Comments by "David Himmelsbach" (@davidhimmelsbach557) on "Waterline Stories" channel.

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  3. That's not it. What engineers don't figure on is compounded equipment failure. Plainly, no-one was checking on the critical valves. They were never engineered to be easy to service in the first place. To top it off, the critical valves didn't have ANY active monitoring. However, when the system really went awry, the SCADA system was over-loaded with alarms. They had never, ever, tested the consequence of compounded alarms. The crew just FREAKED OUT. A similar freak out occurred in 2011 in Japan. Instead of reacting logically, the entire crew freaked out into inactivity. No-one wanted to do the obvious thing: scram the reactors, shut everything down. Instead, 17 minutes rolled on. Even when the wave arrived -- demanded by the laws of physics -- the crew just stood paralyzed. Even the top man wouldn't take responsibility for shutting down the reactors. Even on the Tsunami coast, TEPCO had located its emergency systems within the (low) impact zone. (!!!!) What a design boner. In the entire nation of Japan, no-one had 4160V 60Hz generators mobile enough to rescue the cooling systems. So days rolled by with the atomic reactors never getting their cooling restored -- which is how everything broke down. As a side note, TEPCO could've back-fed the pumps with 50Hz power and at a reduced voltage by hauling common transformers up to the power plants. It just never occurred to them that good-enough beats perfection. No attempt was made to cobble something together. The freak-out had gone national. Even the GE experts failed TEPCO. ( It was a GE-Hitachi system. )
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