Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Operation Rheinübung - First and Last Voyage of the Bismarck" video.

  1. Hood had been in commission for twenty years.
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  2. It Bismarck suffered only minor damage, why did she settle on the sea bed? Perhaps you are unfamiliar with the British expression 'Nutter?'
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  3. You would have to be even dumber to keep your ship stopped in an area where a U-boat sighting has been reported and you are captain of a heavy cruiser.
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  4. HX 84, River Plate, Renown attacking Scharnhorst & Gneisenau off Norway, Barents Sea, 1st Battle of Narvik, Glasgow & Enterprise engaging (and defeating) 12 German Destroyers & Torpedo Boats in the Bay of Biscay, 28 December, 1943, Li Wo, February, 1942. That is a few to be going on with, although there are others. The fact is, because the British had a large navy, they were rarely outnumbered in a naval action, but on the odd occasion when they were, they still did not hesitate to engage.
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  5. Why do you consider sinking a large enemy warship at sea in wartime to be 'revenge, or an 'execution?' The British had assembled a task force of two battleships and two heavy cruisers, and did what the Home Fleet was ordered to do.
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  6. Not really. The response to an attack on an Atlantic convoy by a surface raider would be to scatter the convoy. The merchantmen would all steam off in different directions. Most would escape, especially as the escorts would be expected to sacrifice themselves to buy them time, as HMS Jervis Bay did.
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  7. No it wouldn't. HMS Renown, even after modernisation, was a lightly armoured battlecruiser. During the Bismarck action, James F. Somerville was ordered not to engage Bismarck unless she was already heavily engaged by other capital ships.
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  8. What exactly are you writing about? Just to educate you, Bismarck was on a mission to sink supply convoys. The Home Fleet intercepted her, engaged her, and sank her, before she even saw a supply convoy. 'A true slap in the face to the United States.' This would be the neutral United States, content to leave Britain and her Commonwealth to defend democracy alone, until dragged kicking and screaming into WW2 by events at Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war, I assume? After which, the head of the US Navy, Ernie King, allowed around 600 merchantmen and most of their crews to perish within sight of the American East Coast by refusing to set up a convoy system, simply because it was a British idea. It anything was 'a pathetic disgrace' the Second Happy Time and Operation Drumbeat meets the criterion. When you grow up, perhaps you might buy a book or two to improve your knowledge?
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  9.  @jo944  Do you seriously expect a heavy cruiser to seek to attack a U-Boat? Especially since Dorsetshire didn't carry depth charges? Would you suggest that Dorsetshire should have hung around until your notional aircraft arrived? Moreover, where would these aircraft come from? Do you suggest that a U-Boat would surface in the immediate presence of a large, well armed surface vessel? You appear to have a profound ignorance of the realities of war at sea in WW2.
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  10.  @jo944  If that was the case, why bother to stop in the first place? Why not just steam away and abandon them, following the precedent set by Scharnhorst & Gneisenau with Glorious in 1940?
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  11. It is always pleasant when an academic historian takes the time and trouble to comment on these videos. What a shame your clearly aren't such a person.
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  12. To my mind, the one commander on either side who did everything right was her Captain, Frederick Dalrymple-Hamilton. Rodney's arrival is splendidly described in Ludovic Kennedy's 'Pursuit,' as follows :- ' Now, there was nothing to do but wait. It was an agonising period, but Tovey was not left brooding for long. 'Ship bearing Red Seven-O,' shouted a look out. All eyes on the bridge turned to the port beam, there below the horizon were the unmistakable outlines of a ship's fighting top. Could it be Prinz Eugen?' The alarm bells were sounded, the gun crews ran to their turrets, the great guns swung round. But now her upperworks were coming into view, and there could be no mistaking them. It was Rodney, for Tovey and his staff a truly wonderful sight. She had made no signals for over thirty hours, had been told by the Admiralty to steer a variety of courses which could have taken her anywhere, and now, like Aphrodite, was rising from the sea to take her place on the stage at the time when she was most needed.' Perhaps Ludovic went a little overboard comparing her to the Greek Goddess of Love & Beauty, however!
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  13. Admiral Tovey later regretting not signalling Holland with the suggestion, but decided to leave tactical decisions to the Man on the Spot. Moreover, Hood's deck armour, at 3 inches, was on a par with many other RN battleships.
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  14. It must, as the inmate of a concentration camp, have been heartening to have known that your murderers were smartly dressed ones.
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  15. Have you perhaps considered that Bismarck was not sunk at all, but simply dived to the sea bed until the naughty British went away? A sobering thought, in that Bismarck might re-surface at any time! Well, it makes just as much sense as your post, doesn't it?
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  16. She was patrolling the convoy lanes in an attempt to rescue survivors from torpedoed merchantmen.
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  17.  @erictaylor5462  Oh dear. You really are a touchy little chap. Try not to get so worked up; it really isn't healthy. So you didn't say 'Using modern Carrier battle group tactics.' Odd that, did someone hack into your post and add it without your knowledge? You said 'using carrier deployed Bf-109's' The simple fact is that the undercarriage of the Bf109 made it unsuitable for carrier operations. However, if that isn't enough, why don't you read for yourself the range of which the Bf109 was capable. When you do, you will realise that it was far too short legged for naval operations. Perhaps you are not fully aware of the strategic thinking behind the construction of the German battleship fleet. If you had been, you would have known that it was not intended to fight the Royal Navy, but the French Navy, in line with the thinking developed by the Weimar republic that any future German war would be against the Soviet Union and/or the Soviet Union. The pocket battleships from the Weimar period had a double purpose, in that they could dominate the Baltic, but still operate against French troop convoys. The French retaliated by, from 1932, building the Dunquerque & Strasbourg. Germany responded by producing the Scharnhorst class, France then laid down Jean Bart & Richelieu, to which the Bismarck class were the counter. In other words, German pre-war naval planning was based entirely on the French navy; The Germans never sought a war with Britain, largely because there was never any possibility, of challenging the Royal Navy, which explains why the Kreigsmarine was so ill prepared in September, 1939. By the way, if we go along with your suggestion of German carriers operating in the mid Atlantic searching for convoys (using short range aircraft) and protecting, apparently, wolf packs, what is your estimate of the life expectancy of these vessels?
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  18. If they had expended vast sums on a surface fleet, then they wouldn't have been able to build up their army & air force to the same extent. As a result, the conquest of France probably wouldn't have happened, Italy would probably have remained neutral, and the Anglo-French naval resources could have been concentrated in the North Sea, as, of course, the French Atlantic bases wouldn't have been available to the Kriegsmarine as they historically were. As to modern carrier tactics, the Germans had absolutely no experience whatsoever of naval aviation, the one carrier they half built was, in design, similar to the RNs Courageous & Glorious, which by 1939 were long in the tooth to say the least, and the Bf109, with a very narrow and frail undercarriage, was almost laughably unsuited for use as a carrier based fighter. Just compare it to the Fairey Fulmar, let alone the US carrier aircraft designs of the same period, such as the Grumman Wildcat.
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  19.  @the-trustees  As a famous former golfer said, 'The more I practise, the luckier I get.' The Fleet Air Arm had been training since the early 1930s in attacks intended to slow down enemy capital ships in order to bring them into the range of British Capital ships. They had already partially succeeded in March, 1941, and had brought about the circumstances which led to the British victory at Matapan. Ark Royal's Swordfish achieved an even greater degree of success in May. You suggest that this was luck? If so, how would you describe Bismarck's sinking of Hood? Midway resulted as it did largely because Nagumo was an inveterate ditherer. Finally, Hitler had no reason to suspect Enigma had been compromised. None of his senior officers believed that it had.
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  20. Why do you consider that either the US victory at Midway, or the damage to Bismarck's stern, were 'lucky?'
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  21. Look up RMS Lancastria.
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  22. In view of the weaknesses in the design and the unsuitable aircraft intended to comprise her air group, almost certainly not. The Kriegsmarine had no experience of naval aviation, and the Graf Zeppelin design proved it.
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  23. The radar system had already failed, after Bismarck had fired at HMS Norfolk on 23 May. The blast from Bismarck's forward guns had disabled her own radar, which was rather more 'delicate' than the British type 284. Bismarck's design was outdated, featuring incremental armour of the type used in WW1, which had been superseded long ago in the US & Royal Navies by the All or Nothing type more suited to longer range engagements. It was also significantly thinner than the armour of either the Nelson or King George V classes. These two classes also fired a heavier weight of broadside. There was no possibility of salvaging Bismarck. At the end, she was listing by 20 degrees, sinking by the stern, and suffering from serious internal fires. The leaders of both scientific expeditions to the wreck, Bob Ballard & David Mearns, both opined that any scuttling attempt would only have hastened what was inevitable anyway. You don't consider the losses in Norway of half of the total German destroyer fleet, the sinking of two (out of a total of six) light cruisers, and the crippling of a third in December, 1939, the long term damage to Deutchland/Lutzow, and the damage caused to Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, putting them out of action until November, 1940, to have been significant setbacks, then? Well, I suppose you are entitled to your opinion. In reality, after the sinking of Bismarck, the German surface fleet was more or less reduced to an irrelevance. Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst, & Gneisenau escaped back to German waters. Gneisenau never sailed again, Scharnhorst sailed once more, and was sunk, Prinz Eugen made a abortive attempt to reach Norway, but was torpedoed, and thereafter pottered around the Baltic until surrender to the Allies, and Tirpitz functioned as an expensively maintained Fleet in Being.
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  24. What was it Gary Player used to say? 'The more I practise, the luckier I get.' The Fleet Air Arm had trained for years to carry out torpedo attacks on enemy warships in order to slow them down and bring them within range of the Battlefleet. They had already done this once, at Matapan, less than two months earlier. I regret that facts annoy you, but they are, nevertheless, facts.
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  25. Prince of Wales' engines were not 'in trouble' and her captain was not injured. Her masin armament was quickly restored, although certainly unreliable. However, Bismarck had been damaged by a hit in her bows which left her down by the bows and leaking fuel oil. After the action Lutjens signalled Prinz Eugen to proceed at reduced speed. Aside, of course, from Bismarck's inability to bring PoW to battle (although PoW did re-engage Bismarck later, twice on the same day) was Lutjens' worry about the failure of Luftwaffe intelligence, which had led him to believe that there were no British capital ships in the area. It was, in his mind, a real possibility that following PoW might lead him into other approaching British heavies. As to sinking Norfolk & Suffolk, how would that be achieved when both were several knots faster than Bismarck, and radar-equipped?
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  26. Of course. Bismarck simply cunningly submerged in order to escape further damage, and will one day rise again.
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  27. Odd how British hits are deemed 'lucky' whereas German hits, such as the one on Hood, are attributed entirely to skill. In fact, the Fleet Airm's role was to slow down enemy warships in order to bring them within the range of the battlefleet. They had already done this once two months earlier in the Mediterranean.
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  28.  @ricoh.3162  Did HMS Rodney also have a poor output of shells? I wonder if the crew Of Scharnhorst would agree with your assessment of the guns of the KGV class as 'flawed?' There are indeed many books. Perhaps you haven't read that by Von Mullenheim-Rechberg, the senior surviving officer. To quote from page 211 of the English version, published by the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, in 1980 :- 'Was Lindemann still in charge there? No reports came down to us, nor were we asked what was happening in our area. We had nor heard a single word from the forward part of the ship since the action began but, considering the large number of hits we had felt, there must have been some drastic changes............ Had Albrecht been directing the secondary battery from there? (the forward fire control station). Was his own station serving only as a place of refuge? Those questions were never answered..... I reached a messenger in the damage control center. The man was in a great hurry, and said only that both the First Officer and the Damage Control Engineer had had to abandon the damage control center, adding that he was the last one in the room and had to get out. Then he hung up. That was my last contact with the forward part of the ship.' Of course, that was merely an account given by Baron Burkard Von Mullenheim-Rechberg, presumably, in your mind, another British Fanboy?
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  29.  @TTTT-oc4eb  Oh dear, another wehraboo. Bismarck had been working up for seven months. Exactly how long did she need? USS South Dakota worked up in four and a half, and HMS King George V in three and a half. Bismarck had outdated incremental armour, a generation behind the all-or-nothing of US battleships, and RN battleships from the Nelsons onwards. She also had outdated low angle secondary 5.9 inch armament, at a time when her contempories, the KGVs, & the Washingtons, had DP secondaries. She also had four twin main turrets, rather than the triples of the Washingtons, the Nelsons, and the KGVs, resulting in unnecessary dispersal of armour. Finally, her internal communications were placed above the main armoured deck. In her last battle (if, indeed, it could even be called a battle) these were put out of action in minutes. Then, of course, there is the matter of weight of broadside. Bismarck's was 14.112 lbs. A KGV's was 15,900 lbs, a Nelson's 18,432 lbs, and a Washington's 24,300 lbs. One thing I will acknowledge. however. Her speed when undamaged gave her the ability to avoid action with a Nelson and, perhaps, with a Washington or a KGV. Again, on the subject of AA atmament, she carried 16 x 105mm guns, 16 x 37mm guns, & 12 x 20mm guns. However, when they were as badly directed as they were aboard Bismarck, they were largely irrelevant in any case.
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  30.  @jo944  You made an outrageous claim, which was both immature and ignorant. I simply asked for your supporting evidence.
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  31.  @jo944  So, in effect, you agree with Captain Martin's decision?
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  32. That presupposes that the carriers were of an appropriate design, their air groups were made up of aircraft designed for carrier operations, and suitable escorts were available. None of these three conditions applied in the German case.
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  33. Similarly, I am 'pretty sure' that you are posting nonsense.
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  34. Everyone else today also have modern radar and sensors. A modern Bismarck would simply be a target. Much as the original one was, in fact.
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  35. Two of Dorsetshire's torpedo hits were on her starboard side, but the damage to her stern compartments was definitely on her port side.
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  36. @spider love Try again. Repulse and Prince of Wales were sunk by torpedo bombers. The Luftwaffe in May 1941 had no torpedo bombers. Each ship was hit by only one bomb each, and neither penetrated the armour of the ship concerned. If the Japanese had attacked with level bombers, the two ships would have survived, as the failure of Italian level bombers in the Mediterranean had already demonstrated. Furthermore, at Dunkirk the Luftwaffe had already demonstrated that it was ill-equipped to hit warships at sea or, come to that, even when stopped offshore. In any case, this is more or less irrelevant. Tovey took his battleships away, after they had reduced Bismarck to a slowly sinking hulk, because they were short of fuel and he knew that U-Boats had been directed to the area. Try reading Ludovic Kennedy's book. What has Omaha beach got to do with events which took place in May, 1941, by the way?
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  37. @spider love This would be the same Luftwaffe which, in the whole of the Second World War, never managed to sink any British warship larger than a light cruiser, would it? The only issue concerning Tovey was the critical fuel state of the two battleships, which left the scene before Bismarck sank, leaving the final act to the cruiser Dorsetshire.
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  38. Crawford was Rodney's Gunnery Officer. He had no authority to cease fire. Such a decision could only have been made by Dalrymple-Hamilton, and he would have only have acted in such a manner had he received orders from Tovey.
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  39.  @turdferguson2839  Bullshit. You are a fantasist. Ark Royal's last strike was called off purely & simply because it was unnecessary. To quote from an official history :- 'At 0920 the wind speed over the deck was 56 knots, when ARK ROYAL launched a strike force of 12 Swordfish armed with torpedoes. Their task was to be available should the CINC Home Fleet require their services.' However, by around 09:31 all of the Bismarck's four main battery turrets were out of action. A further torpedo strike was not required, and the aircraft landed back on Ark at around 1045. 'He wanted to make them suffer.' Rubbish. Tovey wanted to get the job done and get his battleships, which were short of fuel, out of the area as quickly as possible.
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  40. River Plate? Taranto? Matapan? Operation Compass?
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  41. No. There were very few U-boats in the area, and those which were were attempting to intercept convoys.
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  42. No. Hood had a number of 'unrotated projectile' launchers mounted on her boat deck, and on her 'B' turret.
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  43. The actual damage to Bismarck was rather more serious & widespread than most people actually realise, as follows:- The fatal torpedo hit the steering area of Bismarck. The full fury of the detonation was vented into the ship and against the shell and rudders. The steering capability of the ship was destroyed. The transient whipping response caused by this torpedo hit was stunning. The hull, according to survivors, acted like a springboard, and severe structural damage was sustained in the stern structure. The steering gear complex, encased in 150 mm thick armor, was rather rigid in comparison to the 10 meter long canoe-shaped stern. The unarmored stern structure vibrated at a different frequency than the main hull just ahead of it. Tears were opened in the side shell and bulkheads adjacent to the damaged area. The two decks in the stern were wrecked by the force of the explosion, and equipment in the quarterdeck area was seriously damaged as the explosion expanded upward. Seaman Helmut Behnke, who was sent to check on the smoke-making machinery and its piping found it completely destroyed. Evidence of the severity of damage can be seen in the videotapes of the stern area of the wreck. The remaining platform decks are badly twisted and the upper portions of the damage can be barely seen just above the sediments. The rudders were jammed at a position of 12 degrees to port, as the ship was in the process of turning to evade a port side torpedo attack when she was struck. Herculean efforts by the damage control teams could not correct this situation as they were unable to enter the steering compartments. Immediately after the torpedo hit Bismarck commenced turning in circles, out of control. Once speed was reduced, the ship inexorably assumed a course to the northwest, directly towards her pursuers, as the intensity of the storm increased. Attempts to vary the propeller revolutions on the three shafts, ordered by the leader of the damage control team, Commander Hans Oels, failed to counter the effects of the jammed rudder. With British destroyers now closing to attempt torpedo attacks, Bismarck began a night gunfire action which prevented any further damage-control efforts aft. Stormy conditions, darkness, and gun blast from turrets Caesar and Dora prevented damage control teams from assembling at the stern to try to access the steering gear compartments and repair the damage. Divers reported to Commander Oels, the Executive Officer, that they were unable to enter because of surging water within the after steering gear rooms. One of the divers had to abandon his attempt after his air hose became ensnared in damaged structure, cutting off his air supply. Josef Statz overheard Commander Oels say to the exhausted divers when they entered Damage Control Center: "Only if we had the diving apparatus issued to submariners." It is believed that part of the stern collapsed onto the rudders, as happened with the Prinz Eugen and armored cruiser Lützow, or was damaged in such a way that it was impossible to steer the ship by either manual or mechanical means. It would have been necessary to cut away structure which was covered by surging water. In any event, the repair of such damage was beyond the capability and material provided aboard the Bismarck, even if weather and battle conditions had been more favourable. The stern structure was massively damaged and eventually failed. There is remarkable similarity between the Bismarck damage and a similar torpedo hit on the stern of Prinz Eugen on 23 February 1942. Dr. Erwin Strohbusch, who directed the repairs of this heavy cruiser in Norway, wrote that this incident, and an earlier one on the armored cruiser Lützow, whose stern also collapsed from a torpedo hit, indicated a structural flaw in the stern design of German armored ships, heavy cruisers, and battleships. Improvements were made to the stern structures of Admiral Hipper, Lützow, Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer and Scharnhorst during 1942-1943.
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  44. Because by the time Tirpitz became operational Bismarck had been slowly rusting on the sea bed for around seven months. Moreover, German air cover could not reach Iceland and even when attacking RN ships within range, it never managed to sink anything larger than a light cruiser.
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  45. Tirpitz did not become operational until late January, 1942. By then HMS Duke of York was in service, which would have given the RN three modern fast battleships, assuming of course that in the revised situation Prince of Wales had nor been sent east. In March, USS Washington, with two heavy cruisers, had also joined the Home Fleet. The Germans were probably wise to keep Tirpitz hidden in a fjord as a Fleet in Being.
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  46. 'A' turret was often trained into this position if rough weather was expected, as it protected the turret face from the full force. 'B' turret was both higher up, and further from the bow, and thus far less vulnerable.
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  47.  @karlheinzvonkroemann2217  'This Rheinubung Operation had NOTHING at all to do with Bismarck.' Of course it did. It culminated in Bismarck being sunk. The Channel Dash was Unternehmen Zerberus, or Operation Cerberus. Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had one successful Atlantic raid, Operation Berlin. After they, and Prinz Eugen, escaped to German waters, Gneisenau never sailed again following damage in port, Prinz Eugen never reached Norway, and Scharnhorst, the only one actually to reach Norway, carried out a single mission in company with Tirpitz, bombarding Spitzbergen. Her next voyage, in December, 1943, led to her sinking. Tirpitz had carried out on aborted operation against convoys PQ12 & QP8 in March 1942, but abandoned it upon the imminent arrival of the Home Fleet. After that, Tirpitz became a typical 'Fleet In Being.' 'Since your're not really very aware of what happend after May 1941.' Very good. As you don't seem to know the difference between Exercise Rhine and Operation Cerberus, or what happened to Gneisenau & Prinz Eugen subsequently, however, I respectfully submit that it is not I who needs to do a little reading. You don't need to reply. I will take your apology as read.
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  48.  @baltulielkungsgunarsmiezis9714  The video refers to the claim I mentioned earlier, which emerged in 2008 or so, from the son of someone who died in 2004. It is unsupported by any German survivor. The reference to the black flag is anachronistic, by the way. U-Boats in May 1945 were ordered to surface and fly a black flag to notify allied ships and aircraft that they had surrendered, but I have come across no reference to such a use prior to that date. Indeed, in the 17th & 18th century, a black flag generally meant 'no quarter.' I would be interested to know if anyone else has heard of this alleged alternative use. If you choose to believe one isolated comment in defiance of all other evidence, then that is, of course, entirely up to you. By the way Crawford was a Lieutenant-Commander, not a Lootenant-Commander, as stated.
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  49. What causes you to believe that anyone was trying to surrender? Neither the senior German survivor, von Mullenheim-Rechberg, nor any other survivor, ever claimed anything of the sort, and the first suggestion only appeared, at second hand, sixty years after the event.
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  50. The 'obsolete biplane' actually sank a greater tonnage of axis shipping than any other allied aircraft type.
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  51. Initially, after the hits from Prince of Wales, Bismarck was down by the bows and leaking fuel oil. After the torpedo hit by aircraft from HMS Ark Royal, she lost several stern compartments, and control of her steering. By the end, she was a mass of internal fires, had lost her main armament, was listing increasingly heavily, and was settling by the stern.
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  52.  @Imperium83  You mean that Britain and Germany were at war, and the British had an opportunity to sink a major German asset?
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  53. Why? Never heard of Force Concentration? As performed effectively by the US Navy later at Leyte Gulf. The Royal Navy used plenty of ships to find Bismarck. Once she was found, a handful disposed of her. It was the job of the Home Fleet to hunt down and destroy enemy warships. That was what happened.
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  54. Because, despite the hype, she was built to an outdated design. The fact that she had the outdated incremental armour lay-out, which the US & British navies had abandoned many years earlier in favour of the all-or-nothing type, says a lot about her shortcomings.
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  55. Scuttling does seem to be a peculiarly Germanic thing. Possibly arising from some sort of strange belief that, if scuttling plays some role, the ship isn't quite so sunk, or quite so defeated?
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  56. You mean like Rodney? Better armoured, with a heavier broadside. Or King George V, better armoured, heavier broadside, and as fast?
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  57.  @thehorsecockexpress1068  Bismarck was inferior in every aspect of her design other than speed to both the British Nelson & King George V classes, which had thicker armour laid out to a more advanced design, and a greater weight of broadside. Once she lost the speed advantage, and couldn't avoid action, she was doomed. Incidentally, haven't you heard of force concentration? It is what large navy do to smaller ones.
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  58. Didn't they rather have their opportunity in 1940, and failed? If you disapprove of force concentration in naval warfare, then the US navy at Leyte Gulf must horrify you.
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  59. The Maine was a result of a coal explosion. Bismarck was sunk by other battleships after being damaged by aircraft, and it was merely coincidence that the US carriers were at sea delivering Marine aircraft to two different islands. Any ship is vulnerable in port, just as any aircraft is vulnerable on the ground. Carriers might have dominated naval warfare in the Pacific because of the distances involved, but they played far less important roles in the German & Italian wars.
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  60.  @josephhardwicke6344  Perhaps, but what matters more is thick armour installed to a modern design, and a heavy weight of broadside. The Nelsons were not pretty, but extremely capable.
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  61. Yet an elegant appearance did rather conceal the many flaws in design.
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  62. Yamato wasn't operational at the time. She was only launched in August, 1940, and only commissioned in December, 1941. Moreover, her details were kept secret from everyone.
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  63.  Jonah Whale  But don't tell the Scots! To them, the current Queen Elizabeth is the first one.
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  64. Excuses? What excuses? Hood was sunk in action, and three days later so was Bismarck.
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  65.  @jo944  You really shouldn't apply the standards to which Scharnhorst & Gneisenau adhered off Norway in 1940 to Admiral Tovey & his force in 1941. I assume you have the merest scintilla of evidence to justify your absurd suggestion, or is it simply your immaturity and ignorance writing on your behalf?
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  66. Presumably, Captain Martin should have ignored the U-Boat report, and risked losing his ship and the 700 men aboard her, instead?
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  67. Unfair. She did ram and cripple a cruiser in the Baltic. A German one, Leipzig, however.
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  68. She was one of only four capital ships in the Home Fleet with the speed to catch Bismarck. There were two outlets into the wider Atlantic, and Tovey put two of these ships in each of them. His strongest and weakest (King George V & Repulse) went to the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and the middle two (Hood & Prince of Wales) to the Denmark Strait.
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  69. Tovey later commented that he had thought of telling Holland to place PoW, a better armoured ship, in the lead, but chose against giving such an order to so senior an officer. I have never seen any suggestion that Leach was so openly critical of Holland. Holland was unlucky in that Suffolk lost contact with Bismarck & Prinz Eugen at a vital time during the approach of Hood & PoW, which meant that Holland was unaware of their course change, resulting in their approach becoming angled rather than direct, as he had intended. Certainly, Hood did assume that Bismarck was the leading ship, whereas PoW had identified it to be PE. Holland was aware of Hood's potential weakness in horizontal armour compared to PoW, and attempted to reduce her period of vulnerability to the minimum, but, despite those who still believe to the contrary, the critical hit does not seem to have been caused by penetration of her deck. In short, Napoleon was said to ask of a commander, 'Is he lucky?' It seems that Holland simply was not.
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  70. So the captain of HMS Dorsetshire should have put his ship and his crew of some 650 men at risk because someone almost 80 years later thinks that Kapitanlieutnant Kentrat was probably a nice chap. An interesting opinion.
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  71. A hard to sink practice target is still only a practice target. Bismarck ceased to be a warship after about 20 minutes on 27 May.
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  72. Bismarcki had 15 inch guns and outdated incremental armour. The Nelsons, Colorados, North Carolinas, South Dakotas, Iowas, and Nagatos had 16 inch guns, and the Yamatos 18.1 inch guns. Bismarck's weight of broadside was 14,112 lbs. Nelson's 18,432 lbs, and the North Carolinas, Iowas, & South Dakotas 24,300 lbs.
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  73. Even though it was the only one of five destroyers to fail to attack with torpedoes, and the only one of the five to lose contact with Bismarck? Gallantry does not excuse the fact that her captain lost sight of the main objective.
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  74.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  It will probably quieten down when he goes back to school.
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  75. Hello there. Thought you would like to know that we went for the promised meal yesterday, Wednesday, to a Michelin Star restaurant in Manchester. Very swish, although expensive. It seems that Professors of Ancient History receive rather decent salaries. I offered a toast to you, of course, as the Founder of the Feast, at least from my point of view. Many thanks for all your rants, without which I might have lost the bet, and had to pay!
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  76. good point succinctly made. Isn't it amazing that some people seem to think that, if Bismarck had been scuttled, then somehow she wasn't quite so sunk?!!
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  77.  @flyop312  Just imagine the BBC of today broadcasting the news in June, 1944. On 3rd June, for example. 'Sources within Allied Headquarters have told a BBC reporter that the British, Americans, & Canadians, intend to make an assault landing in Normandy in two or three days time. We have also been informed that the British have a secret facility at a place called Bletchley Park, which has broken many German codes, including Enigma.'
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  78. It would, in addition, have been totally condemnatory of everything the British did, from start to finish. It is a recent tradition within the BBC.
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  79. The books and articles I have read all mention Piorun's part in the night action.
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  80. RMS Majestic from 1922.
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  81.  @wmorris3484  Where were these paratroopers to come from? The Germans began the invasion of the Low Countries with 4500 trained paratroopers, and had less than that in September. They only had just over 220 operational transport aircraft, by the way. Neither did the Germans have any landing craft, at the time. The 'whole rotten place' did, however, have 70 or so destroyers within five hours of the Channel, with around 500 smaller warships in support, together with a further 40 or so destroyers in home waters, without even mentioning the heavy ships of the Home Fleet. In fact, the 'whole rotten place' had the largest navy on earth defending it.
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  82. Modoc wasn't near Gibraltar. She was near Cape Farewell, Greenland. She was part of the International Ice Patrol.
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  83. Tirpitz was nine months away, and Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were under regular attack by bombing in Brest.
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  84. @spider love 'Moor up to Bismark to parlay' What was there to parlay about, and what authority had a subordinate officer to take such an action anyway?
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  85. Scharnhorst was sunk by Duke of York, not by Anson.
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  86. An obsolete, fabric covered, biplane which sank a greater tonnage of axis shipping than any other type.
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  87.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  I must confess I stopped reading these posts some time ago. I don't think insanity is contagious, but you never know! He is, by the way, still posting.
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  88.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Remember that lunatic I told you about? He has now sent me over 100 comments, all either saying the same thing, or saying entirely irrelevant things. A mate of mine bet me that, if I could get this madman to 100, he would buy me and my wife a slap-up meal in the New Year. I must confess, it was too good a chance to pass up!
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  89. There was certainly one, Lieutenant-Commander Joseph Wellings USN, who had been Assistant Naval Attache at the US Embassy in London, and was appointed as an 'Observer' to the RN. He retired as a Rear Admiral, in 1963.
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  90.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  I believe that he set up an Action Committee, involving a couple of US Navy officers who had cadged lifts back to the US, to plan his course of action.
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  91. 1). The claim that Bismarck's crew were attempting to surrender dates from the son of one of HMS Rodney's crew, and was first made 60 years after the sinking. 2). The British only abandoned the survivors after Captain Martin of HMS Dorsetshire received a U-Boat sighting report. What should he have done? Remained stationary and trusted to the kind-hearted goodness of the boat's commander?
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  92. The Germans only built six light cruisers. One, Emden, was basically a WW1 design used as a training ship, two (Karlsruhe & Konigsberg) were sunk bt the British in 1940, and one (Leipzig) was torpedoed by a British submarine in December, 1939, and only ever fit for use as a training ship thereafter. That only leaves Koln & Nurnberg.
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  93.  @hughsegrave3979  Your evidence for this being? Don't you perhaps consider that the British would have been eager to sink 25% of Germany's capital ships if the opportunity arose?
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  94. It made no difference at all. Aside, of course, from the fact that Prince of Wales had more modern armour than Hood, and was less likely to have been sunk. Bismarck was a major warship of an enemy power. The purpose of the Home Fleet was to destroy such vessels. The idea of revenge did not apply.
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  95. Ludovic Kennedy had a more mundane explanation, which was that the electronic firing circuits closed at the same time as the old ship exploded. Probably the correct explanation, by the way.
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  96.  @Imperium83  How better to demonstrate your peaceful intentions than by invading, without declaration of war, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Belgium. Oh, and two years later, your bestest chum, the Soviet Union?
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  97. The weather conditions in the Atlantic at the time were such that a more advanced aircraft would have been unable to get off the deck of either Ark Royal or Victorious. Moreover, no capital ship, by May 1941, had been sunk at sea by air attack. The only one damaged had been Vittorio Veneto in March, 1941, by British Albacores.
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  98. My father saw HMS Warspite fire full broadsides off Salerno. A sailor standing near him apparently said 'I don't what that is doing to the Jerries, but it isn't doing the Warspite much good.'
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  99. There were two exits into the main Atlantic. These were the Denmark Strait and the Iceland-Faroes Gap. During Operation Berlin, Tovey concentrated his fleet in the Iceland-Faroes Gap, and Scharnhorst/Gneisenau used the Denmark Strait. This time, Tovey, with four capital ships plus one carrier, placed his 2nd & 3rd most battleworthy ships in the Denmark Strait, and his 1st & 4th, plus the carrier, in the Gap. His calculation was that each force was strong enough to prevent Lutjens carrying out his orders, which were to attack convoys in the Altantic. Tovey was proved correct. During the Denmark Strait action, Prince of Wales inflicted sufficient damage on Bismarck to oblige Lutjens to make for France. Holland was well aware of Hood's weaknesses. He needed to close the range quickly, as, in a short range slogging match, Hood's belt, which was almost as strong as Bismarck's, put her in a much less vulnerable position. Holland intended that Wake-Walker's cruisers would engage Prinz Eugen, but the action was over before Wake-Walker could do anything. Protecting the Atlantic Convoy routes was hardly a minor engagement, by the way.
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  100.  @jberry1982  Bismarck and Tirpitz were both built to an outdated design, and both were inferior to the King George V class, and to the Nelson class except for speed, which gave them the ability to avoid action.
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  101.  @jberry1982  Bismarck went on a commerce raiding operation in May 1941. How many merchantmen did she sink, how many convoys did she disrupt, and what happened to her? Tirpitz acted as a 'fleet in being' and was a nuisance but never chanced her arm. Probably just as well in view of her outdated design. You haven't actually managed to make a coherent point in any of your rambles. I would suspect that, compared to you, most of the population of the planet could be considered 'smart asses.'
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  102.  @jberry1982  Your point being?
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  103.  @jberry1982  Mosquito bombers? Attacking Tirpitz in Norway? What colour is the sky on your planet, for heaven's sake? Operation Tungsten resulted in 15 bomb hits on Tirpitz, killing 122 & wounding 316 members of her crew, for the loss of four aircraft and nine aircrew. Tirpitz was out of action for three months. Does that sound like a ship capable of defending itself from air attack?
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  104.  @jberry1982  Major threat to what? Immobilised at the end of a Norwegian Fjord? Fight off an air attack by itself? Tirpitz didn't do very well against Operation Tungsten, did she, despite the nearby fighter cover, the shore based AA guns, and the smoke pots?
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  105. Oh yes. The 'Turpits' was certainly 'scuddled.'
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  106. How? Bismarck was supposed to intercept supply convoys, yet never even saw one. There were no Murmansk Convoys at the time, as Germany still had a non aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The first convoy to Murmansk, "Dervish," assembled at Hvalfjörður and sailed on 21 August 1941.
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  107. Then the sources are either disingenuous or badly informed. The term would probably have been to attack in divisions. In RN WW2 destroyer terms, a 'division' was a half flotilla, usually led by the second-in-command of the flotilla. Early in the war, it would have consisted of four ships from a flotilla of eight. In Vian's case, as there were four destroyers, it would have been reduced to two. It is, frankly, inconceivable that any RN officer aboard Piorun would not have known precisely what Vian meant. Moreover, it really does not explain why, alone of the five destroyers, only one failed to attempt a torpedo attack, and only one lost contact during the action. A gun duel might have seemed gallant, but it was also futile & pointless in the circumstances.
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  108. Not quite. It was Ludovic himself who witnessed the battle. His father, Edward Coverley Kennedy, was captain of the armed merchant cruiser Rawalpindi when she was sunk by Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in the Iceland-Faroes passage on 23 November, 1939. Kennedy was ordered to surrender by the German commander, but instead chose to fight, transmitting an enemy sighting report, and scoring one hit on Scharnhorst. His last words to his bridge personnel were reported as "We’ll fight them both, they’ll sink us, and that will be that. Good-bye". You are right, by the way. Ludovic Kennedy's book is excellent, written as it was by someone who experienced and understood naval warfare.
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  109.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  If you would like a little amusement during these cold days, go to the top of this thread and read the posts begun around six days ago by one 'The Dog General.' I have encountered some strange people where Bismarck & Hood are concerned, but this one is in an insanity class far beyond any of them.
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  110.  @akselsvendsen9020  Actually, the Germans sent almost their entire navy to Norway. As a result, they lost a fair proportion of it.
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  111. Actually, let us concentrate our forces to ensure victory. It is what tends to happen in wartime.
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  112. This allegation was apparently made for the first time in 2004. The idea of someone standing on top of a turret signalling in semaphore is, frankly, incredible, and a black flag to denote surrender was used for the first time by Doenitz' U-Boats in May, 1945. Prior to that, it was used to denote 'no quarter.'
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  113.  @Daz-ty6bo  Sorry, but you are either an idiot, a child, or simply very immature. The prime evidence in the photograph is that, as other photographs, German records, and drawings all clearly demonstrate, Bismarck never carried any torpedo tubes, and Tirpitz only received two sets later in her career. As did, incidentally, Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, although in their case they were triple sets removed from German light cruisers.
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  114.  @Daz-ty6bo  There is precisely no evidence, prime or otherwise, to suggest that Bismarck ever carried torpedo tubes, and a vast amount, including German records, proving that she didn't. What you are seeing, presumably between two of the 5.9 inch twin secondaries, is a small boat. The tubes fitted to Tirpitz, from late 1941, were positioned just abaft the cross deck aircraft catapult.
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  115.  @acosorimaxconto5610  Oh dear, another prejudiced know nothing. Why bother leaving messages on here, when you clearly are completely ignorant of the subject?
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  116. Not in May, 1941, Iowa wouldn't.
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  117. The first suggestion that any such signals were made occurred in book by Iain Ballantyne. Written, I believe, in 2011.
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  118.  @TwistedSisterHaratiofales  I'm sorry. I didn't realise how little you actually knew about the action. In no particular order :- 1). KGV was rather more than 30 or 40 miles away. There were two realistic exit points into the Atlantic. Hood & POW were sent to cover one, whilst KGV covered the other. KGV, by the way, had the battlecruiser Repulse and the carrier Victorious with her. You can find fuller details in any book on the subject. Perhaps you might care to try 'The Bismarck Chase' by Robert Winklareth, an American author. 2). Norfolk & Suffolk were not 'afraid' to engage, but were intending to take on Prinz Eugen whilst Hood & POW challenged Bismarck. However, the main action was over very quickly, at which point Wake-Walker, now in command of the British force, reverted to the traditional role of the cruiser, that of shadowing an enemy force in order to bring further heavy units ( i.e., KGV, Repulse, & Victorious) into contact. 3). POW broke off the engagement because X turret had suffered a mechanical failure. This was quickly repaired, and she did briefly re-engage. 4). The damage to Bismarck was already serious enough to force Lutjens to abandon his mission. You write glibly about Bismarck, after possibly sustaining further damage, still having 'better chance to run for home.' She was already short of fuel following the loss of her bow tanks, was down by the bows, and had a list. This damage led to her eventual destruction. I cannot see how you can possibly argue that a Bismarck with further damage would have had a better chance. 5). In the final engagement, Prinz Eugen would have been useless, although Dr. Ballard would doubtless have taken some poignant pictures of her wreck when he filmed Bismarck. Lutjens' decision to detach her was undoubtedly correct, given his original instructions, in that she might have carried on operations against Atlantic convoys. Of course, as was usual with the Hippers, she developed engine problems and achieved nothing.
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  119. Bismarck had already been hit three times by POW in the Denmark Strait, and Lutjens had already been obliged to abandon the raiding operation. Had Bismarck continued the engagement, she would probably have received further damage. As to the British being 'seriously dazed' one thing that the British Navy of the time thoroughly understood was 'the price of admiralty.' The British had learned over the past 350 years that ships do get sunk in war. Their actual response following the loss of Hood was not mourning or being 'seriously dazed' but rather an immediate re-disposition of their available assets in order, successfully, to bring about the concentration of force which brought about Bismarck's demise.
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  120.  @trentxiiib8756  I note that you haven't explained why the Germans, who were apparently still following 'the rules of war' at the time, failed to attempt to pick up any survivors from HMS Glorious. The RN, in the form of Dorsetshire & Maori, did seek to pick up Bismarck survivors, but abandoned the attempt rather than risk being subjected to a U-boat attack, and U-boats had been reported in the area. Lutjens had even signalled for one to collect Bismarck's war diary. At North Cape, the British picked up those survivors they could find, which were indeed very few, largely because of the darkness and weather conditions. They did not break off until they had completed their task. Do you have any understanding of what life expectancy was in the Arctic in December? There are numerous books about the Bismarck action, the sinking of Glorious (and, for that matter, of Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy) and North Cape. Why not read them instead of persisting with your ill-informed and obviously prejudiced foolishness.
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  121. I see. Are you really ignorant enough to believe that a U-boat commander would be able to see, let alone read, signal flags or lamps, in such circumstances, even should he be unwise enough to try? You suggest that the captain of HMS Dorsetshire stops his cruiser, with a crew of 850 men, in mid-Atlantic, and ignores reports of U-boats in the area, because he can be confident that all U-boat captains are honourable humanitarians who would surely refrain from torpedoing an enemy cruiser? I'm sure that, as the second of three torpedoes slammed into his command, Captain Martin's last recorded action would have been a good-natured shrug. Out of interest, on 8 June, 1940, the aircraft carrier Glorious and her two escorting destroyers were sunk in the North Sea by the German battleships Scharnhorst & Gneisenau. Would you care to tell me whether the two battleships stopped to pick up survivors? Perhaps you would like another example. In September, 1914, the cruiser Aboukir was torpedoed in the North Sea by the German U-boat U9. Two other cruisers stopped to rescue survivors, and the U-boat torpedoed these as well. In point of fact, the German commanders both acted correctly, just as Captain Martin did. At North Cape, by the way, Scharnhorst was sunk at 1945 on 26 December, 1943. It was pitch dark, and the British battleship had been firing by radar. After Scharnhorst sank, Admiral Fraser sent two destroyers to pick up survivors, but in the darkness, with a heavy, freezing, sea, they only managed to find 36. In the prevailing conditions, it was quite remarkable that even 36 survived.
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  122. That was still nine months away, by which time the third KGV was in commission, Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, and the United States was in the war. Lutjens was trying to get to St. Nazaire in order to use the Normandie dry dock, and France was the nearest place where Luftwaffe air cover might have been available. Whichever way he went, he would need to find a way past the Home Fleet.
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  123. Certainly, Bismarck was difficult to sink, but she was comparatively easy to disable. On 27 May she was reduced from a warship to a hulk in the first twenty minutes of the action. For the remaining 70 minutes, Rodney & KGV were effectively firing at a large gunnery practice target.
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  124.  @localbod  There may have been an excuse for Lutjens' excessive use of radio. HMS Suffolk had a more advanced radar ( Type 284) and, after she had actually lost contact with Bismarck, it is possible that the impulses from this radar was still being detected aboard Bismarck, but not in sufficient strength to be received back in HMS Suffolk. Lutjens had already been alarmed to discover that British radar was better than he had been led to believe, and may have credited it with greater effectiveness than it really had.
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  125.  @charlesjames9828  There were 115 survivors from Bismarck, 110 of which were picked up by HMS Dorsetshire & HMS Maori. 'Yes I do know what I am talking about.' Would you care to re-assess that comment, as it is not correct.
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  126. There were only three survivors from HMS Hood. You don't seem to know what you are writing about.
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  127. You were right to use the singular 'warship.' That was about the sum total of the operational German navy after Norway. A Luftwaffe umbrella would have been interesting. Presumably consisting of the same crews who, untrained in anti-shipping operations, had recently failed at Dunkirk?
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  128. The damage was far far greater than that : The fatal torpedo hit the steering area of Bismarck. The full fury of the detonation was vented into the ship and against the shell and rudders. The steering capability of the ship was destroyed. The transient whipping response caused by this torpedo hit was stunning. The hull, according to survivors, acted like a springboard, and severe structural damage was sustained in the stern structure. The steering gear complex, encased in 150 mm thick armor, was rather rigid in comparison to the 10 meter long canoe-shaped stern. The unarmored stern structure vibrated at a different frequency than the main hull just ahead of it. Tears were opened in the side shell and bulkheads adjacent to the damaged area. The two decks in the stern were wrecked by the force of the explosion, and equipment in the quarterdeck area was seriously damaged as the explosion expanded upward. Seaman Helmut Behnke, who was sent to check on the smoke-making machinery and its piping found it completely destroyed. Evidence of the severity of damage can be seen in the videotapes of the stern area of the wreck. The remaining platform decks are badly twisted and the upper portions of the damage can be barely seen just above the sediments. The rudders were jammed at a position of 12 degrees to port, as the ship was in the process of turning to evade a port side torpedo attack when she was struck. Herculean efforts by the damage control teams could not correct this situation as they were unable to enter the steering compartments. Immediately after the torpedo hit Bismarck commenced turning in circles, out of control. Once speed was reduced, the ship inexorably assumed a course to the northwest, directly towards her pursuers, as the intensity of the storm increased. Attempts to vary the propeller revolutions on the three shafts, ordered by the leader of the damage control team, Commander Hans Oels, failed to counter the effects of the jammed rudder. With British destroyers now closing to attempt torpedo attacks, Bismarck began a night gunfire action which prevented any further damage-control efforts aft. Stormy conditions, darkness, and gun blast from turrets Caesar and Dora prevented damage control teams from assembling at the stern to try to access the steering gear compartments and repair the damage. Divers reported to Commander Oels, the Executive Officer, that they were unable to enter because of surging water within the after steering gear rooms. One of the divers had to abandon his attempt after his air hose became ensnared in damaged structure, cutting off his air supply. Josef Statz overheard Commander Oels say to the exhausted divers when they entered Damage Control Center: "Only if we had the diving apparatus issued to submariners." It is believed that part of the stern collapsed onto the rudders, as happened with the Prinz Eugen and armored cruiser Lützow, or was damaged in such a way that it was impossible to steer the ship by either manual or mechanical means. It would have been necessary to cut away structure which was covered by surging water. In any event, the repair of such damage was beyond the capability and material provided aboard the Bismarck, even if weather and battle conditions had been more favourable. The stern structure was massively damaged and eventually failed. There is remarkable similarity between the Bismarck damage and a similar torpedo hit on the stern of Prinz Eugen on 23 February 1942. Dr. Erwin Strohbusch, who directed the repairs of this heavy cruiser in Norway, wrote that this incident, and an earlier one on the armored cruiser Lützow, whose stern also collapsed from a torpedo hit, indicated a structural flaw in the stern design of German armored ships, heavy cruisers, and battleships. Improvements were made to the stern structures of Admiral Hipper, Lützow, Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer and Scharnhorst during 1942-1943.
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  129.  @thehorsecockexpress1068  It didn't do well. Bismarck sank a ship even more outdated than she was, although Hood had at least the excuse of being twenty rather than three years old. That doesn't alter the fact that, compared to the British Nelsons and King George Vs, the US North Carolinas, and the Italian Littorios, she was an obsolete design.
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  130. The claim of the 'Black Flag' was first made in the year 2008 or thereabouts by someone who told an author that he had been told that by his late father, who served aboard HMS Rodney. Moreover, why a 'Black Flag', whicn in naval history has always been symbolic of 'no quarter? The oinly occaion U boats, for example, used a black flag was in May, 1945, when ordered by Doenitz to surface and fly one to notify the allies of their surrender. 'With so many British ships around it was doubtful that any U-boat would have attacked.' Why is it doubtful? Dorsetshire (not Dorcester, by the way) was a big fat heavy cruiser, with a crew of around 700. A tempting target for any U-boat commander, few of whom were known for their chivalrous, kind. approach to their job.
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  131. Yes, the outcome would have been different. Prinz Eugen would have been sunk as well.
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  132.  @malcolmtaylor518  I agree that POW should have led. More relevantly, Tovey thought the same, and subsequently wrote that he had considered signalling this to Holland. Indeed, he was to say that, to the end of his days, he regretted not so doing, deciding instead to leave tactical decisions to the man on the spot. Whether Holland, brought up on the traditions of the Royal Navy, would have so acted will, of course, never be known. Holland did intend that Wake-Walker's squadron should engage Prinz Eugen, but the reality was that the battle was over before any such action could be taken. The idea of holding back until Tovey's two capital ships arrived seems eminently sensible in retrospect, but at the time Holland felt that his two ships, supported by Norfolk, Suffolk, and his destroyers, when they arrived, were sufficient to engage successfully. In short, I believe that Napoleon's question concerning a general ( is he lucky?) could have been applied to Holland. He did little wrong, but on 24 May, the fates conspired against him. I hope that the following, which is a condensed version of the action, explains why I say this :- As Holland approached Bismarck, he was receiving regular reports from Suffolk & Norfolk. By maintaining his course and speed, he could have crossed 60 miles ahead of her track at around 0230. This, however, would have meant undertaking a night action. Therefore, Holland, at 0012, altered course to slightly west of north, and reduced speed to 25 knots, his intention being to meet the German force more or less head on at around 0200. This would have left Bismarck silhouetted against the afterglow, whilst Hood's squadron would have been approaching at a combined speed of 50 knots, from an unexpected direction. This would have minimised the time during which Hood was at her most vulnerable. This intention was signalled to Leach in POW. Unfortunately, Suffolk temporarily lost contact around 0028, and only regained it at around 0300. During this period, obviously unknown to Holland, the German force had altered course to the west to follow the Greenland ice belt. As a result, Holland lost the bold, head on, approach he sought, and was now obliged to approach from a much wider angle, greatly increasing the period during which Hood's weaknesses were exposed. The rest, as they say, is history.
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  133. Would you therefore argue that the Royal Navy in May, 1941 should not have attempted to engage Bismarck, but should instead have allowed the German task force out into the Atlantic?
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  134. What controversy? Prince of Wales, despite being far from being fully worked up, succeeded in damaging Bismarck sufficiently to force the abandonment of her commerce raiding mission. A ship is, by the way, an inanimate object. How it performs depends entirely on the actions of the human beings controlling it. After the Bismarck had been sunk, Churchill did briefly suggest having Leach court-martialled for his actions, until being swiftly disabused of the notion by Tovey, who said that Leach (and, therefore, his ship) had acted correctly. In the event of any court-martial, Tovey said that he would attend as Prisoner's Friend. Churchill immediately dropped the idea. Phillips' actions were intended to intercept a Japanese invasion convoy, perhaps destroying a Japanese cruiser squadron in the process. What alternatives would you suggest he could have pursued?
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  135.  @jessejamesroy0069  You appear to have a lot of 'would haves' in your comment. Firstly, Tirpitz did not become operational for another seven months, by which time the RN had another KGV in commission, and, if Bismarck was still above water, were unlikely to have sent PoW east. Rodney, in addition, would be back from her US refit. How do you know that Tirpitz 'would have' fought off a Swordfish attack any more effectively than Bismarck did(n't)? Which submarines would come to Bismarck's aid? In may, 1941, there were only two anywhere near her. U-Boats generally were used against merchant shipping as part of a trade war. 'Innocent men?' They were the crew of a warship in wartime, on a mission to attack and destroy merchant shipping. 'Unfortunate' perhaps. Defeated ships in naval battles do tend to be sunk, and the crews suffer as a result. What else would you have had Tovey do? Give the Bismarck a stern talking to, and send her on her way with her tail between her legs?
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  136. The problem was in the complexity of the four gun turret.
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  137.  @bobcougar77  I am not arguing. I am simply pointing out that Bismarck wasn't actually amazing in any sense at all. Sorry if I have upset you.
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  138.  @bobcougar77  The fact that Bismarck was reduced to a floating target so quickly resulted in Tovey's ships closing on her and losing the effectiveness of plunging shellfire. Simple as that.
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  139. Not really, when after about 20 minutes Bismarck had been reduced from a warship to little more than a gunnery target. Other ships put up far stouter actual resistance.
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  140. None. The Bismarck was intercepted and destroyed by the Home Fleet. Western Approaches escort forces, mainly older destroyers, sloops, & corvettes, were not involved. Dorsetshire, and Vian's destroyer flotilla, were withdrawn from their escort duties, but neither convoy suffered any losses as a result.
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  141. I believe that Ludovic Kennedy expressed the view that it was a courageous decision. The nature of Bismarck's problems were not known to Tovey, and the possibility that repairs might have been carried out during the night must have weighed heavily on his mind.
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  142. Yet when asked, he attributed the sinking of Bismarck to 'the British.'
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  143. I will await a translation of your post into a form of recognisable English before even considering whether to reply.
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  144. Then why comment?
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  145. Why is a successful attack by torpedo aircraft 'lucky?' By the way, there was more damage than just a 'jammed rudder.' There were several compartments flooded and the whole stern section, always a weakness in German warships, compromised.
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  146. Technologically advanced indeed. Outmoded armour design, low angle secondary armament, obsolete 4 x twin main armament, and radar which failed when the guns fired. Truly a marvel!
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  147. I have never quite been able to understand thev reasoning behind the 'scuttling' obsessives. Do they think that a scuttled ship isn't quite so sunk?
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  148. They didn't. The Scharnhorsts had three triple barrelled turrets. The 11 inch calibre of the guns, however, was seriously inadequate. The Bismarcks, despite what their enthusiasts might say, were outdated in design, and had many features which had been discarded by capital ship designers in other countries.
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  149. The Germans commissioned 1113 U-Boats in WW2, and never came close to victory at sea, In WW1 they, in 1917, they came much closer. In WW1, they commissioned 346.
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  150.  @SolTerran5050  No.The consolation was that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were unable to break into the wider Atlantic, making them much more difficult to chase down, and ensuring that supply convoys were not threatened by them. Hood, by the way, was an aging ship, which would have received a major reconstruction along the lines of Renown had war not commenced. There was a degree of affection for her, but her shortcomings were well known within the Navy. She was, however, one of only four capital ships available to Admiral Tovey with the speed to catch Bismarck, and, as there were two exit points into the Wider Atlantic, Tovey positioned two in each of them.
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  151.  @SolTerran5050  Although Prince of Wales, despite being at best semi-operational, inflicted sufficient damage on Bismarck to oblige Admiral Lutjens to abandon his operation and run for St.Nazaire.
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  152.  @SolTerran5050  Clearly not enough, or Bismarck would not be where she is today.
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  153. Perhaps you are unaware of Rodney's gunnery on 27 May, reducing Bismarck from a battleship to a helpless target in around 20 minutes?
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  154. Yes, it is easy to say something like this 80 years after the event. British warships at sea did not carry things such as mines or unspecified 'hazards' and if you think a U-Boat commander would forego the possibility of receiving a Knight's Cross by refraining from torpedoing a heavy cruiser, then you are much mistaken.
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  155. von Mullenheim-Rechberg says that a survivor saw Lindemann walk forward from in front of A turret onto the stem of Bismarck as she turned over and sank, although he did not see this himself.
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  156. Because she intially fired on Prinz Eugen, but shifted target to Bismarck.
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  157.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Don't be too dismissive. At least the little chap has worked out how to use his keyboard without having to ask his carers for help.
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  158. It seems to be inspired by the strange perception of some folk that a scuttled ship is not quite so sunk, and, therefore, not quite so defeated.
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  159. Yes. The British referred to Hood as a battlecruiser because of her speed, even though her armour was on a par with that of her battleship contemporaries.
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  160. To use your technical academic term, 'I never heard a bigger bunch of bull shit in all my life' as the contents of your posts. Have you thought of either getting help, or even talking to an adult?
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  161. Largely because she was on the outskirts of the blast.
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  162. The 'WW1 Naval Bomber' actually entered service with the Fleet Air Arm in 1936, about 18 months before the Hawker Hurricane entered service with the RAF. It actually sank a greater tonnage of axis shipping than any other type.
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  163.  @daveherman6647  Thank you for your courteous reply. Sadly, rudeness rather than good manners is often the norm on YouTube!
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  164.  @normandong4479  The first two Lions were laid down in February & July, 1939. They would have been in service before the first two projected German 'H' class. All five KGVs were completed by the end of 1942. Moreover, Plan Z was never more than a pipe-dream. When your ultimate enemy is the Soviet Union, transferring raw materials & large numbers of workers to warship construction, at the expense of the army & air force, really wouldn't make sense. Bismarck's 15 inch guns actually fired a lighter weight of broadside than any British capital ship in service in 1941, except for the six gunned Renowns.
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  165.  @markgarin6355  Actually, Sheffield didn't fire on the Swordfish, as they were identified f or what they were. Indeed, several Swordfish, noticing the lack of defensive fire and realising the error, aborted their attacks.
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  166. I don't understand the reference to the British ships. Sheffield's crew knew throughout that the aircraft were Swordfish. As to mis-identification of Sheffield. Ark Royal had been Sheffield's chummy ship for some time, and the Swordfish crews had previously practiced attacks on her. Ludovic Kennedy, a naval officer and later a journalist who was involved in the battle and later wrote a book about it, probably got things about right when he said that, in moments of great stress and in combat, men see what they expect to see. They expected to see Bismarck, and Bismarck was what they say. All sides had similar events during WW2.
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  167. In his defence, it is possible that Suffolk's radar transmissions were still being detected aboard Bismarck, and the Germans didn't know that they were in insufficient strength to return to Suffolk. Lutjens may well have believed that the British cruisers were still in contact. However, British HF/DF skills were impressive, and even without radar they could determine Bismarck's position quite effectively. Another example of Lutjen's amateurishness, like his failure to top up Bismarck's tanks in Norway.
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  168. Nothing. She was dispatched to operate independently against convoys, but, as was common with cruisers of this class, developed engine troubles almost immediately. I suppose that getting to Brest unscathed could be considered an accomplishment?
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  169.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  If you would like to read a series of posts from what appears to be another young lad, I recommend you to have a look at 'Operation Sealion - Actually a Bad idea' and read the posts of one Robert Francis. I have attempted to educate him, but each post gets a little insaner as he goes along. I rarely laugh out loud, but have done so more than once here!
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  170.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Agreed. I have encountered the same individual.
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  171. Great News! My ancient historian mate has just been in touch. You have now reached 102 posts, and he has conceded the second bottle of wine. I did suggest '150 for a case' on a double or quits basis, but he wouldn't rise to the bait, and insists that my 'poking a lunatic with a stick,' as he describes it, should cease at once. Quite why you are unable to accept that only your opinion is the one that matters, and those of others are driven entirely by malice or prejudice, is a mystery to me. Illness perhaps? Still, I wish you all the best for the future, and hope that you eventually recover from whatever condition it is that has assailed you. I will not post again. Delude yourself however you wish about my reasons, even though I have made them plain enough. I do hope that other people stumble upon this correspondence, as I am sure that they will find you immensely entertaining, if not enlightening!
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  172.  @TheDogGeneral  'As I said, this isn't sunday school' No you didn't. You said that your absurd 'Parliamence' was a legitimate word. Now, just as with most of the rest of your rsamblings, you lack the integrity to admit that you could ever be in error.
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  173.  @TheDogGeneral  'it's hardly an invented word' Actually, it is. Unless, of course, you can direct me to any dictionary which defines the meaning. In point of fact, Shakespeare seems to have invented 1,700 or so words still in use in English today. Perhaps you are in the process of inventing the other 4,300?
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  174.  @TheDogGeneral  'Parliamence?' Another invented word? Oh, and Newton's third law states that 'for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.'
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  175.  @TheDogGeneral  The fact that you are unaware that you are writing gibberish even as you do so is perhaps the saddest thing about you. The only thing more tedious than someone who doesn't know what he is talking about is someone who doesn't know that he doesn't know what he is talking about, as you insist upon demonstrating. Don't you have any friends to whom you could ramble?
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  176.  @TheDogGeneral  Gibberish. As Eric Morecambe would have said 'There's No Answer To That!!' As I suspect you wouldn't know, Eric was a great comedian.
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  177.  @TheDogGeneral  'oh I definitely know your age.' No, you definitely do not. 'The battle of the Denmark Strait ended in her death that is the conclusive proof a battleship she was not.' Three days later, Bismarck was sunk. By your logic, does that mean that she was a battlecruiser as well?
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  178.  @TheDogGeneral  What makes you think you know my age? As my opinions are based upon my research and my interpretation of known facts, I am confident about how I might be judged.
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  179.  @TheDogGeneral  Actually, my ancient history Professor friend pointed out that by responding to your obsessions, I am putting myself on the same level as those in the 17th Century who used to visit Bedlam, pay a few pence, and poke the benighted inmates with sticks. I am sure that whatever generated your current inability to reason, or to tolerate any opinion which does not precisely correspond with your own fixation, would make a fascinating case study for a psychiatrist, but it does not much interest me. If any third party has the misfortune to come across this conversation. I will leave the decision as to whose posts are rational, and whose not, to their judgement.
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  180.  @TheDogGeneral  First you complain because I reply, now you winge because I don't. By the way, perhaps you have forgotten, you brought up ABC and what you, in your wisdom, believed he would have thought. Out of interest, he was later to write that, at the Battle of Calabria, he used HMS Warspite 'as a battlecruiser.' ABC evidently operated his assets on the basis of their capabilities, and was not hidebound, as you appear to be, by mere type names. 'And then me and other real historians like Drac and other reasonably minded individuals.' Discounting your own absurd self promotion, would this be the same Drachinifel with whom you previously claimed you disagreed because he had agreed with the identification of Hood as a prototype fast battleship? Please note that I had ceased replying for the same reason that John Tovey ceased fire on 27 May, 1941.
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  181.  @TheDogGeneral  'I never said every Naval historian is wrong, only the ones that would somehow categorically classify a battle cruiser as a fast battleship when they are a third party and are unaffiliated with her construction or her usage.' Which, being interpreted, is simply you saying, 'Naval historians are right, except when they disagree with me.' Can you refer to any such historian who would argue that Hood was simply a battlecruiser, with none of the attributes of a fast battleship? You surely realise that you are simply indulging in the habit of medieval theologians, trying to argue about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin?
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  182.  @TheDogGeneral  'most Naval historians of any worth anything would agree with the stipulation and the facts as they've been presented by the battlecruiser HMS hood is and was a battle cruiser because that is correct and anyone else that says that is a liar like yourself.' You mean like the 'most naval historians' to whom I have referred in earlier posts? I don't recall you quoting any who would disagree wuith my assessment of Hood, as opposed to your peculiar obsessions with definitions.
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  183.  @TheDogGeneral  'we don't need Liars to Sully the reputation of Viscount Andrew Cunningham that would be bad.' I agree. It was disgraceful of you to put false words, or false claims, into his mouth.
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  184.  @TheDogGeneral  'you have repeatedly failed at every instance to put forth any evidence that would go against Hood status as a battle cruiser.' Apart from quoting statistics, statements from Admiralty records, and the opinion of a number of leading naval historians, you mean?
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  185.  @TheDogGeneral  'and you say wasting your time I am not forcing you to participate you have Thrice said that you would not participate after you were thoroughly defeated and squashed and yet here you are continuing to regurgitate a pseudo narrative a false classification about a historical object the battlecruiser HMS Hood.' True. I should have given up trying to reason with you long ago, but the offer of the bet, a three course meal at a local restaurant, lured me back in. It doesn't actually take long to reply to you in any case, as you are remarkably impervious to either reason, or the opinions of anyone other than your self.
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  186.  @TheDogGeneral  'I believe Viscount Cunningham died in 1960s and if he is career had a longevity that I am aware of that he would probably agree with me ' ABC died in 1963. Putting your opinions into the mouth of a dead man is one of the cheapest forms of deceit.
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  187.  @TheDogGeneral  'you are emotionally invested for your own narrative and ego.' Really? It isn't me who has posted almost 100 times, is it?
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  188.  @TheDogGeneral  Ever heard the old joke about the mother telling her friend about watching her soldier son taking part in a march past through her home city with his Regiment? She was asked if it made her proud. Her reply 'Yes, but I was disappointed by the marching. My lad was the only one in step.' It mush be very stressful, when every other naval historian on earth agrees with me, and you have the onerous burden of being the only person who really knows the truth? Perhaps everyone is out to get you simply because you are better than the rest of we mere mortals?
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  189.  @TheDogGeneral  I doubt he much cares what you think of him. He, however, enjoys reading your ramblings. As to his views on the New World Order, I haven't asked him, as I am currently ploughing through his latest work about Eumenes, which he tells me is influenced by 'Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians.' Written by Edward Anson. He has, in return, promised to read my latest work, dealing with the career of Cunningham of Hyndhope, before it goes off for analysis and publication. As even you might be beginning to grasp. I really am wasting more time on you than you merit.
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  190.  @TheDogGeneral  It doesn't much matter to me as I wrote you off as 'odd' some time ago. However, my Ancient History Professor friend/colleague had been reading your posts with increasing disbelief, and the offer of an extra bottle of wine comes from him.
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  191.  @TheDogGeneral  Five more rambles. Well done you! Try to get to 100, and I will see if I can get another bottle out of my mate. It will lead to a more interesting conversation than his usual, which is his specialist subject, The Wars of the Diadochi ( He lectures in Ancient & Hellenistic History ). He can talk about Eumenes of Cardia for hours. Yet he has the unmitigated gall to call my books & articles on 20th Century Naval Warfare boring!!
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  192.  @TheDogGeneral  Do you remember this post of mine? 'Just out of slight interest, why have you started to drool on about the South Carolinas? What, as my mother used to say, have they to do with the price of fish? p.s. I have an ongoing bet with a friend that I can get you to 50 rants. Please keep it up. There is a restaurant meal at stake! He studied Politics & International Relations at University, by the way. He has found your posts to date quite remarkably entertaining. Please don't fail me now!' Thank you for not failing me. You have reached 56 comments. My mate has acknowledged this, and he will be booking a meal for ourselves and our wives early in the New Year. it will probably cost around £350 to £400. I am looking forward to it. I would also like to thank Sir Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt for designing the first ever fast battleship in the world, and thus sending you off on a series of bizarre and illogical rants. Needless, to say, this will definitely be my last comment. I had intended to stop some time ago had my mate not issued the challenge. Goodbye, mon vieux.
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  193.  @TheDogGeneral  'the Congo class battle Cruisers were augmented and refitted various times throughout their interior's the Japanese did redesignate the battleships 1937 1938.' Indeed, the Japanese reclassified her as a fast battleship, despite her 9 inch belt. Yet you argue that Hood, with a 12 inch belt, must not be termed a fast battleship. Simply because, unlike every real naval historian I have ever met or read, you don't personally like the idea?
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  194.  @TheDogGeneral  'No the nagato's were definitely battleships because again their operators created them to be super dreadnoughts Japan completed them as battleships.' So Hood, with a thicker belt and thicker deck armour, could not have been considered a fast battleship, but must have been a battlecruiser, simply because you lack the imagination to understand her capabilities?
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  195.  @TheDogGeneral  'She was the last completed battle cruiser they did not apply it to her, and none of the fast battleships that came after her used her as a basis or resembled her she sat too low in the water for one thing she was a very wet ship.' Indeed she was a wet ship aft. Of course, you understand why. Her displacement was significantly increased by the addition of extra armour when Tennyson d'Eyncourt redesigned from a conventional batttlecruiser into the first true fast battleship.
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  196.  @TheDogGeneral  Yes, of course they were fast battleships. The separate concepts of the battleship and the battlecruiser no longer existed after the British had built the first fast battleship in the world. Although some have made the claim that the term might have been applied to German battlecruisers from Seydlitz onwards,
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  197.  @TheDogGeneral  Do you regard the North Carolinas, with 12 inch belts and 28 knots, or the Iowas, with 12.1 inch belts and 33 knots, as battlecruisers as well? How about Nagato? 11.8 inch belt & 26.7 knots?
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  198.  @TheDogGeneral  'calling her a fast Battleship that which they never classified as they never referred to her as she predates the term.' Of course Hood predated the term. She was the first one.
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  199.  @TheDogGeneral  The only time that Hood went into action at sea, she did so as a fast battleship, accompanying another fast battleship. Her armour was indeed obsolete by modern standards, hardly surprising since she was 20 years old, but she carried a heavier weight of broadside than Bismarck, and even in 1941 was capable of 28 - 29 knots, faster than the new KGVs. Of course between the wars in exercises she was flagship of the battlecruiser squadron. Why would the Royal Navy hamstring a 30 knot fast battleship by attaching her to a battlefleet with a speed of 21 knots? Even the four Queen Elizabeths, capable of 24-5 knots, operated with the Battlecruiser fleet at Jutland. By your perplexing argument that would presumably have made them battlecruisers also, would it? As I, and a whole host of others, have pointed out, how might a vessel with the armour, and armament, of a battleship, yet also possessing the speed of a battlecruiser, best be termed? As a fast battleship, perhaps? Your irrational denial of reality, in the face of overwhelming disagreement with your opinion from all sides, would be amusing were it not so perplexing. Why does the term obsess you so? Hood was what she was, not what you insist upon trying to make her. By the way, you still haven't said when you trod Hood's quarterdeck. Don't be so shy & retiring!
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  200.  @TheDogGeneral  'Yet the way she was implemented it was not that of a Dreadnought or a battleship as I've said before she participated in battlecruiser activities was privy to the battlecruiser Squadron.' She was flagship of the Battlecruiser Squadron because she had the speed of a battlecruiser. The first occasion upon which the opportunity came to engage an enemy battleship, she was herself used as what she truly was. A fast battleship.
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  201.  @TheDogGeneral  'Siegfried brayer isn't an authority on a British battle cruiser built 6 years before he was born.' Really? Then following that bizarre logic, you must be even less of an authority, unless of course you were born earlier than 1926. 'I can respect that I can respect his own considerations but he doesn't wave his ego like you have on the Queue of a revisionism and says borderline psychotically Hood was a fast Battleship and if you disagree with me you are my enemy.' So, you can respect Dracs. considerations, but not mine, or those of the actual naval historians I have quoted. All of whom, in what passes for your mind, are ignorant, biased, or have agendas. Only you, it seems have ultimate knowledge of HMS Hood. You must find it onerous alone to carry such a great burden, especially when no-one agrees with you. Oh, and by the way :- ' The basic concept of Hood's design began on 8 November, 1915 when the DNC was asked to prepare a new battleship design along the lines of an improved 'Queen Elizabeth.' To this end, Tennyson d'Eyncourt forwarded the following data : (detailed data list followed). After some discussions, rwo more modified versions were adopted, when it was hoped that the best of both worlds would be highly advantageous in perhaps having a very fast battleship rather than a slow battleship and a fast battlecruiser. Work commenced on HMS Hood in May, 1916, but as a result of experience at Jutland it was decided to modify the design to secure increased protection, it having been found possible substantially to improve this by accepting deeper draught and slightly reduced speed. (list of design modifications followed). The revised design, which represented a merger of battleship and battlecruiser chacteristics, constituted what was then a unique combination of offensive power, protection, and speed. It also marked the final abandonment in the Royal Navy of the original battlecruiser concept, embodied in varying degrees in all the preceding classes, in which protection was sacrificed ro an extent which rendered them unfit to engage other capital ships. ( British Battleships, 1919 - 1939, R. A.Burt). Let's see now. A ship with the offensive power and protection of a battleship, yet having the speed of a battlecruiser. Can you think of an alternative term for her? I can. Please tell me what R.A. Burt's agenda is? I look forward to it. By the way, you haven't yet said when you trod Hood's quarterdeck. I assume, from your disparaging remarks about others who didn't, that you must have done.
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  202.  @TheDogGeneral  'Siegfried breyer was affectionately always partial to German warships. I don't know.' No, you clearly don't know. His magnum opus was strictly factual, dealing solely with origins, design, and construction. If you now intend to trash every historian who agrees with me and disagrees with you, you are going to be very busy. 'Germans with their armor in the British emphasizing speed towards the great War culmination German warships have often been considered individually Superior than their British and American counterparts.' Whatever led you to that odd conclusion?
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  203.  @TheDogGeneral  'By early 1918, many people in the Admiralty had been querying the reasons for building the Hood as she did not appear to be a great improvement over the Queen Elizabeth battleship design. These queries were answered by the DNC, who stated that Hood had better protection to her sides & barbettes. Taking this further, he also stated that Hood had better deck protection (over the magazines at 30 degrees descent of shell. Hood had the equivalent of 12 inch thickness of decks), and she had complete underwater tybe protection over her vitals, which was entirely additional to the underwater protection of Queen Elizabeth. As far back as March 16, 1917, it had been noted that, although the 'Admiral'' class were designated battlecruisers, they were as heavily armed and armoured as contemporary British battleships, but with higher speed. In fact, the ships would be more correctly labelled fast battleships. It is sometimes very difficult to classify a warship with any precision. Perhaps the best manner in which to describe Hood would be as a hybrid battleship/battlecruiser, although this is a rather clumsy term.' Maurice Northcott 'Hood - Design & Construction.' Now, I expect you to tell me that Northcott, & Sir Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt, her designer, are not experts on HMS Hood. In fact, in your odd little world, anyone who does not accord with your obsession apparently knows nothing about her either. Are you truly the only person on earth who really knows anything about her? 'she was slower in 1940 then she was in 1920 would you still consider her a fast Battleship if she were doing 20 knots because of deficient machinery.' As Hood was capable of 28-29 knots in 1941, the question is a fatuous one. Moreover, had such a situation existed, then she would simply be an old battleship. 'There is no universally accepted Bible for Naval historians.' You will not find any naval historian who does not acknowledge Breyer as a primary source on the subject. 'As I said, Breyers is of no consequence to me as he was not an authority on her as her Builder's operators and crew certainly were. Did he ever set foot on the battle cruiser HMS Hood ?' I am impressed. When did you board and examine her? Did you meet Captain Kerr & Vice Admiral Holland, and explain their ignorance to them? Perhaps you might try to tell an Ancient Historian not to bother with Edward Gibbin either, as he never even met Diocletian? You must be very old indeed! By the way 'Around 1918, American commanders, including Vice Admiral William Sims, commander of US naval forces in Europe, and Admiral Henry T. Mayo, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, became extremely impressed by Hood, which they described as a "fast battleship.' They advocated that the US Navy develop a fast battleship of its own.' ( "High-Speed Thoroughbreds: The US Navy's Lexington Class Battle Cruiser Designs". Trent Hone, 2011.) 'Royal Navy documents of the period often describe any battleship with a maximum speed over 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph) as a battlecruiser, regardless of the amount of protective armour. For instance, the never-built G3 battlecruiser was classified as such, although it would have been more of a fast battleship than Hood.' Raven, Alan & Roberts, John (1976). British Battleships of World War Two: The Development and Technical History of the Royal Navy's Battleship and Battlecruisers from 1911 to 1946. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
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  204.  @TheDogGeneral  'you can articulate probabilities based on statistical analyzation.' I have not done anything of the sort. I have stated a whole series of facts about Hood's original design, and her subsequent post-Jutland redesign by Tennyson d'Eyncourt. Not 'probabilities' but actual documented facts. Do you consider that, because Lexington & Saratoga were designed as battlecruisers, then they should thereafter have been called battlecruisers thereafter? Indeed, where does your bizarre idee fixe that Hood's redesign and massive uparmouring is irrelevant even come from? Try to understand two indisputable facts about Hood. 1). The Admiralty called her a Battlecruiser. 2). The Admiralty regarded her as a fast battleship. An improved Queen Elizabeth. Unlike you, the between the wars Admiralty had more relevant issues to concern them than nomenclature.
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  205.  @TheDogGeneral Brilliant! Siegfried Breyer, just like everyone else (except you) merely had 'incorrect opinions' and was a 'revisionist.' He died in 2010. Didn't you know that? Moreover, the work to which I referred is almost the Bible, where naval historians are concerned. Indeed, it seems that everyone (other, again, than you) is a revisionist. I wonder if you have ever heard the old joke about the proud mother telling a friend about watching her soldier son marching through her town with his regiment. She said, 'It was very moving. The only thing wrong was that my son was the only one in step.' Perhaps she was thinking of you? I don't think that you actually read my comments at all. Certainly you don't seem able to dispute them, except by chanting like a demented Minah Bird that' 'The Admiralty called her a battlecruiser. Therefore she must have been a Battlecruiser.' The Admiralty called Warrior a frigate. Did that mean that she really had only the capabilities of a frigate? Are you, indeed, even capable of independent thought? You certainly didn't seem able to grasp my explanation of the Denmark Strait action. 'If she were a battleship she would have been referred to as such or modified into such from her original configuration that never occurred is that simple they are all.' How many times? The Admiralty class as designed were battlecruisers. Hood was heavily modified from the original design before construction, into something rather different. Are you really incapable of grasping that simple fact?
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  206.  @TheDogGeneral  'I have watched Drax video, and he puts out compelling facts and scenarios, but you see they are all subjective and based on his opinion.' I thought you wrote earlier that you had been in contact with him, and he confessed his error? Make your mind up. You appear now to argue that any opinon which disagrees with yours must be 'subjective.' Only yours is the true one, and not subjective at all! Actually I, and every other student of the subject, would agree that Hood was CALLED a battlecruiser. Where the vast majority of us would differ is in your refusal to accept that her capabilities when commissioned justified using the term 'fast battleship' for her them. I could quote from a few other authors who agree with Roberts (and, of course, with me) but doubtless you would reject them as 'revisionist' or their opinions as 'subjective.' Here, however, is one such opinion for you to reject, as I know beyond doubt that you will :- 'After she was commissioned in the spring of 1920, she (Hood) was considered the largest warship in the world, and as the most perfect solution of the battleship problem of her age.' Siegfried Breyer, 'Battleships & Battlecruisers, 1905-1970. Would you consider Breyer 'revisionist' or his opinions 'subjective' as well? Put simply, she was something new in capital ship design, and the term for what she truly was had not yet come into general use. Must as the first recognisable battleship, as opposed to ship of the line, HMS Warrior, was described using a term (Armoured Steam Frigate) which totally denied the reality of her capabilities.
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  207.  @TheDogGeneral  Why is, in your terms, a 'simple battlecruiser' any less 'grand' than a battleship? Eapecially since, a few rambles ago, you were claiming that suggesting that Hood was more a fast battleship than a true battlecruiser was an insult to the memory of her crew? 'proof she was not a battleship if she were she should have been able to take a hit right to the magazine and kept on going.' So, by your reasoning, USS Arizona must not have been a battleship, then? Can you name any capital ship which survived a magazine hit?
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  208.  @TheDogGeneral  Permit me to quote from the United States Naval Institute :- 'JOHN ROBERTS is one of the best-known names in the field of warship history, with numerous outstanding technical books to his credit.' I would list all his books, but where you are concerned the effort would be wasted. 'John Roberts seems to overlook that statistical anomaly that the Royal Navy always wanted to enhance HMS Hood.' No, he doesn't. He highlights the fact that her post Jutland re-design by Tennyson d'Eyncourt raised her from the original Admiral class battlecruiser to something new, the first true fast battleship. You are the one obsessed with nomenclature rather than capability. Why does a mere name perplex you so?
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  209.  @TheDogGeneral  'Jutland was the primary instance where the battle cruiser demonstrated poor resilience easily more prone to damage owing to the concession of armor owing to speed.' The three British battlecruisers sunk at Jutland were sunk by other battlecruisers, not by battleships. Not that that is relevant, as the over-riding reason for their loss was David Beatty's insistence on rate of fire, which led to cordite being stored outside the magazines. 'Battlecruiser HMS hoods destruction at the Battle of the Denmark Strait is all the proof overall that historians academics students and enthusiasts need to see for themselves the inferiority of a battle cruiser against a battleship.' Enthusiasts might well believe that, but historians and academics ( I refer you to 'Drachinifel' and his excellent analysis of the probable cause of Hood's destruction - available on video. You should watch it) tend to refer to Hood's age by 1941, as well as her outdated armour layout, as she pre-dated the AoN of the Nelsons and the KGVs. Few, if any, have ever argued that Hood was 'only a battlecruiser' as you seem obsessed with doing.
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  210.  @TheDogGeneral  The fact that Hood was showing her age by 1941 isn't the point at issue. To refer you to the evolving design process which resulted in Hood changing for an 'Admiral' into something new, I refer you to John Roberts' book 'Battlecruisers'. of 1997 :- 'On 5 July, 1997, the DNC submitted two revised designs for the Admiral-class ships. The first was a modification of the previous design with slight increases to the deck, turret, barbette, and funnel uptake armour, one-inch protection for the 5.5-inch ammunition hatches and hoists, and the number of electrical generators increased from four to eight. These changes increased the displacement by 1,250 long tons (1,270 t) and draught by 9 inches (228.6 mm). The second design drastically improved the protection and converted the ships into fast battleships. The vertical armour was generally increased by 50% and the deck protection was slightly thickened as in the first design. These changes would have added another 4,300 long tons (4,369 t) to the original design and increased the draught by 2 feet (0.6 m), but would have cost half a knot in speed. This design would have been equal to the Queen Elizabeths, but 7 knots (13 km/h; 8.1 mph) faster and with much improved torpedo protection, although it was some 13,000 long tons (13,209 t) larger than the older ships. After the DNC submitted the above designs, he was asked to consider variations with triple fifteen-inch turrets, and these were submitted on 20 July. The Admiralty chose the fast battleship design, and Hood was laid down again on 1 September.' I refer you to the last sentence of John Roberts' comments. The fact is, that Hood had evolved from a battlecruiser design, but emerged as something rather different.
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  211.  @TheDogGeneral  You keep drooling on about the South Carolina class battleships. I have never mentioned them, but as tou ask, they were simply first generation dreadnoughts, built in response to HMS Dreadnought, but retaining reciprocating engines rather than Dreadnoughts turbines. Their relevance to the Alaskas (another type which seems to fascinate you) was precisely nil. 'But it was clear that was the future Hood should have been converted into an aircraft carrier just in the instance of the USS Lexington in the USS Saratoga retain her as her battle cruiser was a mistake a mistake.' Again, you demolish you claims that you are an historian. HMS Hood was completed and in commission before the Washington Naval Conference even first met. The resulting agreement restricting the numbers of Capital Ships for each sea power led to the US Navy having two choices, either to scrap the six incomplete Lexingtons or rebuild two as carriers. In the event, of course, they chose the latter option, and scrapped the hulls of the other four. The Royal Navy, faced with similar restrictions, followed a similar path, rebuilding the largely useless Glorious class large light cruisers and continuing the development of their half-sister Furious, all as carriers. Odd that you didn't seem to know that? Had you even heard of the Washington Naval Treaty? You do seem rather fixated on terminology rather than reality. For example, when HMS Warrior & her sister HMS Black Prince were completed, they were without doubt the most powerful warships on earth, and remained so for ten years. Yet, they were officially termed 'Armoured Steam Frigates' which implied inferiority to traditional ships of the line, such as the French 90 gun steam ship of the line 'Napoleon' from the same period. This was, of course, manifestly not the case. Would you serously, had there been conflict between Britain and France in, say, 1866, have happily have sent Napoleon into battle against Warrior simply because she was termed a ship of the line, whereas Warrior was merely a frigate? In short, names don't matter, but capability does.
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  212.  @TheDogGeneral  You didn't actually explain why you began rambling about the South Carolinas and comparing them, for reasons which seem entirely irrational to the Alaskas. I didn't say anyone 'was studying' anything. You have confused the tense I used, much as you have confused much else of what I have written.
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  213.  @TheDogGeneral  'Revisionists such as yourself are a discredit to our profession.' Our profession? I have never worked in law enforcement, as you state that you have done. p.s. 21 to go before I get my meal. Keep it up, sunshine!
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  214. Just out of slight interest, why have you started to drool on about the South Carolinas? What, as my mother used to say, have they to do with the price of fish? p.s. I have an ongoing bet with a friend that I can get you to 50 rants. Please keep it up. There is a restaurant meal at stake! He studied Politics & International Relations at University, by the way. He has found your posts to date quite remarkably entertaining. Please don't fail me now!
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  215.  @TheDogGeneral  Oh dear! It seems you have taken my comment about the Holy Roman Empire seriously. Perhaps the allegation that Americans do not understand the concept of sarcasm is true after all? I did not say that Denmark Strait was a 'victory.' Only that it was instrumental in forcing Lutjens to abort his mission. By the way, if you are confident that you have defeated me, why the need to post seven largely deranged rants in the last 18 hours? Personally, I am content to let anyone who stumbles across this 'conversation' draw their own conclusions about the arguments made. It seems you are unable to do the same, descendant of Duke William!!
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  216.  @TheDogGeneral  You appear to have run out of rants. If you are saying that you don't intend again, then I finally feel able to say that, if you are a real historian, then I am heir to the throne of the Holy Roman Empire.
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  217.  @TheDogGeneral  I don't know why I bother, as you appear to be largely beyond reason, but I recall you claiming to have examined IWM documents about HMS Hood in 2014 or thereabouts. Please look up 'Royal Navy Ships' Covers.' You will find that they are kept in the National Archives at Kew, which actually opened in April, 2003. Aren't facts inconvenient, sometimes? I don't intend to respond to your ravings about what constitutes a battlecruiser as compared to a fast battleship, but I will reply to this :- 'The corrected source of action if I were to go back in time would be to dispatch Prince of Wales Rodney and King George V with a fleet a squadron the fact that they called in a massive contingent task force after his destruction to sink the German battle wagon is proof enough that strategy was valid and viable.' Isn't hindsight wonderful, especially in your case? Actually, there were two credible choke points which needed to be occupied by the Home Fleet to ensure that Lutjens' squadron did not reach the wider Atlantic. These were the Denmark Strait and the Iceland Faroes Gap. During Operation Berlin, Tovey had concentrated his fleet in the latter, but Scharnhorst & Gneisenau had used the Strait. This time Tovey hedged his bets, He had four capital ships available to him with anything like the speed to catch Bismarck. These were, in order of capability, King George V, Hood, Prince of Wales, & Repulse. Rodney was already en route to the US for a refit at Boston Navy Yard, escorting a liner, Britannic. In any case, at 23 knots, she was too slow to keep up with Tovey's other ships. Tovey chose to position in each location a force he deemed capable of dealing with Bismarck. His second & third most effective ships, Hood & the semi-worked up PoW, went to the Strait, whilst his best and weakest, KGV & Repulse, went to the Gap. There were also two heavy cruisers patrolling the Strait, and three light cruisers in the Gap. At the time, no-one thought that these measures were flawed. The Admiralty agreed with Tovey that the measures he had taken were appropriate. By the way, they were, alhough not in the way anyone had expected. After the sinking of Hood, PoW inflicted enough damage on Bismarck to force Lutjens to abandon his mission and make for St. Nazaire. Thus, any threat to the convoys by German surface ships was averted. The rest is history, of course. Now that Bismarck had been located, Tovey could use Force Concentration to bring her to battle, and her destruction was the result. Normally, I am paid to educate people in this manner. You have been lucky, as you haven't even needed to buy one of my books. If you think Hood was not suitable for the task, then take the issue up with the spirit of John Tovey, who wouldn't have agreed, rather than continue to post rants to me. By the way, the Maginot Line was not broken in 1940. The Germans went through the Ardennes instead. Surely an historian of your calibre knew that? 'Your denial of her status as a battle cruiser is affront to the man that served aboard her.' Why? Why would serving aboard a fast battleship rather than a true battlecruiser be considered affronting? Please don't bother posting another rant, which I will probably not bother to read. Just check the facts I have presented above, as clearly you were not previously aware of them. Oh, and you may wish to think about this comment by Paul Adam, Chief Analyst at Cassandra Defence Consulting Ltd (2015–present):- 'For the US the canonical example would be the Iowa-class, which had the same 9 x 16″ guns as previous battleships, the same thickness of armour, but five knots more speed (on a much larger displacement); for the UK, HMS Hood as completed had the same firepower and protection as the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships but, similarly, was a lot faster (but also 50% more displacement) A different metric might be the percentage of the ship’s tonnage devoted to armour: for battlecruisers it tended to be 20–25%, for battleships it was 30–35%. (Hood was 33%, again keeping her as a ‘fast battleship’ rather than ‘battlecruiser’).'
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  218.  @TheDogGeneral  Just one brief comment, as it is clear from the increasing number of rants you feel the need to produce that you are far beyond reasonable debate. The majority of the staff at the Imperial War Museum are not ex Royal Navy. Moreover, British historical records are not kept there, but in the National Archives at Kew. One would have expected a naval historian to have known that, but there we are. I have visited both places in the past year. Once to the IWM, which sadly is now very disappointing, and three times to Kew, for research purposes. You might find the following documents of interest, I know I did :- ADM 1/9209 ADM 1/9210 ADM 1/11726 ADM 267/64 You might also consider a visit to the National Museum of the Royal Navy at Portsmouth? At least it might stop your rants. Who knows? Ever one of them you produce makes you look more crazed than the predecessor.
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  219.  @TheDogGeneral  I didn't make the first reference to the Alaskas, you did. Exactly how referring to them as relevant to HMS Hood is unclear, nor have you made it any more obvious. However, 'when they were operated mentioning any vessel over 25 knots was automatically considered a battle cruiser whether inherent traits were applicable or not serious notwithstanding.' Which is what happened to Hood, the first ever true fast battleship, but called a battlecruiser because of her speed. 'battlecruisers vanished by the time of the second world war there was no new battle cruiser constructed during World War II.' I am surprised that an historian is ignorant of the RN's Renowns, or the IJN's Kongos. By the way, only one battleship was laid down and partly constructed in WW2, HMS Vanguard. Others, such as the Iowas, the South Dakotas, the King George Vs, the Yamatos, the Littorios, and the Richelieus, were ordered and laid down before the war. Moreover, the battlecruiser concept disappeared as a result of technological development, in that more efficient and lighter engines made it possible for large well armoured warships to steam at 27 knots and over. The battlecruiser concept simply evolved into the fast battleship. I have explained the British fleet modernisation policy, and why it was suspended from September, 1939. I regret you find the idea difficult to understand. 'The British royal Navy have retained that designation for her and they never altered her in any significant way during her career.' Yes, they did. She was extensively re-designed after Jutland to enhance her armour, and the ship laid down in September 1916 was rather different from the original concept. Hood 'was completely worn out from overuse showing the flag traveling the world demonstrating British Naval Supremacy and they knew it.' Again, for an historian, you seem to have gaps in your knowledge. Hood undertook one 'Showing the Flag' voyage only, as flagship of the Special Service Squadron in 1924, along with Repulse & a cruiser squadron. 'Hood was utilized throughout the Mediterranean the Atlantic the Pacific Australia I could go on she was present at Mears Al kabeer in France when the French Fleet refused to surrender she took down Pirates and other forms of Raiders as far north as Scandinavia and around the coasts of Africa.' Again, your knowledge is rather lacking. Certainly, Hood was a flagship for much of her career, but her only action other than the Denmark Strait was at Mers el Kebir (I am surprised that you couldn't spell it, by the way), because most of her career was spent in a world largely at peace. Why do you think, by the way, she has only one Battle Honour, Bismarck 1941? I would like to hear about her hunting down pirates, however. Who was her captain? Horatio Hornblower or Jack Aubrey? 'This conversation would be much like your career if that's the case it's going to go nowhere.' You know precisely nothing about my career. Moreover, insults are a poor substitute for argument. I had promised myself that I wouldn't reply, and from now onwards I certainly will not.
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  220.  @TheDogGeneral  Which other fleet actions involved HMS Hood? Of course Hood didn't feature AoN armour. Her design pre-dated the introduction of the concept into the Royal Navy. I have been unable to identify a (living) Admiral Fairfax in RN records. 'HMS Hood should never have been sent after a brand new big gun Dreadnought Battleship that had Superior armor protection and much more modern building quality.' Your alternative being? Tovey had four capital ships capable of catching Bismarck. Two were sent to the Denmark Strait, and two to the Iceland-Faroes Gap. You do appreciate the pressure under which the RN was operating at the time, I hope? Should Bismarck and Prinz Eugen simply have been let out into the wider Atlantic unchallenged? Of course Hood was showing her age. I have already explained the British fleet modernisation policy. The fact is that after September, 1939, a major asset like Hood could simply not be laid up for 18 months to 2 years. The battlecruisers at Jutland were not blown up because their magazines were penetrated, but because David Beatty had placed rate of fire ahead of accuracy, and tacitly encouraged his captains to store cordite outside the magazines. The British also referred to the proposed G3s as battlecruisers, despite their planned armour lay out. The fact is, the definition of a battlecruiser within the RN at the time was based on speed. The Alaskas are not a relevant comparison, but simply red herrings. 'call her a fast Battleship does not give her any justice or credulity for her crew in the families of the men who died.' I met one of Hood's three survivors. I don't think any of our conversation offended, or was disrespectful, to him. For what it is worth, I have a First in Modern History, and am a naval historian with several published articles and books. That doesn't make my opinion any more or less valid than that of anyone else, but it might suggest that I too are rather more knowledgeable than most people 'on this channel.' This is going nowhere. I will not, therefore, respond further.
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  221.  @TheDogGeneral  Bismarck was intended, with Tirpitz, to be the answer to the French Richelieus as part of the Franco-German between-the-wars naval race. The German belief (hope) was that Britain would be neutral. Once that optimistic idea was proven false, the German surface fleet became largely irrelevant, and Operation Rheinubung was a gesture of despair. You are worrying about nomenclature. Hood had the armour of a battleship, the firepower of a battleship, and the speed of a battlecruiser. What is something that looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and walks like a duck? If you did speak to the Curator, what makes you think that was an authority on naval architecture? I simply pointed out that Hood had battleship-level armour when compared to the most modern battleships in the RN at the time of her construction. 'Bismarck should have been utilized in Fleet coordinated action closer to the mainland of Continental Europe with other German warships to throw around.' Which other German ships? Tirpitz was incomplete, and both Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were damaged and in Brest. If you really are an historian, who would you need to consult a Curator, whose knowledge would inevitably be superficial? The writer doth protest too much, methinks.
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  222. But Biasmarck was being used as a 'line of battle' ship when she was sunk. The Germans would, moreover, have found it difficult to form a 'line of battle' with only one operational battleship. Hood was far more a fast battleship than a battlecruiser.After her redesign, her armour was on a par with that of the Queen Elizabeth class battleships. Her 12 inch belt was twice as strong as the belts of the newest conventional battlecruisers, the Renowns. The British had been modernising their battlefleet, with Warspite, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, & Renown having received full modernisation, but in the political climate of the time only felt able to withdraw two capital ships from service at any one time. Hood, as a newer ship, was likely to have been modernised after Malaya, Barham, & Repulse.
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  223. With two battleships and two heavy cruisers in contact, and as Bismarck was a listing, blazing hulk, slowly sinking by the stern, why exactly should Tovey have done that? It was easier to finish Bismarck off with 21 inch cruiser torpedoes than with less powerful 18 inch aerial torpedoes.
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  224.  @DiePinky  You confuse anger with contempt, little chap. You should have said before posting that you were what my American friends call a 'horse's ass.' It would have saved me the trouble of replying.
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  225. Over 1400 lives. Perhaps your life might not be valuable, but theirs were.
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  226. USS Missouri only commissioned in June 1944, and is therefore irrelevant to any discussion of Bismarck, except perhaps as proof of how AA armaments of battleships had improved over three years of war. The 'lucky' torpedo hit was achieved by a Fleet Air Arm which had trained for such a moment for years, and had already done it once before, in the Mediterranean. The more you train, the 'luckier' you get. What have the Java Sea battles got to do with German gunnery skills? By the way, only one, RN (actually RAN) light cruiser was sunk there, and she didn't blow up. If you choose to ignore what Ballard & Mearns have said about Bismarck, that the British sank her, then feel free. As I am sure the Admiralty of May 1941 would have told you, 'If so, it doesn't make her any less sunk.'
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  227.  @randomlyentertaining8287  Which still doesn't alter the fact that she was reduced to impotence in about 20 minutes by a much older ship.
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  228. Tough to sink, but not to cripple. Bismarck had been reduced to a helpless target in about 20 minutes.
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  229. At 0600 hours on 24 May, RODNEY, SOMALI (D6), ESKIMO, TARTAR, MASHONA and the HMT BRITANNIC were in approximate position 56-30N, 16W. Rodney was heading for Boston Navy Yard for a refit. At 1036, Rodney was ordered to leave Britannic with one destroyer, and join the hunt for Bismarck.
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  230. Correct. None were.
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  231.  @patrickvanloo5206  Which is why I wrote 'From 1922'.
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  232. Actually, Tovey ordered 'Speed of Fleet 22 knots.' Rodney was on her way to the US for a refit when she was diverted, and her engines were not in the best of health.'
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  233. Bismarck had the old, outdated, incremental scheme, which the US & Royal navies had long abandoned.
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  234. Yes. Seemingly except when the political leader is the loathsome 'Sir' Tony Blair.
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  235. Modoc began Atlantic ice patrol service with the International Ice Patrol in 1923. For much of the next 18 years, she and another cutter alternated on 15-day patrols off the Grand Banks, using Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Boston as their bases.
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  236. I am not convinced about the torpedo suggestion. There isn't, however, any conclusive evidence.
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  237. Not if you served in a light cruiser after 1940. Safest place to be, although probably very tedious.
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  238.  @rolfnees4622  Although not excusing Lutjens' foolish decision to make a long winded signal, it is possible that impulses from Suffolk's Type 279 were still being detected aboard Bismarck, and consequently Lutjens believed that Wake-Walker's cruisers were still in contact. The idea that the impulses lacked sufficient strength to get back to Suffolk might not have occurred.
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  239.  @rolfnees4622  von Mullenheim-Rechberg didn't mention any of this in his book.
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  240.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Boney used to ask of a General 'but is he lucky?' and I suggest Holland was very unlucky indeed. After successfully, at least in ABC's view) acting as Vice Admiral CS18 at Spartivento, he was promoted to becoms second in command of the Home Fleet, but only joined Hood nine days before she sailed on 21 May. He would have had little time to judge the abilities of his subordinates, especially since his Flag Captain, Ralph Kerr, had himself only joined Hood in mid February. Holland's battle plan at Denmark Strait was to have Hood and Prince of Wales engage Bismarck while Suffolk and Norfolk engaged Prinz Eugen (which, Holland assumed, still steamed behind Bismarck and not ahead of her). He signalled this to John Leach of Prince of Wales but did not radio Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, Commander of CS1, directed Suffolk and Norfolk, for fear of disclosing his location. Instead, Holland hoped to meet the enemy at approximately 02:00. Sunset in this latitude was at 01:51 (ship's clocks were four hours ahead of local time. The intention was that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen would be silhouetted against the sun's afterglow while Hood and Prince of Wales could approach rapidly, unseen in the darkness, to a range close enough not to expose Hood's 3 inch decks to plunging fire from Bismarck. The Germans would not expect an attack from this quarter, giving the British the advantage of surprise. The plan, essentially correct, The plan's depended on Suffolk maintainingunbroken contact with the German ships. However, Suffolk lost contact from 00:28. For 90 minutes, Holland neither sighted the German ships nor received any further news from Norfolk or Suffolk. Reluctantly, Holland ordered Hood and Prince of Wales to turn south-southwest but he detached his destroyers which continued searching to the north. However, the loss of contact should be understood as temporary and tactical only; and not strategic in terms of the tactical outcome. Suffolk lost contact with the enemy force in what was essentially a closed, confined rectangular space; aligned generally northeast (the entrance to the Denmark Strait) to southwest (the exit of the Strait into the Atlantic). The enemy units were firmly constrained by the Greenland ice pack to the north, and the extensive Royal Navy minefield to the south along the coast of Iceland. Given the prior warning of the German sortie, there was ample time for the Royal Navy to place armed reconnaissance at both ends of this narrow alignment. Suffolk and Norfolk were at the eastern entrance to the Strait (where contact was made immediately upon Bismarck's entry). Holland was waiting at the western end as the Bismarck force exited the Strait. The German force, still unaware of Holland's presence, altered course at 0141. Had this not happened, contact would have been made much earlier than it was. However, Just before 03:00, Suffolk regained contact with Bismarck. Hood and Prince of Wales were 30 nm. away, slightly ahead of the Germans. Holland signalled to steer toward the Germans and increased speed to 28 kn. Suffolk's loss of contact had placed the British at a disadvantage. Instead of the swiftly closing head-on approach Holland had envisioned, he would have to converge at a wider angle, much more slowly. This would leave Hood vulnerable to Bismarck's plunging shells for a much longer period. The situation worsened further when, at 03:20, Suffolk reported that the Germans had made a further course alteration to the west, placing the German and British squadrons almost abeam of each other. The rest, as they say, is history. Certainly, Churchill's later criticism of the angle of approach did not take account of the factors above, which were beyond Holland's control. I suggest that one error he made was not to have placed PoW, with her superior armour, in the lead. John Tovey later said the same, and commented that he almost signalled the suggestion, but felt at the time that he ought not to interfere in the plans of so senior a commander. In short, just as Spruance & Fletcher were favoured by good fortune at Midway, so Holland was punished by ill-fortune in the Denmark Strait.
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  241.  @turdferguson2839  No. I am saying that what one individual claimed his late father might have said, after he was no longer around to confirm or deny it is hardly a 'fact.'
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  242.  @alexlupsor5484  I think that, in view of your original post, the suggestion that you mistook a reference to Prince of Wales for one to Hood is perfectly reasonable. Nor is it really an 'objection' but simply an alternative opinion.
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  243.  @alexlupsor5484  'I read it in one of the Quora comments.' Beware of comments on Quora!!
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  244. Whereever did you hear that? Ted Briggs, a survivor on the bridge who heard the conversation of Holland and Captain Kerr, never mentioned anything of the sort. Probably because the suggestion is nonsense, for a host of reasons.
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  245. The plates were damaged by the blast effect of her own guns.
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  246.  @daniellastuart3145  Don't tell me. Tell the person who claims that there was no evidence that a shell from Bismarck exploded in Hood's magazine.
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  247.  @manilajohn0182  Sorry, but how could anyone from Bismarck, or from any British ship, possibly know what brought about Hood's sinking?
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  248. Denmark was occupied by Germany at the time.
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  249.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  I think I read about it first many years ago in a book about the Royal Naval Patrol Service, or 'Harry Tate's Navy.' I wonder if the spuds arrived baked? Most welcome after standing a watch in the North Sea, I suppose.
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  250.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Ever heard of the 'Holman Projector?' I believe it was fitted aboard armed trawlers very early in WW2, and the crews used it to fire potatoes at each other. Apparently, it was intended to project hand grenades into the paths of approaching bombers! Probably pips the UP for the title of 'most useless AA weapon of WW2.'
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  251. The anti-aircraft rockets were called 'Unrotated Projectiles.' If not the most useless anti-aircraft device invented during WW2, they probably came very close. They were installed as an emergency measure, and removed almost as quickly. Secondary armament was 4 inch by the way, just to be pedantic.
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  252.  @grahampahl7100  Not quite. Pound informed Tovey that he wished to court martial Wake-Walker & Leach, on the basis of his interpretation of the Action Reports. There was no actual procedure put in motion, after Tovey said he would haul down his flag and appear as Prisoner's Friend if that happened. It was an unedifying incident, but it doesn't suggest that Wake-Walker & Leach had disobeyed an order.
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  253. No he didn't issue such an order. He signalled Wake-Walker asking what his intentions were regarding PoW re-engaging. A question, not an order. Tovey signalled that he did not wish PoW to re-engage until his own force arrived, and the issue ended there. Pow, by the way, did briefly re-engage later in the day. What Pound did do was set in motion a series of actions which resulted in a major concentration of RN resources against Bismarck.
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  254.  @herby4215  Bismarck displaced around 20,000 tons less than Yamato.
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  255. No. Bismarck wasn't.
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  256. What makes you think the British 'slaughtered' survivors? 'Weren't the British regarded as heroes (along with Churchill) for slaughtering French sailors?' Actually, no. Churchill said it was one of the hardest decisions he ever had to take. The French battlecruisers and large destroyers at Mers el Kebir were far from obsolete, by the way, and the French Armistice/Surrender required that the ships be placed under supervision.
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  257.  @romandecaesar4782  I suspect that you don't actually know much about Bismarck's design.
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  258. The damage was far more than simply a 'bent rudder.' Several compartments had been flooded, and the structure of the whole stern compromised. The sterns of large German WW2 surface warships were seriously flawed in design.
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  259. They didn't. They engaged Bismarck with the elderly Hood & the brand new battleship Prince of Wales. It was essential to the British that Bismarck & Prinz Eugen should not break out into the wider Atlantic, where they would be harder to hunt down and where convoys would be at risk. The Battle of the Denmark Strait ensured that the break out was prevented.
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  260. You mean stayed motionless after a lookout had reported the presence of a U-boat? The first duty of a captain in wartime is to his own ship & crew.
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  261. No. U556 saw Renown & Ark Royal ( Force H). According to Kennedy, Wohlfarth mistook Renown for King George V, which is understandable as their appearances were not dissimilar.
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  262.  @pigpig252  Fair enough.
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  263.  @gymcurry4312  Look up what happened to the crews of Glorious, Ardent, & Acasta on Norway in 1940 before you say that.
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  264. They had major flaws around the stern, as subsequent action damage demonstrated.
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  265.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Ludovic Kennedy, when writing of Ark Royal's Swordfish attacking Sheffield, said that 'in times of great stress, men often see what they expect to see.'
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  266. Prinz Eugen's acoustic team reported hearing torpedoes on three separate occasions, two of which were definitely false. I suspect that the third occasion was equally false as well.
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  267. Tiny correction :-- MODOC, not MADOC. Named after the Modoc tribe.
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  268. What about it? Part of a British destroyer flotilla which attacked Bismarck the night before she was despatched. In fact, the only one not to make a torpedo attack and the only one to lose contact. Doubtless gallant, but also, seeking to exchange 4.7 inch shells with 15 inch ones, extremely foolish and unprofessional.
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  269.  @georgettewolf6743  It was hushed at the time because, in Churchill's words 'The public have had enough bad news for today' and it seems that the facts were overtaken by events, which were certainly occurring thick & fast at the time.
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  270. Not 'technically' but 'actually.'
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  271. Hood & Prince of Wales were sent to the Denmark Strait to prevent Bismarck & Prinz Eugen breaking out into the Atlantic convoy lanes, whilst King George V and Repulse went to the Iceland- Faroes passage to do the same thing. Guess what? Hood & Prince of Wales succeeded, in that the damage inflicted on Bismarck forced her Admiral to abandon his mission and make for France. Tell me, please, how many merchantmen Bismarck & Prinz Eugen sank?
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  272. They did. Ludovic Kennedy believed that he detected Churchill's hand in the issue. When Tovey informed the First Sea Lord, Dudley Pound, that Wake-Walker and Leach acted exactly as he had hoped, and that he would appear at any court-martial as 'Prisoner's Friend,' which meant that he would present the case for the defence, the suggestion was immediate dropped.
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  273.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  In the wise words of The Famous Eccles, of Goon Show fame, 'I like chips with gravy.'
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  274. The radar was no longer functioning after Bismarck's own guns had disabled it when firing at Wake-Walker's cruisers. There was nothing 'State of the Art' about her main armament, her (low angle only) secondary armament, and her inaccurate AA weaponry.
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  275. Isn't it easy to be wise after the eve? Firstly, Hood was as well armoured as many contemporary battleships, secondly, she had the support of a brand new, though not fully functioning, second battleship, and thirdly, the action forced the abandonment of Bismarck's mission.
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  276.  @scabbycatcat4202  Bismarck was no longer capable of maintaining her maximum speed after the hits she had received from Prince of Wales, whereas POW's speed had been unaffected. Thereafter, Bismarck had to reduce to a more economical speed because she could not access the fuel in her forward tanks.
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  277. He apparently once said 'On land I am a hero; at sea I am a coward.' Certainly, he is known to have fretted whenever a big ship was at sea, and, to be polite, his understanding of Sea Power was more than a little lacking.
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  278. You weren't obliged to view it. Or, subsequently, to comment.
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  279.  @decimated550  There are numerous sources. Prinz Eugen's war diary is the primary German one. British ones include the findings of two separate Courts of Enquiry, the testimony of the three survivors, eye witness accounts from British observers on other ships, and sketches made by these observers.
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  280.  @decimated550  Prinz Eugen's War Diary, which is readily available, claims one hit on Hood, around the area of the mainmast, which agrees with reports of survivors from Hood (Ted Briggs & Bob Tilburn) and those of observers in other British ships. Briggs, whose action station was on the bridge, within feet of Captain Kerr and Admiral Holland, also recorded that there was a report of one hit only prior to the fatal explosion. This was the one on the boat deck, to which Holland replied 'Leave it until the ammunition is gone.' Moreover, the fire control position was atop a tripod mast immediately above Briggs' position. Do you not perhaps think that he would have noticed a 15 inch shell exploding in such close proximity? The supposed hit in a 'room' forward is likewise, unsupported by any witness. Prinz Eugen's war diary didn't make any such claim, and neither Briggs, Tilburn, nor Dundas reported it in their evidence at the subsequent enquiry. Moreover, as they were the only survivors, as a simple matter of fact, how would anyone know? Finally, sketches of Hood as she exploded, particularly the one by Captain Leach in Prince of Wales, as presented to the RN Courts of Inquiry, show Hood's fire control position to be intact. Look it up for yourself, it is available on the internet. You have a choice. You can believe a single statement, perhaps added for dramatic effect, on the video, without the source being stated, or you can believe the evidence of eye-witnesses, British & German, of the event itself. Entirely up to you.
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  281.  @decimated550  At 26.00, there is a reference to a hit on Hood's boat deck by Prinz Eugen, which started a fire in ready use AA stores. That is all. Either you are listening to something different, or simply posting nonsense. Whichever, you are totally wrong.
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  282. No shell from Prinz Eugen ever burst 'inside a room where hundreds of British sailors were sheltering.'
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  283. Think so, except for the last r.
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  284. It is called 'Force Concentration' old chap. If you have the biggest navy in the world, wouldn't it be sensible to use a small part of it to ensure victory? The United States Navy demonstrated the same principle rather well at Leyte Gulf. As Nelson remarked 'Only numbers can annihilate.'
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  285. ?????????
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  286.  @baltulielkungsgunarsmiezis9714  Indeed. But if the person narrating the commentary doesn't have sufficient knowledge to know that 'lootenant' is inaccurate, then how much credibility does the alleged surrender claim he describes have, especially since it is unsubstantiated by any other source? Frankly, I don't really care, as I don't believe that any such incident took place in any case. You can believe whatever you choose.
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  287.  @baltulielkungsgunarsmiezis9714  Except in the video we are told that a sailor aboard HMS Rodney made the comment to his Gunnery Officer. No Americans involved.
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  288.  @baltulielkungsgunarsmiezis9714  Believe me, no one in the Royal Navy, to this day, would refer to his officer as a Lootenant. Moreover, the event being spoken about occurred in May 1941. I really don't know what you are arguing about, especially since it really doesn't have anything to do with alleged attempts by members of Bismarck's crew to surrender.
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  289.  @baltulielkungsgunarsmiezis9714  Not quite. Lootenant is the American pronunciation, Leftenant is the British one. No-one in the Royal Navy would ever use the word Lootenant with reference to a British officer. Just goes to show that people shouldn't believe unquestioningly everything that is said in a video.
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  290.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  I must confess that I sent a copy of the whole thing to my daughter, who has an MSc in Psychology and works in the field. Her response was 'And I used to think that you were 'Strange!!'
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  291. It has actually been mentioned in almost every book written about Operation Rheinubung. Have you never read Ludovic Kennedy's account, for example?
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  292. The one which operated as part of Vian's flotilla? What about it?
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  293. Assuming that one could even have operated aircraft in the kind of seas which prevailed during the Bismarck Operation.
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  294.  @steriskyline4470  If I were you, I wouldn't waste any further time on this sad clown with his strange references to 'torpedo turrets'.
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  295.  @Daz-ty6bo  The photograph is clear enough. As we say in the UK, 'You should have gone to Specsavers!' Tell you what, sonny. Find me one naval writer who agrees with you that Bismarck carried torpedo tubes (not 'turrets' by the way). I await with eager anticipation.
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  296. Bismarck did not have torpedoes. Tirpitz was later fitted with two sets of tubes, salvaged from a sunken German destroyer.
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  297. True. The number of people who think that the torpedo hit only damaged the rudder truly amazes me. Several compartments were flooded, and the whole of the stern badly compromised.
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  298.  @acosorimaxconto5610  Nelson made the comment on October 6, 1805, in a letter to George Rose. The point he was making was about the concentration of force in order to bring about complete victory, which is what the British did against Bismarck, and of which you seem to disapprove, and what the US Navy did at Leyte Gulf, of which, oddly, you have made no such disparaging comments. If by 'armchair admiral' you refer to the fact that I am an author on naval matters and have a First in History, then thank you for the compliment.
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  299. Firstly, what part of Nelson's maxim that 'only numbers can annihilate' is beyond your grasp? It you have plenty of naval assets, then you should use them. The United States' Navy did something similar, when they concentrated around 300 ships, including 34 carriers and 12 battleships, against a Japanese force of 67 ships, including 4 carriers, two hybrid carrier/battleships, and 7 battleships, at Leyte Gulf, and more or less annihilated it. What would you have done had you been the Americans? Sent around 230 of your ships away to be more sporting about things? Secondly, would you care to list the 25 British capital ships involved in the action.
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  300. How could U-boats with a surface speed of 17 knots possibly have accompanied two fast warships capable of almost 30?
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  301. The flagship of the Home Fleet, HMS King George V, with the invaluable assistance of HMS Rodney. The Swordfish wntered service in the mif 1930s and was still in service in May, 1945, by the way.
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  302. 'The question has been asked as to why Admiral Lütjens on board the Bismarck didn't order his ship to return to Germany?' He did, immediately, making for St. Nazaire for dry-docking, Prinz Eugen was detached in the hope that she could operate independently as a lone raider, in order to salvage at least something of the operation. The loss of fuel, by the way, was a result of hits from Prince of Wales, not from attacks by Victorious' aircraft. How do you suggest reaching a German port might have been easier?
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  303. Surely, battleships should be about rather more than simply being difficult to sink? In her last engagement, Bismarck inflicted no damage on any British ship, and had herself been reduced to a mere gunnery target in abour 20 minutes.
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  304. No-one, I suggest.
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  305.  @geoffbarney5914  USS South Dakota came off fairly well when a power failure and an ill-considered turn silhouetted the ship to Japanese fire off Guadalcanal. The ship was extensively hit by common, HE, and AP shells in the superstructure, most of which passed through while causing relatively little damage. She remained fully operational, whereas Bismarck lost her main armament, her bridge and command staff, and most of her internal communications, in 20 minutes, largely to a fifteen year old battleship.
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  306. Lutjens commanded the Squadron (Bismarck & Prinz Eugen) and determined how the operation should proceed. He was the one who made the decision to abandon it and make for St. Nazaire after Bismarck was damaged by Prince of Wales. The portrayal is a little unfair, as Lutjens doesn't seem to have been a particularly hard line nazi, and his signals after the Denmark Strait action suggest the opposite of overconfidence. He had previously commanded Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in a successful raid into the Atlantic (Operation Berlin) but he made two significant errors with Bismarck. Firstly, excessive use of the radio, enabling British HF/DF stations to locate her, and secondly, possibly more important, failing to top up his fuel tanks when in Bergen.
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  307. The British had considerable experience of attacks by torpedo aircraft in the Mediterranean, and had handled them effectively. A fighter squadron, 453, had been allocated to provide Air Defence for Force Z, but failed to arrive when needed. Whether the failure to call for it was Phillips' fault, or whether he was let down by his Chief of Staff in Singapore, Palliser, has been the subject of considerable debate ever since.
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  308. It would have been more difficult, which is why she was engaged in the Denmark Strait.
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  309. I believe that a Klingon Bird of Prey was involved.
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  310. She worked up in the Baltic, but Rheinubung was her first, and of course last, operational mission.
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  311. I believe that they were in action against U124 in December, 1941.
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  312. What? Not true.
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  313. Realistically, the only use the WW2 German surface fleet, like the High Seas Fleet after Jutland, really had was as a nuisance factor, a Fleet in Being, as Tirpitz later became.
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  314.  @youraveragescotsman7119  I think that it is called the Homer Simpson Stratagem. Plug your ears, shout La La La very loudly, and all the inconvenient facts simply melt away. Mr. Free The Plane seems to be a master of it.
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  315.  @FriePresse  'i will turn of notifications.' A wise move. When you can't produce counter-arguments, simply put a finger in each ear and shout 'La, La, La' for long enough, and it might all go away. The Homer Simpson technique.
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  316.  @FriePresse  'many belives the corona lie also.' Perhaps, but how is that relevant to anything?
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  317.  @FriePresse  Well, in view of the foolishness of your posts, I believe that many people would deeply appreciate a period of silence on your part.
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  318.  @FriePresse  Do you actually believe that the Luftwaffe did not try very hard at Dunkirk? If so, your are hardly in a position to suggest that other can't think.
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  319.  @FriePresse  If you use 'logic & wisdom' how is it that you don't know who issued the Halt Order? It was actually von Rundstedt, not Hitler, and it was issued in order to prepare the armour for the second stage of the campaign against France. Von Rundstedt feared a second Miracle of the Marne. Hitler agreed with him, firstly because his time in the area in WW1 had told him that the area was difficult for tanks, and secondly because Goering had convinced him that the destruction of the pocket was a job for the Luftwaffe. The order may be read in the War Diary of Army Group A, which is available for anyone to read. Do you seriously suggest that the British were more likely to come to terms with their army safely behind a barrier guarded by the Royal Navy than they would have been with most of it in PoW camps? Your 'logic & wisdom' is somewhat lacking.
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  320. Why? The British wanted to prevent a German breakout into the wider Atlantic, where the German force would be harder to bring to battle. That is precisely what happened. Moreover, in a longer engagement, there would have been two capital ships and two heavy cruisers engaging one capital ship and one heavy cruiser.
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  321. Actually, Lutjens' signals to Berlin said that he was making for St. Nazaire, as it contained the Normandie dry dock, which was the only dry dock on the French coast capable of repairing Brimarck.
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  322. The claim was, apparently, that Bismarck raised a black flag in token of surrender. However, a black flag actually meant nothing of the sort, but symbolised 'no quarter.' Actually, on one occasion, in May, 1945, surviving U-Boats WERE ordered to raise a black flag by Doenitz, to confirm that they were no longer combatants. I suspect that this doubtful claim about Bismarck was based on a misunderstanding of that fact.
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  323. Why do you think sinking an enemy warship in a battle could be considered a war crime? During the Denmark Strait action, Lutjens didn't seek to pursue Prince of Wales firstly because Bismarck had been damaged and was listing, resulting in a reduction in speed. Secondly, for all Lutjens knew, to pursue her could have resulted in Bismarck running into other British heavy ships coming up in support. Wake-Walker's cruiser squadron had a significant speed advantage, and was in no danger. The damage, and the loss of access to the forward fuel tanks, had already convinced Lutjens that he must abandon his commerce-raiding mission, and make for the Normandie dry dock at St. Nazaire for repairs.
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  324. Not really. All it did was give the already demoralised crew one last sleepless night.
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  325. How long do you think German seagoing tugs might have survived when the Royal Navy encountered them?
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  326. @Relentless Bismarck was down by the bows and listing. Her speed after the action was 24 knots, according to Prinz Eugen's war diary. She hadn't the speed to catch PoW. Moreover, Lutjens couldn't risk further damaging hits, and couldn't be sure that other RN capital ships were not also in the vicinity. He had already abandoned his mission, and was hardly likely to get involved in any quixotic adventures.
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  327. @Relentless The British didn't actually need foreign support (unless you consider the Royal Canadian Navy to have been foreign) to fight the Atlantic Convoys through.
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  328. @Relentless Bismarck had been damaged by Prince of Wales, and was down to 24 knots for a time. After the action Lutjens abandoned his mission and made for St. Nazaire. Bismarck sank one elderly RN warship, but was then promptly hunted down and destroyed by others.
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  329. Not true. The first suggestion that anyone aboard Bismarck tried to surrender was made around sixty years after the sinking. Certainly, her senior surviving officer, Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg, never mentioned anything of the sort in his book.
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  330. No. Hood was the only British ship lost.
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  331. Hood was due for modernisation after the work on Queen Elizabeth had been completed but this never happened as the war intervened. Had the refit taken place, she would have emerged looking rather like a four turret KGV class.
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  332.  @gejuje  'Pointless' or not, there have been over 4,600 posts on the subject on this site alone.
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  333. ,'what does it matter who put that wreck on the ocean floor???' It seems to matter a lot to the wehraboos who, to this day, obsess about it.
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  334. What Navy? Bismarck did not commission until early 1941, and Scharnhorst & Gneisenau were being repaired following torpedo damage until November, 1940. Prinz Eugen did not become operational until May, 1941, whilst Graf Spee, Blucher, Karlsruhe, Konigsberg and ten of 22 destroyers had already been sunk, with a 'pocket battleship' and a further cruiser seriously damaged. In fact, in September, 1940, the German surface fleet consisted, in terms of warships actually operational, of one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, a similar number of large torpedo boats, around a dozen S boats, and a small number of minesweepers. By 'landing ships,' do you mean barges towed by tugs?
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  335. 'Modoc' I believe.
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  336. Hood almost certainly didn't launch any torpedoes as she was far out of range. Prinz Eugen's team claimed to have identified torpedoes on three occasions. The second and third were definitely false. The probability is that the first was as well.
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  337. He detached Prinz Eugen to carry out independent commerce raiding after abandoning Bismarck's own mission as a result of the damage she had sustained. Prinz Eugen, of course, promptly developed engine problems and ran for Brest. The Royal Navy abandoned picking up survivors following a report of a U-Boat sighting. Bismarck was known to have been transmitting signals on the U-Boat frequency, which the British took to be homing signals. Stopping a heavy cruiser in wartime in mid-ocean is not wise, and Captain Martin's first duty was to his own ship & crew.
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  338. No, we don't, actually.
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  339. Nonsense, for two obvious reasons.
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  340. Really? What leads you to that erudite conclusion?
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  341. Actually, Surigao Strait was bigger.
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  342. What about her?
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  343. Which Germans were trying to surrender? The first reference to this came in a book by Ian Ballantyne, published in 2011 or thereabouts, and based on a claim by the son of a crewman from HMS Rodney (I think) who had died in 2004. 'And I'm guessing it was rightful fear of more murder.' Are you? Well, you are guessing wrongly, then.
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  344. Then you don't know much about bracketing a target, or about what HMS Rodney did to Bismarck three days later.
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  345.  @Drachinifel  Thanks for the reply. I appreciate the point about the ranges of Piorun's 4.7s compared to her torpedoes, of course. I had always understood that Piorun, although part of the escort of WS8B, had not been part of DF4, and had not previously worked with Vian's ships. Accordingly, I thought that she was operating independently, or at least semi-independently, during the action. Of course, you are right, but it does occur to me that the actions of Plawski, whilst undoubtedly gallant, were perhaps a trifle quixotic? I wonder if, given several hours of darkness ahead of him, he might possibly have manoeuvred into a more favourable attack position? Still, I have never been keen on 'what ifs' and it is easy to make such comments from a comfy chair 80 years later!
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  346. Why would attacking with torpedoes have been any more suicidal than firing a few ineffective 4.7s from close range? The RN ships accompanying Piorun all made torpedo attacks and weren't damaged. Furthermore, they didn't lose contact with Bismarck either.
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  347. Northern Ireland wasn't neutral.
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  348.  @TTTT-oc4eb  None of it true? So, Bismarck didn't have twin guns in four turrets, or low angle 5.9 inch secondaries, or incremental rather than AoN armour, or internal communications that were destroyed at an early stage, as von Mullenheim-Rechberg stated. Or a lighter broadside than any British battleship in service? Which of this isn't true. Actually, I have a First in Modern History, specialising in naval aspects of WW1 & WW2. I have written a number of books and articles on the subject. Put simply, Naval History is what I do. However, feel free to challenge any of the above, mon vieux. Or, at least, to try.
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  349.  @ricoh.3162  'there wasnt a Problem with unprotectet comm or Power cables but dead people cant answer.' Well, von Mullenheim-Rechberg thought that there was, and he was in the best position to know. Communications broke down at a very early stage. The British 16 in never achieved the reliability of the 15 inch, which was classified by the US navy after WW2 as the best capital ship gun of the 20th Century, but it certainly did the job required of it. I refer you to the Bismarck action for further information. As to North Cape, DoY hit Scharnhorst with her first salvo, and 31 of 52 broadsides were straddles. Again, when called upon, 'the worst guns of all modern WW2 Battleships' seem to have done everything required of them. I'm sorry you seem to think that the use of Force Concentration by the British at North Cape was rather unsporting. Perhaps the British had not been informed that, in war, the laws of cricket or the rules of tennis did not apply.
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  350. Well, both Mearns and Ballard attributed Bismarck's sinking to 'The British.' I suggest that they are best placed to know.
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  351.  @williamtyson9503  Why bring up PoW's hits? Because they were the reason Lutjens abandoned his primary mission and made for St. Nazaire. Hood and PoW were in the Denmark Strait in order to prevent a German breakout into the wider Atlantic. Because of PoW's hits, that is what, actually, they did. As there were two British and only one German capital ships present, it was inevitable that one of the RN Ships would not be under heavy fire at the start of the action. PoW, far from battle-ready, was only expected to play a supporting role, and Leach sensibly withdrew after his ship suffered a number of main gun failures, although he did briefly reengage later on the same day. The fact that Hood blew up could hardly be attributed to PoW. I do agree, however, that my phrasing earlier was unfortunate, in that I probably should have written:- 'PoW inflicted more damage on Bismarck than vice versa during the course of the action.'
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  352.  @williamtyson9503  I fail to see the relevance. What is relevant is that PoW's hits on Bismarck were of greater significance than those of Bismarck on PoW.
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  353.  @williamtyson9503  What do you mean? Bismarck engaged PoW after sinking Hood.
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  354. When PoW and Bismarck exchanged shots, PoW inflicted more damage on Bismarck than vice versa.
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  355. The main armament on capital ships was fired by completing an electrical circuit in the gunnery control position. As Ludovic Kennedy explained, this circuit had probably completed at the moment of explosion. 'lions led by donkeys' Why do you think that?
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  356.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  It is in 'Coronel & the Falklands' by Geoffrey Bennett.
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  357. There was a tradition in the Royal Navy that 'we fight the ship, not the men,' which was reflected in the tributes paid to the crews of beaten enemies. In particular, those by Tovey & Fraser in WW2, and Sturdee in WW1. This was reflected in Spee's comment in Valparaiso after the Battle of Coronel. At a dinner given by the German business community, the toast 'Damnation to the British Navy,' was proposed. Spee refused it, and after the rest of the room had sat back down, quietly rose to his feet, raised his glass, and said 'I drink to the memory of a gallant & honourable foe.' People like Raeder & Lutjens had been brought up in this tradition, and their principles permeated the German surface fleet. Doenitz, a more committed nazi, was, however, rather different.
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  358. Only Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were ever operational together. When Bismarck sailed, both were damaged in Brest, and Tirpitz only became available in 1942.
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  359. No, it wasn't. It was disabled by a torpedo bomber dating from 1936, actually one of very few designs capable of even taking off in the existing weather conditions, and then destroyed by naval gunfire.
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  360. Which existing histories actually say that? By the time Ark Royal's aircraft arrived on the morning of 27 May Bismarck was already being pounded by Rodney and King George V. The aircraft, consequently, were recalled, in order that Ark Royal could leave the area, as she was in range of land based bombers. Indeed, she was attacked by one as her aircraft landed back on.
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  361. Three days later, of course, on 27 May, 1941, the British did indeed celebrate. What the man or woman in the street, or even the average hack journalist, might have thought, is irrelevant, given the remarkable level of ignorance displayed, to this very day, by these people.
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  362. Modoc began Atlantic ice patrol service with the International Ice Patrol as early as 1923. For much of the next 18 years, she and another cutter alternated on 15-day patrols off the Grand Banks, using Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Boston as their bases. With the outbreak of WW2, the USCG began rescuing survivors of torpedoed merchantmen as well. Her presence where she was in May, 1941 was totally predictable.
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  363. Jellicoe's ships didn't blow up. Beatty's did, largely because of his insistence on rate of fire above accuracy.
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  364.  @youraveragescotsman7119  Odd how people don't seem to grasp that US carriers in the Pacific were successful because they were at the heart of large task forces, and were heavily protected by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. An aircraft carrier without support was (and, come to that, still is) extremely vulnerable. Something like Graf Zeppelin, with a smallish air group of remarkably unsuitable aircraft, would struggle to protect itself from a well handled destroyer flotilla.
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  365. Most of Hood is missing. What remains could provide little information other than the position of her rudder.
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  366. Raeder was an old fashioned, battleship admiral, who fell for the impossibility that was the Z Plan. Hitler always regarded the Soviet Union as his true enemy, rather than Britain or France, which is why military spending was concentrated on the army & air force. The attack in the west was a pre-emptive strike, intended to neutralise France, after which Hitler was confident that he could come to terms with Britain, leaving him with a free hand in the east.
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  367.  @mandelorean6243  Where did these three 'equal' battleships suddenly come from? Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, both damaged in Brest, or Tirpitz, still undergoing trials in the Baltic? Bismarck was not sunk at night, but in broad daylight.
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  368. Yes. Within three days, Bismarck had been sunk. Thereafter, the German surface fleet in the Atlantic was conspicuous only by being absent from it.
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  369. The damage was far greater than simply the to rudder. Several compartments were flooded and the whole integrity of her stern compromised.
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  370. Actually, the battle resulted in the abandonment of Operation Rheinubung, and the failed attempt by Bismarck to run for St. Nazaire. It ensured that the convoy system would not be threatened by surface raiders again.
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