Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Refit of HMS Hood - But what if she had survived?" video.
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Hood was one of four planned 'Admirals.' She was redesigned after Jutland to incorporate more armour. The other three were cancelled when priority was given to construction of escorts and merchantmen instead. She did not 'fail' her sea trials, but almost immediately, with Repulse and a cruiser squadron, went on a world tour in 1923-4. The Admiralty never 'demanded it got scrapped.'
'Very poor ventilation below decks so they had to keep the hatches open or the crew below decks would suffocate.' Nonsense.
'She had to stay in shallow water as much as possible to avoid waves bigger than 4 foot.' Nonsense.
'A refit was done to change the design of the bow to make it higher.' Nonsense. This simply did not happen.
'10 refits in 5 years and they all failed to make her sea worthy.' Nonsense. Apart from minor details (removal of range clocks and some searchlights, and fitting of additional secondary armament rangefinders) her first major refit was not until 1929-1931, and her second in 1936.
'Crew were forced to serve on her as most refused once they heard about the problems with her. Mostly it was new recruits who didn't know anything about her. Officers and the captain were on board as pushishment not because they wanted to be there. Most tried to resign rather than serve on her but they were told nope sorry u cant resign cause we cant find anyone to replace u.' Absolute and utter nonsense. A posting to Hood for an aspiring officer was generally a sure way to subsequent promotion. Do you have any idea how many officers who served aboard her between the wars went on to Flag Rank?
'She was what is now called a lemon. not fit for service. An embarrassment to the royal navy.' Absolute nonsense. For almost fifteen years, she was regarded as one of the most powerful capital ships in existence by the navies of the world. She had the armour & firepower of a battleship, with the speed of a battlecruiser.
'The hatches between the gun turrets and the powder room had to be kept open while in action or the powder room crew would suffocate as they got their air from the gun turret above them. That was a big danger and the crew knew it. in the end its what caused her to explode.' Absolute nonsense. Such hatches, as you call them, had never been left open in RN warships since Jutland, when the commander of the battlecruiser fleet insisted upon a high rate of fire, and allowed charges to be stored within the turrets. Hood was sunk when she was hit by well-directed fire from a more modern warship.
'Sparks from firing the guns went down through the hatches into the powder room and bang up she went.' Absolute nonsense. Do you really believe that heavy naval guns gave off 'sparks,' for heavens sake?
Just to state a few facts:-
1). Hood was certainly a 'wet ship' aft because of the installation of additional armour.
2). In common with many ships of the day, conditions aboard did result in cases of TB among the crew, but the idea that there was a risk of suffocation aboard is simply idiotic.
3) She was, by 1941, overdue for complete modernisation, along the lines of similar work already carried out on Warspite, Renown, Valiant, & Queen Elizabeth. Not because of any particular design flaws, but simply because naval technology had moved on, and she was 20 years old.
You seem to have a very odd fixation about Hood. I wonder if you feel able to substantiate any of your claims?
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Not really. The Home Fleet was already at sea searching for Bismarck. There were, in addition to Hood, PoW, Norfolk & Suffolk in the Denmark Strait, KGV, Repulse, Victorious, and three cruisers in the Iceland-Faroes Gap. Bismarck & Prinz Eugen were a serious threat to the Atlantic convoy network at a time when the Royal Navy was already hard pressed in the Mediterranean.
German warships rarely appeared at sea, and the opportunity to destroy the biggest one was too good to be missed. Pride did not really come into it, as the Price of Admiralty was well known to the Royal Navy.
Moreover, the lesson of Bismarck's sinking was not lost on the Kriegsmarine. Early in 1942, Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, & Gneisenau fled back to Germany through the Channel, and no German surface ship appeared in the Atlantic for the rest of the war.
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@dmunro9076 Have I ever said that Bismarck had NO functioning radar? Only that her forward radar was out of commission. The Baron says (Chapter 13 of his book) in the English translation, that 'It now developed that the jolts caused by the firing of our big guns had put our forward radar out of action and, since Bismarck was in the lead, our Task Force was blind to any threat from ahead. In order to overcome this disability and also to have the ship with the heavier guns near the shadowers astern, Lutjens ordered a 'number change' which meant that the Prinz Eugen, her forward radar intact, would take the lead.'
When Prince of Wales re-engaged later on 24 May, The Baron records that the action was at extreme range, and that the glare of the sun on the water made observation from the main fire control centre in the foretop difficult. If so, why didn't Schneider use his, according to you, working radar? Moreover, why wasn't this radar used during the Hood action?
In chapter 15 of the Baron's book, he discusses Lutjens' reasons for abandoning his mission, stating that 'Furthermore, he (Lutjens) was probably disheartened by the fact that the few salvoes fired at Norfolk the night before had put the Bismarck's forward radar out of action. Shipboard repair of this radar was obviously impossible.'
There is, by the way, an entry in Prinz Eugen's War Diary, at 0028 on 24.05.41, that 'Bismarck's radars are not functioning.' Jasper also records that 'his ship was initially stationed 16,000 yards ahead, but later that night Bismarck's radar did completely pack up and apparently the gap was closed to 3000 m so that PG could scan ahead and astern.'
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Churchill didn't orchestrate Gallipoli. He suggested the operation as an alternative to the unfolding carnage on the Western Front. Asquith authorised the Operation, but the planning was entirely that of the Admirals & Generals involved.
In 1941, the Admiralty had given Tovey four capital ships capable of catching Bismarck. There were two exit points into the wider Atlantic. Tovey placed his best & weakest ships (KGV & Repulse) in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and his second third best (Hood & PoW) in the Denmark Strait. Hood's deck armour was 3 inches thick, on a par with the Queen Elizabeths, and only in retrospect was what happened to Hood considered inevitable. The fact is that Bismarck needed to be prevented from reaching the wider Atlantic, and so she was.
Incidentally, Churchill didn't send either Prince of Wales or Repulse to a war zone. He sent them in an attempt to deter Japanese aggression. Again, you are applying hindsight, despite your denial. As to the advice of the Admiralty, that was to send slow & unmodernised R class battleships.
Assuming that Churchill wandered around during WW2 making foolish and unjustified decisions seems to be a strange modern trend, presumably intended to denigrate him. As a war leader, he made many decisions, some of which, inevitably, were wrong ones, but in these cases, as I said, he did not plan Gallipoli, he was not involved in the tactical disposition of the Home Fleet, and Force Z, though in the end a flawed judgement, was a justified gamble at the time.
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@GreyWolfLeaderTW The use of naval torpedo aircraft to slow down an enemy fleet in order to bring it within range of the Battlefleet had been a staple of British policy for years. Haven't you heard of the concept of 'Find, Fix, & Strike?' Moreover, it had already happened once, less than two months earlier, in the Mediterranean at Matapan. The conclusions you seek to draw from Matapan are, by the way, erroneous. Without the strike on Vittorio Veneto, the battle would simply not have happened.
One battleship at Taranto, by the way, Cavour, was never repaired. The Italian fleet was relocated to Naples, and six months passed before the defences (mainly the addition of additional anti-torpedo nets) at Taranto had been improved. In short, the attack gave the Royal Navy a material superiority at a crucial time, and a psychological one which it retained for the rest of the campaign. To follow your argument, Pearl Harbor must have been equally unsuccessful, because of the ability of the US subsequently to salvage and repair most of the warships there.
The reward for disposing of Bismarck was always immense. The British simply could not allow a German Task Force out into the wider Atlantic, because of the difficulties of hunting it down. Operation Berlin had already demonstrated that. Moreover, Bismarck was the most powerful warship in the German arsenal at the time, and her elimination led directly to the Kriegsmarine abandoning any further attempts to operate large surface ships in the Atlantic. Of course Tovey was willing to risk Victorious' aircrews and aircraft in order to slow her down, just as he was willing to risk those from Ark Royal. His actions were not in any way dictated by the idea of 'revenge' but by an understanding of the situation of the war at sea as it existed in May, 1941.
Oh, and when did Tovey say that he was willing to accept the loss of KGV because Bismarck had sunk Hood? His reactions to Churchill's later order that KGV must complete the sinking of Bismarck, even if this meant her subsequently being towed, show that the loss of KGV was something which Tovey did not for a moment believe acceptable. If you must make this claim, please provide a credible source.
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@GreyWolfLeaderTW 'Unproven Technology?' Taranto? Matapan? Don't be silly. The Fleet Air Arm had had the 'Find, Fix, and Strike' approach since the early 1930s.
Honour had nothing to do with anything. The Germans had four large warships, and the opportunity to sink one of them was too good to miss, especially since they rarely appeared at sea. Moreover, Bismarck had been sent on a commerce raiding mission, and her destruction was of importance for the convoy network.
The British, more than any other nation, understood the price of Admiralty. The knew that, in war, ships would be lost. 'Honour' was not part of the issue, but strategy was, and the result of Bismarck's sinking was the complete withdrawal, thereafter, of German surface warships from the Atlantic.
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@McRocket Akagi was not rebuilt from an existing warship, but was converted to a carrier following the Washington Naval Treaty. Even so, her conversion began in November, 1923, and was only completed in March, 1927, after which she did not complete trials until November.
Illustrious was laid down in April, 1937, and completed her work-up in Late July, 1940, rather more than three years.
More to the point, in June 1941 the British did not believe that the era of the battleship had ended. Nor, indeed, did the navies of the United States or Japan, both of whom, like the British, were building new battleships at the time. Indeed, the carrier never attained the prominence in western waters that it did in the Pacific, and a modernised, fast battleship, Hood would have been far more useful to the Admiralty from 1943 than your suggested carrier conversion, however relevant that might have been to any future British Pacific Fleet.
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@McRocket A shame you feel the need to be offensive simply because I chose not to agree with you. Oh, well.
I ignored California because rebuilding a battleship as a battleship was hardly relevant. In any case, California was raised in April, 1942, and returned to service in January, 1944. Whatever work Hood might have undergone would have commenced around nine months before California was raised, or, indeed, around six before she was sunk.
The British did not suspend battleship construction at the start of the war. All five King George Vs were incomplete in September, 1939, and three were only even launched in 1940. In the United States, all four Iowas were launched in 1942 or later, and all four South Dakotas were completed after January, 1942.
If you think the working up process is nothing to do with making a ship fit for duty, then clearly you know less than you confidently believe. Read up on Prince of Wales at the Denmark Strait, or Shinano's whole career, for further information.
A modernised Hood would have been a significant addition to the Home Fleet's screen for Russian convoys, could easily have taken the place of Duke of York at North Cape, and could have acted as part of the RN's anti-Tirpitz dispositions, releasing a KGV for use with the Eastern Fleet or, indeed, could have been part of the Eastern Fleet herself.
Clearly, your knowledge of the RN's intentions for the post-war fleet is somewhat lacking. The Admiralty planned, as late as 1944, for twelve battleships, and were producing design changes for the Lions at the same time. Certainly, construction was suspended shortly after the start of WW2, not because the Admiralty no longer wanted them, but because in the short term the use of the yards for quick repair of damaged ships was deemed more of a priority than the construction of new warships which were at least two years away from completion, and the completion of the KGVs was imminent in any case.
The light fleets, by the way, were only laid down from March, 1942, and the Escort Carriers were, in the main regarded as for convoy protection rather than as fleet carriers, at a time when the Royal Navy had as the main priority the security of the Atlantic convoy system.
By the time the rebuilt Battleship Hood would have appeared, much of the German surface fleet would indeed have ceased to exist. In the main, because it had been destroyed by naval actions, rather than by aircraft.
Your opinion about my level of knowledge does not really concern me but,
if you think that 'I have more than made my point (with facts)' might I be permitted to observe that to justify this claim, the facts need to be correct ones, and, regretfully, many of yours do not appear to fall into this category.
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@WillowEpp Renown paid off for modernisation in late August, 1936, and this was not completed until April, 1939. The work involved was as follows:-
15in Turrets were modified to increase the elevation from 20¼ to 30¼.
Bridge structure redesigned similar to that fitted in NELSON and RODNEY.
Entire secondary armament replaced by ten twin 4.5in HA mountings for air defence.
Three 8 barrelled 2 pounder Pom-Poms were fitted to improve her close range air defence.
New gunnery control systems were fitted AFCC Mk VII for the main battery and HACS Mk IV for the 4.5in HA.
Two quadruple, deck mounted torpedo tubes fitted in place of the two submerged tubes.
Limited improvement of armour protection, 4in over the magazines and 2in over the engine rooms.
The 42 Babcock and Wilcox boilers in 6 boiler rooms with 285 psi working pressure were replaced by 8 Admiralty 3 drum type with 400 psi working pressure in 4 boiler rooms. This saved 2500 tons in weight.
The two Brown Curtis direct drive turbines were replaced by two Parsons single reduction geared turbines supplied by Cammell Laird.
These changes increased SHP from 112,000 to 120,000.
Some of the space saved by reducing the number of boilers was used to increase fuel storage and thus increase her range.
Aircraft catapult replaced with Hangar for stowage and maintenance.
The ship was, in effect, largely redesigned within the existing hull, and what emerged was a new warship, as comparisons of the post-rebuild Renown with the Renown of early 1936 demonstrate.
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@padurarulcriticsicinic4846 1). A court-martial might have taken place, just as one was suggested for Captain Leach. Had either taken place the C-in-C Home Fleet, John Tovey, would have participated as Prisoner's Friend, and Holland exonerated, simply because he had done nothing wrong. Being defeated in battle is not necessary a reason for shame.
2). Losing one's ship is not a reason for discharge from the Royal Navy. Rear Admiral Stuart Bonham-Carter lost two cruisers in quick succession in the Arctic, but was still promoted to Vice Admiral, becoming Flag Officer, Malta, late in 1942. I doubt that Holland would have suffered from any sort of guilt, as Hood's loss was not the result of any failure on his part.
You seem very eager to attribute blame to Holland. How would you justify levelling such an accusation at him?
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@edtrine8692 The conning tower, her existing secondary armament, the existing bridge and most of her superstructure, and her boilers & engines, among many other things. Replacement of her propulsion system alone would result in a major weight saving which, combined with the other changes, would result in, effectively, a new ship (see Renown and the modernised QEs for details) with improved armour, bridge, and secondary armament on the same displacement.
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@whydoyougottahavthis Just obtain a copy of Tarrant's book, and read page 98. At the time, the Germans had 33 operational boats, of which 24, on average, were at sea on any one day in 1941. Historically, when U-Boats were sought to be sent to Bismarck's aid, there were only two anywhere near her, one of which had already expended her stock of torpedoes. The waters around Bismarck (and Hood) were hardly 'infested.'
By the way, Hood would have gone initially to Iceland, and then back to a British port, and could have expected an escort of three destroyers (Electra, Anthony, & Icarus) at least back to Iceland, although doubtless additional escorts from Iceland would have been sent, without affecting those already with convoys. The probability is that the Kriegsmarine would not even have known where she was.
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The guns were all the 15 inch Mk. 1, and the mountings of the ships other than Hood ( i.e, the Rs, the QEs, the Renowns, the Courageous/ Glorious, Vanguard, and the four monitors) were known as Mk. 1s, also. Hood's turrets were of an improved, Mk. II, design, with 30 degrees of elevation. Elevation of the guns in the Mk 1s was limited to 20 degrees, but with modification of some of the battlefleet from the mid 1930s, these ships had their turrets modified to Mk 1(N), which allowed an increase in elevation to 30 degrees.
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@Andrei613 You are the one worried about 'point scoring,' and now I observe you feel the need to become offensive. Indeed, the reference to a 1982 Hood was a fantasy (which is rather different from a delusion, as in this case the writer was well aware that it was never 'real') but my original post was about keeping a modernised Tiger instead of one of the 'R's, so your breathless CAPITAL LETTERS are rather wasted, old fellow. You do need to get the CAPS LOCK key on your keyboard fixed, however.
Just to correct you inaccurate recollection of your own posts, you actually wrote :- 'The RN only converted a pair of old cruisers during the war into A/A ships, Caledon and Calypso.' Which was, in fact, untrue. Don't worry, I accept your apology for your error.
You clearly don't know why Effingham was re-armed. I would have expected that someone of your erudition would have heard of the restrictions on numbers of heavy cruisers contained in the 1930 London Treaty. Oh well, look it up for yourself, as it might enable you to understand the reasoning behind the re-arming.
Your posts seem to be degenerating from their initial insistence upon your singular belief in your concept of a 'standard fit' for cruiser AA weapons, to a wide ranging and all-purpose rant about the Royal Navy in general. I observe that the large light cruiser conversions are the latest to incur your wrath, as I also note your inability to provide a source for your idiosyncratic standard fit belief.
As I haven't mentioned the subject of carriers, by the way, what exactly, apart from what seems to be a general need on your part to be insulting, led you to post this? 'I would suggest that you do some actual research on that matter, since you appear to be ignorant of it, as well'
I am sure you will award yourself a few more 'points' as a result of my post, and you are welcome to them. No one else seems to have any particular views on this theme, and therefore I won't waste any further effort posting against your clearly ingrained prejudices.
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@Andrei613 You seem somewhat fixated on point-scoring, rather than having a proper discussion. Quite charming, if rather immature, I suggest.
'The RN only converted a pair of old cruisers during the war into A/A ships, Caledon and Calypso.' Really? Better get the reference book re-written then. Caledon was indeed converted in 1942-3, but Calypso, an early war loss, wasn't. Presumably Curacoa, Carlisle, and Colombo weren't given similar conversions then? Nor Coventry & Curlew, immediately pre-war?
Indeed Nelson and Rodney were slow. In fact, only two knots faster than the fastest US battleship in service until late 1941.
'No doubt this is a part of why the QEs got sent to the Med, and not the Nelsons.' No, actually it isn't.
There are indeed many sources which describe the weapons fits of RN warships at the outbreak of WW2. Only you seem to have issued a dogmatic statement of what the 'proper' weapons fit ought to have been.
Still, if you wish to pursue a tedious argument about what you appear convinced were the manifold failures of the Royal Navy in WW2, then please carry on. Just don't expect me to respond.
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@Andrei613 My mistake on the Arethusas, I agree. However, of the cruisers, Ajax received 2 x 4 pompoms by May 42, Achilles received 4 x4 2 pounders, and 4 x 2 4 inch, in early 1943, Arethusa 2 x 4 pompoms by March 41, Aurora 2 x 4 pompoms in June 1940, Galatea 2 x 4 pompoms by Jan. 41, Hobart 2 x 4 pom poms by Oct 42, Orion 2 x 4 pompoms by Feb 42, and Penelope 2 x 4 by July 41. The ones which didn't receive upgrades were Neptune, an early war loss, and three (Sydney, Perth, & Leander) operating in the Far East. Incidentally, of these 12, how many were actually lost to the air attack for which you claim they were ill prepared? None. Incidentally, I haven't made any point for you. You have simply stated that RN warships fell short of what you yourself have asserted ought to have been their minimum AA fit. Have you any contemporary sources which agree with you?
Which warships would you suggest the RN should have rebuilt after the war began? Both Valiant & Queen Elizabeth were still rebuilding, Warspite and Renown had been rebuilt, and Nelson & Rodney were the most powerful ships in western waters in any case. British shipyards were busy building new escorts, converting older cruisers to AA ships, and repairing damaged vessels. Moreover, the three US ships you name were not modernised out of choice, but because of their Pearl Harbor damage. Certainly the US had the greater manufacturing & repair capability, but there was also the advantage of having safe yards, far removed from the danger of air attack.
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@Andrei613 I appreciate that the Omahas were older than the Leanders, but they were still the nearest US equivalent, given that the next US construction was the Brooklyns which more properly related to the Southamptons.
I didn't realize that you wished me to discuss all 27 British cruisers between the Kents & the Arethusas, which is why I only referred to light cruisers. However, of the thirteen Counties, five still had single 4 in guns as their primary AA weapons at the outbreak of war.
Two of these were the RAN ships, and the other three had been upgunned, in that Sussex, Shropshire, & Devonshire mounted eight four inch guns each. Australia had twins fitted in late 1940, and Canberra by early 1941. Shropshire had her singles replaced by four twins in late 1941, when two eight barrelled pom poms were fitted, Devonshire also received two eight barrelled pom poms in 1941, and had her singles replaced with four twins in 1942. Sussex was badly damaged in port in Glasgow and not returned to service until late 1942, having been re-armed in line with her sisters. All except these five had also received pairs of either eight or four barrelled 2 pounders by the outbreak of war. The other two heavy cruisers, Exeter & York, did also retain single 4 inch, although Exeter received twin 4 inch mountings, together with two eight barrelled pom poms, when reconstructed after the Plate.
Of the light cruisers, four of the five Leanders had received twin mountings by the outbreak of war, as had two of the three Amphions, & four of the five Arethusas.
I don't recall giving a completion date for the modernisation of the two QEs. The point was that both began their rebuilds before September, 1939, actually in 1937, and that after their completion no further capital ships could be set aside for the same procedure
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@Andrei613 Easy to say with the advantage of hindsight. In 1939, RN cruisers & capital ships had AA fits on a par with similar ships in the US navy. Compare, for example, the Southamptons & the Brooklyns. A Southampton had 2x 4 4 inch HA, 2 x 4 2pdrs & 2 x 4 0.5 inch machine guns. A Brooklyn mounted either 8 x 1 5 inch, or 4 x 2 5 inch, with 8 x 1 0.5 inch machine guns.
Of the older cruisers, USS Marblehead of the Omaha class in 1941 mounted 7 x 1 3 inch AA, supplemented by 8 x 1 0.5 inch machine guns. The nearest British equivalent, the Leanders, all except Achilles had been rearmed with twin four inch AA by 1938 (Achilles was due to receive these at her next refit in 1940), giving them 4 x 2 4 inch AA & 3 x 4 0.5 inch machine guns. The British were also building ( the Didos) or converting (the 'C's) a number of specific AA cruisers for fleet defence. At the time, the level of AA defence of both the British & U.S. cruisers I have mentioned was regarded as adequate.
In terms of Repulse, certainly a rebuild along Renown lines would have been desirable, but the RN were in the process of modernising their fleet by rebuilding two at a time. After the second pair, Valiant & Queen Elizabeth, had completed, two of Malaya, Hood, or Repulse were next in line, but this programme had, obviously, to be abandoned in 1939. Again, though, Repulse's AA armament is comparable to, for example, a Colorado class battleship.
Finally, selecting Sydney is perhaps a little unfair. Her two sisters Hobart & Perth, had received their twin mounts upon refit in 1939. Sydney's was deferred as a result of the outbreak of war. Of the Auroras, only one, Arethusa, had not received her twin mountings by the outbreak of war.,
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@garyhill2740 The British didn't send a QE after Bismarck because the QEs were not fast enough, and were rather busy in the Mediterranean at the time. Your West Virginia analogy is a false one, by the way. Before WW2, West Virginia had had one minor refit, improving her AA fit & mounting an aircraft catapult, whereas Arizona received a major rebuild in 1929 - 1931. In other words, the US navy was following a similar policy to the British, in that older warships capable of improvement were being modernised first.
If British decision-making was poor, then so was that of the US Navy. In point of fact, neither made particularly bad decisions where their capital ships were concerned.
Unfortunately, the Admiralty did not have your advantage, in that no-one told them that a major war was scheduled to commence in September, 1939.
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@dmunro9076 How do we know this? :- 'We know that at 0400 24 May 1841 Bismarck had functioning radar.' Mullenheim-Rechberg was a gunnery officer, and is quite certain that Bismarck had no working forward radar after engaging Norfolk.
Moreover, in his description of the final action, he makes no reference to use of radar at any time, and even comments that his own brief period in command of Bismarck's aft armament ended when the lenses and mirrors of his director were shattered.
Certainly, the first re-engagement with Prince of Wales was at 30,000 to 33,000 yards, according to Leach's report to Tovey, but the second re-engagement, at 0131 on 25 May, was at 20,000 yards. Leach records that POW obtained 'A good RDF range.' If Bismarck's radar was working, shouldn't she have observed POW's approach?
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@dmunro9076 The relevant phrase being 'if she had at least one working radar,' when Prinz Eugen's war diary, which I quoted earlier, said that her radar had failed. Do you consider the diary to be unreliable as well? In view of your lack of any evidence at all to support your claim , comments like ', it is likely that,' and ' this appears to be the case,' are hardly convincing, and nor is your rejection of Mullenheim-Rechberg simply because he disagrees with you. Or rather you disagree with him. How, by the way, do you know that he was 'out of the loop?'
As to your assumption that Bismarck must have been using radar in her final action because she found the range so quickly. Why? Rodney straddled Bismarck with her third salvo, and hit her with her fourth. Rodney did not even have gunnery radar. Schneider, according to the (in your mind, unreliable) Mullenheim-Rechberg, recorded his first three salvoes, using A & B turrets only, as 'short' 'straddle' and 'over.' The Baron even refers to Bismarck's stereoscopic range finding instuments, rather than her radar. Oh, but of course, the Baron was unreliable and out of the loop.
In short, you choose to insist, for reasons which presumably make sense to you if not to anyone else, that Bismarck must have had working radar, even though the only sources available either state that she had no operating forward radar, or in the case of PE's diary, that all her radars were not functional.
There is no purpose to be served in continuing to discuss this matter.
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@dmunro9076 So, the Baron is relable when he makes a reference to radar relating 25 May, but obviously unreliable otherwise.
Actually, you are misunderstanding what Schmalenbach wrote in the War Diary, by the way. After it states that Prinz Eugen was ordered to take the lead, at 2044 on 23 May, and that Bismarck's 'instruments' (plural) are not functioning, at 0228 on 24 May, the next reference, by Schmalenbach, at 0400 on 24 May, states that Prinz Eugen, steering 180, or due south, was to sweep 270 to 90 degrees (i.e., due west to due east, ahead of her course) and Bismarck was to sweep 90 to 270 degrees (i.e., due east to due west, or astern ). This makes complete sense if Bismarck's forward radar was out of commission, but her aft set (right above the Baron's head, by the way,) was still functioning . No other interpretation can be applied.
Q E D, I submit.
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@dmunro9076 You do seem to be peculiarly fixated in this issue. Why do you claim that I am 'admitting' anything, when I have never suggested that Bismarck's after radar was not working? Prinz Eugen's diary uses the plural, suggesting that both forward radars were out of action, and only later refers to use of radar to sweep astern of Bismarck's course. There is no suggestion that any radar forward of the beam was operational after the initial cruiser action..
Moreover, Mullenheim-Rechberg's account of Schneider's actions during the engagement with Hood (I appreciate that you only accept the Baron's account when he agrees with you, and that when he contradicts you it must have been due to a lapse in the old chap's memory, by the way) is that of a gunnery officer using traditional optical rangefinders, not that of one using radar technology to determine distance. A similar description applies to Schneider's last action against Rodney.
Similarly, Mullenheim-Rechberg's description of his brief period in charge of what was left of Bismarck's armament clearly shows that he was not using the radar equipment which was actually a few feet directly above him.
Personally, I suspect that the events of the Operation would have impressed themselves upon the Baron's mind for the rest of his life, not, conveniently for you, have become blurred by time.
Still, if you choose to insist that Bismarck used radar in her last action, because you believe she must have done, and the only survivor from the gunnery team must have forgotten about it, then so be it.
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