize the ship.' Don't be childish. This wasn't a scene from a 'Hornblower' novel. The French ships were in a defended French harbour, were protected by coastal batteries, as well as their own guns, and were fully manned.
'It is obvious that no French sailors will fight against their Allies.' French sailors would, I am sure, have acted in accordance with the orders given by their superior officers. I have always regarded the French navy of 1940 as a disciplined, professional, force let down by their army and their political masters. You appear to be saying that they were an undisciplined rabble.
In Alexandria, Godfroy acted wisely and sensibly. He and Cunningham came to an agreement, and both kept to it.
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Churchill didn't hold any political office between 1929 & September, 1939. When in the political wilderness, he argued that nazi Germany was expanding her military resources, and preparing for war. Was he wrong? If not, then how can warning the government of the United Kingdom about this be considered 'warmongering?'
As to the failed operations he planned, I doubt he ever planned a military operation in his life. Certainly, as part of the Asquith/Lloyd George government in WW1, then during WW2, he was closely involved in the strategy the allies pursued, but the planning was left to the supposed 'professionals' and, at Gallipoli at least, the professionals failed badly.
As to Mers el Kebir, certainly it was his decision, and it was the correct one. After the collapse of France, the British Isles relied absolutely upon the Royal Navy for defence against invasion. The German navy was weak, but had Hitler gained operational control of the French navy, then an invasion attempt might have been made. Mers took place only a week or so after the establishment of the Vichy government, and this government's attitude towards the British (and towards their German overlords) was unclear, to say the least.
Do you think that, had Churchill not taken such a decision, the House of Commons and the people of Great Britain would have responded with good-natured shrugs had a German invasion force, protected by the French navy, arrived off the South Coast later in 1940?
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The France of early July 1940 was not an ally of Britain, and in fact had not been so since the fall of Paul Reynaud and the subsequent 22 June Armistice. To use a more recent comparison, was the Iran of the Shah, and the Iran of Khomeini, the same country?
One of the clauses of that armistice was that the French Fleet should be returned to French Atlantic ports, and placed under German supervision. The British, whose only sure defence at the time was the knowledge that, after Norway, the remaining German fleet was far too weak to support an invasion, simply were not willing to risk the French fleet appearing in the Channel in support of such an attempt.
Furthermore, the British ultimatum provided for the transfer of the French fleet to the French West Indies, to be placed under the supervision of the neutral United States, but this option was never considered by Darlan or the new French government, because, for unknown reasons, Gensoul chose not to pass it one.
Sorry to interfere with your anti-Churchill diatribe, by the way, but Operation Keelhaul was authorised by Clement Attlee, after the 1945 General Election, and Operation Unthinkable was a theoretical study which never became a reality.
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@whitewolf1298 As I said, I don't intend to indulge you in an argument over the number of deaths. I take it, however, that you haven't read Neutzner, Matthias; et al. (2010). "Abschlussbericht der Historikerkommission zu den Luftangriffen auf Dresden zwischen dem 13. und 15. Februar 1945." Don't, by the way, as you wouldn't like the conclusions.
As best I can tell, you seem to believe that the Germans were innocent of anything even slightly naughty, i.e., 'the Germans were not interested in war crimes per say' whereas the British (i.e., apparently, Churchill) were constantly on the look out for further evils to perpetrate.
If Hitler had no intention of invading Britain, why were there, by late September, 1940, 159 transport ships, 1859 modified Rhine barges, 397 tugs, and 1168 motor boats, in French and Belgian ports? Presumably, the Kreigsmarine were undertaking some sort of pleasant, peaceful, regatta to entertain the grateful French, Belgian & Dutch citizens who had just been liberated by the German army?
Other than that, brief, comment, I really have more interesting and constructive things to do with my time than to debate with people of your sort.
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@whitewolf1298 I'm not going to get into a 'counting corpses' squabble with you, but Germans historians, and even David Irving, have actually estimated the Dresden casualties to have been 25,000.
Obviously, this is horrible enough, but should be seen in the light of a 1953 United States Air Force report, which defended the operation as the justified bombing of a strategic target. Dresden was a major rail transport and communication centre, housing 110 factories and 50,000 workers in support of the German war effort. My own view of the use of bomber command during WW2 is that it was ill-advised, in that greater resources should have been concentrated on long range air cover of Atlantic convoys, rather than the obsession of Harris and his like with Douhet's theories that bombing alone could force a nation into submission. The big four engined bombers had the range to bridge the air gap at least a year earlier than historically occurred, which would probably have resulted in the Royal & Royal Canadian navies winning the Battle of the Atlantic much earlier than May 1943, when they historically did.
However, though I would argue that Harris & the Air Ministry were wrong in their strategy, that does not make them, nor the British Government, guilty of anything remotely resembling a 'war crime.' They believed that their actions would aid the Soviet Union, bring about the collapse of the German war economy, and thus shorten the war.
In the case of the 1943 Indian famine, the British did not divert foodstuffs. There were a number of events which brought it about, including the loss of imports from Burma, now a Japanese occupied territory, the pressure on an agrarian economy from population growth, natural disasters in SW Bengal, the refusal of the US government to agree to the diversion of shipping, and the spread of diseases such as malaria. Indeed, some of the shortages were political in character, caused by supporters of the Congress party in an effort to embarrass the existing Muslim Government of Bengal. The British government give control of food distribution to the military later in 1943, and around 350,000 tons of wheat were shipped direct to India from Australia. Certainly, there were a number of shortcomings in the British response, but largely these were as a result of the pressures of the war situation, and a delay in appreciating the extent of the impending disaster, rather than, as you seem simplistically to believe, merely because the British diverted foodstuffs.
Neither event you cite was a war crime.
Isn't it easy, by the way, to spout 'War Crime' allegations eighty years after the event from a comfortable chair in front of a lap top?
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'It goes without saying that it would have been highly advantageous for Britain to have negotiated its own armistice with Germany.' Then I'm really glad you didn't say it. How can you possibly make such a comment without having the vaguest idea what the terms of such an 'armistice' might have been? Moreover, your apparent confidence that Hitler would abide by the terms of any such agreement is hardly borne out by the facts, as Adolf's record in such matters was hardly impressive.
Certainly, the British government did not trust the Vichy French. Can you explain why they should have been more trusting? Why do you place the blame, should that be an appropriate term, on Somerville? He was a serving officer, acting under orders from his political superiors, and he stretched things to the limit, well beyond the deadline, before actually opening fire when Gensoul's ships had raised steam and were starting to move.
Your various alternatives are, in the main, not credible. The option of sailing to French West Indian or even US ports had been offered, and Spain was a fascist dictatorship which, in July 1940, might well have joined the axis. A skeleton British presence? Would the French have allowed this, and in any case wasn't this simply handing over British servicemen to become hostages in the event of a failure to agree? Anchoring British ships alongside their French counterparts? In a French port, under French guns? In any case, in July 1940 the British government was hardly in a position to immobilise a major part of their fleet. Allowing the ships to go to French colonies? The British government had offered this. Gensoul simply chose not to tell his political masters that the offer had been made. Insist that the French reduce to skeleton crews? In a French naval base? How would the British monitor this? Allow the French to enter into tranquil negotiations? When Gensoul's fleet was raising steam and was preparing for sea, and the British were aware of orders from the French Admiralty to any French warships in the area to proceed to Mers in support of Gensoul?
The capability of the Italian navy at that time was an unknown quantity, by the way, and the fact that the German navy (not, by the way, better on a ship to ship basis, despite your throw away comment) had been largely destroyed during the Norwegian campaign was precisely the reason that the status of the French navy had to be settled. The Kriegsmarine alone could never support any sort of invasion attempt on Britain, but the French navy was strong enough to provide such support. France had, by the way, entered the war with around seventy destroyers, nineteen cruisers, five obsolete and two modern battleships. It was not, by the way, particularly 'crappy' despite your authoritative assessment.
In short, in July 1940, the British depended absolutely on their navy to prevent invasion, and it was widely scattered, having to absorb duties which had not been expected in any pre-war planning. The only card the British government had was the fact that the German navy was desperately weak after Norway. In July, 1940, the attitude of France was unknown, but the British government could not contemplate the possibility that the French navy could be ordered to support a German invasion attempt. Fling about glib terms such as 'war crime' as much as you like, (and isn't it easy to do eighty years after the event?) but the action Churchill took was intended to ensure British national survival. It was not only his decision, it was his duty, to act in the way he did.
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@rosesprog1722 Churchill had no guarantees at all. Admiral Darlan, when C-in-C of the French Navy, said he would not let the fleet fall into German hands. That was before he ceased to be a naval officer and joined the new Petain-led French Government. What if the new French Head of State undertook to send the French fleet in support of a German invasion attempt? Similarly, you think Hitler said he didn't want the French fleet? Oh well, if Hitler said it, it must be true, mustn't it? After all, his career to date proved him to have been a man of his word!
Don't be naive. In July 1940, the only thing standing between Britain & an attempted invasion was the Royal Navy, and the fact that the German navy had been maimed during the Norwegian campaign. Churchill had to ensure that the French fleet did not appear in the Channel in support of a German attack, and he acted accordingly.
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@jpmeunier5595 Would you like me to recommend a few books, as your knowledge is slightly lacking? I have already told you the facts about the manner in which Fighter Command aircraft were used, so won't repeat them.
Please show me any credible source from the time which demonstrates that the British intended to withdraw from 21 May. The Dunkirk operation was intended to make possible the removal of the trapped troops of the BEF & French First Army in order to land them further west. The British actually began re-landing troops in Cherbourg, from 7 June, but were told by General Weygand that the French Army was no longer 'able to offer organised resistance.' At that point, I wonder if the Admiralty wondered why they had wasted time, ships, & lives evacuating French troops who, when re-landed in France, were simply ordered to lay down their arms by their commanders.
As to Mers-el-Kebir, of course the British were scared. Unlike France, they had chosen to continue to resist, and they feared that an attempted invasion was planned. The German navy had been desperately weakened during the Norwegian campaign, but there was a possibility that the French navy might be used to support an attempt. After all, in early July, 1940, no-one knew exactly how the new French government might behave. Consequently, the British took preventative measures, the extent of which might have been much less bloody had Gensoul acted properly, and told his superiors what the full text of the ultimatum actually contained.
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@vonVince Actually, anyone who knows anything about the period knows exactly why the British acted as they did. After Norway, the Germans had virtually no navy left and were never seriously in any position to attempt to invade Britain. However, had the Petainist government chosen to send the French fleet in support, then an attempt might just possibly have been made.
Therefore, the British chose to act to prevent the possibility. Unfortunately, Admiral Gensoul, for reasons never explained, chose not to pass on the full text, including the French West Indies/US supervision option, to his government, which was ironic considering that Darlan would probably have accepted it, but instead began to prepare his fleet for sea.
I wonder if the potential alternative, of French and British warships engaging in a series of actions in the Channel & Mediterranean as the French sought to do the bidding of their conquerors, would have been preferable? I suspect not.
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Somerville sent Captain Cedric Holland, commander of the carrier Ark Royal, to negotiate with Gensoul. Holland spoke fluent French, was known to be a Francophile, had been British Naval Attache in Paris, and knew most of the senior officers of the French navy personally. How much more suitable could he have been?
As to 'coveting the forces at Mers-el-Kebir' do you truly not understand the situation facing the British government in July, 1940? The alliance with France no longer existed following the collapse of the Third Republic, precisely how the new, Vichy, regime would behave was unknown, the British army had been withdrawn and was in the throes of re-equipping, and the only force capable of defeating a German invasion was the Royal Navy, currently overstretched by additional, unexpected, commitments. The one trump card that the British held was the fact that the already tiny German navy had been savaged during the Norwegian campaign, and little remained to protect an invasion force. However, the French navy, the second largest in Europe, could have provided such protection, which would make an invasion attempt at least possible. The British did not covet the French fleet, but they wanted to be sure that it would not be committed against them. Transfer to neutral West Indian ports, or to the supervision of the United States, would have been acceptable to them, but the uncertainty which currently existed was not.
'The British forces claim that they were willing to escort the French to American waters was probably an empty promise should the French have chosen to leave the port. They more than likely would have claimed that the French (neutral entity at this point) had sortied against them.' Your evidence for this is? Actually, non-existent, presumably based on prejudice?
Finally, please don't post piously, 80 years after the event, about 'honor.' In July, 1940, honour was irrelevant, but national survival was vital. The British government was willing to do whatever was necessary to improve the chances of survival after the French & Belgian collapse, and they acted accordingly, as Roosevelt was the first to acknowledge. Gensoul was given options; sadly he chose not to pass on the full text of the British ultimatum to his political heads.
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@MostHigh777 Clearly, you don;t remember your original post, so here it is again :- 'One can understand French anger at British behavior. First, the British convinced them to give up Czechoslovakia. Next the British got them involved in a fight with the Germans in which the British army simply retreated. Finally, the British bombed the French fleet killing a lot of Frenchmen.'
There are three separate issues. 1). The Sudetenland. I have answered this in some detail, although I suspect the answer was wasted, as I would not be surprised if you had never previously heard of the Little Entente, the Franco- Czech. military alliance, or even Daladier. The assessment which French Intelligence gave to their leaders may well have been an underestimate of Czech. capabilities, but it was what was believed at the time, and upon which the French government based policy. For further information, there is a detailed account in 'Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol.5 No.1, Pages 81-106, of March, 1994. This relies to a large extent upon 'French Military Intelligence & Czechoslovakia, 1938' by Peter Jackson, by the way. The historian Harindar Aulach, in "Britain and the Sudeten Issue, 1938: The Evolution of a Policy" pp. 233-259 from The Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 2 April 1983 p. 238, states that the Anglo-French summit represented a British "surrender" to the French, rather than a French "surrender" to the British. I don't post falsehoods. I do not need to, as I am certain of my facts, and I have access to a University archive and a military/naval archive. One of the perks of being an academic with a First in Modern History, I suppose.
2). 'Next the British got them involved in a fight with the Germans in which the British army simply retreated.' How did Chamberlain, who has just been accused by you of convincing the French to appease Hitler by giving up Czechoslovakia, suddenly turn into a warmonger? The declaration of war was a joint decision, arising from the German invasion of Poland, and strategy on land was entirely dictated by the French General Staff. Of course the British retreated after the collapse of the French front at Sedan. So did the 1st & 7th French armies, which were the best equipped French units at the time, which had accompanied the BEF into Belgium, and which significantly outnumbered the BEF. The BEF was under French orders, and followed these orders when instructed to withdraw. Subsequently, General Weygand informed Sir Alan Brooke that the French army was 'no longer able to offer organised resistance.' Exactly what alternatives did Gort have?
3). 'Finally, the British bombed the French fleet killing a lot of Frenchmen.'
I have asked you where and when. Your nebulous response was
Highlighted reply 'By the way the British did bomb the French fleet at its anchorage in southern France.' I'll try again. When did this happen, what base did the British aircraft fly from, which vessels were targeted, and where were they?
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@MostHigh777 There is only one person jumping around irrationally, and it isn't me. Indeed, Chamberlain wanted the Sudetenland transferred to Germany peacefully, because of his belief in the policy of appeasement inherited from Stanley Baldwin, but Edouard Daladier was a party to the talks held on 29 September, 1938 with Hitler, Mussolini, and Chamberlain. Daladier was as determined as Chamberlain to avoid war, he needed no inducements. However, since the Little Entente, France had had a military alliance with Czechoslovakia, and should the British & French reject any compromise with Hitler, then the only action which could be taken would be by the French alone, in the form of military action against Germany's western border. The British, with a tiny standing army, had no such alliance with the Czechs, by the way. Once Daladier informed the Czech. government that France would not take any such action in the event of a German invasion, then the issue was settled. Chamberlain was, at this point, little more than a bit part player.
When did the British bomb the French Fleet 'killing a lot of Frenchmen' in France, by the way? I keep referring back to your original post, even if you have forgotten it.
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In 1938, the Intelligence section of the French General Staff reported to their government that there was nothing that France could do to prevent the German military conquest of Czechoslovakia. Read 'French Military Intelligence & the Czechoslovakia, 1938,' by Peter Jackson. Certainly, Chamberlain's government sought to avoid war, but they hardly 'convinced' the French, they were pushing at was an open door.
The British didn't get France 'involved in a fight with the Germans in which the British army simply retreated' because the allied military strategy on land was determined by France, with 90 divisions, and supported by the British, with 10. Neither did the British force upon France a declaration of war which was a join decision. The British didn't 'simply retreat' they advanced into Belgium in support of the previously determined French strategic plan, although you are probably correct about the British strangely failing to attempt to storm through the 120 German divisions to Berlin with their 10 divisions.
Finally, the British didn't bomb the French fleet; they shelled it.
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Why was it a betrayal? There was a new French government, which no longer regarded Britain as an ally, and the Armistice agreement required that the French fleet be placed in French Atlantic ports, under German supervision. The possibility that the Fleet might end up in German hands, or, at least, operating in support of the German war effort, was something that the British government could not allow. The British government would have been happy to accept the re-location of the Fleet to the West Indies (indeed, Darlan might well have accepted the proposal) but Gensoul chose not to mention this part of the Ultimatum to his government.
Somerville could not leave his flagship, as that would have left him out of contact with London at a critical time. Indeed, it might have led to him being 'detained.' Holland had been British naval attache in Paris, spoke excellent French, and was both known and liked by many of the higher ranks in the French navy, though, unfortunately, he had never met Gensoul. What could Somerville have said through a translator that Holland couldn't say directly. The reality is that Somerville wasn't there to negotiate.
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@whitewolf1298 'There is no way no how the Kreigsmarine was going to be able to best the British navy on the high seas.' The Kriegsmarine didn't need to do this. If they could have controlled, or, at, least, prevented the British from controlling, the Channel for around ten days, that would have been sufficient to attempt a large scale landing, even using the amateurish plans the Kreigsmarine had made. The British concern was not that the Germans would seize and crew the French ships, but that the French navy, with French crews, itself would operate in support of an invasion attempt. The fact is that the British government had no idea how the Vichy government would behave. Certainly, as head of the French navy, Darlan had given his word that it would not work with the Germans, but Darlan subsequently moved from a military to a political position within Vichy, and was known to be under pressure from Weygand not to let what Weygand called his 'little boats' scupper the armistice agreement.
'Hitler allowed the British to evacuate from Dunkirk.' Another throwaway line which cannot pass. Hitler did no such thing. The famous Halt Order on the Aa canal did not come from Hitler, but from the commander of Army Group A, von Rundstedt, who was concerned that his tanks, although they had not seen much actual combat, had travelled a considerable distance on their own tracks, and needed a brief period of maintenance before the second phase of the invasion of France commenced. Hitler was at von Rundstedt's HQ when the order was issued, and didn't query it, firstly because from his own WW1 experiences he knew how unsuitable for tank warfare the area was, but mainly because, on 23 May, Goering had approached him with the comment that the destruction of the allied troops in the Dunkirk pocket, and any evacuation fleet, 'is a special job for the Luftwaffe.' Fortunately, the Luftwaffe at the time was almost as incapable of hitting ships at sea as was the RAF. Seriously, if Hitler hoped for a peace with Britain, wouldn't he have had a better chance of getting it with the BEF in German prison camps, rather than allowing the Royal Navy to rescue it?
Certainly, Hitler saw the Soviet Union as his true enemy, but if you had read the full extent of the Kreigsmarine planning for Sealion (and I have) you would not so blithely dismiss the idea. Raeder certainly thought Hitler was serious. Indeed, he became increasingly desperate to find reasons to stop what he believed would have been a disaster, until he hit upon the failure of the Luftwaffe as his 'Get out of Jail Free' card. The reality, of course, is that, if ordered, the Luftwaffe should have been able to maintain control of the air space over the Channel. The problem, however, was that control of the surface of Channel itself was what really mattered, and that remained throughout entirely with the Royal Navy.
For his part, Hitler, as Trevor-Roper argued so cogently so long ago, sought to neutralise France, and to persuade Britain to remain inactive, as he undertook his attempt to achieve lebensraum in the east. That the British government did not acquiesce in his plans was his first major miscalculation.
None of which, by the way, has much relevance to Mers-el-Kebir, except as part of the explanation as to why the British government acted as it did and, of course, why they were justified in so doing.
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@rosesprog1722 The French navy had 70 destroyers at the start of the war, together with a number of modern cruisers. Are you seriously suggesting that, because of the size of the RN, it was unsporting in some way to take action to make a potential German invasion less likely? Any such invasion would not depend on the size of the respective navies, but on whether sufficient force could be concentrated in the Channel area to stop the RN breaking into the barge convoys and destroying them. Your actual lack of understanding is, frankly, phenomenal.
As i have already explained, at the time the U-Boat fleet was tiny, and not relevant to any proposed invasion. The Germans actually sent three boats into the Channel in October, 1939. The boats, and their crews, are still there.
Where do you think I have apologised? I really haven't. As to :-
'There was many other ways like escort them away, evacuate the ships before sinking them, attacking only one at first as a warning, send a torpedo that would sink a ship slowly, etc..' This is so ludicrous that it is barely worth comment, so I won't lower my standards far enough to respond. Finally:-
'Churchill was a savage beast who showed again and again how little he cared for human life, Gallipoli, fire bombing German cities, the Bengal famine etc...' I could try to make you grasp that it is easier to make pious condemnations many years after the event from the comfort of your living room, but it wouldn't work. However:-
1). Churchill suggested Gallipoli, but didn't plan it. He believed it was an alternative to the unfolding slaughter on the Western Front. He proposed it to Herbert Asquith, who sanctioned. The fault lies with the senior officers who produced a flawed plan.
2. Fire-bombing German cities. Indeed he did, because German cities were the manufacturing centres for the weapons and equipment without which Germany could not prosecute the war. You make the common mistake that, in the 20th century, there were such things as civilians. Could you explain to me, for example, why the man or woman who produces a shell which kills a British, American, or Soviet soldier is any less of a combatant that the German soldier who fires it? As Admiral Sir John Fisher wrote 'moderation in war is imbecility.' The simplest answer is to avoid war in the first place. In this case, don't invade Poland!
3). Actually, the Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that you won't believe any of this, as it doesn't suit your agenda.
I can give you a whole list of errors made by Churchill in WW2, just as I can for FDR and Uncle Joe. Hitler's would need a much longer list, as would those of the Japanese, but this bizarre fixation you appear to have about Churchill is beginning to look like an idee fixe.
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@southerneruk Did this Log Book also explain how Ramsay MacDonald, in your (largely gibberish) words 'turncoats the people he was to representing backs Churchill dictatorship' in May 1940, when he had been dead since November, 1937? Did he do this by means of a medium, or through a ouija board? Does it also explain what confused Arthur Henderson into thinking he was Labour Party leader from August, 1931, George Lansbury from October, 1932, and Clement Attlee from October, 1935? Don't you consider it slightly odd that the entire Labour Party, indeed the entire British political establishment, thought these were the facts, and every historian writing on the subject thought & thinks the same, when in truth this was all smoke and mirrors and only you know the truth?
Clearly, in your world, you are the only one in step.
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@southerneruk Clem Attlee became leader of the Labour Party on 8 October, 1935, after George Lansbury stood down. Churchill had been a member of the Conservative party since 1925. He had been a Tory MP between 1900 & 1904, when he joined the Liberal Party. He switched twice, not four times as you wrongly claim.
Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty in both WW1 & WW2, but this is not the same as your incorrect statement that he was First Sea Lord. The First Lord of the Admiralty was always a politician, not a professional naval officer.
Oh, and Churchill was not 'at fault' for Mers el Kebir. No one was at fault. It was a military decision taken in a time of crisis to prevent the powerful French fleet from falling into the hands of Hitler's Germany, with all the implications that would have had for the possibility of a German invasion of Britain.
Finally, Churchill did not lose the 1945 election because the British public say him as no better than Hitler. Perhaps you didn't know that one Labour election slogan used at the time was 'Cheer Churchill, vote Labour.' Your statement is, frankly, rather asinine.
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@yingyang1008 'needless slaughter of innocent men, fairly simple concept.' Isn't it nice making pious condemnations from a comfy chair, over 80 years after the event?
Try to understand. The only powerful force available to Britain at the time was the Royal Navy, which was massively superior to the Kriegsmarine. However, had the French Navy been sent into the Channel to protect an invasion attempt, then a successful German landing might, just, have been possible.
The British, unlike the French, had chosen to continue to fight. The French navy in the Mediterranean was given the option of also continuing the fight, or going to the West Indies to be immobilised, under US supervision. Admiral Gensoul chose not to notify his own government of the full text of the ultimatum. The British had made plain, from the outset, that Gensoul's fleet would not be permitted to return to France, to be placed under German 'supervision.'
Oh, and Dresden. Perhaps you would explain why it is that the soldier who fires the shell which destroys a tank and kills the crew is a legitimate target, but the 'civilian' who makes the shell, or provides the soldier with the food without which he would be unable to continue the fight, is not?
In other words, however much it may offend your noble principles, THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN MODERN INDUSTRIAL WAR.
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@ralphbernhard1757 So, after declaring war on Britain, and concurring with Germany in the armistice of 22 June, which did not hand over any French territory in North Africa to Italy, by the way, you seriously suggest that Mussolini would indulge in a two front war, facing in opposite directions, even after his attempted attack on southern France, against a demoralised French army, had been soundly defeated?
Sorry, but I haver been fortunate enough to have a sense of reality, and am not trying to invent reasons for Gensoul's inexplicable actions.
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@MrRikouz What 'contempt?' Are you suggesting that most of the French troops evacuated from Dunkirk did NOT return to France?
The RN at Dunkirk assumed that the French Navy was making arrangements to evacuate French troops. Once the real state of affairs became known, the French were lifted alongd with the British. Would you like exact details? I have the official, Staff History.
The failure at Dakar was because de Gaulle had convinced Churchill that he was able to persuade the forces there to reject Vichy and join the Free French cause. Perhaps Churchill wanted to believe this because the gold reserves of the Polish government in exile and of the Banque de France were there.
Once it became obvious that de Gaulle was unable to match his words with deeds, and his 13th Demi-Brigade of Foreign Legion troops would meet serious resistance, the operation no longer made military sense, and Admiral Cunningham called it off, after only around 48 hours. De Gaulle's credibility with the British, and later the Americans, was seriously dented for some time.
You seem a very bitter little person, considering 80 years have passed since the Americans, British, and Canadians rescued France from occupation.
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@gandigooglegandigoogle7202 The French Armistice/Surrender was signed on 22 June. Mers-el-Kebir was 3 July, when France had ceased to be an ally, and had become a country whose neutrality was, at best, questionable. Didn't you even know these two dates?
The 'real' government in France was that of Petain & Laval. They commanded the remnants of the French army, and almost all the navy. The French forces under de Gaulle were a tiny minority. If they represented France, what happened at Dakar in September, when the Vichy French forces their defeated the Free French?
'Very likely' isn't really a credible claim. Supposing the British had allowed the French Fleet to assemble in Atlantic ports, and found it operating in support of a German invasion attempt two months later? Darlan's word counted for nothing, as he had joined Petain's government, and changed from a military to a politrical role. The certainly is that the French fleet would have obeyed any orders given to it by those the French Admiralty regarded as the legitimate government of France. In July, 1940 that was the Petain administration.
Didn't Gensoul have the opportunity to 'rally,' as you put it? What did he actually do?
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Who were these 'Allied' soldiers. The French had broken their alliance with Britain when they signed the Armistice/Surrender which, incidentally, committed them to returning the bulk of the French Fleet tro Atlantic ports, where it would be placed under German 'supervision?'
Yes, the French ships in Toulon were scuttled. But the war situation in November 1942 was rather different than that of July, 1940, I suggest. Moreover, the British government had no idea how closely a Petain administration might choose to work with their new overlords, and were not willing to contemplate the possibility of the French Fleet acting in support of a German invasion attempt.
Oh, and the British Royal & Merchant Navies actually rescued around 120,000 French troops from Dunkirk, only to see the bulk of them return to France to surrender shortly afterwards.
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@rosesprog1722 It is always pleasant to read a reasoned, well argued response. What a shame yours isn't one.
Indeed, there were other ways. Gensoul could have given his superiors the full text of the ultimatum, but chose not to. Once he rejected this option, and ordered his ships out to sea, the end was inevitable.
How could the ships have been sunk but the men saved, for heavens sake? They were armed warships, in a major French naval base, with heavy defensive shore batteries and regular troops immediately available. Do you, even with your entertaining obsessions, believe that Gensoul would have invited the British ashore and quietly allowed them aboard his ships in order to sink them, perhaps offering them lunch first?
The rest of your post is a repeat of your regular all purpose rant. Might your real problem with Churchill be that he refused to allow Britain to surrender?
You have missed one or two details, by the way. He was also responsible for the Black Death, the Hundred Years' War, was the man on the Grassy Knoll when Kennedy was shot and, as a teenager, was Jack the Ripper.
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@rosesprog1722 Actually, in July, 1940, the Kriegsmarine had 53 commissioned U-Boats, of which only 30 were Frontboote. On any one day, there were 11 at sea. 'Surface Scuffles?' Do you really not know of the hammering the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet took in Norway?
'If Hitler had wanted those ships once decommissioned it took 6 months to rearm again, useless.' Again, you assume that, once back in French metropolitan ports, the ships would be decommissioned. In July, 1940, was the British government supposed to take this on trust?
Of course Churchill wanted the French fleet to come over to the British side, but his main concern was that it should not go over to the German side, as the option for it to be taken to French West Indian ports, perhaps under the supervision of the United States, made clear. Unfortunately, Gensoul did not pass on the full text of the ultimatum to his superiors, but ordered his ships to raise steam and prepare for sea. Would you suggest that Somerville should have behaved sportingly and allowed them to sail before engaging?
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@ManuelGarcia-ww7gj Holland was not a 'mere captain' he had been British Naval Attache in Paris, and was familiar with many of the senior figures within the French navy, including Darlan, de Laborde, and Abrial, but not, unfortunately, Gensoul. Somerville did not visit Gensoul himself mainly for the reason I have previously stated, but also because to have done so would have obliged him to have used a motor launch in order to pass through the Mers el Kebir boom. Gensoul had already denied Holland permission to enter the port aboard the destroyer Foxhound, merely instructing Lieutenant de Vaisseau Bernard Dufay, his flag lieutenant, to inform Holland that he would not speak to him, but that he would send his Chief of Staff instead. Not to put too fine a point on it, Somerville did not wish to place himself in a position which might result in his being 'detained' in Mers el Kebir, out of contact with his fleet. Perhaps you might ask why Gensoul himself did not offer to visit Somerville aboard Hood. Actually, when told that Holland wished to meet him confidentially, Gensoul's response, which shocked Dufay (a close friend of Holland's) was 'You see how it is. Last week they sent me Admiral North, today they send me a Captain. Next time it will be a Petty Officer.'
You really should get hold of a copy of 'The Deadly Stroke' by Warren Tute, for a fully detailed account of the events.
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@ManuelGarcia-ww7gj Oh yes. I ignored it because it seemed utterly irrelevant in terms of the actual situation. Somerville had sent a fluent French speaker, a senior captain well known to, and liked by, the French, to communicate with Gensoul in Gensoul's native tongue. Somerville probably assumed that Gensoul, as a full Admiral, would have understood how critical the situation was and would act with the maturity to be expected of a man of his rank and experience. Instead, he behaved like a prima donna, apparently refusing to meet Holland for several crucial hours because he was 'only' a full captain. As Somerville was 'only' a vice-admiral, and therefore junior to Gensoul, would even he have been deemed worthy of Gensoul's time? Actually, we will never know, because Gensoul never suggested that he would meet with Somerville, just as he never forwarded the full text of the British proposals to the Vichy government.
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@ManuelGarcia-ww7gj Actually, the British would have been delighted if the Mers el Kebir force had come over to their side. This was always unlikely, but the British would have been satisfied if it had been taken to the French West Indies, or to the United States. The British, in July 1940, were willing to take whatever action was necessary to avert the possibility of a cross-Channel invasion. Furthermore, Somerville sent Holland to negotiate because, firstly, Holland spoke fluent French, secondly, he was an enthusiastic Francophile, and thirdly Holland had numerous friends and acquaintances within the French staff at Mers-el-Kebir. Perhaps Somerville had underestimated how 'touchy' Gensoul was about status, but anyone reading Somerville's communications with the Admiralty, and his subsequent writings on the matter would appreciate the effort he made to avoid bloodshed. Perhaps you might care to read what he actually wrote before making simplistic judgments?
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So, in you opinion, no British commentator can ever be impartial? Would you apply a similar judgement on statements by, for example, French, German, Italian, Spanish, American or Turkish commentators. If you do, then there can be no such thing as history. If he, or any other, commentator is biased, then the correct response should be to state the reasons which led you to this conclusion.
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@yingyang1008 'Surely you agree it was an extremely controversial decision.'
It was a very brave decision, demonstrating to the world, and to any wavering allies, that Britain intended to continue to resist.
'A man generally despised by his own generals, admirals and staff.' As that simply isn't true, it isn't worthy of much comment. When Churchill announced the action in the Commons, he expected serious criticism, but in fact was cheered to the rafters by the members of all parties.
Certainly, some of his commanders became exasperated with him from time to time, but if you want to know how they really felt you should read Alanbrooke's memoirs.
I doubt you could recommend any reading material on these subjects to me, although it appears the reverse would apply.
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@shikeqin I think that a complete collapse of morale played an important part. The French army dominated military planning (with over 100 divisions, compared to the 10 or so British, how could they not?) and assumed that a second war would be a re-run of 1914-1918. The allies would remain on the defensive initially, building up their forces gradually from conscription and from their overseas possessions & dominions, with their best-equipped troops in Belgium and the rest of France safe behind the Maginot Line. As the allies increased their strength, and the naval blockade began to bite, they could then take the offensive.
There doesn't seem to have been a Plan B, and once the German Ardennes offensive had split the best allied forces from the rest, and reached the Channel coast, Weygand in particular seems to have thrown in the towel.
I don't think any criticism can be attached to the French Navy, which had done nothing wrong, but the political leadership seems to have failed.
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@shikeqin I believe that the French ships were fully manned, fuelled, and munitioned, although they were not expecting to be attacked and had awnings on their quarterdecks. The process of removing these and raising steam began when Force H arrived. Mining began following an order from Somerville at 1105, by which time the French fleet had been seen to be raising steam, and the British ultimatum had been rejected. Holland was able to persuade Somerville to delay opening fire until well after the deadline imposed by Churchill, and despite the fact that French naval forces had been ordered to Mers el Kebir.
Certainly, Darlan had given Churchill a letter stating that the French fleet would not be allowed to fall into German hands. However, that was before he became a member of the Vichy government. Subsequently, Churchill had serious doubts about his sincerity. In an attempt to obtain the release of French ships in British ports, Darlan ad provided the British with a version of the armistice terms which they knew to be inaccurate. In short, Churchill was not convinced that Darlan intended to abide by his promise or, even if he did, whether he might be over-ruled by the new Vichy administration of which Darlan was a part.
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@treyhelms5282 How many times? The Anglo-French alliance did not exist after 22 June. The French administration which agreed it was no longer in power.
How many times? The fleet at Mers. was loyal to Petain. The Free French wished to continue to resist, Petain didn't.
The British concern was not that the French would hand the ships over, but that Petain would send the ships of the French navy, with their crews, to operate in support of the Germans. Whatever you may choose to believe in pursuit of what appears to be your anti-British agenda, the British considered this risk, or the similar one that the Mers. fleet would join the Italian one, to be a genuine one. You have the comfortable advantage of a gap of 80 years to make you after the event assumptions. The British didn't.
Do you not understand the difference between the Free & Vichy French?
I know Gensoul did not ask the British to capitulate. Why did you post that he did?
Well, I did not make the statement about Dunkerque. de Gaulle did. Similarly, I am simply quoting from Lacouture's biography of de Gaulle. Clearly, you know better than both. I am not making any point about Bizerte; Lacouture did.
Why is Toulon relevant? Do you seriously believe that in July 1940 the British should have known that the French would scuttle their ships in November, 1942? Perhaps, also, you might ask yourself whether the war situation had rather changed between July 1940 and November, 1942.
'Well, I hope you agree we've proven the British attack at Mers-El-Kebir was dishonorable.' Well, you have the right to hope, but I regard the attack as a distressing necessity, taken in a time of huge crisis.
Please stop posting the same thing time after time. You are adding nothing to any debate, except that you now seem to believe me to be paranoid as well. Frequent repetition of words like 'murder' 'evil' 'backstabbing' and 'paranoia' are poor excuses for reasoned arguments, and, for the very last time, please try to understand that Petain's French & de Gaulle's French were entirely different entities.
Going round in circles in this manner is becoming tedious, therefore I no longer intend to bother.
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@treyhelms5282 I don't recall the Japanese giving the Americans several hours notice of their intentions.
The Free French had, as I have said before, nothing to do with Petain's government. Indeed, both viewed the others as traitors, as Operation Menace clearly demonstrated.
Your paragraph B is simply emotional rhetoric. It is important to understand the military situation as it existed in July, 1940. Why do you consider an action intended to strengthen Britain's fairly desperate military position to be 'evil?'
Claiming that the British Fleet's strength meant that the attack was 'paranoia' is on a par with the posts I read regularly that it was, somehow, unsporting of the British to concentrate a major force to dispose of the Bismarck. If taking the action they did ensured that the French Fleet did not support an invasion attempt, or even join the Italian Fleet in the Mediterranean, as London believed at the time, then the action was justified.
French forces had been ordered to Mers. before the British opened fire. Again, you call the French forces in Mers. 'allies,' when they had not been since 22 June. Can you imagine a potential alternative situation where, after a successful German landing in southern England, supported by Vichy French warships, Somerville turned up at the Admiralty and said, in effect, 'By disobeying your orders I may have lost us the war, condemned many of our people to the gas chambers and to slave labour, but at least I have kept my honour.' The precedent of Admiral Byng comes to mind.
Your paragraph F 'Gensoul didn't ask the British to capitulate' was what you said in your previous post. What I posted wasn't a speech. It was the text of the ultimatum which Somerville had been ordered by his political masters to present to Gensoul. Somerville kept London informed of events as they unfolded. Part of the tragedy was that Gensoul chose not to do the same with his own superiors.
Incidentally, de Gaulle, in a speech broadcast on July 8th 1940, De Gaulle described the attack as an “odious tragedy”, while admitting that this act was actually understandable on behalf of Britain – sure enough, he asserted that he preferred to see the Dunkerque sinking rather than see it at the hands of the Germans. De Gaulle's biographer, Jean Lacouture, blamed the events on a breakdown in communications, and believed that had Darlan been informed an agreement could have been reached. More importantly, Lacouture also accepted that there was a danger that the French ships might have been captured by German or more likely Italian troops, as proven by the ease with which the British seized French ships in British ports or the German seizure of French ships in Bizerte in Tunisia in November 1942.
There is no point in continuing. You are seemingly not willing to view the events leading up to the attack from the British viewpoint, and, moreover, seem determined to view every British action in an unfavourable light, based on 'evil,' paranoia,' and a determined desire to 'murder' French sailors.
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@treyhelms5282 The Free French continued to fight against the Germans, but, as they were not the Government of France, they did not continue the alliance. In any case, the ships at Mers el Kebir were loyal to the new French government, the one which had just surrendered to Germany.
The British presented clear options to Gensoul, the man on the spot. At the time, there was no obvious means of contacting the French government through diplomatic means. After the armistice of 22 June, until Petain was given, in effect, dictatorial powers on 10 July, there was no clear government to government channel available. Gensoul, however, had direct links to his superiors, but chose not to use them in full. You can hardly blame the British for responding swiftly to French collapse.
I didn't say that the French gave their warships to Germany, only that there was in London's mind the possibility that they might send them in support of a German seaborne invasion. The fact that the Royal Navy in Home Waters was still superior was hardly a reason to run the risk of it happening.
The French had done more than simply raise steam. The British knew that signals had been sent to other French units to proceed to Mers el Kebir, and some ships had started to move. You continue to refer to this 'alliance' which ceased to exist after 22 June, and in wartime the nebulous concept of 'honour' has of necessity to take second place to necessity. Somerville had his orders, did not, of course, know the nature of the Franco-German armistice terms, and was obliged to act before Gensoul's ships put to sea.
Your reference to the Spanish fleet is irrelevant. Spain had not just surrendered to Germany. I don't doubt for a moment that, had Spain proved to be a threat, the Spanish fleet, such as it was, would have been the subject of similar action. As Gensoul had not made any response, and as French aircraft had already attacked Fleet Air Arm ones, Somerville was entitled to consider the French actions to have been threatening.
Why would Gensoul have asked the British to capitulate? Have you seen the full text of Somerville's message to Gensoul, by the way:-
'It is impossible for us, your comrades up to now, to allow your fine ships to fall into the power of the German enemy. We are determined to fight on until the end, and if we win, as we think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our Ally, that our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we shall restore the greatness and territory of France. For this purpose we must make sure that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by the common foe. In these circumstances, His Majesty’s Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives;
(a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans.
(b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment.
If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile.
(c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans unless they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance — where they can be demilitarised to our satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated.
If you refuse these fair offers, I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours.
Finally, failing the above, I have the orders from His Majesty’s Government to use whatever force may be necessary to prevent your ships from falling into German hands.'
Where does the message order Gensoul to 'disobey orders and surrender his command?'
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@treyhelms5282 Indeed. Many French did continue to fight alongside the British. They were known as the Free French, and were disowned by the Vichy government when it was established. The alliance ended when the French made a separate peace. Please, read any history book on the subject.
Gensoul was given time to contact his own government, and, in fact, did so. What he did not do is pass on the full text of the British ultimatum, but simply chose a course of action himself.
Can you really not grasp that, in July 1940, the only force preventing a German invasion attempt, at least as London saw the situation, was the Royal Navy? The German fleet was weak and in disarray after Norway, and had no hope at all of successfully convoying an invasion force across the Channel, but the view in London was that, should the French fleet be used in support, then such an attempt might just be attempted. Of course national survival was at stake. The orders, as Churchill said at the time, were regrettable but necessary. Perhaps, 80 years later, you have the luxury to make dismissive comments; Churchill could not afford to be so generous at the time.
At least you seem able to grasp the reason the French were raising steam. As Gensoul had refused to negotiate, and had failed to take instructions from his political masters, what would you suggest that Somerville should have done? Let the French put to sea in order to be more sporting?
Why do you think the British were 'backstabbing' the French? Notice of British intentions had been given to Gensoul well in advance. It was hardly Copenhagen or Pearl Harbor.
The French comment was correct, especially the use of the word 'if.' Gensoul seems to have been unable to grasp the fact that, simply because France had capitulated, that did not mean that Britain would automatically do the same. Interestingly, Godfroy, in Alexandria, seems to have had more political nous.
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@ringowunderlich2241 Do you really think that 'hoping for the best' is a wise course of action in wartime? Certainly, Britain acted in her own interests when action was taken against the French fleet. She would have been foolish not to have done so.
In point of fact, on 3 July, Darlan played no part in what happened at Mers el Kebir, as, apparently he could not be contacted, and Gensoul failed to pass on the full text of the British ultimatum to the Vichy Government, only the apparent alternatives of internment or battle. The British needed to be sure that they would not suddenly find the French fleet acting in support of Germany, and if you feel that their action was a war crime then that is your opinion, but it is a less than pragmatic one .
Roosevelt intended to act in a manner had the British navy been in a similar position, and, in putting the defence of his country before any other consideration, he, like Churchill, would have acted rightly.
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