Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Battle of the North Cape - Ice and Fire at Sea" video.
-
14
-
7
-
The Hipper class cruisers had boilers which broke down regularly, German destroyer designs had high pressure boilers which were equally unreliable, were poor seaboats, and the later ones were overgunned, making it almost impossible to work their main armament in anything but a flat calm, both the Bismarcks and the Scharnhorsts had incremental armour which was a generation behind US & British designs, obsolete low angle secondary armament, and the Bismarcks had outdated 4 x twin gun main armaments.
As to armour, the Bismarcks had 12.6 inch belt and 4.7 inch horizontal, the Scharnhorsts 13.8 inch belt and 4.1 inch horizontal, and the King George Vs (and Nelsons) 14 inch belts and 6 inch horizontal.
'Better ships?' Not really.
5
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 I am not defending British actions, I am explaining them, based on my knowledge of the realities of naval warfare in WW2, following extensive interviews with veterans, including a Hood survivor, as part of my degree. Possibly you have never heard the statement 'we fight the ship, not the men' which was common to sailors of most navies (with, of course, the exception of the Japanese) in WW2. The glib and facile statements you make about Dorsetshire might please your prejudices as you sternly pass comments on events of three quarters of a century ago, but they have no basis at all in fact. I doubt you even know that, for many years after the war the survivors of Bismarck & Dorsetshire head regular reunions, and as late as the 1970s some of the last living Bismarck survivors visited Dorchester to lay a wreath to commemorate the loss of Dorsetshire in 1942. Hardly the actions of men who felt their colleagues had been abandoned, I suggest. The U-Boat report, by the way, was not an excuse. Captain Martin stated that on of his officers, Lt.Cdr. Durant, claimed to have seen a smoking discharge about two miles off the leeward beam. Martin himself crossed to the compass platform and observed the same thing. As there was no British ship at that location, and as U-Boats were believed to be in or approaching the vicinity of the action, (Bismarck had previously transmitted a number of signals on a U-Boat frequency, which were believed to be homing signals) Martain really had no choice. When the first U-Boat actually arrived is irrelevant, as the British in May 1941 did not have the benefit of your confident certainty.
Your comment about Scharnhorst is simply nonsense. No U-Boat sightings were claimed. The British searched until no more survivors could be detected. The weather, water temperature, and sea state, all factors which you cheerfully discount, were critical factors.
Incidentally, on 8 June, 1940, the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two escorting destroyers were sunk by the battleships Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in the North Sea. Over 2000 men went into the water, and 1200 died. Scharnhorst & Gneisenau did not stop to pick up survivors. The water was cold, but the sea was calm and visibility good. Would you care to comment?
The facts are that, whatever the realities of the events at North Cape in 1943 or of the Bismarck action in 1941, your personal prejudices will not allow you to accept what actually happened, as you much prefer your own version. Why not read a few of the many excellent accounts of the actions which are readily available? You might try 'The Bismarck Chase' by Robert Winklareth, in particular, as he is an American author, and therefore not troubled, as apparently you believe me to be, by any sense of 'shame.'
5
-
5
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 I regret that you consider my correcting of your errors to be 'hatred.' This, of course, is your problem, not mine. The BBC World Service account comes from December,2011. It also includes the following comments :- 'We were full speed at 36 knots and going through those mountainous seas' 'It was a full gale blowing. To go through that at full speed, the bow would rise in the air and come down, hover there and come down with a clatter as if on concrete; mountains of water coming all over the ship.' 'It was pitch black and we shadowed with the use of radars.' 'At that point it went pitch black.' 'It (steaming away) seemed a terrible thing to do and it was. But it was the right thing to do.
If we had stayed a moment too long we could have joined those unfortunate men.'
As to Scharnhorst & Gneisenau. Of course they shouldn't have stayed to pick up survivors. It would have been foolish in the extreme to risk Germany's only two battleships, one of which was damaged Devonshire actually received one (corrupt) signal from Glorious, which read ' R.A.A. from Glorious. My 1615 2PB Time of origin 1640.' This was not a distress signal, but a signal addressed to the Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, Admiral Wells. Neither escorting destroyer made any distress signal (at least, none was ever picked up by any British warship,) No other British ship or shore base received anything at all from Glorious, by the way. Admiral Cunningham, aboard Devonshire, concluded that the signal related to routine aircraft carrier signals traffic, and took no action. Indeed, what action should he have taken, given the garbled nature of the transmission? You do seem to have a remarkable ability to put the worst possible construction on every British action, assuming as you do that every British report was falsified, yet you accuse me of 'hatred.'
Perhaps, instead of trawling the internet, you might consider reading the writings of professional naval historians, where you might possibly find out something about the realities of naval warfare. Alternatively, you could simply continue spouting your prejudiced anti-British bile.
4
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 So, we shouldn't accept the words of biased British officers, but should accept your prejudiced opinion without question? Perhaps you might supply credible sources for your claims. One of us needs to be smarter, but it isn't me. Actually, by the way, landing a thousand or so German survivors in a British port would have been seized upon by the British as a wonderful propaganda opportunity, at a time when the war was going badly. Haven't you seen the newsreels of large numbers of surrendered Italian troops in North Africa? The British would have done the same with Bismarck survivors.
As for Scharnhorst, the nearest U-boats were the eight boat Eisenbart pack, which was tracking Convoy JW55B. No boats were reported by any British observer during the rescue operations, and your emotive nonsense about men screaming in the dark is just that, nonsense, which you have made up. However, at least you have admitted that it was dark, even if the freezing seas and the rough weather are still too much for you.
Incidentally, the highest ranking British officer present at either rescue operation was a captain, hardly a high-ranking individual making 'political' decisions, but a professional seaman of many years' service, who would have had instinctive sympathy for the crews of the enemy ships, based upon the principle that 'today it was them; tomorrow it might be me.' Your insinuations insult their memory.
I notice you haven't commented on the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau/Glorious action. Why might that be?
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
@trevortrevortsr2 No. Belfast and her sister Edinburgh were Southampton class, third group cruisers. At the time the Admiralty were concerned that both the American Brooklyn class and the Japanese Mogami class cruisers carried 15 x 6 inch guns, as opposed to the 12 of the Southamptons. Belfast and Edinburgh were intended to be enlarged Southamptons, with 4 quadruple 6 inch turrets, 6 twin 4 inch AA guns, and improved armour. In the event, the quadruple 6 inch turret never went into production, and the triple 6 inch was fitted instead, with further additional armour being added as a result of the weight saving. Apart from Sheffield, fitted with an experimental set in 1938, radar only began to be fitted to the Southamptons in 1941, by which time Belfast was under extended repair following her mining in November, 1939. When Belfast returned to service in late 1942, she had been extensively modernised.
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 Do you know what punishment Midshipman Brooks received for his action? Confinement to his cabin for a few days. Hardly keel-hauling was it? The fact was that Brooks disobeyed orders, and as a junior officer could not escape punishment. He did, however, receive nothing more than a wrist slap. Where is your evidence that Martin was a cold-hearted bully? Should you be interested, he actually joined the navy as a boy seaman in 1908, and retired as a (knighted) vice-admiral in 1947, having, at the end of his career, commanded assault forces ( Force W) from HMS Bulolo during the Arakan campaign.
I note that you 'distrust' the motives of Captain Martin, and blame the British commanding officers on the scene. As a historian, you surely know that personal prejudices should play no part; what matters is evidence based on known facts.
2
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 Precisely what sort of evidence would you expect? Whether there was a U-Boat there or not is irrelevant. If the British thought there was then they were obliged to act to avoid being attacked. Actually, post-war German records make it fairly clear that there was no U-Boat but, astonishingly, the British did not have access to post-war German naval records in May 1941. All the British knew was 1). U-Boats had been ordered to concentrate on Bismarck's position. 2). Bismarck had been transmitting signals, possibly homing signals, on a U-Boat, rather than the usual surface ship, frequency. 3). An officer on the bridge of Dorsetshire reported seeing exhaust fumes on the beam of the cruiser. If you can prove that Group West had not ordered U-Boats to concentrate on Bismarck's position, and Bismarck had not transmitted homing signals on 852 meters & 443 kcs, then please present your evidence.
If you really are an historian, as you apparently claim, then you should know that your personal prejudice against Captain Martin is irrelevant.
2
-
2
-
@ClassicFormulaOne1 Well, as you haven't presented any arguments, other than your conviction that you must be right, and as you also claimed that rescue operations after the Scharnhorst action were aborted following a U-Boat report, when this is demonstrably false, it seems fairly self-evident that your 'claim' is based entirely on your personal prejudice.
Incidentally, who exactly do you think you are 'proclaiming' your fantasies to? I know of no credible naval historian who would buy in to your evil murdering British hypothesis, based as it is on a quite remarkable ignorance of the realities of warfare.
In short, keep posting your nonsense, or just go away. I really don't care either way, although people like you do provide some amusement for those of us who have professional qualifications in the field of naval history, I suppose.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@blogsblogs2348 At the time Drew gave the order to scuttle, 0250 on 13 August, he believed that the ship was unable to move, and Drew reasoned that she needed to reach deep water by dawn, which was three hours away. The initial estimate was that power would not have been restored by then. In fact, power and steering was restored at about the same time as the order to scuttle was given.
Drew's evidence at court martial placed great emphasis on his concerns that, had Manchester been attacked again , she might have fallen into enemy hands.
Although it is easy to be judgement at this distance in time, when efforts made by other RN commanders to save, or even keep in action, badly damaged vessels (Exeter & Edinburgh, as typical examples) the result of the subsequent Court Martial, a severe reprimand and prohibition from any subsequent sea command, seems justified.
Rather oddly, in 1948, one of his subsequent duties was to be appointed as ADC to King George VI.
1