Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "The Battle of Jutland - Clash of the Titans - Part 3 (Aftermath, Outcome and Lessons)" video.
-
16
-
13
-
11
-
6
-
6
-
There is more to assessing the result of a battle than simply counting the corpses. Was Stalingrad, for example, a German victory? The first part of the battle, between the battlecruisers was undoubtedly a German tactical victory. The second, between the main battlefleets, a British one. The High Seas Fleet didn't so much 'leave the field of battle' as run desperately for the Jade, from which it rarely emerged again.
Strategically, the battle was a British victory. The High Seas Fleet never dared face the Grand Fleet again. Nor, indeed, did Scheer even attempt to challenge the British trawlers and armed merchant cruisers of the Northern Patrol, which systematically starved Germany into collapse & revolution. Instead, he argued for unrestricted submarine warfare, which brought the United States into the war on the allied side.
6
-
5
-
@mattbowden4996 'Each one of the actions your propose risks the isolation and annihilation of the raiding force by either the Grand Fleet on the not inconsiderable number of RN Destroyers and Submarines operating in the Channel.' The RN wasn't operating submarines in the Channel. Why would they? Moreover, if you are now saying that the HSF shouldn't have been risked in situations where destroyers were present, then exactly when would it have been safe to take any action at all?
Furthermore, if you insist on a policy of despair, by which I mean the WW2 Hitler approach of avoiding risk to capital ships or even cruisers, then all you achieve is, at the end of the war, a more or less untouched High Seas Fleet being handed over to the victorious Allies. Which is, of course, exactly what happened. Yes, of course some risk is involved, as it is in any military operation, but if the course of action taken is the one you suggest, which seems to be 'we can't achieve anything so we shouldn't even try' then you simply confirm my conclusion that, in North Sea terms, after Jutland the HSF was an irrelevance. Scheer might just as well have advised the All Highest to decommission his big ships, send the crews & guns to the Western Front and recycle the steel.
The reality of late 1916 was that the Blockade was beginning to bite into civilian morale. The Blockade was maintained by a couple of dozen AMCs and armed trawlers. Are you really saying that nothing could have been attempted against it? Similarly, the Harwich Force consisted of light cruisers and destroyers. Was it really invulnerable to attack?
'Ultimately, it seems to me that you are determined to damn Scheer for not giving the RN the grand battle of annihilation they wanted.' Not at all. I have never argued that he should have sought such a battle, which could only end one way. I am critical of him for his complete inability to come up with any alternative means of using the HSF to contribute to the German war effort. The Japanese, in a similar position in WW2, came up with actions such as Savo Island. Why do you consider it so laudable that the HSF spent the rest of the war avoiding any sort of risk?
As you have labelled my proposals for potential sorties as unreasonable, might I ask what, had you been Scheer, you would have done with the HSF Fleet after Jutland?
5
-
@tomriley5790 The most fascinating thing about the whole High Seas Fleet saga is that, however one might perceive the merits of the cause for which they fought, in two world wars the German armed forces battled determinedly almost to the end against increasingly impossible odds. U-boats, towards the end of both wars, continued to embark on what were increasingly becoming suicide missions, and even the Kriegsmarine surface fleet,, when obliged to fight, did so bravely.
The only significant German force to which this cannot be applied was the High Seas Fleet. After Jutland, almost two & a half years before the end of the war, Scheer consciously chose to keep it safely from harm, and was allowed to act in this manner. Certainly, the fleet sortied twice, barely going out of sight of land and rushing back home at the merest mention of the Grand Fleet. These were sorties in the same sense as, in WW2, an aircraft flying from, for example, Blackpool in the North West of England to Filey in the East of England on a routine training flight was carrying out a 'sortie,' and had about as much relevance to the war effort of the respective countries.
The final irony, of course, was when the High Seas Fleet, after unloading coal, ammunition, & breech blocks in the ports of a defeated Germany in revolution, nobly presented itself at Scapa Flow to be interned, before (to the secret delight of the British & Americans, who were eager to prevent France & Italy demanding some of the better German warships) scuttling itself.
Thus, after Jutland, no daring raids on the Channel (protected by a force of, in the main, pre-dreadnoughts), no dawn swoops on the cruisers and destroyers of Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force, no genuine sorties by fast cruisers and battlecruisers against the auxiliaries imposing the blockade. In short, nothing, apart from Scheer's insistence on unrestricted submarine warfare, which had the triumphant result of bringing the United States into the war on the Allied side.
At what point, I wonder, did Reinhard Scheer conclude that it was quite nice being moored in the Jade estuary, and much to be prepared to going out into that unpleasant North Sea, where nasty people lurked? The inactivity of Tirpitz in WW2 can be justified, in the sense of the classic 'Fleet in Being' preventing Allied capital ships from being deployed more usefully elsewhere. This cannot be applied to the Scheer's antics in WW1.
The Grand Fleet had one main purpose, which was to protect the blockade. Where else could it have been used? The Mediterranean was an Allied pond, with the Austrian & Turkish navies totally outmatched anyway, although the former Goeben & Breslau did show more activity than their former sisters in the Jade, and the Japanese were allies.
The surprising thing, in many ways is that, when Hindenburg became, in effect, military dictator of Germany later in 1916, he did not question why Scheer had been allowed to turn his fleet into an irrelevance, and decide to transfer some of the crews to the army, the guns to the Western Front, and the coal & steel to industry.
Of course, some would say that the above is nothing but British propaganda, I expect.
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
@mattbowden4996 I see. Resorting to insults rather than even trying to make a coherent argument. What previous statement have I backtracked upon?
'Truly, you are an intellectual colossus.' I wouldn't claim that, although I do have a first in modern history, my particular period being the naval war in 1940-41. It brings back half-forgotten memories of my arguments with Professor MRD Foot, my tutor, about the Battle of Britain & Operation Sealion. Foot had been an Intelligence Officer in WW2, knew all about Bletchley Park, and never breathed a word to us about any of it, by the way.
If you can make any sort of rational argument which explains how Operation Albion challenged the Royal Navy in the North Sea, please present it. Wasn't sending a battlecruiser, 10 battleships, 9 cruisers and around 50 torpedo boats into the Baltic against a Russian fleet already deeply involved in revolution rather over-kill? I suppose that sinking one of the two pre-dreadnoughts, and an elderly armoured cruiser, that were still loyal to the pre-bolshevik Russian regime as it collapsed must have seemed something of a success, after the various strikes, anti-war meetings and desertions that the HSF had experienced in 1917, but frankly it rather stands comparison with Operation Zitronella, in September, 1943, when the German navy sent two battleships and nine destroyers to bombard what amounted to a large shed on Spitzbergen.
From my reading of the German reasons behind the WW2 operation, it appears that there was concern within the Kriegsmarine about the state of morale aboard the Tirpitz, and Zitronella was invented to, in effect, give a disaffected crew something to do. Doesn't Operation Albion rather resemble something similar in WW1, although perhaps you might consider it to have been worth the effort, as the effect on civilian morale, as these poor people tucked into their turnip slices in their unheated homes, must have been most uplifting?
Oh, and Operation Albion lasted for around 10 days in October. What did the High Seas Fleet do during the rest of 1917?
4
-
3
-
3
-
@mattbowden4996 'Your initial assertion that the High Seas Fleet August 1916 fleet advance wasn't "serious" is easily disproved.' Indeed? then why haven't you disproved it? Incidentally, I think you will find that what
I actually said was that whether this brief sortie should be considered 'serious' was open to debate. Something you haven't as yet been able to pursue.
You didn't need to remind me, as I already knew about Operation Albion. Perhaps you consider this to have been a triumph on a par with Trafalgar or Midway, but I fear you will be in a minority should this be your view. The relevance to the overall progress of the war, by the way, was minimal, and I ask you to find an historian who thinks that it was.
'Incidentally you also seem to believe that unless a naval operation wins the war single handed then it's unworthy of your notice, which is a ridiculous standard to judge anything by.' Quite. An absurd view, which is why I don't hold it. Indeed, I have been the one suggesting that, after Jutland, Scheer should have undertaken a series of raids against the Royal Navy, as the Japanese did against the US Navy after Midway. You are the one who keeps bleating that this would have entailed risk.
What Red Herrings, by the way? I compared the Spitzbergen raid with Albion because both appear to have been minor operations dreamed up by a German admiralty worried about a collapse in morale following prolonged periods of activity. Can you really not grasp the parallel?
I have already asked you to explain why August, 1916 was serious, but then you post 'so kindly either defend you statement that August 1916 fleet advance was "unserious" and the HSF did nothing of note post 1917 in good faith.' A tricky one, that, as you have already said that 'no one is about to argue that the HSF's forays into the North Sea in 1918 were very serious.' Please feel free to argue with yourself about that one.
By the way, you might wish to consider what the Admiralstab said of the August 'sortie' which was :- 'The sinking of two light cruisers hardly credits the operation as successful. Such sorties might damage the British Fleet, but they will not produce an important, let alone a decisive, result. The stranglehold of the British Blockade has not even been dented, let alone broken.' The report then suggests no further sorties, but the immediate commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare.
3
-
3
-
@mattbowden4996 I think my original post read as follows:-
'The High Seas Fleet did sail twice more, but on the first occasion returned to port when advised that the Grand Fleet was approaching, and on the second occasion returned almost immediately when one of their ships was torpedoed. Whether these can be considered serious sorties is open to debate.' Are you now claiming that the HSF didn't return to port when the approach of the Grand Fleet was reported to Scheer, or that the second 'sortie' was not abandoned when a cruiser was torpedoed? The Moltke incident was much later, in April, 1918, by the way, and therefore irrelevant to the October 'sortie.'
When have I suggested cowardice, by the way?
I know that the HSF fleet managed to find something to do in 1917, but operations again a feeble Russian navy would do nothing to bring about victory on the Western Front, although I don't doubt that reading about such actions would have made the Turnip slices being eaten by the starving and disenchanted German civilian population taste much more palatable.
When did I say that the sole purpose of the HSF was to break the British blockade? I would argue that the prime purpose of the Grand Fleet was to protect the Armed Merchant Cruisers maintaining the Blockade, but that is a different issue.
'What you do think they should have done? Just sailed into the North Sea to be annihilated? What possible good would that have done the German state? Even without considering the potential loss of life, capital ships are expensive national resources that take a significant amount of time to replace.' When did I suggest that? I agree that, as far as the Grand Fleet was concerned, the HSF was utterly outmatched, but other actions could have been taken, possibilities being a raid on the Channel, an attack on the Harwich Force, or a sortie against the AMCs of the Northern Patrol, using battlecruisers and light cruisers.
'You're arguing that Scheer should have wasted his ships and the lives of the men under his command in futile gestures against the Royal Navy. Why would he want to do that? What could he possible gain?' No, I'm not. When did I say that?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
The real mystery is that Scheer seems to have been incapable of devising an alternative strategy which would at least enable his surface fleet to make some sort of relevant contribution to the German war effort. Popping briefly out of port twice, then running home rather than risking a meaningful engagement doesn't really amount to much. How about a raid on the Channel, protected in the main by pre-dreadnoughts, or an attack on the cruisers & destroyers of the Harwich Force, or even a strike by a fast battlecruiser/light cruiser force on the auxiliaries policing the blockade? Sitting comfortably in the Jade estuary, while telling the All Highest that the fleet must not be risked again and that the only answer was unrestricted submarine warfare, wasn't really a credible attitude.
I wonder how Scheer explained the result of his master plan, the entry of the US into the war on the Allied side, to Paul von Hindenburg? Perhaps, echoing the wise words of Britain's greatest military strategist, Captain George Mainwaring, 'typical shabby American trick!'
2
-
2
-
2
-
@brucetucker4847 Just to answer one particular question, the Blockade was enforced by the Northern Patrol, the 10th Cruiser Squadron, of around 24 Armed Merchant Cruisers, later supplemented by armed trawlers, firstly under the command of Rear-Admiral de Chair, and later Rear Admiral Tupper, in turn the Rear-Admiral Commanding Northern Patrol, under the overall command of the Admiral Commanding Orkney & Shetlands.
According to 'The Blockaders' (1980), until disbanded in December, 1917, the Patrol inspected over 13000 ships, and only 642 passed through without being examined. I leave it to you to determine whether a battlecruiser force including such vessels as Moltke ( range 4200 sea miles at 14 knots) or Derfflinger (5600 sea miles at 12 knots), supported by a few of the more modern High Seas Fleet light cruisers, which had similar ranges, could have carried out a raid against these vulnerable, unarmoured ships which were choking Germany to death, had their admiral had the flexibility of mind to plan such an operation.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@JohnSmith-of2gu I think that the all big gun was an inevitability anyway. Even before Tsushima, in 'Jane's Fighting Ships' of October, 1903, the Italian designer Cuniberti had published a paper entitled 'An ideal battleship for the British navy' which proposed a 17000 ton ship armed with 12 x 12 inch guns, and the Japanese Satsuma class, ordered in 1904, had been designed, though not, in the event, built, with such an armament.
1
-
1