Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Battle of Jutland - Clash of the Titans - Part 1 (Beatty vs Hipper)" video.

Why, then, didn't they exploit the 'victory' to challenge the British blockade? Have you even heard of the 'Turnip Winter?'
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@ffsForgerFortySeven.9154 I would love to know the source of the 'accounts' you have. Able Seaman Tilburn, whose action station was on the boat deck, confirmed that a hit from Prinz Eugen had detonated ready use ammunition for the 4 inch and UP mountings fitted there, but that protective doors were all closed. The order given by Holland was that the fire from the ready use lockers should be left until it had burned itself out, as it was no threat to the ship. As RN ships had not left magazine doors open, nor charges lying around the turret interiors, since Jutland (and even then, only the battlecruisers, with the encouragement of their Admiral, did this) I regret that the claims you make are simply not credible.
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@hajoos.8360 The Deutchlands were almost certainly superior to the surviving Russian pre-dreadnoughts, but would probably have been overmatched by the Ganguts, which, though lightly armoured, were much faster and had 12 x 12 inch guns. Certainly, however, they should never have been risked anywhere near the Grand Fleet.
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@RedXlV There was a tale, possibly untrue but it does give some idea of how the Ks actually performed. !st Lieutenant (in the stern of the boat) on the telephone to his captain :- 'I say sir. My end is diving. What is your end doing?'
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Beatty was extremely wealthy, married to an even more wealthy American heiress, and very well connected. Subsequently, as First Sea Lord, he was able to 'doctor' the official report on Jutland. In his favour, however, as FSL, he argued strongly, though ultimately in vain, against the foolish decision to hand over control of naval aviation to the Royal Navy's most intransigent enemy, the Royal Air Force. As a result, the RAF systematically destroyed the Fleet Air Arm between the wars.
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@ffsForgerFortySeven.9154 Your first post said :- 'This is what happen on the Hood ...someone left the door open on the rear AA mag' Your second post said :- 'The door and the fire seal was open. I have a few accounts of the door being left open and that... pressure and fire from the explosion.' I asked for details of the sources of these accounts. All you have done since is made vague references to observers, rather than witnesses to 'open doors.' Of course, there were hundreds of witnesses to Hood's sinking. I have read them, from both the text of the first Inquiry, of 30 May, and the subsequent, more detailed, Inquiry, of 27 August. None of them contain the slightest suggestion that any doors were left open, largely because the only witnesses who could have confirmed or denied this died aboard their ship. Are you really going to suggest that observers from Norfolk, Suffolk, Prince of Wales or even (at the second Inquiry) Bismarck could have had any knowledge whatsoever. All they were able to do was to give their varied interpretations of Hood's destruction, and no-one has ever doubted that this came about because of an explosion in the 4 inch magazine, which detonated the 15 inch magazine. You are going much further than this, in that you are attributing the loss of Hood to slipshod procedures aboard the ship. As no Royal Navy capital ship had stored cordite in such a manner since the battlecruisers at Jutland, and as the Grand Fleet battleships had never used this method of storage at any time, you will need to prove your allegations. Can you produce any statement by a credible witness that such actions took place aboard any Royal Navy capital ship in WW2? Perhaps a crewman who had been transferred away from Hood a few weeks before she sank, or someone who saw this happen aboard one of the other RN capital ships? As to Anthony Preston, I have a copy of the book in which he made this statement ( Sea Power: A Modern Illustrated Military History, 1979) in which he makes the (unsubstantiated) claim in order to justify his belief that Hood was sunk by Prinz Eugen. Needless to say, he was, and is, in a minority of one where this opinion is concerned. As to: 'Please bear in mind the crew of the Hood was an Older crew They or some of may have been stuck with bad habits.' They would have to have been an old crew indeed, as Jutland took place 25 years earlier. Do you really believe that the crew of a warship, in the middle of a war, wandered around ignoring safety procedures aboard the ship? Do you really believe that their officers would have tolerated such behaviour? Please feel free to present your 175 sources, by the way.
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@ffsForgerFortySeven.9154 There is absolutely no suggestion in either Admiralty Inquiry that such a conclusion was reached.
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@ffsForgerFortySeven.9154 Where in the Report does it state that explosion of 4 inch rounds stowed outside the magazine was a 'possible factor?' Have you read the evidence of Dr. Godfrey Rotter, the Director of Explosives Research at Woolwich, given on 2 September, 1941? (Admiralty Record ADM 116/4352, pages 364 - 369). Dr. Rotter was asked a number of questions on the nature of cordite explosions, and what their effects might have been on the structure of the ship. He gives particularly detailed information on the effects of an explosion of the 4 inch magazine. As part of the evidence, the detailed stowage of 4 inch ammunition is stated, as follows:- 'The 4” magazines in the after group contained the number of rounds, and the weight of cordite, indicated. The stowage was in bottle racks Hold 280 – 290 539 rounds 2.17 tons. Hold 290 – 302 830 rounds 3.32 tons Lower Platform 280 – 296 1001 rounds 4 tons Lower Platform 296 – 302 540 rounds 2.17 tons Upper Platform 280 – 294 467 rounds 1.88 tons Upper Platform 296 – 306 1232 rounds 4.96 tons Total about 18 ½ tons.' What isn't here is any suggestion that rounds were stowed outside the magazine. Have you read Jurens, Garske & Dulin, 'Battleship Bismarck: A Design and Operational History' published in January, 2019, which states 'Hood's destruction was most likely caused by a 380-mm shell from Bismarck that penetrated the deck armor and exploded in the aft 102-mm magazine, igniting its cordite propellant, which in turn ignited the cordite in the adjacent aft 381-mm magazine. Rapid expansion of the resulting combustion gases from the conflagration then caused structural failure, passing out through the sides of the ship as well as forward and upwards via the engine room vents, expelling the aft main battery turrets and causing the stern to be detached from the rest of the hull at the aft armored bulkhead.' I don't see any reference to 4 inch munitions being stored outside the magazines here, nor in either Admiralty report. In fact, the only reference I have ever come across is a single, uncorroborated claim by Anthony Preston in 1979, in support of his pet theory that Hood was sunk by Prinz Eugen.
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@ffsForgerFortySeven.9154 I didn't suggest that the theory was 'crackpot' only that it is completely unsupported by any evidence. The torpedo explosion theory put forward by Goodall was also a possibility at the time, until discounted. Unlike that, however, the unsafe stowage of ammunition was never put forward as a cause of loss. I have read numerous documents about the sinking in the archives at Kew, and have yet to find any such suggestion.
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Not really, because all available German dreadnoughts were already with the High Seas Fleet.
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I believe that Scheer was talked into taking the pre-dreadnoughts with him by Mauve himself. He was not forced to do this, but chose to. I see yet another 'would have' relating to German 'might have been' victories. I'm sure if I had been selected to play Test Cricket for England, I WOULD HAVE a current batting average of 70+ and probably WOULD BE the captain. Much like the High Seas Fleet, all I really lack is the ability, but where fantastical WOULD HAVES are concerned, that doesn't really matter.
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@hajoos.8360 According to Geoffrey Bennett, two factors led to Scheer taking the Second Battle Squadron with him. Firstly, Mauve protested strongly about being left behind, and secondly, sentimental reasons, as the Second Battle Squadron had been Scheer's old command.
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The callsign DK was for the Fleet Flagship, Friedrich der Grosse. When the fleet sailed, this callsign was transferred to a shore station on the Jade, and Scheer used a different one.
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@grandadmiralzaarin4962 Before Jutland, Scheer had placed a number of U-boats in what might be called 'ambush' positions. A signal was to be sent to them when the High Seas Fleet sortied (originally, to shell a British East Coast town) warning them to expect the Grand Fleet to appear. Most U-boats missed the signal when it was transmitted. Only two sighted any Grand Fleet ships. Only one made a (failed) attack on a light cruiser.
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@faheem65asss The Germans didn't really 'make a play for the Channel.' Rather, they fled through it at speed when they abandoned any attempts to operate heavy surface ships in the Atlantic.
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@paulschauer6273 They were still neutral.
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@scottgiles7546 At the Battle of the Barents Sea, HMS Sheffield used her 6 inch guns, her 4 inch guns, and her lighter pom poms and oerlikons against the German destroyer Friedrich Eckholdt, which had mistaken her for the cruiser Hipper. An eye witness aboard Sheffield later wrote that the Eckholdt was almost literally 'blown apart before our eyes.' Sheffield opened fire from 4400 yards, Eckholdt broke in two and sank, with the loss of all hands, in around two minutes.
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BMT The battlecruiser action was a German tactical success, but overall, strategically, it was a British victory, in that Scheer made damned sure that his fleet never risked a further engagement with the Grand Fleet. Effectively, apart from a couple of aborted sorties, the High Seas Fleet withdrew from the war at that point.
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