Comments by "" (@TraditionalAnglican) on "The Drydock - Episode 043" video.

  1. Steven Li & NMCCW - Actually the blame should be put at the feet of the Naval Torpedo Station Newport, RI who designed & certified the torpedo, along with the crazy idea that US sub commanders were strongly encouraged to “save torpedoes” by only firing the absolute minimum needed to do the job, & were encouraged to return to port with torpedoes on board, until late 1942. Contrast this with Doenitz’s instruction to German sub commanders to fire MORE torpedoes than they thought would be needed, along with the fact that German sub commanders who returned to port with torpedoes on board would often be relieved of command. Gunther Prien fired 9 torpedoes at Royal Oak & Ark Royal in his raid on Scapa Flow, & 11 at “a wall of ships” during the invasion of Norway! He received a Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves, while an American sub commander who had “wasted” torpedoes during the first year of the war in a similar manner probably would have been relieved of command.
    3
  2. ~1:02:00 - “The Germans...” Adm. Doenitz had said in 1938 that he would be able to strangle Britain using “Rudltaktik” if he had a fleet of 240 Type 7 submarines (along with 60 long range Type 9’s). Britain was short of escorts in the first 18 months of the war, & most of those they did have didn’t have effective RADAR. Also, the British weren’t aware of how deep the Type 7 could drive (it could go deeper than 660’, while the Brits thought the limit was 540’) & almost never set their depth charges to detonate deeper than 540’ until Mar., 1941. Using the 80,000 tons of steel that went into the Bismarck & Tirpitz BEFORE Sept., 1939 would’ve enabled the production of at least 110 Type 7’s (more than tripling the number of U-boats available to Doenitz in 9/39. As Britain was brought to the brink of starvation by the few U-boats available to Doenitz in 1940 (& in 1941), one has to conclude that, with the extra 110 U-boats, the German U-boat Blockade of Britain would’ve succeeded in mid-1940...
    3
  3. We say no to pay to win - The highest ranking surviving officer from the Bismarck, Burkard Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg, claimed the scuttling charges went off BEFORE the first of the torpedoes fired by the Dorsetshire hit the ship, but he also said the ship was down by the bows & listing when the charges went off, meaning the Bismarck would’ve sunk anyway - It just would’ve taken an hour or two longer to finish sinking...
    2
  4. alganhar1 - I think it should be noted the ARA General Belgrano was a LIGHT CRUISER built in the 1930’s & NOT a Battleship - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARA_General_Belgrano It should also be noted the USS Indianapolis (CA-35) was split in half & sunk in 12 minutes after being hit by 2 Japanese Torpedoes after delivering “Little Boy” & related components to Tinian - https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/uss-indianapolis
    1
  5. We say no to pay to win - Actually, I’m repeating what Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg said in his book & on numerous other occasions when asked about the sinking of the ship he was serving on when it sank. He, therefore, was not speculating when he describes the sequence of events, & his “speculation” about the actual cause of the sinking of the Bismarck has to be given at least as much weight as anyone else’s simply because he was in a better position (Aft Gunnery Control) to see what was happening on board the ship than anyone else who’s written or commented on the sinking. The British like to say the Torpedoes from the Dorsetshire effectively sent the Bismarck to the bottom, while many Germans like to claim the Bismarck would never had gone down if the crew had not deliberately scuttled it. Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg’s position that the scuttling by the Crew only caused the Bismarck to sink more quickly than it otherwise would have appears to be a “middle course” that settles the dispute between these two POV to the satisfaction of neither, while allowing both sides to “save face”.
    1
  6. Ludger Houtman - HMS Hood wasn’t sunk by only one volley. According to reports, Hood was hit by the Prinz Eugen in a “ready ammunition storage bin” (some reports say the Hood’s torpedo warheads were stored in that bin), & Prinz Eugen had hit Hood al least one other time as well. It also appears Bismarck hit the Hood once before the fatal hit to the aft 15” magazine, & that magazine explosion did most of the damage... https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Hood
    1
  7. Sar Jim - Actually, the Mk 14 was replaced by the Mk 18 during the last 2-1/2 years of WW II.
    1
  8. Sar Jim - I don’t know if it was a “regulation” to be sparing in the use of, & return to port with, torpedoes, but I have read that “wasting torpedoes” (firing extra torpedoes at targets) was discouraged in an introductory video commentary on, “The Submarine Commander’s Handbook,” by Adm. Doenitz (1942), & in some other commentaries on the American Campaign in the Pacific, where our torpedo use “policies” were contrasted with direct instructions from Adm. Doenitz. In fact, it has been claimed by at least one of these books that the encouragement to “save torpedoes” contributed significantly to how long it took for us to see & then solve the profound defects with the Mk 14 Torpedo. Remember, the Germans had largely solved their problems with the G-7e (which were just as bad as our Mk 14 & Mk 18 at the beginning of the war) within 14 months of the beginning of WW 2 (all. German U-boats going on patrol in 1941 had working torpedoes), while American submarines were “sent to war with dummy rifles” (Quote from Gunther Prien’s RANT in May, 1940 after firing 11 torpedoes “at a wall of ships”). I don’t believe the German bureaucrats at their Torpedo Bureau were any better or more responsive than ours were at the Bureau of Ordinance or that Adm. Doenitz was any more persistent on this issue than was Adm. Lockwood... https://www.historynet.com/us-torpedo-troubles-during-world-war-ii.htm
    1
  9. Sar Jim - Thank you for explaining one reason why American skippers were encouraged to be “economical” in their use of torpedoes. Another reason was the marked deficiency in torpedo production by BuOrd’s 3 production facilities - They never produced >23 TOTAL torpedoes/day from Fall, 1941 - Fall, 1942, producing <2,000 torpedoes for submarines in the entirety of 1942. That means that even without the losses from the attack on the Cavite Navy Yard in the Philippines, American submariners would’ve been forced to be “economical in their use of torpedoes”. This FALSE Economy saved a LOT of Japanese ships, lengthened the war in the Pacific & cost the lives of a LOT of American submariners. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_14_torpedo#/media/File%3ATorpedo_production_US_WWII.jpg
    1