Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Loss of HMS Hood - But why did it blow up??" video.
-
68
-
8
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
5
-
@JBrandeis1 You don't think that Briggs, who was on the bridge right behind Holland and Kerr, or Tilburn, on the Boat Deck where Prinz Eugen's shell started a fire in the ready use lockers, were reliable witnesses, then? You don't think that observers in Prince of Wales, watching the flagship for tactical signals from Holland, might have known precisely when the ship exploded, or where the fires were? You don't think that observers from CS1 were able to contribute their evidence either? You don't think that Prinz Eugen's War Diary has anything to say on the matter? You don't think that the technical experts who attended both Courts of Inquiry were able to give them the benefits of their specialist knowledge? You don't think that conclusions can be drawn from the known ballistic features of German weapons, even when this became fully available to everyone after 1945? You don't think that Sir Stanley Goodall, Director of Naval Construction, might have known something about the reasons for the loss?
Oh well.
5
-
5
-
@shalaconballard9912 Hood had armour on a par with that of, for example, the Queen Elizabeths, and thicker than the Iron Dukes or the Nagato, and her belt was the same as that of the North Carolinas. That is, simply, a fact.
The post-Jutland redesign changed Hood, from a conventional battlecruiser into a fast battleship, and did result in her being lower in the water, but there was never any intention to add further armour to the ship in her existing form. There was a proposal, never implemented because of the war, for her to undergo a complete modernisation along the lines of Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, or Renown, which would have seen her with new, lighter, engines, and a totally different superstructure. Significant weight savings would result, which permitted installation of enhanced protection without increasing the overall displacement of the 'new' ship.
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
The battlecruisers lost at Jutland were lost because of foolish practices encouraged by their commanding admiral. Courageous and Glorious are not relevant to the argument as they had been converted to carriers years earlier. Lutzow was scuttled after taking significant damage. Repulse was sunk as a result of several torpedo hits, as was a state of the art battleship accompanying her. The others, other than Hood, were lost well after they had been converted either to carriers or to fast battleships.
In point of fact, the three other 'Admirals' were cancelled not because of concerns about design but because the Germans were no longer building capital ships. Only one battlecruiser, Hindenburg, and two battleships, Baden & Bayern, were completed after Jutland. The RN already had a massive numerical superiority, and priority was given by the British to the construction of small, fast, convoy escort vessels.
The battlecruiser was not, in itself, a horrible idea, providing that it was used as intended, which was to seek out and destroy enemy armoured cruisers (i.e., the Battle of the Falklands) or to drive away enemy scouting cruisers.
3
-
3
-
3
-
@ellsworth1956 Firstly, half of the RN's battleships were not 'outdated hunks of junk.' The earlier classes, such as the Vanguards, Bellerophons, and Neptunes, were at least on a par with the German Nassaus & Helgolands, and the three second generation classes, the Orions, King George Vs, & Iron Dukes, were superior to the German Kaisers and Konigs. Moreover, the British also had ten fifteen inch gunned ships, the Revenges and the Oueen Elizabeths, whereas the Germans only ever managed to produce two. During the phase of the Battle of Jutland when the two main fleets actually engaged, from 7.00 p.m. to 7.45 p.m., there were 30 heavy calibre hits on High Seas Fleet vessels, compared to 2 on ships of the Grand Fleet.
Secondly, after Jutland, Scheer more or less admitted that his fleet could not be risked again. Apart from a couple of brief sorties, both instantly abandoned when reports of the approach of the Grand Fleet reached it, and a foray into the Baltic in 1917, the High Seas Fleet remained a Fleet in Being for the rest of the war. No attempt was made during the post-Jutland period to challenge the Royal Navy's Northern Patrol, which intercepted neutral freighters heading for Germany, and which imposed mass hunger on the German civilian population. There was no urgent need, indeed no need at all, to build a further three battlecruisers/fast battleships, when there was no other naval force around capable of challenging the existing Grand Fleet, but there was an urgent need to produce convoy escorts.
3
-
3
-
@hajoos.8360 I thought you said that US battleships did not engage Japanese battleships? You don't need to tell me about the battle, as I, clearly unlike you, already knew the details. I didn't need to scurry off to wikipedia to find out about it. You might try reading 'The Battle of Surigao Strait' by Anthony Tully, perhaps? If it helps, it was part of a larger battle, Leyte Gulf. I assume that you have heard of Leyte Gulf?
Incidentally, when Hipper engaged HMS Berwick on Christmas Day, 1940, an action in which Hipper came off best but Berwick saved her convoy (WS 5a, a convoy containing a number of troopships) Hipper used 8 inch AP shells for much of the action. Of course, you wouldn't have known that, so look it up on wikipedia.
I don't 'interpret' anything; I simply draw conclusions from documented facts. You might perhaps consider doing the same?
Please feel free to go away, as your ideas of what constitute 'politeness' are decidedly odd.
3
-
@hajoos.8360 Sorry, but it is clear that you haven't read the war diary, whereas I have. After Prinz Eugen returned to port, Vice Admiral Schmundt was critical of Korvettenkapitan Jasper for mis-identifying Hood & PoW as cruisers, commenting that :- The assumption by the 1st Artillery Officer [Korvettenkapitän Paulus Jasper] that he is facing cruisers, is incomprehensible.
Particularly from an artillery officer who must answer the opponent effectively, an accurate identification of the opponent's types is a prerequisite, since the choice of shells, and in some cases for outcome of the battle itself, depends on his decision.' This is from 'Position Statement of the Commander of Cruisers (B.d.K.), Vizeadmiral Schmundt, regarding the War Diary of the cruiser "Prinz Eugen".' The log itself reports the initial contact as 'presumably a light cruiser' at 0537.
I will ignore your insults, but would ask you to explain, once again, why, if Prinz Eugen knew she was facing capital ships, she used HE ammunition throughout. Indeed, she ought, according to German fleet orders, she should have withdrawn from the action. As Schmundt stated in the document I referred to above :- ' Although the conduct of "Prinz Eugen" during the battle against 2 heavy enemy ships is indeed very courageous, it does not meet the common [tactical] views presently in force, according to which, already during the assembly for battle, the cruisers and torpedo boats are to post themselves in the fire-lee of the main body – here undoubtedly "Bismarck".
Although the cruiser had an armament of 20cm guns, with which the artillery officer fired remarkably well and also achieved damaging the opponent, this ship is so poorly armored that it belongs to the light units despite its designation as "heavy cruiser". Every 35 cm or 38 cm hit would have made this ship probably a prize of the pursuing English units or would have forced "Bismarck" to assume extremely unwanted responsibilities for protecting the heavily damaged ship.'
In short, Prinz Eugen, as her log states, used HE shells throughout, because her 1st Gunnery Officer had wrongly identified his opponents. The log confirms this, and Vice Admiral Schmundt agrees.
Presumably, you know better, of course. Do you have any source at all to support your certainty?
3
-
3
-
@hajoos.8360 Fascinating. You refer to Prinz Eugen closing the range on PoW in order to achieve greater accuracy, I ask you whether you think it would have been a good idea for a lightly armoured cruiser to do such a thing against a battleship, and in response you embark or a barely coherent rant.
The US navy never exposed their BBs anymore to imperial Japanese BBs.'
Really? 25 October, 1944, the Battle of Surigao Strait? Heard of it? Obviously not. Where on earth did you get the bizarre idea that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, & Hipper had the best secondary armaments on the planet?
Your actual lack of knowledge and understanding, combined with your enthusiastic use of insults in your attempt to conceal the fact, is extremely entertaining, but there is only one 'bullshitter' posting on here at the present time, mon brave, and it isn't me.
3
-
2
-
2
-
@ellsworth1956 Hood was certainly inferior in terms of firepower and armour to the Colorados, but, with 10 knots greater speed, had the ability to choose whether to engage or not. Nagato had a heavier weight of broadside, but thinner armour and four knots less speed. Moreover, both the Colorados & the Nagato were completed after Hood.
Certainly, Hood was outclassed in terms of weight of broadside and armour by the Nelsons, & the King George Vs, as well as by the North Carolinas. Only to be expected, since these were newer classes. In terms of Bismarck, which featured a number of outdated design features, Hood had a heavier broadside, but inferior armour. However, with a similar level of armour to the Queen Elizabeths, Hood was one of only five British capital ships with the speed and firepower to catch & engage Bismarck. Four of these were with the Home Fleet, and Tovey needed to block two exit points into the broader Atlantic.
Thus, he placed his best and weakest capital ships, KGV & Repulse, in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and the second & third best, Hood & Prince of Wales, in the Denmark Strait. Holland was well aware of Hood's weakness against long range plunging fire, which is why he sought to shorten the range as quickly as possible. Had he achieved this, the probability is that, with the support of PoW, sufficient damage would have been inflicted in Bismarck to either sink her, or at the least force her commander to abandon his mission. In point of fact, that is what actually happened.
Only with the benefit of hindsight have armchair admirals waxed eloquent about the foolishness of sending Hood to engage Bismarck.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@hajoos.8360 So, you claim that I am making things up? You are deluding yourself. Try reading Vice Admiral Schmundt's Report of 16 June, 1941. Schmundt was, by the way, 'Commander of cruisers' in the Kriegsmarine at the time. More relevantly, I hope anyone else who reads this will also look up the document to confirm the accuracy of my comment. They could also read Busch's 'The Story of the Prinz Eugen' for confirmation of Jaspers' error, although Busch is a less reliable source.
Your comment about using AP 14 or 15 inch shells against heavy cruisers is irrelevant, because both PoW & Hood were engaging (or in Hood's case, believed they were engaging,) Bismarck, and, by the way, their ammunition usage has never been in doubt. What sort of 'success' do you think Prinz Eugen achieved? A hit on Hood's boat deck, which ignited AA ammunition, but had no effect on her operational capability. Seriously, if you believe that 8 inch AP shells are of no use against armour, then what purpose do you suggest they served at all? In other words, why did Prinz Eugen carry them?
Do you know any credible authority who would argue that using 8 inch HE shells against Hood was a matter of choice, and not simply an error arising from a mis-identification of the British ships, as the German records, or at least all those I have seen, clearly state?
As to remaining in line, clearly you do not agree with the German 'Commander of cruisers' of the time, whose assessment I quoted earlier. You know, the one you believe I made up, apparently.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@hajoos.8360 Let's see. Graf Spee, engaged and forced to scuttle, by an 'inferior' cruiser force. Scharnhorst & Gneisenau both damaged during the Norwegian campaign and out of action for six months until November, 1940. Deutchland/ Litzow crippled in April, 1940 and out of service until April, 1941. Karlsruhe sunk on 9 April, 1940. Konigsberg sunk in Bergen harbour by the Fleet Air Arm on 9 April, 1940. Leipzig crippled in December 1939, and only repaired sufficiently to be used as a training ship thereafter. Ten destroyers sunk in the two battles of Narvik, half of the total German destroyer fleet, in fact. Granted, after that, it does get harder, as German surface ships were rarely seen at sea. Bismarck, after failing on her commerce raiding mission, sunk on her first voyage, in May, 1941. Scharnhorst sunk off North Cape, December, 1943, and three German destroyers (of a force of eleven) sunk by two cruisers in the bay of Biscay during the same month. Would you like a list of the occasions when RN arctic convoy escorts groups saw off occasional attacks by German surface forces, even supposedly superior ones as well? The Barents Sea comes to mind, for one.
Odd that most of the above slipped your memory, isn't it?
2
-
@hajoos.8360 As a 'well educated on-paper seaman' may I have the impertinence to correct this :-
'High velocity 11-inch-shells from Gneisenau or Scharnhorst penetrated easily the armor of Renown, which meant cold food for Renown's crew.' I assume you have never read Captain Simeon's report of the action with Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, still less, probably, that of Admiral Whitworth. Well, I have.
Despite your untruths, which I will generously attribute to your ignorance, rather than to a deliberate attempt to mislead, Renown was actually hit twice during the action. One shell passed through the main leg of her forward tripod mast, without exploding, although it did sever some electrical leads, and the second passed through Renown's extreme stern, damaging a fan and some light fittings, again without exploding. Renown's armour was not penetrated, and the damage was minimal, with none at all to her galley. I recall telling you this some time ago. Presumably you did not expect me to read this post, hence your attempt to patronise me.
By the way, Kirishima was never a British ship, although built, in Japan, to a British design. Again, clearly, you cannot possibly be attempting to mislead, but are simply either ill informed or merely allowing personal prejudice to override the facts.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
'Better circumstances?' Would that have been after Bismarck & Prinz Eugen had broken out into the wider Atlantic, and taken a lot more resources to locate?
The British had four capital ships in the Home Fleet with the speed to catch Bismarck, and positioned two of them in each of the choke points from which Bismarck might have emerged. The Battle of the Denmark Strait, and the damage Bismarck received during it, ensured that Lutjens was obliged to abandon his mission and make for St. Nazaire.
Bismarck had a weaker broadside, and thinner armour, than the British Nelsons or the KGVs. Moreover, her armour was laid out in the outmoded, incremental, manner rather than the superior all or nothing of the two British classes. All Bismarck had in her favour was her speed. Once that was lost, she was doomed.
2
-
2
-
2
-
The point where a shell hit an enemy warship always relied to some element on luck. However well trained the gunnery team, WW2 crews could not aim at a particular area of a ship.
The torpedo hit, however, was the culmination of years of training by Fleet Air Arm crews, in carrying out and executing attacks on enemy warships. The philosophy was based on the fact that RN capital ships were generally slower than new construction or modernisations entering service in the late 1930s. Torpedo aircraft sought to inflict damage which would slow down enemy units sufficiently to bring them to battle. In point of fact, this had already happened once, in the Mediterranean in March, bringing about the Battle of Matapan.
The 'balsa wood' biplane, by the way, actually sank more axis shipping than any other allied aircraft, so perhaps there was some merit in the old Stringbag?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@shalaconballard9912 Very nice. You should look at any proper book on HMS Hood for accurate facts. I would recommend 'HMS Hood - Design & Construction' by Maurice Northcott, or 'British Battleships of WW2' by Raven & Roberts, to begin with, for proper facts about her. These detail, in particular, her re-design after Jutland, and the proposals for the 'Large Repair.' This was the modernisation which never actually happened.
Put simply, Hood was a ship with the armour of a contemporary battleship, and the speed of a contemporary battlecruiser.
As I said, why don't you look up any of the numerous sources which detail her armour, instead of sticking doggedly to your opinion in defiance of the facts?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Holland actually intended to engage at around 0200, when Bismarck & Prinz Eugen would be silhouetted against the afterglow (sunset was at 0151) but Suffolk lost radar contact at 0028, and Lutjens changed course at 0141.
Suffolk regained contact at around 0300, by which time Holland was about 35 nm away from Bismarck, and slightly ahead. This meant that the British approach involved converging at a wider angle, which became even more disadvantageous to them when the Germans altered course again around 0320. This is another of the many 'what ifs' surrounding the Bismarck action, i.e., what if Suffolk had maintained contact, and Holland was able to engage at 0200?
Holland seems to have chosen not to detach Prince of Wales to act independently (as Tovey later did with Rodney) because of a wish to determine the separate fall of shot from his two capital ships, although possibly he had doubts about POW's state of readiness. I doubt anyone can know his reasoning for sure.
The action, to be honest, concluded before Norfolk or Suffolk could do anything, although I believe that was the intention.
As to Prince of Wales leading, Tovey thought the same, and considered signalling Holland to suggest it, before deciding to leave such decisions to the man on the spot. Certainly, POW was far better equipped to cope with Bismarck's shellfire. Probably, Holland did not believe that he should, Duke of Plaza Toro like, lead his regiment from the rear. I have read that, for the rest of his life, Tovey profoundly regretted not making the signal.
2
-
2
-
@MrSkillfish Well, Ballard & Mearns, who led two separate expeditions, both attributed the sinking to 'the British.' Moreover, by the time she sank, she had lost her main armament, her bridge and command staff, her internal communications, and was suffering from widespread internal fires. She had developed a serious list, and was settling by the stern.
Hardly scratched, really, I suppose.
2
-
2
-
@dillonpierce7599 Well, both Ballard & Mearns have gone on record as saying that the British sank Bismarck. Mearns, incidentally, documented the holes from Dorsetshire's torpedoes. By the time of her sinking, Bismarck's main armament had been destroyed and her bridge blown away. Internal communications had ceased, and she was extensively on fire.
Rodney was heading for Norfolk for re-fit in any case, but her only damage was some internal pipework and a jammed torpedo tube. No main guns were damaged at all. Dorsetshire only became involved late in the action, long after Bismarck had ceased to be anything more than a target.
As to your last comment, you seriously suggest that Bismarck, faced by two better armoured, heavier gunned, opponents, would sink one with her two forward turrets, cripple the second with her aft turrets, whilst at the same time sinking a heavy cruiser with her 5.9s. Congratulations! Probably the silliest suggestion I have ever come across, although well in line with the idea of Ark Royal indulging in a surface action with the full might of her 4.5s!
Why not go the whole way? 'Fire Photon Torpedoes at Rodney, Mr. Chekov!'
Alternatively, you might read a book which analyses the Bismarck action in a rational, sensible, manner, perhaps?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@montanabulldog9687 No, you didn't. I doubt any official RN document would refer to Hood's 4.5 inch secondary armament being replaced by 4.5 inch twins. Largely because Hood's 5.5 inch low angle secondary armament was removed completely, and a secondary armament of seven twin 4 inch AA guns were fitted in completely different locations on the boat deck.
This, however, did not happen during the course of one refit, but in a series of stages. Initially, the shelter deck 5.5s were removed, and four twin 4 inch mountings fitted. Later, the remaining three single 4 inch were also replaced by twins. Twin searchlight towers between the funnels were removed, and the old HACS control system replaced by a new one. No deck armour or plating was removed.
There was a proposal to replace protective deck plating with 4 inch armour over the magazines and 2.5 inch armour over the machinery spaces, but this was not 'forgotten about.' The additional weight involved, 1410 tons, was regarded as having too adverse an effect on a ship whose displacement had already increased significantly over the years.
1
-
@montanabulldog9687 Hood never carried a 4.5 inch gun, single or twin, during the course of her entire existence.
In addition, as I wrote earlier, this :- 'her primary DECK ARMOR PLATE had been "Removed", to have been "Replaced", by a THICKER plate ,. but during the installing of the "New" guns, she was RUSHED back into service, having "Omitted" the deck armor plate, an what ended up happening was that it was simply . . . "Forgotten" about . . .'
was simply not true.
1
-
@montanabulldog9687 I have detailed accounts of every refit carried out on Hood between 1929 & 1941. the took place on:- 3 June, 1929-28, May 1931, 1 August to 5 September, 1934, 26 June to 10 October, 1936, 8 November to 16 December, 1937, February - June, 1939, July-August, 1939, 29 March & 27 May, 1940, and 16 January to 15 March, 1941.
There is no suggestion anywhere that armour plate was removed from the boat deck & not replaced. There was, as I wrote earlier, a proposal to fit thicker armour over the magazines & machinery spaces, but in view of the increase of weight this would inflict on an already overweight ship, it was not undertaken. Hood was scheduled for complete modernisation after the completion of work on Queen Elizabeth, but, of course, world events intervened.
Seriously, do you really think that large sections of armour plate could possibly have been removed, and then 'forgotten about?'
1
-
1
-
1
-
@willosee Certainly, the 'Battlecruiser' term has been over-used. Her design was extensively altered after Jutland to improve her armouring. For example, her predecessors, the Renowns, had 6 inches of belt armour, and the Lions & Tiger had 9 inches. Hood, by contrast, had a 12 inch belt, the same as the WW1 Orion, King George V, and Iron Duke class battleships, and only 1 inch less thick than the Queen Elizabeths. Hood should more correctly be described as a fast battleship than as a true battlecruiser. Her horizontal armour, at 3 inches, was the same as that of the QEs, and actually thicker than that of the Iron Dukes.
That said, in 1941 she was 20 years old, and had the war not intervened she would have been in the middle of a reconstruction along the lines of those given to Warspite, Valiant, Queen Elizabeth, and Renown. Even so, the assumptions in many posts that 'Hood was a battlecruiser and didn't have a chance against Bismarck' show a lack of knowledge about her design, and are made, I suspect, from ignorance and with the benefit of hindsight.
Certainly, at the time, whilst the RN were fully aware of Hood's limitations, there was no suggestion that to put her up against Bismarck, especially with the semi-worked up Prince of Wales in support, was in any way a suicide mission.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@dillonpierce7599 Firstly, there wouldn't have been a final battle. Tovey would not have caught up with Bismarck, which would in all probability have reached St. Nazaire. Secondly, however, had Bismarck been forced to engage, then the final action would almost certainly have ended much as it did. Both Rodney and KGV had better laid-out, thicker, armour than Bismarck, heavier broadsides, and in a two to one action, one (probably KGV) would be able to target Bismarck whilst being unengaged herself.
What leads you to make the claim you have made, given Bismarck's many & known inferiorities to her opponents?
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@davidcolin6519 'a strong odour of politics, cover-up and vested interest.' I take this to mean that, because you choose not to accept the conclusions of the two enquiries into Hood's loss, then clearly there must have been sharp practice involved, because the conclusions cannot possibly be correct if they do not meet your requirements. In other words, exactly the same argument that every other 'cover up' enthusiast deploys. The other possibility, that the Admiralty actually wanted to know the reasons for Hood's loss, clearly you consider too far fetched.
As to carriers. Have you never heard of the Washington Naval Treaty, which set restrictions in capital ship construction? From the RN's point of view, the Treaty allowed for 137,000 tons total in terms of operational carriers. The seven carriers in service with the RN in 1939 displaced, in total, 137,900 tons. The Royal Navy, therefore, had built up to the allowed limit. As, indeed, had the United States' Navy, which had actually, six carriers totalling 147600 tons. If you accuse the RN of 'ignoring' carriers, then would you level the same charge at the United States Navy?
Surely you aren't seriously asking me to produce a list of technological developments? This from someone apparently unaware of the ramifications of Washington? If you aren't aware of them yourself, there are plenty of books available to educate you. However, in terms of capital ship development after WW1, read up on the RN's various new designs, and in particular the designs from K3 to I3. All these were subsequently, like the US Lexingtons, cancelled because of Washington, but they hardly suggest that 'UK capital ship development pretty much froze after WWI,' any more than US development did. Even the two which the RN did build, the Nelsons, had superior armour and weight of broadside to the much later Bismarcks, and were arguably the most powerful warships on earth until the arrival of the North Carolinas.
'As for politeness; your unsurprising condescension as to my reference to Wikipedia simply and entirely misses the point; that it was a significant theory at the time, and still continues to be.' I didn't think I was being particularly condescending. I simply asked you to refer me to my earlier post to which you considered this to be a reply. You still haven't, incidentally.
You do, by the way, appear to have ignored another reason for Bismarck's eventual fate, which was that at the Denmark Strait she was damaged by surface gunfire, lost access to around 1000 tons of fuel, and was forced to abandon her mission in order to make for St. Nazaire.
As to Tirpitz. You have been arguing about the role of the carrier. I chose not to include Tirpitz, but instead kept my comments to warships lost during actions at sea, because neither Tirpitz nor, indeed, Konigsberg, Gneisenau, or Scheer, were lost as a result of either carrier of surface ship attack, and were not therefore illustrative of the respective importance of either.
I notice that you seem to consider the Admiralty & the Royal Navy to be separate entities. Bizarre!
Finally, you apparently consider me to be ' a dyed-in-the-wool supporter of all things RN...... who clearly sees no fault anywhere in anything that the RN has ever done or will ever do.' I am far from that, but I do choose to respond to ill-informed comments from someone whose prejudice is only exceeded by his lack of knowledge about the subject upon which he pontificates so apparently sagely.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@davidcolin6519 Actually, I was referring to the 'unconsidered' part of the comment, although it could be pointed out that the Swordfish was, at the time, probably the only carrier aircraft in the world even capable of getting off the deck in the sea conditions prevailing. By the way, the Albacore, which was used at Matapan, was also a biplane.
'In action' does not mean whilst inactive in port, by the way, and didn't you notice my reference to Matapan? Accuse me (wrongly) of not knowing what I am talking about, but at least have the manners to read what I am saying first.
A further example. You say 'And yes, the view that it was Hood's flash protection was definitely the dominant theory when I first looked at this part of Naval History in the 1970s, so I'd suggest that you try provide evidence that this was never a post-battle theory.' As I have restricted my comments to Bismarck & to carrier operations, I would be grateful if you would enlighten me as to when I made such a comment.
I am fortunate enough to have access to ADM 116/4352, the record at Kew of the Second Enquiry. The two experts, D.E.J. Offord, & Dr. Rotter, the Director of Explosives Research at Woolwich, both gave extensive evidence, and both considered the explosion to have been the result of a 15 inch magazine explosion, probably triggered off by the 4 inch magazine.
Your touching conviction that it says so in wikipaedia so it must be true is charming, but neither the exploding gun, nor the failure of safety measures is supported by any professional source.
Finally, your 'catch all' general comment about RN complacency seems totally to ignore the fact that most major developments in naval warfare during the period you disparage were from the RN in origin.
'The very fact that most German Capital/Heavy ships were lost due to surface engagements does nothing to prove your point. If you have only very limited numbers of carriers, then the likelihood is that result.' The Royal Navy didn't have a limited number of carriers. In May, 1941, for example, there were eight in commission, and a ninth (the first escort carrier) almost complete. The reality is that fleet carriers were not suited to convoy escort duties, which is why the RN had begun building Audacity, and had ordered improved Audacities from the United States in early 1941.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
The events of 27 May actually showed that, however difficult to sink, Bismarck had been reduced from a warship to a helpless target in little more than 20 minutes.
As to 'the carrier's unconsidered and obsolete Swordfishes!' Sorry, but nothing could be less true. FAA doctrine since the mid-1930s had seen carriers as a means of slowing down an enemy fleet in order to bring it within range of the British battlefleet. Indeed, this had already happened once, at Matapan, only two months earlier.
I submit that you have a Pacific-centric view of naval warfare in WW2. However important carriers might have been there, they never attained a similar importance in the west. The carrier there was an integral part of the fleet, not the centre of it. The three German heavy ships sunk in action were all destroyed by surface ships, the Italian fleet was repelled in the Mediterranean mainly by surface ships, and for much of the year carriers were unable to operate effectively in the Arctic.
Oh, and there has never been any suggestion that Hood succumbed to a repeat of Beatty's Jutland foolishness.
1
-
1
-
@briandickinson9383 Just to correct one or two points. No battleship ever hit another battleship at '14 miles.' The best recorded was 26000 yards., by HMS Warspite on Giulio Cesare on 9 July, 1940. Bismarck's hit was from around 15000 yards.
Bismarck was hit during the action by Prince of Wales. Her forward fuel tanks were no longer accessible, she was down by the bows, listing by 9 degrees (although this was reduced by counter-flooding) trailing oil, and reduced to 28 knots. At that point, by the way, her mission was abandoned and she made for St. Nazaire.
Two naval enquiries concluded that Hood was sunk by a hit which ignited her 4 inch magazine, which in turn triggered off a 15 inch magazine. There was no suggestion that any magazine doors were left open, largely because this particular folly, the idea of Admiral Beatty, was discontinued after Jutland, and had never happened in the Grand Fleet at all.
Finally, Hood was one of only four capital ships available to Tovey with the speed and firepower to challenge Bismarck. Tovey sent two to the Denmark Strait, and two to the Iceland-Faroes Gap. Hood, though aging, was as well armoured as a Queen Elizabeth class battleship, and Tovey had every right to believe that, together with Prince of Wales, the combined squadron was capable of preventing Bismarck & Prinz Eugen from breaking out into the wider Atlantic. In fact, that is what they did.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@elrjames7799 No. Hood was 20 years old, and was less well armoured than Bismarck. Bismarck had superior optical rangefinders, although Hood had gunnery radar. Both had obsolete incremental armour, compared to the all-or-nothing of more modern ships such as the Nelsons, the KGVs, or the Washington.
However, if Hood could have closed the range, she was well enough armoured to have inflicted considerable damage on Bismarck. A damaged British ship, of course, could expect support after the action from other British ships. No similar support would be forthcoming for Lutjens' squadron.
Furthermore, Hood was not alone. She had the support of a modern, though not worked up, Prince of Wales. The fact was that, had the action gone as the British expected, either Bismarck would have been forced to divide her main battery in order to engage both British ships, or would have concentrated on one and allowed the other to fire on her unchallenged. In a longer action, also, Wake-Walkers two Counties could have been expected to act against Prinz Eugen. Incidentally, Lutjens, throughout the action, thought that the battleship with Hood was King George V, not Prince of Wales.
The point I have been trying to make is that those people who harp on about the sort of British arrogance which could have sent an old battlecruiser with eggshell armour against a state of the art super-battleship are writing nonsense. Hood was well armoured, and Bismarck was far from state of the art.
Tovey had every right to expect Hood & Prince of Wales to have been capable of preventing a break out by Lutjens into the wider Atlantic. Indeed, stripped of the emotion involved, that is exactly what they managed to do.
Hindsight, however, is a wonderful thing, as many of the people who post one here efficiently demonstrate every day.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Newie67 Hood was completed in 1920. Bismarck had been commissioned in August, 1940, and then spent six months working up in the Baltic. Hardly hurried. Moreover, her AA guns were all modern, even if in the event they failed her.
Bismarck's flaws were more basic. She had four twin turrets, (at a time when every other major navy had moved to three turret designs,) thus requiring a greater length and therefore more armour. Her armour itself still followed the WW1 incremental layout, which other navies had long abandoned in favour of the superior 'all or nothing' design, and she retained an outmoded low angle secondary armament when other navies were installing Dual Purpose secondary systems. Finally, internal communications were placed too high in the ship, and were disabled almost at once in her final action.
1
-
@Newie67 Firstly, Bismarck was not rushed into action. After commissioning, she had six months working up in the Baltic. British and, later, American heavy ships could only dream of such a leisurely work up timescale. Secondly, the German navy did not have an air search radar, even less a radar capable of directing AA fire. Even Tirpitz never received anything more than the FuMo 23 main gunnery sets.
Instead of looking at the hits it took to sink Bismarck, why not look at how quickly she was reduced from a warship to a helpless target. On 27 May, about 20 minutes. By comparison, USS South Dakota at Guadalcanal received 27 heavy hits and remained in action. Warships were expected to achieve rather more than simply being hard to sink, and Bismarck didn't.
Bismarck was never called a 'pocket battleship.' The only three to which this term might be applied were the Deutchlands, supposedly 10,000 tons, but actually nearer 15,000. Bismarck was built well after Hitler had chosen to ignore any treaty limitations, and actually displaced almost 50,000 tons.
Bismarck, by the way, was built to take on the French Jean Barts, in a potential war between Germany & France/Poland. The German navy never gave any consideration at all to the sheer impossibility of challenging the Royal Navy.
Seriously, there are so many errors in your comments about Bismarck that I wonder why you bothered to post at all. Why not just buy a book or two in order to correct the gaps in your knowledge?
1
-
@Newie67 Certainly, Bismarck had three FuMo23s, or, to be strictly accurate, three radars known as FMG 39G (gO)s, of a type which later were renamed long after Bismarck had settled in the sea bed. However, in her initial encounter with Wake-Walker's squadron, she fired a few rounds at HMS Norfolk from her forward turrets, and the shock effect disabled her forward radar, probably both sets if Prinz Eugen's War Diary is correct. Bismarck's senior survivor, von Mullenheim-Rechberg, was actually her 4th Gunnery Officer, in command of her aft director, and he does not refer to use of radar in the last action at all, even when he briefly took command of what was left of her armament until his optical equipment was smashed.
You have, at least, got something right. The bulk of the initial damage, including the destruction of Bismarck's forward armament and her bridge & command staff, was the work of Rodney, in the first 20 minutes of the action.
If the British did not use radar for range, how do you explain the fact that, among others, Hood, Suffolk, & KGV, had main gunnery, Type 284, radar, and used it during both actions. Type 284 had both search & ranging capability, by the way. The reference to radar at 10.15 in your rather poor YouTube presentation is irrelevant, in that it only refers to the main radar, not to supposed AA gunnery radar which you mentioned earlier, and is, frankly, wrong, for the reasons I have explained earlier. The British by May 1941 had gunnery radar on most of their larger warships, and many also had effective air search sets as well. If you wish to discuss naval history with people who are professional historians, with Firsts in the subject and access to a vast array of archives, you really need to up your game, old chap. Incidentally, 'dum' is actually correctly spelled 'dumb.'
As to your rather infantile comment :- 'France was defeated so why build a ship for somebody that was defeated?' Are you really so ill-informed that you are unaware that Bismarck was laid down in 1936, and launched in February, 1939? Was France defeated in 1936 or, indeed, in 1939?
What if the American vessels were built after the sinking of Bismarck? What relevance at all has this to the lengths of their work-ups, or to that of the British KGVs? I will ignore your anti-American rant as irrelevant, and end by saying that the British only became a naval enemy of Germany when Kaiser Bill embarked on a building programme specifically intended to challenge the supremacy of the Royal Navy. Prior to that, the French had been the main potential opponent, but Wilhelm's actions were something no British government of the time could ignore.
I do, by the way, regularly discuss history with others, but they do tend to have rather more knowledge than you appear to have, possibly because, unlike you, they do not acquire their information from rather dubious sources, such as questionable YouTube programmes.
1
-
1
-
1
-
@Newie67 I wrote that the Bismarck did not have AIR SEARCH RADAR, because she didn't. Show me where I wrote something to the contrary, please. She was not state of the art, despite what your 'documentary' says. For example, she had four twin turrets, when other navies had moved to three multiple gun turrets. This made her much longer, and requiring more armour, than contemporary British & American capital ships. She was, by the way, 251m long, compared to the 227m of the King George Vs, and the 222m of the North Carolinas. Next, she was given low angle secondary armament, at a time when British & American ships were fitted with dual purpose secondary armaments. The British 5.25 inch and the American 5 inch could engage approaching aircraft; the German 5.9s could not. Thirdly, she still retained the outdated incremental armour system, which all other major navies had discontinued after WW1, in favour of the superior All-or-Nothing design pioneered by the US navy. As a result, she, in common with other 'incremental' ships, was far more vulnerable to internal fires. Look up the ends of Hiei, Kirishima, & Scharnhorst, as well as Bismarck, for proof of this, and compare them to the South Dakota, which suffered considerable damage, but no serious internal fires. Finally, her lower belt was positioned too low in the ship. This made her difficult to sink, but comparatively easy to reduce to impotence. As a result, she was reduced from a functioning warship to, in effect, a helpless target, in about 20 minutes on 27 May. Combine all that with her internal communications network, which was positioned above her main armour, and thus was destroyed right at the start of her final action, and you have an impressive looking, but rather outdated, capital ship. Finally, her belt, at 320mm, was 36mm thinner than those of the Nelsons or the KGVs, her deck armour, at 120mm was 32mm thinner than the KGVs and 39mm thinner than the Nelson, and her weight of broadside, at 6400 kgs, was lighter than either the KGVs (7212 kgs) or the Nelsons (8360 kgs). You thus have a warship which has only one advantage, which was the speed to avoid action. Once that was lost, she was doomed.
You might want to print off the above, rather than sticking to simply watching superficial and inaccurate documentaries on TV. There are academic studies of the naval war of WW2 available for adults, you know.
I agree, we do have different ideas about 'healthy discussion.' Mine involve presenting facts and drawing conclusions from them, whereas yours seem to involve refusing to read things you don't like, and then calling people 'nobs' and 'dum.' I suppose I should have realised the extent of your lack of knowledge when you, absurdly, referred to Bismarck as a 'pocket battleship.' Please feel free to go away and watch a few more 'documentaries' if you find proper studies beneath you.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@28pbtkh23 He seems to make a habit of it, and he has already demonstrated that he is often a stranger to the truth when it conflicts with his ill-concealed prejudices. Please read my reply to him on another subject, as follows:-
As a 'well educated on-paper seaman' may I have the impertinence to correct this :-
'High velocity 11-inch-shells from Gneisenau or Scharnhorst penetrated easily the armor of Renown, which meant cold food for Renown's crew.' I assume you have never read Captain Simeon's report of the action with Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, still less, probably, that of Admiral Whitworth. Well, I have.
Despite your untruths, which I will generously attribute to your ignorance, rather than to a deliberate attempt to mislead, Renown was actually hit twice during the action. One shell passed through the main leg of her forward tripod mast, without exploding, although it did sever some electrical leads, and the second passed through Renown's extreme stern, damaging a fan and some light fittings, again without exploding. Renown's armour was not penetrated, and the damage was minimal, with none at all to her galley. I recall telling you this some time ago. Presumably you did not expect me to read this post, hence your attempt to patronise me.
By the way, Kirishima was never a British ship, although built, in Japan, to a British design. Again, clearly, you cannot possibly be attempting to mislead, but are simply either ill informed or merely allowing personal prejudice to override the facts.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@hajoos.8360 Do you think it would have been a good idea for Prinz Eugen to have closed the range? Oh well, possibly fortunate for her that someone more sensible was making the decisions on her bridge. Why do you have such a problem with accepting what everyone else with any knowledge already knows, which was that Jasper believed Hood & PoW were cruisers?
As for the Report from Schmundt which, apparently, you believe I have invented, simply search for :- 'Position Statement of the Commander of Cruisers (B.d.K.), Vizeadmiral Schmundt, regarding the War Diary of the cruiser "Prinz Eugen".' It is followed by further comments by Admiral Carls, Head of Naval Group North. Unless, of course, you now wish to suggest I made that up as well? Carls concluded by writing that 'The criticism of the assumption by the 1st Artillery Officer is not warranted, namely, that at very far distances of the opponent, particularly at sharp angles, the identity of a ship's type, even with the most accurate knowledge, cannot be demanded with absolute certainty.' In other words, Carls, like everyone except you, accepts that Hood & PoW were wrongly identified.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@donfelipe7510 She could, but Tovey only had four capital ships to block two Atlantic exit points, so kept his strongest and weakest (KGV & Repulse) in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and sent the middle two to the Denmark Strait. He hoped, by so doing, to have an adequate force in both locations to prevent Bismarck breaking out. He was proved right, but hardly in the way he expected.
Previously, when Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had broken out (Operation Berlin, also commanded by Lutjens) Tovey had gambled on this being through the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and had placed his capital ships there. He had been proved wrong. This time, he hedged his bets.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@manilajohn0182 Marder's death is relevant, in that it makes it impossible to determine his source for the comment.
'He came to believe that it "endangered the safety of the ship" ' If he did say that, it doesn't appear in the Enquiry findings. Whilst he may not have been asked that specific question, it seems odd that he would have expressed tho opinion to the commander of HMS Kent, but not to any of the members of the Enquiry panels.
'It's understandable why the enquiry didn't go down that path.' Not really. The Enquiries were set up to determine what led to the loss of the ship. The Board for the first one consisted of a Vice-Admiral and two Captains, and for the second one a Rear-Admiral & two Captains. Both Enquiries were confidential, Admiralty, affairs. At the time, there was no suggestion that any of the hits had been from Prinz Eugen, so the idea of concealing anything did not apply.
I will, however, get hold of the book as soon as possible.
1
-
@manilajohn0182 Sadly, Marder died over 30 years ago, so what Leach allegedly said to Oswald cannot be verified.
Neither of the Enquiries into Hood's loss attributed it to the explosion of ready use AA ammunition. Indeed, Briggs stated that the fire on the boat deck was reported to Holland, who said 'leave it until the ammunition is gone' and Tilburn, who was actually on the boat deck, stated that the 4 inch ammunition hatch on the boat deck was 'definitely closed' during the action.
Jack Leach also gave evidence, stating that the explosion was 'before the mainmast' as did his navigator, Lt. Cdr. Rowell. Neither made any reference to the "explosion of the ready use cordite penetrating the flash proofing of X turret". The Enquiry did state that, as PoW was in action at the time, this fact may well have prevented observers aboard her 'from giving a clear cut impression of the occurrence.'
The evidence of technical experts led to the conclusion that :- 'The fire was not in itself the cause of, and was distinct from, the explosion that destroyed the ship. The fire which was seen on Hood's Boat Deck, and in which UP and/or 4 inch ammunition was certainly involved, was not the cause of her loss.'
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@ellsworth1956 What do you believe these 'drastic flaws' to have been? The British Director of Naval Construction was informed (actually, wrongly) that the losses at Jutland were due to penetration of their armour, rather than the actual reason. He was requested to 'beef up' Hood's protection, which ended up on a par with that of the Queen Elizabeths. She became, in effect the world's first fast battleship, rather than a traditional battlecruiser.
I have already explained why the other three Admirals were not completed. After Jutland, the High Seas Fleet rather abandoned the idea of challenging the Grand Fleet again, and completed only one of eight planned battlecruisers either under construction or projected. Hood was far enough along to justify completion, but the other three had barely been started.
As, from 1 February, 1917, the Germans concentrated on unrestricted submarine warfare, construction of the three Admirals was almost immediately (early March, 1917) suspended in order to concentrate on escort vessels. The ships were not cancelled until February, 1919, largely because warship design was developing as such a pace that a new generation, capable of matching the speed and firepower of the proposed US Navy Lexingtons, was being designed.
Undoubtedly, if, for example, Mackensen & Prinz Eitel Friedrich had been constructed, then the three Admirals would also have been built along the lines of the redesigned Hood.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1