Comments by "John Lucas" (@johnlucas8479) on "The REAL Operation Market Garden | BATTLESTORM Documentary | All Episodes" video.
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Common narrative in various comments is that the Nijmegen Bridge was undefended and that if Warren had move directly to the bridge, it would have been captured. Comments rely on the fact that 3 men Weaver Patrol reach the bridge and capture several Germans. Both Zig Boroughs “The 508th Connection” page 246-7 and Christian Bergstrom “Arnhem 1944” page 228 provides a narrative about the 3 men activities at the bridge. However, both sources failed to explain why the rest of the patrol failed to reach the bridge.
Phil Nordyke “Put us down in Hell” is used to explained who is responsible for the delay. Phil does not mention the story of the 3 men but on pages 275-276, he provided a narrative about what happen to the patrol. Following is an extract, on page 276, ”The firing alerted a German machine gun position down the road, which open fire pinning down the patrol. Fifteen members of the patrol were slightly wounded by ricocheting machine gun bullets.”
McManus, John C.. “September Hope” also provides a narrative covering both the 3 men and the patrol. On pages 159-160 is his narrative about what happen to the patrol. “Weaver had also lost touch with his three-man point element, led by Private First Class Joe Atkins, and that was a shame, because after somehow getting separated from the platoon, they had found their way to the bridge. They captured seven Germans who were undoubtedly members of the eighteen-man defense force referred to in the Dutch resistance reports. Atkins and his two friends guarded the prisoners and waited at the southern entrance to the bridge for the rest of the patrol to catch up with them, but they never did. “We decided to pull away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack,” Atkins said. Their German prisoners asked to come with them but, “having no way to guard them,” they told them to stay put. On their way back, Atkins and the other two men promptly got lost themselves. They never hooked up with Weaver and the main group. Once the lieutenant obtained a guide, he resumed the search for the bridge. Before they had even gone a block, they encountered two Germans and captured them. At the end of the next block, a German voice challenged them. One of Weaver’s machine gunners opened fire, killing him. No sooner had the echoes of the shooting died out than they heard a truck approaching. “The men lay flat on the sidewalk, unobserved, and fired with machine guns, BARs, bazooka, and grenades, stopping the truck and setting it afire,” an after-action report stated. Out of the darkness somewhere to the right, they began to take heavy machine gun fire. Bullets ricocheted off the pavement, wounding fifteen of the soldiers. The patrol’s greatest asset, surprise, was gone. They were compromised. They responded with enough fire to disengage and retreat. All of the wounded men were ambulatory. The guide led the patrol through several dark side streets, all the way to the traffic circle, known locally as Keizer Lodewijk Plein, that led to the bridge (nowadays the circle is known as Keizer Traianius Plein). With German strength in Nijmegen clearly building, and his patrol’s presence revealed to the enemy, Weaver decided that there was no sense in moving on the bridge itself. To do so would invite slaughter. His job was reconnaissance, not assault. He gathered up his men and started back to the battalion.”
From both accounts it was the Germans from Henke Kampfgruppen, that stop the patrol from reaching the bridge. So, what time did Henke Kampfgruppen arrived at the Bridge? If we refer to Robert Kershaw “It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944” pages 96-98 we have the following extract.” As news spread in Nijmegen about airborne landings south of the city, Colonel Henke, commanding a spare Fallschirmjaeger Training Regiment staff headquarters, was ordered to co-ordinate the necessary measures to safeguard the two bridges crossing the Waal in Nijmegen. Henke ‘alarmed’ all in situ local forces and took them under command. During the afternoon and early evening of 17 September there were no contacts with enemy units in Nijmegen. SS-Captain Viktor Graebner, the 30-year-old Commander of the Hohenstaufen’s Reconnaissance Battalion, reached Elst, 9km north of Nijmegen, at about 1900 hours. To their relief the approaches to the bridges were already occupied by Henke’s Kampfgruppe. He had probably been briefed by Henke’s men on the Nijmegen bridge that there had not as yet been contact with the enemy. At the same time, at 2000 hours, the 1st Company of the 10SS Reconnaissance Battalion was involved in a heavy exchange of fire on the Arnhem road bridge.”
Tim Lynch, in his book “Operation Market Garden” on page 106 states “That afternoon, Nijmegen had been held by a weak company sized NCO training unit, three infantry companies of 6th Ersatz (Reserve) Battalion of 406th Infantry Division and a company of the Herman Goering Paratroop Training Regiment under Colonel Henke, together with assorted flak crews, railway guards and military policemen. By that evening, the entire garrison numbered fewer than 1000 men.”
It would appear by 1800 hours according to the above source Henke had his men deployed at the bridge.
So, what time would Warren and his men reach the bridge if there was no delay?
According to Phil Nordyke (page 274) states “Lieutenant Colonel Warren 1st Battalion arrived at De Ploeg at around 18.30pm 5 hours after landing.” Which is at least 30 minutes after Henke had is men deployed at the bridge.
Comparing Nordyke to the US Official History The Siegfried Line Campaign, the Official History on page 163 states “Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen a mile and a quarter southeast of the city astride the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway. Colonel Warren was to organize this objective for defense, tying in with the battalion near Hatert and the other near Hotel Berg en Dal, then was to "be prepared to go later." into Nijmegen. The assembly and movement to De Ploeg took approximately three and a half hours.” That into account the 508th landed around 1330 hours the Official History has warren reaching De Ploeg at 1700 hours which is 90 minutes earlier that Nordyke.
Another source that discuss in detail the reason for the delay is Poulussen, R.G.. Lost at Nijmegen: A rethink on operation "Market Garden". On page 75 Poulussen states “around 1400, 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, some three miles away. Around 1600, they arrived there - without German opposition - and dug in. Around 1900, the order to go for the Waal Bridge came. Around 2100, "A" Company finally left and at midnight - ten hours after leaving the drop zone - encountered the first real opposition, in the middle of the city of Nijmegen.”
So Poulussen have Warren arriving at De Ploeg 1 hour earlier than the Official History. Further, Poulussen is claiming that there was a delay of 5 hours, therefore without the delay Warren and his men would have reached Nijmegen around 1900 hours at least 60 minutes after Henke men were deployed at the bridge.
So, when did Warren and his men reached De Ploeg? Because we have 3 sources with 3 different times, so which one is correct. Because it would impact what time Warren could have reach the bridge if there was no delay and level of opposition he would have meet at the bridge.
It would appear if Warren continues to the bridge without stopping at De Ploeg based on the above source he would have found Henke men deployed at the bridge. Its debatable if Warren would have been able to capture the bridge especially the northern end. Remembering that Frost was unable to capture the southern end of Arnhem Bridge.
With the southern end in 82nd hands and northern end of the Arnhem Bridge in British hands. The German may decide to reverse the decision about not destroying the Nijmegen Bridges. If they do destroy the bridges Market Garden is finish.
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Steven this may help answer your question
"There was absolutely no attempt to use airpower in the 9 days of the operation, and what was used was terribly uninformed, and this is the part I stop to think about."
Buckley, John; Preston-Hough, Peter. Operation Market Garden (Wolverhampton Military Studies) (p. 105). Helion and Company.
One further thing hindered CAS during Operation Market Garden: the weather. The weather turned bad almost immediately.37 During the entire operation after the initial drop, the weather was generally rainy and very poor for air operations and CAS. The result was that even when calls did come in for support from one group, squadron, etc., it was frequently impossible to fly the mission. Out of ninety-five requests for CAS the RAF received during Operation Market Garden, fifty were unfulfilled due to weather.
21st Army Group Operation Market Garden Sep 17 to Sept 26
Page 40 XXX Corp Operations 18th Sept.
Section Air Support:
During the whole day the weather was the limiting factor, as it was bad both over airfields and the battlefield, consequently the ground troops did not get the same close and intimate support that they received the previous day. In addition, the ground situation lacked the clarity of the previous day had enable the degree of intimate support already described to be achieved.
Page 44 XXX Corp operations 19th September
Section 21 Ground Support:
Weather was the limiting factor, only 73 sorties were flown
Also appendix R part 3 gives a daily report of the weather.
Steven reason that impacted on airpower was the weather.
Steven very few account including TIK actually discuss the weather condition during Operation Market Garden which gives the impression of lack of air support.
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@davemac1197 Dave clearly the only way we would ever know what was happening in Nijmegen if we were present at the time.
From all my study, research and analysis, and from your latest comment, the picture at Nijmegen is still incomplete.
From 82nd Point of view we are unable due to inconsistent and unreliable information accurately determine the time Warren and his men would have reach the bridge if there was no delay. Also, its clearly from the above comment even if we could determine the time, we do not a clearly picture of German force available to defend the bridge and the approach at any point in time between 1300 and 2000 hours.
Can you objectively prove with 100% certainty if there was no delay the 82nd would have captured both ends of the Bridge. My answer would be NO for reasons mentioned.
If there was no delay when Warren reached the bridge, there are 3 possible outcomes:
1) The German are successful in preventing the 82nd from capturing the bridge. (Historical outcome)
2) The 82nd capture the southern end but like Frost at Arnhem unable to cross the bridge to capture the other end. In this case the Northern end. So how would the Germans react? One opinion is to attempt to recapture the southern end. the second abandon Nijmegen and fortify the northern end of both bridge the northern bank of the river. The last opinion would be to destroy the northern end of both bridges. Clearly Dave the 82nd did all it could so capture the bridge, but the German resistance is the reason for the failure to capture the northern end. The result would be a delay as the Allies force a crossing of the Waal and the possible need to build a bridge.
3) The 82nd are successful in capturing both ends of the bridge. So, when XXX Corp arrive, they could cross immediately. Again, we need to consider how the Germans would respond. Option 1 attempt to recapture the northern end or option 2 during the 18th and morning of the 19th as reinforcement arrive from the north establish a defense line covering the northern exists from both bridges.
Then the question would be can we prove with 100% certainty that XXX Corp could cross the island. My answer would be NO due to the fact XXX Corp failure to reach Arnhem historically due to combination of German resistance and terrain. So, with the Germans have all of the whole of the 18th to prepare their defenses would XXX Corp chance be any better?
In my opinion even if everything when right up to and including Nijmegen Market Garden could still failure.
At the end of the day whether XXX Corp can or cannot cross the island is pure speculation because they no way of proving one way or the other.
Hence, my position no one is responsible for the failure due to number of facts. For example, as Montgomery noted in his memoirs 1) lack of support, 2) weather, 3) location of landing zones in Arnhem and 4) underestimation of German resistance. You could also add lack of aircraft, causing the Market force needing a minimum of 3 lifts to deliver the entire force.
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@davemac1197 Dave
My starting point is how an investigator would review a witness statement. Looking for inconsistency in the statement.
Look at your narrative stopping when Rienhold and Traupal reach the bridge and with a superficial read you would come up with the following sequence of events at the bridge.
1. Atkins arriving
2. As it getting dark Atkin leaves the bridge releasing the prisoners
3. At the same time Gradner and 9th SS Recon arrived
4. Reinhold and Traupel arrive
5. Gradner leaves for Elst and Arnhem.
Also, from the narrative when Traupal Narrative” Traupel asks for a platoon of SPWs to be left behind while there are so few troops to defend the bridge” So the defence of the bridge when Gradner left was a few men and platoon of SPW’s
Knowing that on the 17th September sunset at Nijmegen was 1847 hours, therefore 2. Would have occurred just before 1847 hours and as Atkin was at the bridge for an hour, he arrived around 1747 hours. Therefore, Gradner and the 9 SS Recon arrive around 1847 hour.
However, if you do a deep dive into the narrative, you would realize that there are gaps in the narrative.
1. Narrative “HQ of Kampfgruppe Hencke (Fallschirm-Lehr-Regiment 1 staff commanding mixed reserve troops stationed on the Maas-Waal canal MLR) and Hartung's Fallschirm-AOK Ausbildungstelle (95 staff and 14 officer candidates), both located in the NEBO monastery at De Ploeg, is evacuated.” Question where to? The narrative does not tell us. Would they have been incorporated into the defense of the Bridge? If yes clearly, they would have been at the bridge when Atkins arrived.
2. Narrative “Weaver attempts to reach the bridge well after dark and runs into German resistance in the area of Mariaplein, preventing them from reaching the bridge.” Comment a) Did this event occur before or after Gradner left Nijmegen? If before why would Gradner leave knowing the bridge was weakly held and with reports of US Troops in the town. b) what troops stop Weave at Mariaplein? If they were Gradner, again why would he leave if part of his command was engaged with US Troops. If they were no Gradner men, what units did they belong too. When did they arrive and from which direction and how many men.
The next section relates to the attack by 1st battalion of 508th the key passage is Narrative “The 1st Battalion 508th (minus Adams' patrol) is withdrawn from the city, considering the bridge to be too strongly held.” Comment In the narrative to date the only German defenders were a few men and a platoon of SWP’s. So, were how could this force stop 2 companies of paratroopers? Clearly, additional German troops were in Nijmegen, which are not reported in the narrative. So, the question what unit or units, how many men, and when did they arrive and from what direction?
The last section refers to the first group of reinforcements arriving on the morning of the 18th.
So, Dave as you see the narrative provide is incomplete, with many unanswered questions from a deep dive analysis of the narrative.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
1) included in that section is the following: "Dempsey and Browning were clear as to what they believed would work. Their only choice was cancellation after shutting down air supplies along the front for nearly two weeks, virtually an admission that the Airborne Army couldn’t handle a strategic mission. There was no competing airborne concept."
Market side of the Operation was the airborne side that included both the Air plan (Williams) and the ground side (Browning). "Leaving the bridges for later capture was a fatal idea." That decision would have been made in the case of Nijmegen by either Gavin or Browning in either case Browning approved the decision, The Air Force were not involved in that decision.
"There was no competing airborne concept." Browning would have been involved in the development of the British Airborne concept, the Air Force role would have been the delivery of the Airborne Force to their target areas.
2) On receiving Market Plan on the 15th Montgomery realised that the plan violated of the original intend of the ground commanders (I assuming both Dempsey and Browning) the question is why did he not reject the plan and cancel the Operation. Instead he approved the plan and allowed the operation to proceed. Clearly indicated at he still was confident the Operation as planned will still be successful.
3) Your comment "Monty had no authority or command over 1st Airborne Army." In his memoirs on page 297 in the section about reason Market Garden failed ( you can judge your self how reliable his memoirs are) " The airborne forces at Arnhem was dropped too far away from the vital objective the bridge. It was some hours before they reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered Second Army and I Airborne Corp to arrange that at least one complete parachute brigade was dropped quite close to the bridge, so that it could have captured in a matter of minutes and its defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so."
Clearly from that statement Montgomery believed that he did have the authority.
4) This is a different version of events relating to planning of Market.
Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (pp. 213-214). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.
"The key outcome of the 10 September meeting was the green light for MARKET GARDEN, eventually pencilled in for launch on 17 September. Detailed planning continued from 10 September onwards, but the scale of the operation and the multiple issues to be resolved undermined the plan more and more as the day of MARKET GARDEN approached. Brigadier Charles Richardson, Monty’s chief planning officer, claimed that 21st Army Group staff were simply handed the plan by Browning’s team and told by Montgomery to implement it.12 Perhaps the most debilitating shortcoming proved to be the air-power element of the plan. Although MARKET GARDEN involved a significant airborne element, there had been little immediate air staff involvement in putting the plan together. As problems with the airlift emerged, 21st Army Group staff, determined to make MARKET GARDEN a reality, rode roughshod over a series of related air-based problems, whilst air staff refused to budge on some fundamental aspects of the plan.
Montgomery did not become fully aware of this problem probably until 15 September, by which time it was far too late to change the plan. Insofar as Monty had failed to include the air staff properly in the planning process, this deficiency was self-inflicted and he was paying the price for this approach. Consequently, the input of air staff and any scope for shaping the plan accordingly were limited."
So which version is correct. Who knows and how can we find the events to prove the correct version?
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@johnburns4017 John you are making thinks up.
1) "Comet was not presented to Eisenhower. It was part complete being shelved under planning when circumstances dictated it does not go ahead. Work in progress. Dempsey wanted Wesel. Thinking extended to two jumps over the Rhine, not one. British troops did eventually move through Wesel." John only a single jump was every consider for Market Garden. Yes Dempsey and Browning both preferred Wesel at the target, however Montgomery overrule them in favour of Market Garden. Thinking Extending to two jumps is totally incorrect, I do know your source for that gain, done of the source I read every mention a jump plan.
2) "Half of Williams' troop transport planes were not available to drop troops as they were being used to deliver parcels for US armies running into unimportant territory. But you already know this." Again, that statement is totally false. if you look Operation Market Garden Now and then on page 45 show the organizational strength of Williams command the 9TCC. If you cross reference the Group listed on page 45 to 17th of September lift for each Division (101st page 96, 82nd page 132 and 1st British page 193) you would know that all 14 groups list on page 45 are accounted for. 6 each to 2 US Divisions and 2 1st British. Again, name your source that claims only half of Williams command was allocated to Market Garden. For Operation Comet only 52 US Wing (5 Groups) were allocated to Operation Comet.
3) As to the story of 3 men reaching the bridge, I notice in Zig Boroughs “the 508Th Connection” pages 246-7, he never explains why the rest of the patrol failed to reach the bridge. In Phil Nordyke “Put us Down in Hell” he never mentions the story of the 3 men but on page 275-6 states that the patrol failed to reach the bridge due to enemy resistance. McManus, John C in his book “September Hope” pages 156 to 162 gives a detail account including the story of 3 men reaching the bridge. He also on page 161 - 162
“In fact, they were members of an SS reconnaissance battalion, probably from the 9th SS Panzer Division, and they had traveled from Arnhem to Nijmegen to buttress the bridge defenses. They were arriving just in the nick of time. Unbeknownst to the Americans, they were joining a 750-man Kampfgruppe (roughly analogous to an American battalion) made up of reservists, NCOs, antiaircraft men, and parachute trainees, under a colonel named Henke and named for him. Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge.”
Your claim "A bridge they could have walked on whistling Dixie. Three 82nd 508 men took half the bridge guards but left as no one turned up. " Based on Nordyke and McManus accounts both indicated that the bridge was defended, and from Michael Reynolds 2 SS Panzer Corp page 133 Henke had deployed his force at both ends of the Bridge. Clearly possible if Warren had move earlier of capturing the southern end, the question with Germans at the northern end supported by 88mm and 20mm cannon could Warren have been able to cross the bridge? As Frost was unable to capture the southern end of Arnhem Bridge due to German presentence, do you think Warren would have any better luck?
But you know all this.
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@johnburns4017 Montgomery never what to cancel the operation Market Garden, he cancelled Operation Comet and replaced with Market Garden. From his memoirs
"Ever since the Battle of Normandy had been won my eyes had been fixed on the Rhine and the Ruhr; I knew that we should require all our airborne resources to ensure we got over the Meuse and the Rhine. I had been allotted the First Allied Airborne Corps and on the 3rd September, the day we liberated Brussels, I had asked its commander (General Browning) to come and see me, so that we might discuss the general axis of the thrust towards the Rhine and the best areas in which to drop the airborne divisions. On the 9th September I received information from London that on the previous day the first V2 rockets had landed in England; it was suspected that they came from areas near Rotterdam and Amsterdam and I was asked when I could rope off those general areas. So far as I was concerned that settled the direction of the thrust line of my operations to secure crossings over the Meuse and Rhine; it must be towards Arnhem. Dempsey and Browning came to see me again on the morning of the 10th September to discuss the Arnhem operation; but I knew that the maintenance situation would be the limiting factor in deciding when it could be launched.
In response to the request in my signal three days before, Eisenhower flew to Brussels on the afternoon of the 10th September. Tedder was with him and we had a good talk in Eisenhower's aircraft; he could not get out since he was still very lame. I explained my situation fully. I told him about the V2 rockets which had started to land in England, and from whence they came.
We parted without any clear decision, except that, as I understood it, the “broad front” strategy was to remain in operation. But Eisenhower agreed that 21 Army Group should strike north wards towards Arnhem as early as possible, and he admitted that successful operations in that direction would open up wide possibilities for future action."
No where in his memoirs does Montgomery state 1) He was thinking of cancelling Operation Market Garden or 2) that Eisenhower resurrecting Operation Market Garden.
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@davemac1197
So, Dave your solution is a night landing of Glider and Paratroop on the 17th.
A night drop for the second lifts on a dark moonless night in a middle of a battlefield, you forget that pathfinders and the Eureka system that you are putting your trust in for the second lift was also used for the Normandy Drops where both the British and American airborne forces were widely dispersed. Normandy Drop at least had some moonlight to assist with the Gliders landing and was relatively close to beaches and the Channel. Remember the bulk of the second lift are Gliders, at Arnhem 2nd Lift included 297 Gliders.
Some comments about night operations on a moonless night especially Glider missions
Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 19)
"However, all agreed that the initial airborne assault in OVERLORD would require the protection of darkness, and HUSKY had confirmed earlier opinions that glider missions should not be flown at night except perhaps in fair weather under a full moon. Chances of getting fair weather and a full moon simultaneously for OVERLORD were less than 50 percent. These circumstances explain why responsibility for the initial assault came to rest with the paratroops."
Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 240)
“Whatever the danger from flak, a night mission was virtually out of the question once D-day was set for 17 September, because that date fell at the dark of the moon. Postponement would not help, since on the following nights the moon would not rise until about dawn. Both doctrine and experience warned against attempting airborne missions in total darkness. The warning was reinforced by the fact that the objectives in MARKET, deep in enemy territory, and some 200 miles from the nearest Gee chain, would be much more difficult to locate by radar than those in Normandy had been. “
Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market Garden (pp. 198-199)
"Weather conditions had to be sufficiently fine to allow aircraft to take off, transit to their objectives, deliver their paratroops or gliders, complete return journeys and land safely. Overcast conditions rendered glider operations all but impossible. Tow-rope breakages breakages were a regular occurrence when tug and glider combinations flew through cloud, either because the glider pilot lost sight of the tug and the two aircraft got out of alignment or because, in assuming the recommended position for bad weather conditions, the glider inadvertently passed through the tug’s slipstream. Operations executed in darkness or half-light had largely proved unsuccessful."
So, how successful do you think a night lift would have worked out?
You state "Several authors have rightly criticised the air planners for putting the airmen's needs above that of the airborne troops". I assume you mean the reluctance of the Airmen to fly near Flak. Have you considered that for every plane lost in the first lift reduces the size of the second and third lifts. To maximize the size of the second lift is to minimize the 1st Lift loses.
For Market the total number of sorties need to deliver the Market force was 3,795 with the 1st Lift of 1,525 that each aircraft in the 1st Lift need to fly 2.5 sorties to deliver the entire force. They ideal is 1st Lift 100%, second Lift 80% and the third 70%. If the second lift due to a short turnaround is less than 80% a fourth lift would be required.
The Airmen at the very beginning of plan would need to inform each Divisional Commander his allocation of aircraft for each of the plan lifts to enable their planning to go ahead.
Once, the air plan has been agreed due to short planning time it would not be possible to change the plan without causing disruptions or delays in starting the operation.
Your statement "Gavin was exasperated with the lack of flexibility from Brereton's people - he had to form his divisional plan within the constraints of the LINNET air plan and Brereton was not prepared to make any changes". I assume the change he requested would be for additional aircraft, if that the case for each additional aircraft Gavin receive would either come for 101st or the 1st British Division allocation. As a system analysis you would realize the cascading effects of changes to systems and project timelines. I would like to know your source, I have not read about Gavin asking for some flexibility, he does mention it in his two books.
Do you know how long it takes to turn around a damage aircraft? The amount of time required will depend on the amount of damage. So how can you claim "USAAF did not trust their own airmen and also seemed to think the ground crews would need several hours to turn aircraft around, which seems unnecessarily pessimistic." Of course, undamaged aircraft would be turnaround fairly quickly, the issue how many undamaged aircraft did the USAAF and RAF expected back from the 1st lift.
For Operation Dragoon the first lift H-Hour was 0430 (396 Aircraft for Paratroopers) and 0800 for 75 Gliders and the second 1800 Hours (total 373 Aircraft). Williams was responsible for the Air Plan and he allowed 13 and half Hours between the 2 H-hours to allow for the turnaround of 373 aircraft. Williams would be aware how long it would take to turnaround the 1st Lift.
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@thevillaaston7811 XXX Corps linked up with US 82nd Airborne early in the morning of the third day. Any reasonable person would conclude that XXX Corps would probably have been able to link up with the troops at Arnhem Bridge if Nijmegen City and Bridge bad been in allied hands.
The Villa Aston, your point and those of TIK, John Burns and John Condell that XXX Corp would not have meet any reasonable resistance on the Island. As John Buns states in his comment Also there were few Germans between the two bridges. Which Historically on the 17th may have been correct except for the German Force at the southern end of the Arnhem Bridge and a force in Lent covering the northern exits of the Nijmegen bridges.
As Maj Gen Sosabowski stated “How about the Germans”.
Clearly do disagree with my arguments but I yet to see for You or the others proved any evidence that would prove beyond any reasonable doubt that XXX Corp if it crossed the Nijmegen Bridge on the 19th would have reach Arnhem on the 19th.
TIK in place the entire failure of the Operation on the shoulder of Gen Gavin, I look for any hard evidence he provided to support his claim.
So, I ask myself can a case be constructed to prove either TIK is correct or not.
These are the steps I followed to build the case study.
1. Gathered the following Data from a number of different sources:
a. Time Warren started towards the Bridge (around 1400 Hours)
b. Time Viktor Grabner reached Nijmegen (around 2000 Hours)
c. Size of the force defending the Bridge. Depending on the source the number is either less than 20 of around 750 plus 88mm and 20mm Guns.
d. Study the map of Nijmegen as to likely approaches to the bridge. The options were via the town or the river.
2. Ask the following Question: Could Warren have captured the Bridge on the 17th.
3. Looked at what task Warren needed to undertake and the time he had to complete the task.
So, this is my result which you and the other clearly disagree with and as John Burn states: stop attempting to find silly excuses to exonerate the Americans who screwed the operation up. Each time you do, each time you get slapped down. You do not do yourself any favours.
By the way I was not trying to exonerate Gavin or the American. I was solely attempting to see TIK was correct.
This is what I came up with:
Task Warren need to perform the following tasks within a 6 Hour period (1400 Hour to 2000 Hours) because after 2000 he will need to deal with 9th SS Recon Bat at the northern end of the Bridge.
1. March to the Bridge.
2. Overcome any resistance at the southern end of the Bridge. If TIK is correct about the number of men guarding the bridge the conclusion would be that with a 99% certainty Warren would have capture the southern end of he bridge. If he incorrect then his chances of capturing the south end will depend on the amount of time he has, the approach he takes and how the Germans are deployed.
3. Assuming he is successful in capturing the southern end, he would then need to cross the bridge and overcome any German position at the Northern end. Based on Frost experience at Arnhem where he was unable to cross the bridge due to German Force holding the Southern end. The size and composition are unknown). This is where I started having doubts. Would Warren have any better luck than Frost if the Germans were guarding the northern end of the bridge.
4. If we assume, he is successfully in capturing the northern end his final task would be to prepare defensive position and the question is did he have enough troops to included the village of Lent in those positions.
Then what would the Germans do especially Gradner if the found that the Americans were holding the Bridge. Clearly, we would not known the answer to the question.
Your point about a reason person.
TIK in his presentation makes the point that the inactivity of 82nd on the 18th enable Germans to turn Nijmegen into a fortress.
So, if the 82nd was holding the Bridge clearly the Germans would use those troops that fortify Nijmegen on the 18th to turn the Island into a Fortress. When you look back Historically XXX Corp only reach Elst by the 23rd.
Clearly there are issues with the 82nd communication on the 17th. But the conclusion I reach that as anything is possible in War, I can not see how anyone can prove with 100% certainty that XXX Corp would have reach Arnhem on the 19th if 82nd had capture the bridge.
I am happy if you can highlight any weakness in my process or arguments with the evidence that I have missed.
Back to a reason person can only come to a conclusion based on the information provided. If additional information is provided later that person conclusion would change. Clearly a reasonable person need to be provide with all the fact including possible German reaction if they are expected to made an inform conclusion.
I would agree with your position regarding XXX Corp crossing the Island if I was told there were no Germans on the island. But there were Germans on the island.
As with the Air Plan we must agree to disagree.
I wonder what the Air Plan would have been if Browning and Hollinghurst were in charge of the Planning. I doubt if it would have been much different.
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@thevillaaston7811 My personal position regarding Operation market garden is that no individual is personally responsible for the failure just a combination of factors for example, single road, weather, distance from the objectives and the level of German resistance.
I image the blame game started with TIK in blaming Gavin for the failure. After that each person than started to pass the blame on other individuals based on various decisions made without actual considering the underlying factors behind the particular decision or if any alternative decision was available.
The push for the establishment of the 1st Airborne Army was by the British supported by Gen Marshall and Arnold. (Source Airborne Operations WW2).
The merits of broad front verse a single thrust can be hotly debated, as each approach has benefits and limitations. If you study the eastern front the Russian used both approaches at various times.
The stopping of the Allies was due to supply shortest than Eisenhower decision making. Any advance into Germany would need the port of Antwerp to be operational whether its was a single thrust or Broad front.
You raised a very interesting point "As does Brereton, who devised the airborne plan and over whom Montgomery had no jurisdiction".
The 1AAA was allocated to 21st Army Group for the Operation, therefore theoretical under a normal chain of command Brereton would be reporting to Montgomery in the same way Dempsey. So why did Montgomery have no jurisdiction? Was one of the weakness of the Operation that there was no overall Commander or was the problem the short planning time of only 7 days did not allow for any one exercise the level of command required.
Operation Plunder/Varsity was on the 24th March which was successful, however 2nd March 9th Army requested a surprise crossing of the Rhine was there was little opposition but was vetoed by Montgomery (source Airborne Operation WW2) because of German resistance in 2nd Army Area. What would have been the outcome if Montgomery had said yes.
As to Remagen bridge, yes it was good fortune or luck, point is they take advance of good fortune and some time the difference between success and failure is timing or luck.
Dunkirk would not have occurred if the German High Command did not stop the Panzer Division. A lucky hit sunk the Hood and later a lucky hit by British Swordfish resulted in the sinking of the Bismarck. Luck sometimes plays it part in a battle.
Regarding Hollywood, I do agree with you about U571, although they do acknowledge HMS Bulldog and the British in the credits. I not sure about Saving Private Ryan as I have visited the graves of the 2 brothers the Movie was based on, it may not be 100% accurate. Patton is reasonable accurate as its focus only on what actions Patton was involved in and clearly not a complete record of Patton actions in WW2. I image the sane for British Movies for example "Sound Barrier" are also not 100% accurate. Movies are movies some are good others are bad.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing for Monday morning quarterbacks who also play the prefect game.
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@thevillaaston7811 So TheVilla Aston let see if I got it right.
Operation Plunder/Varsity, Montgomery initiated the Plan, Eisenhower as Land Commander approved the plan, 21st Army Group executed the plan. The outcome was a success, Montgomery received the credit for the success and Eisenhower acknowledge Montgomery success without attempting to claim any credit for its success.
Operation Market Garden, Montgomery initiated the Plan, Eisenhower as Land Commander approved the plan, 21st Army Group executed the plan. The outcome was a failure, who should be responsible, Montgomery or Eisenhower? In you comments and these are your words “If Arnhem had been taken, Eisenhower's name would have been all over the Hollywood films about it. There would not have been mention of Montgomery”. I am interested to know were your evidence to support the statement. Then why didn't Eisenhower name been all over Hollywood about Operation Plunder/Varsity.
I image if Operation market garden was successful, Montgomery would have claimed the credit and Eisenhower would have acknowledge Montgomery success has he did with operation Plunder/Varsity.
The way I see if right your position is Eisenhower as Land Commander was responsible for the failure of Market garden. Therefore, is it logical that as Land Commander Eisenhower not Montgomery be credit with the success of Operation Plunder/Varsity.
The logical position would be who ever was responsible for the failure of Market Garden, should be entitled to the credit of Plunder/Varsity. Or in another way the person wishing to claim the credit for Plunder/Varsity should be held responsible for Market Garden.
You cannot take a position if the Operation was a failure Eisenhower is responsible and if the Operation was a success Montgomery is entitled to the credit.
I support your position about Market Garden that Eisenhower was responsible if you acknowledge that Eisenhower not Montgomery should have received the credit for Plunder/Varsity.
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@lyndoncmp5751 John Hollinghurst was involved with the planning for Operation Comet that included a company landing on the south side. So why the change for Market?
Dr Warren makes the following comment.
"In COMET, however, the decision had been made on the assumption that neither German fighters nor German antiaircraft could do the missions much harm. Intelligence indicated that the Luftwaffe would not be a serious threat to MARKET, but that the flak around Arnhem was much more plentiful than when COMET was conceived and was increasing to the point where it might present a serious threat".
Poles were to there on 19th, based on the assumption the AA positions around the bridge would have been captured or Knock out.
Question if Williams planned for 2 lifts for Operation Dragoon and 2 lifts were planned for Linnet 2, why the change to a single lift. Clearly he had his reasons.
Dr Warren in his book also questions the single lift "by distributing the delivery of the troops over a period of three days, not only put MARKET at the mercy of the weather but also forced the airborne to waste much of their strength in guarding drop or landing zones for the later missions. All concerned would have much preferred to complete the lift in one or two days, but that was easier said than done".
He then raises a number of possible solutions to the problem for example
"The American glider missions could have been completed on D plus 1 by using Horsa gliders or by flying Wacos in double tow, but the Americans had acquired an aversion to the Horsa, and double-tow, though used later in VARSITY, was a perilous novelty in 1944. The time which might have been spent in practicing it had been eaten up by bad weather and the air supply effort. Double-tow from England would also have involved a fuel problem, but this could have been met by the use of extra tanks or by allowing the units involved to land at bases in Belgium". Even these solution to the problem raises further issues that need to be solved. His solution about extra fuel tanks, questions are are there enough tanks for all the aircraft that will be towing the Gliders and is there enough time to fit the tanks. As the max take off weight is the same the extra fuel carried would reduce the load that could be carried. His next solution about landing in Belgium the question are is there available airfields and fuel for the planes to land refuel and return to England?
The airman I believe did the best they could with the resources, information and time available. Its easy to criticize with the benefit of hindsight.
I also notice you have yet to response to my comment were I ask which option you would chose because of the fog on the morning of the 17th.
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Dave you are right the sequence of events is more important that the actual timing as you say is unreliable. So, my question to you is how to determine the right sequence?
So, which event occurred first Atkin reaching the bridge or Weaver patrol running into the Germans.
Using the following sources narratives:
a) Zig Boroughs “The 508th Connection”
b) Phil Nordyke “Puts us down in Hell”
c) Christer Bergstrom “Arnhem 1944 part 1”
d) John McManus “September Hope”
So, what does each source narrative tells us what happen on the 17th in Nijmegen. Zig Boroughs on pages 246-247 a narrative covering a) the departure of A & B companies being leaded by S-2 patrol toward the bridge and b) Joe Atkins account what happen at the bridge, c) leave the bridge after an hour and hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge. D) Lastly about A & B Companies advance into the city.
Christer Bergstrom on page 227-228 narrative covers a) Atkins account at the bridge, b) Weaver’s patrol getting lost, and c) Grabner arrival with 9th SS Bat.
The third narrative is Phil Nordyke pages 275 -276 only covers the events around Weaver patrol and it running into German outposts. He does not mention Atkins reaching the bridge.
Clearly, Dave each source only tells part of the story, so in what order should the sources be read.
1) Zig Boroughs and then Phil Nordyke
2) Phil Nordyke and then Zig Boroughs
How does Christer Bergstrom narrative about Weaver patrol fit in the narrative as it differs from Nordyke narrative?
Then you have John McManus narrative covers pages 157 to 162. Below are the key events in order they appear in the narrative.
1) Weaver patrol was lost
2) Weaver lost touch with his 3-man point.
3) getting separated from the platoon, they had found their way to the bridge.
4) Atkins leave the bridge.
5) On their way back, Atkins and the other two men promptly got lost themselves
6) Weaver patrol run into the Germans
7) Arrival of Grabner and 9th SS Recon.
8) Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge.
Looking at the 4 narratives together they paint the following picture.
If we work backwards from Borough and Bergstrom Grabner and the 9th SS Recon arrived as Atkin and his companions were leaving. Assuming Grabner arrived at H-hour than Atkin and his companions reach the bridge at H-hours -1 (assuming Borough is right about the time Atkin was at the bridge.) and McManus narrative place Henke men at the bridge at least 2 earlier therefore H-Hour -2 plus.
Therefore, Dave if A & B companies accompanied Weaver patrol and they remain in contact with Atkin group the entire force would have found Henke men at the Bridge.
I know you think McManus is unreliable, but can you prove his narrative is inaccurate as to the events of the 17th. When you consider Kershaw, Reynolds, Buckingham, Tim Lynch and Poulussen narrative place Henke’s men at the bridge some time during the afternoon or at 2000 hours.
@davemac1197
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@davemac1197 According to:
1) Michael Reynolds “Sons of the Reich II SS Panzer Corp” on page 121 claims "Gradbner's 9th SS Reconnaissance Battalion, now under his command, had crossed the Arnhem bridge at 1800 hours with the mission of securing the route to Nijmegen for use by the Frundsberg. Gradbner's Battalion reached Elst at about 1900 hours and continued on to the main Nijmegen road bridge where it met German troops already in position. These troops were a scratch force of about 750 men from various training, and reserve units in and around the city, cobbled together by a Colonel Henke.'
2) Robert Kershaw " It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944" (p.96- 98). "As news spread in Nijmegen about airborne landings south of the city, Colonel Henke, commanding a spare Fallschirmjaeger Training Regiment staff headquarters, was ordered to co-ordinate the necessary measures to safeguard the two bridges crossing the Waal in Nijmegen. Henke ‘alarmed’ all in situ local forces and took them under command. During the afternoon and early evening of 17 September there were no contacts with enemy units in Nijmegen. SS-Captain Viktor Graebner, the 30-year-old Commander of the Hohenstaufen’s Reconnaissance Battalion, reached Elst, 9km north of Nijmegen, at about 1900 hours. To their relief the approaches to the bridges were already occupied by Henke’s Kampfgruppe. He had probably been briefed by Henke’s men on the Nijmegen bridge that there had not as yet been contact with the enemy. At the same time, at 2000 hours, the 1st Company of the 10SS Reconnaissance Battalion was involved in a heavy exchange of fire on the Arnhem road bridge." On page 98 "With a crisis developing in his rear, and nothing happening to his front in Nijmegen – apparently secured – Graebner turned back with the bulk of his column, and began his final drive toward Arnhem. The defence of the Waal bridges had inadvertently become Henke’s sole responsibility again."
3) McManus, John C.. "September Hope" on page 162 has the following narrative, “In fact, they were members of an SS reconnaissance battalion, probably from the 9th SS Panzer Division, and they had traveled from Arnhem to Nijmegen to buttress the bridge defenses. They were arriving just in the nick of time. Unbeknownst to the Americans, they were joining a 750-man Kampfgruppe (roughly analogous to an American battalion) made up of reservists, NCOs, antiaircraft men, and parachute trainees, under a colonel named Henke and named for him. Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge. These were the actual defenders of the Nijmegen bridges, not the paltry squad of misfits portrayed in the Dutch resistance reports. Henke had placed outposts at the traffic circles that led to the bridges. These were the defenders of the Keizer Karelplein who had originally opened fire on A Company. At almost that exact moment, their SS reinforcements arrived. Collectively, these enemy soldiers now stood between the Americans and the bridges.”
You also have accounts from Buckingham, William F.. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (p. 244) and Poulussen, R.G.. Lost at Nijmegen: A rethink on operation "Market Garden" (p. 32). Who has his source from Brigade-General Heinz Harmel, commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg"
So, was Henke men deployed at the bridge on the afternoon of the 17th as per the above sources or on the 18th from your source. Clearly, depending on what position you what to take about the defence of the Nijmegen Bridge on the 17th there are sources that would support your position. The challenge is proving which source is correct?
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@davemac1197 Reply 2
You talk about the sense of sequencing of events are important. without reliable timing how do you know the correct sequence.
For example, 3 events occurred A, B and C. Without knowing the timing of each event, the possible sequences are ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB and last CBA. Only 1 is correct, so without timing how do you know which one is correct?
The only way would be narrative about the 3 events, which hopefully will provide the answer. If you look a different narrative and each has a different sequence or only discuss 2 of the 3 events in the narrative. Again, how do you know the correct sequence? The more events involved in the narrative the more difficult to get a sense of the correct order.
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@davemac1197 You take about the sequencing the events are important, but without accruate timing how do you what the correct sequence of events.
You say Gradener Left at 2100 Hours after been there an hour, but Christian Bergstrom states "As we were leaving we could hear heavy vehicle... This was the vehicle of Gradner Reconn Battalion ...They arrived just as Aitken and his men had left the site, but were quickly summoned north again."
John McManus September Hope
"From the German side of the roundabout, the Americans heard the sound of trucks halting and hobnailed boots hitting the pavement as soldiers jumped from truck fenders to the street. A half-track pulled out of a side street and rumbled slowly around the circle. Lieutenant George Lamm, Adams’s 2nd Platoon leader, yelled for a bazooka team. Private Van Walker, an assistant gunner, loaded a rocket into his gunner’s bazooka. The gunner crept forward and snapped off a shot that hit the half-track squarely in the side and disabled it. “Our bazooka was disabled by the blast,” Walker said, “and the gunner was wounded in the shoulder.” Enemy soldiers poured out of the half-track and ran in all directions. To the veteran paratroopers who caught glimpses of them, they appeared to be wearing the spotted camouflage uniforms typical of the SS. In fact, they were members of an SS reconnaissance battalion, probably from the 9th SS Panzer Division, and they had traveled from Arnhem to Nijmegen to buttress the bridge defenses. They were arriving just in the nick of time. Unbeknownst to the Americans, they were joining a 750-man Kampfgruppe (roughly analogous to an American battalion) made up of reservists, NCOs, antiaircraft men, and parachute trainees, under a colonel named Henke and named for him. Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge. These were the actual defenders of the Nijmegen bridges, not the paltry squad of misfits portrayed in the Dutch resistance reports. Henke had placed outposts at the traffic circles that led to the bridges. These were the defenders of the Keizer Karelplein who had originally opened fire on A Company. At almost that exact moment, their SS reinforcements arrived. Collectively, these enemy soldiers now stood between the Americans and the bridges."
Using your important of sequence from McManus and Bergstrom
1. Henke men reach the bridge (McManus) a few hours before Gradner arrives.
2. Atkin arriving at the bridge remaining an hour (McManus and Bergstrom
3. Atkin leaving as the bridge as Gradner arrives (Bergstrom), and Adams 2nd Platoon attacking the Bridge (McManus).
Of course other source could provide a different set of sequence , but which source is correct and how do you prove it, is the question?
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@davemac1197
Do you understand the impact of Browning 33 % losses would have on the operation>
At Arnhem on 2 Battalion of 1st Landing Brigade would have been available to capture the high ground north of the city and the Bridge.
At Nijmegen Gavin would only have 6 Battalions to capture all his objectives.
The Airforce's the impact on the 2nd lift Historically the second lift was 1,327 aircraft towing 1,201 Gliders, Browing 33% would reduce the 2nd lift to 1,016 aircraft.
Gavin has been stated he would be prepared to accept 5 to 10% losses to get close to the DZ/LZ.
Day verse night
MacDonald, Charles B.. THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (129)
One of the more crucial decisions facing General Brereton and the staff of the First Allied Airborne Army was that of daylight versus night attack. Moving by day, planes and gliders would be exposed to more accurate flak. This was a serious consideration, both because the C-47 (Skytrain) troop carrier planes were low-speed aircraft possessing neither armor nor self-sealing gasoline tanks and because marked increase had been noted recently in antiaircraft guns in the vicinity of the target area. On the other hand, moving by night invited greater danger from enemy aircraft. Although the enemy's daylight fighter force had been reduced almost to inconsequence, his night fighters had retained some measure of potency. In regard to the actual drop, it went without saying that a daylight operation should provide a better drop pattern.
The reasons for the dropping the second lift are:
MacDonald, Charles B.. THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN 132
For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result.
As you have Ritchie Arnhem Myths and Reality, He has a whole chapter about the reason for the single lift.
Your statement
"The deletion of the glider coup de main was also probably because they didn't like the idea of British glider troops taking the 82nd Airborne's prime bridge targets for them by coup de main." If a coupe de main did occur at Nijmegen it would have been undertaken by 82nd not the British because ethe British could not have spare the company.
Your statement
"they just wanted to minimise any losses to flak as much as possible" Every plane loss in the 1st Lift means that aircraft not being available for the second lift. With a short turn around damage aircraft returning from the 1st lift may not be repaired in time to take part in the second lift.
Look at Browning comment about losses combine with a short turn around how many aircraft would have been available for the second lift? less than a 1,000 which means over 300 less aircraft for 2nd lift. At Arnhem it could mean only part of the 4th Para brigade would arrive.
As for Operation Comet you forget that the US 52nd Wing was going to fly the same mission profile as the RAF, so clearly the 52nd could match the RAF.
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@davemac1197 Dave
A) Your Statement "The USAAF had far greater numbers than the RAF in 1944, but they were less capable in comparison. "
Source Shilleto, Carl. Merville Battery & the Dives Bridges (Battleground Normandy)
On D-Day the better trained RAF at Merville Battery
1) Plan page 122"As the advance party made their way to their respective objectives, 100 Lancaster Bombers from RAF Bomber Command would drop, using the OBOE electronic navigation system, their load of 4,000lb (1814kg) bombs onto the battery. Commencing at 0030hrs this would soften up, if not destroy, the German defences." Result page 129 "Unfortunately the bombers overshot their mark and the majority of bombs landed in and around the village of Gonneville-sur-Merville (now Gonneville-en-Auge). Others landed as far away as 2 miles (3.22km) from DZ V."
2) page 121 "the task of destroying this coastal gun emplacement went to twenty-nine year old Lieutenant Colonel Terence Otway and 650 men of 9 Para, 3 Para Bde."
Actual Drop page 138 "At 0235hrs, the time when the whole battalion was supposed to be at the RV and ready for setting off, only 110 men had arrived. None of the gliders had turned up and therefore the heavy equipment: jeeps, trailers, anti-tank guns, 3in (76.2mm) mortars, and additional Bangalore torpedoes, were all missing. The engineers, from 591 Para Sqn RE, with their mine clearance equipment and tapes, had not turned up and neither had any of the section from 224 Para Fd Amb RAMC. In the next fifteen minutes only a few more stragglers turned up. About forty extra men had shown up by 0250hrs, and Lieutenant Colonel Otway was still left with a seriously depleted force,"
So, it appears that the RAF also on occasion had problem navigating at night when you consider the Merville battery was only 3 miles away from Sword Beach.
B) About 2 lifts and Coupe de Main
from Roger Cirillo PhD The MARKET GARDEN Campaign: Allied Operational Command in Northwest Europe, 1944page 346 fluid tactical situation;
COMET required a different approach to battle. According to the published plan, beginning at 0600 on 8 September, three coup-de-main parties each in six Horsa gliders would independently seize one of the designated bridges, holding the structure until relieved. Two-thirds Of the I Airborne Division would arrive by parachute at 0800 in the first lift, carrying out parachute drops for 90 minutes. The second lift, including the remainder of the division, I Polish Brigade, and the corps headquarters, would arrive either in the evening or early the following morning. The 52 Division would arrive by air landing on an airfield improvised by 30 Corps on D+2 (10 September). 621 The planned landing and drop zones reflected the compromise required between seizing the objective and finding suitable terrain for large-scale glider and parachute landings. Flak was an overriding concern, determining not just the routing of aircraft but also landing- and drop-zone selection. Recognizing the need to capture the bridges by surprise to prevent their destruction or reinforcement, the coup-de-main teams were subjected to the highest risks.
(note 621 ' MHI, Papers Collected brMajor General FL Parks. "Operation Comet, " Hq/Atps/2559/G. 6 Sep 44, HQ Airborne Troops Olý Instruction No. 1. Browning's order noted, "There will be no advance [of Second Army] from the RHINE bridgeheads before a port between HAVRE and ANTWERP is operating.)
From Roger Cirillo PHD his research indicated that for Operation Comet there was the possible of a single lift on the 8th and that the Coupe de Main were a high-risk operation. So, therefore there a strong possibility the coupe de main could have failed.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- You are basing your comment with the benefit of hindsight. How would Gavin had known when he made his plans that the major counterattack would occur on the 20th, when he had reports of 4,000 SS Troops in the Nijmegen area.
1) the claim that the 82nd only loss 11 men wounds is a myth. This from Buckingham, William F.. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944
"The remainder of the patrol continued across the Wyler road and a field planted with sugar beet to within 200 yards of a group of farm buildings atop Voxhill before coming under fire from two .30 calibre machine-guns that killed two men and forced the rest to seek cover. At first it was assumed the firing was accidental but when a faster-firing German weapon joined in, it became apparent that the 2nd Platoon had been overrun and Voxhill was held by the enemy. Casualties might have been more severe had the two squads not been well dispersed and without the shelter offered by the furrows, which fortuitously ran at right-angles to the German position.
The attack was finally halted 250 yards short of the US positions, but countering this new threat left the American’s right flank open to the Germans holding Voxhill, who poured withering 20mm cannon fire into the hapless paratroopers. This swelled the number of casualties including Lieutenant MacVicar; the Company Commander had crawled forward to inform Sickler that the messenger had found no sign of the 1st Platoon. Sickler was thus left the sole unwounded officer in a Company effectively reduced to less than Platoon strength, pinned down from two sides in an increasingly untenable position and running short of ammunition."
A Company reduced to a platoon size would have suffered more than 11 causalities.
2) In either of his two books does Gavin mention 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald, he does mention the report of 4,000 SS Troops in the Nijmegen area.
Source Lynch, Tim. Operation Market Garden: The Legend of the Waal Crossing (p. 72).
In fact, remaining intelligence reports for Operation Market Garden show that the British repeatedly downplayed the threat, questioning the effectiveness of what they saw as the battered remnants of Panzer divisions. The intelligence briefing provided to the 504th PIR claimed that no more than around 250 tanks were operational in the whole of Holland with a maximum reinforcement of 350 possible, albeit unlikely. The 21st Army Group estimate suggested that the Reichswald might contain the equivalent of ‘two Home Guard divisions’.
Between the 504th at Grave and the rest of the Division were thought to be some 4000 SS recruits in a heavily built-up area in which, Gavin said, ‘a few well placed automatic weapons could hold up a battalion indefinitely in narrow city streets.’
3) With limited artillery supplies I doubt Gavin would have ordered his artillery to blindly pound the forest was the best way to protect that front. As they would need the supplies to stop any attacks by the Germans.
4) Gavin decision to bring in his artillery in lift 2 would be the same reason Urghart decision to bring in his artillery and A/t guns in lift 1ahead of the 4th Parachute Brigade.
5) If the bridge was taken the 10th SS would have 3 days to dug in and fortify the island. From Saunders, Tim. The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem (Battleground Europe) (p. 46).
"The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. General Horrocks summed up the military qualities of the ground: ‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’ "
With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse.
Would it have been an easier fight?
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@thevillaaston7811
I known all that.
In the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132 if you read one from your quote is a breakdown of each lift by Division and on p133 "On the fourth day the tails of all divisions might arrive." which was coming by road on by air.
You quote Operation Dragoon that a double lift was possible, yet if you actually study the plan prepared by Williams the time between the 2 lifts was 13 1/2 hours. with morning fog on the 17th which did not clear until 0900 its impossible to fly 2 missions on the 17th.
Having read both Urquhart and Gavin 2 books, either author mention requesting a second lift on the 17th. Urquhart complained in his book that there never sufficient aircraft for Airborne Operations. Montgomery in his Memoirs also does mention a request for a second lift, he did comment about the landing zones at Arnhem.
I see that in replying you did not provide a plan how 2 lifts could be achieved on the 17th.
You say " It seems that people that knew about such matters showed that Brereton failed to use his resources as well as he could have, by not having a plan to have two drops on day one, and by not putting more troops nearer to their main objectives." From all my sources I have yet to come across any author making that statement, so who is you source?
If you going to reply provide the evidence requested. Also you should read "Arnhem: Myth and Reality chapter 3.3 The Airlift by Sebastian Ritchie" were Ritchie did an in-depth analysis of the Air Plan
On page 196 "The maximum size of the follow-up lifts would ultimately be dictated by the time available to turn around the aircraft back in England; the more time available, the larger that lift could be. it was this reason that, on the 10th Sept, Williams staff briefly considered the possibility of conducting lifts at substantially less than full strength. Clearly, they would be certain of their ability to turn around at least half of their force for the second lift, in accordance with Linnett timetable, but not the whole force."
There initial plan for 2 lifts on 17th would have 1st Lift approx 1,500 aircraft and 2nd lift approx 750 verse actual second lift of 1,327. subject to weather. So TheVilla Aston the starting point for the planning a 2 lifts on D-Day, Clearly problems with attempting to achieve 2 lifts resulted in the decision for a single lift.
As to landing troops closer without detail maps show clearings big enough to handle Airborne Drops, and the location of AA Guns, its difficult to determine if closer sites were available especially at Arnhem. See chapter 3.2 of the same book for detail analysis of Arnhem drop zone.
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Its interesting to see the continue comments blaming Brereton and Williams for the failure of Market Garden because they only organised a single drop on 17th and refused Montgomery request for a second drop. They usually refer to Operation Dragoon to as proof two lifts should have been undertaken on the 17th.
If we actual take a step back and actual analysis the plan for Market Garden. Montgomery plan required 3 Div plus Polish Brigade to be drop along a corridor to capture the bridges.
The number of actual sorties need to lift that force over the course of the Operation was approx 3795 (Source Operation market Garden Now and Then). When compared to available aircraft 1529 would require each aircraft to fly 2.5 sorties. Therefore, it would require at least 2 days with good weather to fly in the entire force. Any adverse weather on the 17th would cause a further day to deliver the market Force.
Did the Airmen make the right decision of a single lift per day?
If we first study Operation Dragoon which was also planned by Williams had 4 Missions. The first Mission Albatross the main paratroop drop involved 396 aircraft with H-Hour of 04.25. The next mission Blue, the first Glider mission involved 75 aircraft with H-hour of 08.00. The third was Canary the second paratroop drop of 41 aircraft with H-hour 18.00. The last mission Dove, involved 332 Gliders with H-hour of 18.10. The time gap between 1st Lift (Albatross) and 2nd lift (Canary & Dove) is 13 Hours and 30 minutes.
Next point is the restricted flying conditions for Glider operation. They were restricted to daylight hours and could not operation if there was low cloud cover.
Next the amount of daylight on the 17th, with sunrise was at 0617 and sunset at 1847, for two daylight lifts to occur, would require reducing Dragoon time gap by at least 2 hours a reduction of turnaround time between lifts of19%.
Finally, the actual weather on the 17th with morning fog clearing by 0900. With a take-off time of 0900 verse historical take off of around 1000 would see the 1st Lift arriving around 1200 vs 1300 and based on Dragoon timetable the 2nd lift would arrive at 0130 on the 18th. Clearly only 1 lift would have been possible on the 17th as the second lift would have been cancelled and If the 3 Airborne Div's were working on 2 lifts arriving on the 17th. The cancelation would have caused issue for the Airborne Div's.
The Airman therefore face an impossible decision. The options available to them were:
1) Tell Montgomery that due to the lack of Aircraft and the weather it’s impossible to delivery Market Force in 1 lift or on 1 day so the recommendation would be to cancel. The consequence would be forgoing the opportunity for reach the Rhine while the Germans forces were disorganised. Another would that Montgomery would be forced to open up Antwerp before continuing North. We can speculate on how weeks it would then take 2nd Army to reach Arnhem.
2) Procced with the Operation with multiply lifts over multiply days knowing that the delay in delivering the Airborne Force would put the operation at Risk, but hoping that the state of the Germans force would mitigate the risk. Unfortunately, the Germans reaction were quick than anticipated.
3) Would be to scaled down the Market Force so that the entire revised force could be delivered in a single lift. This option would also see the operation failed.
My view having analysis and studied the Operation the Air plan while clearly not ideal, was best possible plan available. Airman took the risk, unfortunately risk did not pay off due to the weather and level of German resistance.
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The lack of air support was down to the weather. From Buckley, John; Buckley, John; Preston-Hough, Peter; Preston-Hough, Peter. Operation Market Garden (Wolverhampton Military Studies) (p. 105). Helion and Company. Kindle Edition.
"One further thing hindered CAS during Operation Market Garden: the weather. The weather turned bad almost immediately.37 During the entire operation after the initial drop, the weather was generally rainy and very poor for air operations and CAS. The result was that even when calls did come in for support from one group, squadron, etc., it was frequently impossible to fly the mission. Out of ninety-five requests for CAS the RAF received during Operation Market Garden, fifty were unfulfilled due to weather."
The resupply issue was down to communication problem, inability of 1st British Airborne advise the RAF of new Drop Zones for resupply missions.
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@warspite1807 You the one that needs to ponder and check your facts about Air side of Operation Market Garden.
1) Lack of Aircraft: Source Operation Market Garden Now and Then Total Number of Sorties to deliver the entire Market Force 3,795 over the 3 days aircraft available for the first lift 1,525.
Your statement "Very simply the Allied airlift needed a single night lift for the three divisions and one brigade, and a second lift same day for the one division and engineer battalion." So, how many aircraft do you think would be needed? the 1st British Airborne Division 1st Lift 463 aircraft deliver 2 Brigades less 2 companies, Div Artillery & Div HQ 2nd Lift 423 Aircraft 4th Para Brigade, 2 Airlanding companies plus division troops and more artillery, 3rd lift 149 Aircraft Polish Brigade, Total aircraft 1,035 That just 1 division and Polish brigade. Each US Division had 3 Parachute and 1 Glider Infantry Regiment. 101st need 1,330 sorties and 82nd 1,392 soties.
2) Pegasus archive website It was, however, perfectly possible that the First Lift could have taken place early in the morning of the 17th September, the Second during the evening, and the Third on the following morning."
This is from 21 Army Group Operation Market Garden weather for the 17th September forecast "Fog over bases clearing by 1000 hours with moderate cumulus 3,000ft and good visibility thereafter"
Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 199).
"During the early hours of the morning of 17 September the Allied air transport bases in central southern England and the West Country once again became shrouded in fog, which reduced visibility to 200 yards. This would have completely ruled out any attempt to stage a dawn lift (on a timetable similar to that devised for Linnet) and, consequently, the entire operation would have been thrown into confusion. However, by 09.00 the fog was clearing so that ultimately, under the Market Garden schedule, the lift could take place as planned,"
Buckingham, William F.. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (p. 169)
"By 09:00 the fog that had complicated the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment’s march to their aircraft at Membury had dissipated in the sun, and the weather was ‘fine and clear except for some broken cumulus cloud."
Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 267)
"At 1630 on 16 September (D minus 1) the experts delivered a favorable report on the coming four-day period. A high-pressure system was approaching Belgium from the southwest and would be over it next day. Fair weather with little cloud and gentle winds would prevail until the 20th. The forecast did predict fog on and after D plus 1, but only during the early morning."
page 273
"The weather was almost exactly as promised. Fog, present in the early morning, had cleared by 0900. A little thin, low stratus persisted longer but had dissipated by take-off time."
Clearly on the 17th there was morning fog, which would have rule out predawn takeoff.
2) Williams your statement "Until October 1943 Willaims had commanded wings. DRAGOOD employed several squadrons. In September 1944 he was given four groups to command, and therefore had 0 experience for doing this job."
Williams in September was in command of 9th TCC that included 52nd Wing (5 Groups) 53rd Wing (5 Groups) and 50th Wing (4 Groups) not 4 Group as you claim.
Operation Dragoon was supported by 51st Wing (3 Groups) Not several squadrons as you claim.
D-Day: From Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 99) "Half an hour after the first pathfinders jumped, the main paratroop drops began. These were ALBANY, a mission by 432 aircraft carrying troops of the 101st Division, and BOSTON, a 369-plane mission for the 82d Division. The missions were divided into serials, most of which contained 36 or 45 planes. In 1943 it would have been all a group could do to contribute one such serial. Having been raised to almost double the 1943 strength, all IX TCC’s groups except the 315th, the 442d, and the two groups responsible for the morning glider missions, were able to send two serials."
Operation Husky Williams commanded 51st and 52nd Transport Carriers wing and RAF 38 Group
So how did you reach the conclusion William had zero experience.
3) "Williams' change in Browning's lift planning and scheduling scrambled the original plans and essentially doomed 1st Airborne", so what was Browning plan?
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@thevillaaston7811 This is response to your latest comment that for some reason is hidden. I will reply in a number of comments.
This the first reply relating to your request that I prove only 1 lift was doable:
TheVilla Aston, you ask me to provide evidence that only 1 lift was doable. Ok this is my analysis, clearly, I do not have the experience or all the information available to Gen Williams.
So, let’s go.
First part is working out the board tasks require to achieve 2 lifts and the time require to complete each task.
Task are:
1) Take-off and assembly of the 1st Lift
2) Flying from the assembly point to various DZ/LZ
3) Time it takes to deliver the 1st Lift Force
4) Return flight to the various bases
5) Turnaround of the 1st lift which includes
a. Check the returning plans to see if they ate airworthy, if not how long will it take to make them airworthy
b. Once the last aircraft has return start spotting the Gliders for take-off on the runway
c. Refuel and load the aircraft
6) Take-off and assembly of the 2nd Lift
7) Flying time from the assembly point to DZ/Lz
8) Time to deliver the 2nd lift.
Secondly the source used with their code:
S1 Buckingham, William F. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944
S2 Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality
S3 Warren, Dr. John C. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater
S4 Operation Market Garden Now and Then
With each extract I use the code and page reference.
Now we need to analysis the actual lift data to see if the information is available find the times need to complete each task
The actual H-Hour was set at 1300
Take-off time on the 17th.
Buckingham (S1 page 169) “The MARKET force thus began to take off at 09:45, starting with the glider combinations from the airfields in Berkshire and the West Country”
Warren, Dr. John (S3 page 272) “Shortly after 1000 on the 17th, even before their pathfinders had left the ground, the formations of the 53d Troop Carrier Wing which were to fly the paratroops of the 101st Division began taking off from their bases around Greenham Common.”
Warren, Dr. John (S3 page 283) “The mission bearing the paratroops of the 82d Division began its take-offs at 1019 on the 17th. Six groups of the 52d and 50th Wings based in the Grantham area”
So TheVilla Aston with H-Hour at 1300 and the first planes leaving at 0945 the time required for task 1 & 2 is approximately 3 hours 15 minutes.
Time over the DZ/LZ.
Warren (S3 page 301) has the drop finishing by “Between 1353 and 1408 all but four of the 2,283 paratroops in the aircraft made their jump (British)”
Buckingham, William (S1 page 194) “As with the 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen, the 101st Airborne Division’s glider element came in at around 14:00 onto LZ W,”
So, the time required to deliver the Market force was just over 1 Hour.
The return Flight. Only Operation Market Garden Now and Them (S4) on page 95 “12 Stirling of 38 Group deliver British pathfinders at 1240 return to base between 1446 to 1500”
Giving a return time for the Stirling of just over 2 Hours. The Stirling had a cruise speed of 200mph verse C-47 of 140mph, (Operation Market Garden Now & Then page 151) therefore C-47 return times would be around 2 hours 45 minutes.
Sunset:
Ritchie, Sebastian; (S2 page 201) “On 17 September sunset occurred at 18.11 p.m. and nautical twilight ended at 19.26 p.m.”
Morning Fog:
Ritchie, Sebastian (S2 page 199) “However, by 09.00 the fog was clearing so that ultimately, under the Market Garden schedule, the lift could take place as planned,”
Warren, Dr. John C (S3 page 273) “The weather was almost exactly as promised. Fog, present in the early morning, had cleared by 0900.”
The Analysis
The earliest the 1st Lift take-off is 0900 (assuming they take-off immediately the fog cleared) verse historical 0945. The reverse H-Hour would be adjusted to 1215.
Due the time of sunset on the 17th the second Lift H-Hour would be 1800 with the drop completed by 1900, that will leave just 26 of twilight remaining.
Therefore, the latest possible take-off of time 2nd lift would be between 1445 to 1500 hours.
The last returning aircraft from the 1st lift (leaving the DZ/LZ at 1315 – H-Hour 1215 plus 1 Hour) will not reach their bases until between 1515 to 1600 hours (depending if you using Stirling or C-47 time)
From the above analysis TheVilla Aston when the 2nd lift need to take-off (1445-1500 Hours) planes from the 1st lift are still in the air. Even the earliest time the 1st lift would reach their bases would be 1415 hours that will only leave 30 minutes to complete all the task required to prepare the planes for the second lift. Hence the conclusion I reach was that only one lift was doable.
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@davemac1197
Dave this is from 21st Army XXX Corp operations 17 September (page 37)
"To overcome this temporary check, a further set piece attack, supported by a typhoon "cab rank" was staged; this attack was only partially successful. and at 1800 hours the medium RA barrage afforded in the morning had to be lifted forward and repeated. This weight of supporting fire accomanied by a ground attack, that had the desired effect, and by 1815 hours the Irish Guard Group, against weakening opposition, had cross a small river south of Valkenswaard, reaching the town at last light and there they harboured for the night."
21st Army Group Directive page 12
Period of Movement and Harbouring
21.a The principle of movement that movement should take place by day only.
b. Formations and Units would harbour along the road each night, retaining their order of priority.
So, Dave it would unlikely Irish Guards would have continued pass Valkenswaard on the 17th.
About Williams involvement regarding the decision about drop zone for 101st
Source Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 238). Tannenberg Publishing. Kindle Edition.
"Agreement as to just where and how the 101st was to be used was not so easy. Montgomery’s proposal called for it to be strung out like a kite-string over a 30-mile stretch extending to within artillery range of the Second Army front. General Taylor protested against such extreme dispersion of his division and was strongly supported by Brereton. No decision on the matter was reached at the Sunnyhill Park meeting, but Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery, who agreed after a rather sharp exchange of views to let the matter be settled by direct discussion between General Taylor and Lt. Gen. Miles C. Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on 12 September. Since both were good diplomats, and General Dempsey was confident that his army could slice through unaided as far as Eindhoven, they readily reached a solution. The 101st was to be responsible for the crossings in a 16-mile area between Veghel and Eindhoven, and could postpone the taking of Eindhoven until two hours after its initial operations."
Source Bowman, Martin W.. The Build Up to the Beginning (Air War Market Garden Book 1) (pp. 87-88).
"Taylor was dissatisfied with Browning’s original plan for the disposition of his division which would have spread the 101st in seven separate areas along an axis thirty miles long. Taylor was anxious to concentrate his forces and Brereton was in agreement: ‘Such dispersion destroys its tactical integrity, renders it incapable of fighting as a division and presents insurmountable problems of resupply. Each small group is susceptible of being destroyed in detail.’ Brereton raised further objections from the air point of view; the difficulty of making accurate drops on the numerous small drop zones, the problem of finding suitable drop zones in each of the areas and exposure of the air lifts to hostile fire over a large area. Finally Taylor received permission to discuss the problem with Lieutenant General Sir Miles C. Dempsey, commanding the British Second Army; under whose command (through 30 Corps) the 101st Airborne would operate on the ground. As a result, the proposed seven areas for the 101st drop were cut to two general areas."
From Bowman the question of Flak could related to the large areas to be covered than just Eindhoven.
Poulussen claims the telegram was dated the 14th, Warren has the meeting occurring on the 12th.
As to your comment
" you may well be right in saying Williams didn't make the decision to cancel drop zones south of the Wilhelmina canal as he seemed happy with his one Troop Carrier Group's involvement in the otherwise all-British/Polish COMET plan, but seemed to change his tune in MARKET" yet the the 1st British Parachute Brigade was carried by US 314 and 16 TCG. The 4th was carried by US 314 and 315TCG. Your right he double is commitment to 1st British Airborne Division.
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@thevillaaston7811 Tucker-Jones, Anthony. The Devil's Bridge (p. 138). Date would either be the 17th or 18th as not date is mentioned.
"Frustratingly for Harmel and Paetsch, 16 tanks arrived at the crossing, but they were far too heavy for the ferry. Engineers were summoned to construct a 40-ton raft, though that would take precious time. The crews of four Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers, which were of a similar weight, decided to chance their luck with the ferry and got over the river. The lack of tanks did not really matter. What the Germans really needed to prevent the British and Americans from getting over the Waal was artillery. Harmel’s gunnery commander, SS-Lieutenant-Colonel Sonnenstahl, reported that he had 72 guns, some of which had been rounded up in Arras from an abandoned train. The ferry was more than capable of transporting these. Sonnenstahl already had two gunnery officers down in Nijmegen, SS-Captains Krueger and Schwappacher.
At about noon, SS-Captain Karl-Heinz Euling arrived at Nijmegen with a hundred men. Having got out of Arnhem, he had not gone via Pannerden, but instead made use of a ferry at Huissen. He then moved through Elst and south. Euling joined SS-Captain Leo Hermann Reinhold at his command post in Lent, on the northern bank of the Waal. This village lay sandwiched between the railway and the road. Reinhold was charged with holding this side of the river, while Euling with Baumgaertel was to protect the south side and reinforce Colonel Henke’s forces. The Jagdpanzers rumbled over the road bridge, but Allied fire was so heavy it was impossible to get the infantry across other than by armoured half-track."
So at least 4 Jagdpanzers and Artillary plus infantry.
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As TIK has claimed that Gen Gavin was responsible for the failure of Operation Market Garden. It would be interesting to see what would be the outcome if Gen Gavin faced a General Court relating to failure of the Operation.
The Prosecutor would firstly need to articulate to the Board the actual decision that lead to the failure then he would need to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following points.
Firstly, that Gen Gavin was solely responsible for the decision and by making that decision he was either disobey a direct Order or a directive from a Senior Officer.
The next point to prove, if that decision was not made the 82nd would have capture both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge and held both end until the arrival of 30 Corp.
The last point, that 30 Corp would have been able to cross the island and reach the 2nd Parachute Bn before they were forced to surrender.
For Gen Gavin to be Guilty all 3 points must be proven. The failure to proven any of the above points would mean that Gen Gavin was not solely responsible for the Failure.
If we review various sources to see if we can identify the critical decision and if possible whether Gen Gavin was responsible.
In Ryan “ A Bridge too Far” on page 264 Ryan states “General Browning had directed Gavin not to go for the Nijmegen crossing unit the high ground around Groesbeek was secured.” Further on he states that Gen Gavin call in Colonel Lindquist and directed him to send one battalion racing for the bridge.
Robin Neillands in his battle “The Battle for the Rhine” on page 103 “General Brereton’s orders were specific on this point: the airborne divisions were to take the bridges with thunderclap surprise.”
Further on “Why Gavin, urged on and abetted by Browning, elected to ignore this prime requirements and substitute the Groesbeek heights as the prime objective and why Brereton let them get away with it remains a mystery.”
David Bennett in his book “A Magnificent Disaster” on page 37 “Gavin had no criticism of the assault plan assigned to his division; he said that the clear decision to give priority to the Groesbeek Heights was most helpful and that it seemed imperative.” Later in the same paragraph “one formidable authority Lt Col John Frost, went further and questioned whether the Groesbeek Heights should have been an Objective at all.”
The Us Official History page 157 cover Nijmegen planning “Take only the bridges and you probably could not hold them without the high ground. Take only the high ground, the Waal bridge at Nijmegen, and the MaasWaal Canal bridges, and the ground column could not get across the Maas either to use the other bridges or to relieve the airborne troops. With only so many troops at hand, General Gavin saw no solution at first other than to take first the high ground and the Maas and MaasWaal Canal bridges-thereby ensuring juncture with the ground column-then Nijmegen.
General Gavin and his staff were not alone in this thinking. Indeed, the directive from the corps commander, General Browning, was "clear and emphatic" to the effect that the division was "not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeck-Berg en Dal high ground was firmly in our hands.” Later
After "almost daily" discussions about the Nijmegen bridge in relation to the over-all plan, General Gavin and his staff finally decided, "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well," that they could risk sending one battalion in a quick strike for the bridge. This was admittedly a minimum force, but if the Germans were not in strength at the bridge and if the expected counterattacks from the Reichswald could be held with a smaller force than originally deduced, the risk would be justified because of the nature of the prize. "I personally directed Colonel Roy E. Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled later, "to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald."
Clearly if you only read Neilland, Gavin has a case to answer, he also states the Browning influence Gavin in making his decision. However if you only read the other 3 as well sources it would difficult for the Prosecutor to make a case against Gavin.
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@thevillaaston7811 As you say if Montgomery had command on the 23rd Sept, he would have reached Germany in a couple of weeks (Yours Words) but were in Germany? Historically Brussel was reached on the 3rd Sept, Antwerp is reach on the 4th Sept ( 23rd plus 12 days) and capture Joe's Bridge on the 10th Sept ( 23rd plus 18 days).
This is from Market Garden Now and Then page 50 "Between Sept 3, the day the British Guards Arm Division entered Brussels, and 17th Sept, the Start of Market Garden, the situation confronting British 2nd Army changed completely and rapidly. In a miraculous recovery after their retreat from France the Germans managed to build up a new and cohesive front along the Belgian-Dutch border. In this, they made particular good use of the defensive possibilities of the two waterlines in North Belgium. They managed to stall and then halt 2nd Army."
If the Germans were so weak on the 4th why didn't 1) 2nd Army reach German Border by mid Sept. and 2) on the 9th why did Montgomery cancel Comet and replace it with Market Garden which had 3 times as many Airborne Divisions?
The opportunity have had exist but it appears the window to take advantage of the opportunity was very short.
You quoted Arthur Bryant p262 (my version is page 209 1960 Edition) but it continues "If the Germans were not as beat as they are this would would be a fatal move, as it is, it may not do too much harm"
Page 232 Oct 5th "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place'.
On page 231"Monty and Alexander both refused to transfer troops to Burma due to heavy fighting. I therefore, advised against trying to stage Rangoon Operation before next Monsoon and P.M. agreed". It appears British interest in late 1944 was to transfer troops from either North West Europe or Italy to support British Operations in South East Asia.
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@thevillaaston7811 I not questioning Brereton Control of the Air Plan, that a given.
Let’s break you comment why Brereton is being criticise into 2 Parts, Number of Lifts and location of DZ/LZ.
The Number of Lifts on the 17th.
Your point is, if Brereton had plan for 2 lifts for the 17th , he would be free of any criticism (Your Words).
I am Brereton and I meet with Williams and Hollinghurst to agree to use Dragoon Timetable for Operation Market. Hollinghurst confirms the 10-hour turnround for the 2 Glider Lifts to Arnhem is achievable. Browning, Taylor, Gavin and Urquhart are informed so they can complete their Division Plans.
Come the 16th and the weather forecast indicate morning fog for the period 17th to 20th, resulting in possible postponement until the 21st subject to weather.
I then inform Montgomery due to the weather conditions the Market side of the operation will need to be postponed to 21st again subject to the weather 21st.
Montgomery meets with Dempsey to discuss the options, which are:
1. Postponed the entire Operation until 21st with no guarantees
2. Cancel the entire Operation
3. Cancel Market but continue with Garden.
If the Operation is cancelled, the strategic opportunity is lost and Market Garden will become one of those what If debates, just as the debate between Montgomery Northern Thrust verse Eisenhower Broad Front. With the Operation can cancelled the 2nd Army will be faced with the task of moving north with 3 major rivers crossing ahead of them. But Brereton is free of any criticism, or would he be? I wonder if he would face criticism for not putting together a plan that would have enable the Operation to proceed regards of the weather.
You say 2 lifts were doable if the will to do so was there. For all we know the will was there to do two lifts, but the anticipated weather conditions just made it impossible. As you say 75 years later, we only see what actually happen, and maybe if we are lucky so of the planning. Can you say for sure that Brereton and Co did not look at a 2-lift option?
The location of the Landing Zones.
The ideal location of landing sites for attacking a bridge is to land on both sides of the River and as close as possible to the Bridge. Clearly the successful attack on Grave Bridge proves the point.
So, let’s consider Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges terrain.
Nijmegen Bridge is located at the north end of the town a bottom of a U-shape bends in the river and the Village of Lent located at the northern exits. There are open spaces just east and west of the town and around the village of Lent. The only issues are, 1) The west side is Waal- Maas canal and 2) AA positions around the Bridge. Gavin position is it better to take higher landing casualties to land closer to the objectives.
Arnhem Bridge is located at the southern side of the Town and from the map not open spaces close to the bridge on the north side. However, there is open spaces available, but due to irrigation canal not ideal for Gliders. But as with Nijmegen the present of AA position is a problem.
So, what are the risk trade-offs if Landing Zones are located as close as possible.
1. Higher Aircraft loss and damages during the 1st Lift will reduce the 2nd lift capacity as there will be insufficient time to repair any damage aircraft.
2. Higher casualties to Airborne troops and lose of equipment as experience by the Germans at Crete could impact on the ability of the survivors to achieve their objectives. For Arnhem only 2 Battalions were assigned the Arnhem Bridge and at Nijmegen only 1 battalion.
3. Size of available zone could lead to greater dispersion of Troops again will impact their ability to achieve their objectives.
If the troops had landed closer and suffered high casualties and failed to capture the Arnhem and Nijmegen bridge would the Air men be free of any criticism?
As with the 2-lift option are you sure that alternative sites closer to the bridges you mention were not look at, but for information available at the time resulted in those sites being rule out. In case of Zon Bridge the final decision was made by Dempsey after a presentation by Taylor. But we have no detail as what information and argument was provide by Taylor.
For the issue of location of Landing Zone will only be discuss if the Operation proceed in the first place.
As you point out look back 75 years later with partial information and the benefit of 20/20 hindsight it easy to criticise decision made. But if we were to made those decision base only on the information available and the same experience those Officers had would our decision be any different. We can also look back and ask what if? If overall plan for Market Garden was different or the timing change. The German reaction and response will also be different. Would the outcome change who knowns, it may have been better or it could have been a lot worst?
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@billballbuster7186 Bill three other sources that shows it was Montgomery Plan and that on the 15th September he was aware of issues with the Market side of the operation but decided to allow the operation to proceed.
Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 236).
On the morning of 10 September General Eisenhower flew to Brussels to confer with Montgomery on the strategy they would use in the coming weeks. In a stormy session aboard Eisenhower’s Eisenhower’s plane Montgomery won his superior’s approval for an expanded version of COMET. This operation, MARKET, was to lay an airborne carpet, comprising not only the First Airborne Division and the Polish airborne but also the American 82d and 101st Divisions, along the road to Arnhem. To lift this force would require all available British and American troop carrier aircraft in a series of missions lasting at least two days.
At 1430 on 10 September General Browning, who had just flown back to England with news of the Brussels conference, notified Airborne Army of the decision on MARKET. At 1800 General Brereton held a conference of his troop carrier and airborne commanders and their staffs at Airborne Army Headquarters in Sunnyhill Park. There Browning sketched out Montgomery’s conception of MARKET, and a short discussion was held on the main points of the operation.
Powell, Geoffrey. The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944 (pp. 337-338). Pen & Sword Books. Kindle Edition.
If this extra time had been available for careful thought and discussion, Brereton might also have been persuaded to examine the basis for the flak intelligence and to ask for the aircraft loss estimates to be justified. And, even if Brereton had done nothing, it is all but certain that Montgomery himself would have intervened to ensure that a realistic plan for the operation was produced. As it was, his staff did not see the ‘Market Garden’ plan until two days before take-off. By then, it was far too late to make major changes, although the Field-Marshal did attempt to persuade Brereton to produce a double sortie for British 1st Airborne Division.
Page 73-74
The one person who could have cancelled ‘Market Garden’, even at a late stage, was Montgomery himself. The boldness of the plan was uncharacteristic of the man, and it was not in his nature to hazard the lives of his troops without good cause. This was especially so in the autumn of 1944 when, after five years of war, the British manpower tap was running dry, and formations were being disbanded and their men reassigned to other units because of the lack of replacements. Why then did Montgomery disregard the accumulation of evidence about the increasing German presence in the area where the airborne divisions were to land, not to mention the advice of senior members of his staff in whose judgement he had the greatest confidence?
Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (pp. 213-214). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.
Montgomery secured the use of 82nd and 101st US Airborne Divisions for MARKET GARDEN at a fractious meeting with Eisenhower at Brussels airport on 10 September.
The key outcome of the 10 September meeting was the green light for MARKET GARDEN, eventually pencilled in for launch on 17 September. Detailed planning continued from 10 September onwards, but the scale of the operation and the multiple issues to be resolved undermined the plan more and more as the day of MARKET GARDEN approached. Brigadier Charles Richardson, Monty’s chief planning officer, claimed that 21st Army Group staff were simply handed the plan by Browning’s team and told by Montgomery to implement it.12 Perhaps the most debilitating shortcoming proved to be the air-power element of the plan. Although MARKET GARDEN involved a significant airborne element, there had been little immediate air staff involvement in putting the plan together. As problems with the airlift emerged, 21st Army Group staff, determined to make MARKET GARDEN a reality, rode roughshod over a series of related air-based problems, whilst air staff refused to budge on some fundamental aspects of the plan.
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@johnburns4017 You claim Brereton overruled Monty when he requested a drop on the Scheldt, actually the request some claim relates to drop on Walcheren island.
Montgomery request ask for a US Airborne Division (the 82nd most like would have been given the task) to be drop. As the request was made around the 8th September. Did Montgomery require the operation to be undertaken as soon as possible? If yes what support would Montgomery have been able to supply to the airborne drop?
State of play around 8th September. The 2nd British Army was committed to initial support Operation Comet schedule for the 8th. Then later Operation Market Garden, however as the 82nd was committed to Montgomery Scheldt operation only the 1st British, Polish Brigade and US 101st would be able for Market. With the British and poles at Arnhem and 101st assign Nijmegen and Grave no airborne troops would have been available to cover the area south of Grave.
The 1st Canadian Army in September was engaged in capturing the various channel ports and would not been a position to support Scheldt operation until October.
The question in early to mid-September did Admiral Ramsay was in a position to launch an amphibious assault in support of the Montgomery airborne assault.
I doubt Montgomery would have proceed with the airborne assault without support.
John what if Montgomery approach Brereton with this question: is an airborne assault on Walcheren Island a feasible option? If we speculate and Brereton after studying the question said it is feasible subject to the certain condition. Then John the actual assault on Walcheren Island may have seen an airborne element included in the Plan.
But we know the answer was no. Below are several difference sources explaining why Brereton said No.
Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle For Europe, Note 481 The fact that there was so little firm, clear land on Walcheren made it impossible, in the opinion of Leigh-Mallory and Brereton, to use airborne troops in the assault upon the island.
Buckingham, William F.. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (p. 82). Walcheren was too small to make a parachute assault a viable option, and the fact that virtually the entire island apart from the perimeter dyke was below sea level, dotted with flooded areas and criss-crossed with dykes effectively ruled out a glider landing.
Warren, Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 236). Between 8 and 10 September Montgomery also considered an airborne operation against Walcheren Island to open the Scheldt, but Brereton rejected this, asserting that the terrain was very unsuitable and flak sure to be intense.
Finally, Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 98). Montgomery did propose using the American airborne divisions in the Scheldt Estuary area in an assault on Walcheren Island, but Brereton raised a number of objections to this scheme. He maintained that plans were still under consideration to use the American divisions in the Aachen-Köln area ahead of US ground forces, that Walcheren’s flak defences were too heavy, that the island made a dangerously small parachute drop zone and that its terrain was unsuitable for glider landings.
So, John looking at those four sources it easy to speculate that Brereton in saying that an airborne assault was not feasible giving the following reasons:
1) The island was too small for a parachute drop.
2) The terrain is unsuitable for Gliders due virtually the entire island apart from the perimeter dyke was below sea level, dotted with flooded areas and criss-crossed with dykes
3) Even if 1&2 can be overcome the island flak defences were too heavy.
Did Brereton reply to Montgomery that an assault was not feasible for the above reason been interpret by Historian as overrule Montgomery.
If that the case the argument that Montgomery had no say over the FAAA no long hold water.
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@johnburns4017 John you need to actual study the planning process for Market Garden. What you are claiming is totally incorrect. Also, to keep it simple for you I only use Operation Market Garden Now and Then by Karel Margry which I know you love to quote and 21st Army Group Operation Market Garden
Fact 1 Operation Comet page 22 the Map Show the target for Comet was Arnhem Nijmegen area NOT Wesel as you claim. You well also note that Browning 1st Airborne Corp Hq was located on the Groesbeek Heights. On page 23 "In a stormy session aboard Eisenhower plane Montgomery won his superior approval for an expanded version of Operation Comet. Is occurred on 10th Sept. So, your statement "When the FAAA got hold of Comet to expand." is totally incorrect. FAAA only know about Market Garden after Montgomery got Eisenhower approval.
Fact 2 The reason for the 3 lifts was due to Montgomery decision to expand the airborne from 1st British Airborne Division and the Polish Brigade allocated for Comet to include the US 82nd and 101st For Market Garden which required 3,795 sorties to delivery the entire Market Force were as the total available aircraft was around 1,525 aircraft therefore each aircraft need to fly 2.5 sorties., hence the 3 lifts. Even Operation Comet Air Plan which was prepared by the RAF called for 2 lifts to deliver the Comet Force.
Fact 3 The single lift each day was due to the weather. On the morning of 17th fog grounded the aircraft until it cleared at 0900 hours this was recorded by 21 Army Group Appendix B to Part III
"D-1 16 Sept period 17-20 Sept Suitable for airborne ops with fair weather apart from morning fog light winds.
D Sept 17 Forecast Fog over bases clearing by 1000 hours with moderate amounts cumulus 3,000 ft and good visibility. Light winds. Summary of actual weather Similar to Forecast. Notes On advice given to General Brereton at 1800 hours it was decided to postpone take-off until 1030 hours
D+1 Sept 18th Fog on bases clearing shortly after 1000 hours visibility becoming good. Ops proceeded but Northern route only take-off 1030 hours."
Clearly, John with takeoff at 1000 hours only 1 lift was doable. All Surprise would be lost once the first troop started to land.
Fact 4 The Landing Zone at Arnhem if you study the map on page 22 you will see the same landing zone used for Market Garden was the same plan for Operation Comet which was decided by RAF and AVM Hollinghurst, Brereton was not involved in that decision.
Fact 5 "Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions etc" page 90 Operation Market Garden Now and Then quote
"On the morning of the 17th The Eight Air Force dispatched 872 B-17s to attack 117 Installations mostly anti-aircraft batteries along the troop carriers routes. B-17 were supported by 147 P-51's.
The period 18th to 21st Sept the 21 Army Group reported the following in regard to Air Support.
18th (page 43) During the whole day the weather was the limiting factor.
19th (page 45) Weather again was the limiting factor only 73 sorties flown.
20th (page 52) Bad weather and maintenance lift to Arnhem number of sorties only 259 of which 181 were purely fighter ops, air cover and sweeps. that leaves 78 sorties for air support.
21st (page 56) weather and necessity for air lifts number of sorties 259 of which 181 were purely fighter ops.
On the 17th 21 Army Group reported 550 sorties flown by 83 group between 1450 to 1830 hours"
So, John support was provided limited by weather conditions.
Fact 6 Operation Market Graden Now and Then page 24. The final decision relating to 101st Drop zone south of Eindhoven was made by General Dempsey after Montgomery referred Gen Taylor to Dempsey for Dempsey to make the final decision.
This is a comment posted regarding the Son Bridge (DAVE MAC)
"The Zon bridge was one of the few intact bridges on the Wilhelmina canal, most had been already demolished, and was itself prepared for demolition with a 'sprengkommando' of engineers from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', and supported by a heavy Flak battery of 8.8cm guns repositioned for ground defence. The canal itself was a defence line manned by troops of the Luftwaffe Flieger-Regiments - I believe Flieger-Regiment 53 was on the Sonsche forest sector between Best and Son. A/506th assembled quickly and followed by B Company moved to the Zon bridge through the forest and approached from the canal back, while 2/506 moved down the main street in Zon, clearing houses. There was a pitched battle for the bridge lasting at least an hour and the Germans blew the bridge when they realised they were about to lose it. I don't think you can blame anyone for that, it was an assault on a prepared position, a defended bridge, which was already also prepared for demolition. Since reading John Sliz's book, Bridging The Club Route - Guards Armoured Division's Engineers During Market Garden (2015), I'm convinced by his argument that there was zero delay at Zon since the bridging equipment was on site at 1930, just 30 minutes after XXX Corps arrived, and as it was already getting dark the Bailey bridge was completed entirely in the hours of darkness, when it was doctrine not to operate tanks. In his book, Corps Commander (1977), Horrocks said he had risked an advance with tanks at night twice in his career and it had paid off both times, so he felt that trying it a third time with so much at stake might be pushing his luck. He was already unhappy about the operation starting on a Sunday, in his experience, no operation starting on a Sunday had ever succeeded. So he gave orders that the armour was not to move at night in enemy territory, which was the case between the 101st Airborne's bridgeheads at Zon, St.Oedenrode and Veghel, and the 82nd Airborne's at Grave."
Clearly someone has done a lot of research into the Zon Bridge story.
But this is from Christer Bergstrom “Arnhem 1944 Vol 1 Page 135” we find the following, while it applied to the bridges at Veghel, we can assume the second part would also apply to the Son Bridge.
“The fact that all these bridges had fallen into the enemy hands undamaged came as a shock to the German Paratroop General Student. “According to the plans for a further German withdrawal,” he recounted “all bridges had been prepared for demolition, and were guarded by strong detachments and special demolition commandoes. Each bridge had a responsible bridge commandant who had orders to blow up the bridge in case of immediate danger.”
It would appear that the chance of the 101st capturing the Son Bridge intact was very low.
As to your comment "The FAAA was under SHAEF. It was to be used by the army groups when needed. For Market Garden the FAAA was notionally under the 21st Army Group, in participating in their operations(s), but directly under its command. They were under Eisenhower."
Technically all ground force was under Eisenhower command including the 21st Army Group. For Market Garden FAAA was under the command of 21 Army Group Group (Montgomery) not notionally but actually.
But John you know all of this, as you been told a number of occasions.
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@davemac1197
Dave
1) if Montgomery on the 11th requested Operation Infatuate which was an attack on Walcheren Island to help open up Antwerp were would Brereton get the troops. 1st British 101st US and 82nd US were committed to Market Garden, the 6th British had just return to Britain and 17th US had just arrived in the UK. What support would be provided to assist the Airborne Force as all of 2nd Army was also committed to Market Garden. That would leave the 1st Canadian Army which was busy opening up the Channel ports as per Montgomery 14thSeptember Directive M525
FIRST CANADIAN ARMY
8. Complete the capture first of Boulogne, and then of Calais.
9. Dunkirk will be left to be dealt with later; for the present it will be merely masked.
10. The whole energies of the Army will be directed towards operations designed to enable full use to be made of the port of Antwerp.
Airborne troops are available to co-operate.
Air operations against the island of Walcheren have already commenced and these include: (a) the isolation of the island by taking out road and rail bridges. (b) attacks on coast defence guns. (c) attacks on other artillery, including flak.
So, Dave which units would have been involved in Montgomery 11th September propose Operation Infatuate.
2) It was Dempsey that made the final decision about the drop zone south of Eindhoven after Taylor raised the objection to the number of small drops zones over a 30 Klm of the highway, not Williams and it was Horrocks that made the decision to stop at Valkenswaard on the night of the 17th and not push onto Eindhoven.
3) As to the double lift on the 17th prove 2 lifts were possible when you consider the period of a New Moon ruled out night operation especial Glider Operations. I image when you talk about the second lift you are only looking at the transport group turnaround times. For a second lift Brereton and Williams would also need to arrange a second anti-flak mission by 8th AF, 9th AF and Bomber Command. The question would 2nd TAF also be used to fly a second anti-flak mission or focus on CAS. Then you need to consider the number of fighters and pilots than can be turnaround to escort the flak mission and transports involved in the second lift. As the second lift will be return in the dark due to new moon period so there would be not moonlight. How do you expect the single eater day fighter to navigate back to their bases. Final the size of the second lift, if you assuming the second on the 17th would be the same size as the historical second lift you would be mistaken. A second lift on the 17th if it was possible would be smaller than the historical second lift.
4) Coupe de Main in daylight would be very risk unless 100% of AA Guns around Arnhem Bridge were not out before the Coupe de Main force arrived. Could the Airforce guarantee that level of success. The Coupe de main for Grave bridge was not needed as the DZ sites were close to both ends of the bridge. As for Nijmegen the 82nd would have undertaken the coupe de main if Gavin though it was possible not the British as all the British Glider force would be needed at Arnhem.
You keep claiming the dropping of the coup de main compromise Market. Have you actual consider that the coupe de main for Operation Comet could have compromise Operation Comet. The H-hour for coupe de main was 0430 Hours, and the main lift was 0745 Hours. Once the coupe de main arrive the element of surprise would be lost, and the Germans would have 3 hours warning that an airborne operation was under way and the target were the bridges. Whether the German could have taken advantage of the warning we would never know.
5) Even if the Nijmegen Bridge was captured on the 17th there no way to say with 100% certainty XXX Corp would have reached Arnhem, as they failed on the 21st.
6) You quote John Manus September Hope which John included the following: (page 162)
"Enemy soldiers poured out of the half-track and ran in all directions. To the veteran paratroopers who caught glimpses of them, they appeared to be wearing the spotted camouflage uniforms typical of the SS. In fact, they were members of an SS reconnaissance battalion, probably from the 9th SS Panzer Division, and they had traveled from Arnhem to Nijmegen to buttress the bridge defenses. They were arriving just in the nick of time. Unbeknownst to the Americans, they were joining a 750-man Kampfgruppe (roughly analogous to an American battalion) made up of reservists, NCOs, antiaircraft men, and parachute trainees, under a colonel named Henke and named for him. Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge. These were the actual defenders of the Nijmegen bridges, not the paltry squad of misfits portrayed in the Dutch resistance reports."
According to John Manus Henke men would have been in position before Atkins would have reach the bridge if Atkin heard 9th SS Recon Bn arriving as he was leaving the bridge.
Without knowing when Warren men would have reached the bridge if there was no delay, how do you prove what was the strength of the German force protecting the approaches to the Bridge.
Also, as Atkins in his narrative does not provide any details of what he saw between leave the rest of the patrol and reaching the bridge, how can we be 100% certain he did not spot any Germans on the way to the bridge.
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@johnburns4017 You right the British did have ship and airborne radar. If you study the actual raid the best chance the British had was the night of the 5th when the distance was only about 120 miles due to as Boyd pointed out
"This was a high-risk strategy. A combination of careful positioning, luck, and Japanese errors nearly produced the preconditions for a strike on the night of 5 April; the enemy was within 125 miles (201 km) – 1-hour flight range in an Albacore – but accurate information on the enemy's vector was missing. Even then, it required experienced air crews to find their targets at night, using radar with a range of just 20 miles (32 km) and new tactics." The problem was British even with radar was unable to locate the Japanese force.
On the other hand, "Japanese intelligence on the morning of 5 April 1942 indicated that British carriers were absent, and the Japanese morning air search was limited accordingly. At dawn, Japanese aerial reconnaissance aircraft flew off to the south-west and north-west; they would fly out to a maximum of 200 miles (320 km) over the next few hours."
So, Japanese reconnaissance was also poor.
John, when the Japanese spotted the 2 British Cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire both were sunk, as was the Hermes. Clearly John the Japanese had the advantage if they spotted the British Fleet during the day and British if they could attack at night. As its turnout either was able to locate the other to launch an attack.
At the Battle of Coral Sea 2 Japanese Carrier were able to sink the Lexington and Damage the Yorktown in return for one carrier damage and other air group suffering heavy losses so both missed Midway. In the Indian Ocean the Japanese had 5 Carriers and were at their peak.
John the British 3 carriers only carried 100 aircraft whereas the Japanese carried 350 aircraft.
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@johnburns4017 John your question only asked about fight in 4 Oceans, nothing about control. USS Saratoga did fight in the Indian Ocean. If you talk about assisting to gain control, then that a different question, then you right British command the Indian ocean. Therefore, on the same bases the US Navy gain control of the Pacific Ocean before the Arrival of the BPF. Therefore, by you definition you need to exclude the Pacific Ocean from the British.
As to the Japanese raid, you claim "They retreated out of the ocean being chased by a British fleet, and quite luckily for them avoided contact otherwise their carriers would have been sunk at night by British planes with onboard radar." Is not quite correct.
Source Boyd, Andrew (2017). "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" gives a different picture.
"By 6 April, British SIGINT indicated the Japanese force contained four carriers and three battleships, a force Somerville clearly realized was beyond the Eastern Fleet's capability to engage without undue risk."
"By 8 April, the Eastern Fleet had withdrawn [Roskill, Stephen (1956). War at Sea 1939-1945, Volume II, the Period of Balance] and the Japanese fleet was approaching Trincomalee from the east. The Japanese fleet was detected by a RAF Catalina at 15:17 on 8 April. The harbour at Trincomalee was cleared that night. Hermes, escorted by HMAS Vampire, was sent south along the coast."
"The British interpreted their position as precarious. Ceylon and the Eastern Fleet were required to safeguard the sea lines of communications through the Indian Ocean. The British expected the Japanese to continue threatening these lines. SIGINT suggested that the Japanese were preparing a deliberate advance across the Indian Ocean. The raid demonstrated that the RAF was too weak to defend Ceylon and the naval anchorages, and that the navy was ill-prepared to meet a Japanese carrier force.
The Eastern Fleet transferred its main base to Kilindini, Kenya, in East Africa, temporarily ceding the eastern Indian Ocean to the Japanese; from there it continued contesting control of the central Indian Ocean on better terms."
So, John the British was also lucky they were not spot in daylight, otherwise the British carriers may have been sunk.
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@johnburns4017 "Name the only country ever to fight a three continent four ocean war?" Britain and the USA - US Army and Air Force, Africa & Europe (1&2) North Africa, Sicily, Italy NW Europe, Asia (3) Burma/China (US 14th & 20th Air Forces and Merrill Marauder's US 5307 Composite Unit ) Australia (4th) US 5th Airforce various Army units before moving north.
US Navy,- Med in support of Touch, Husky and Invasion of Italy, USS Wasp ferry missions of Spitfires to Malta, North Atlantic(1) - support of British Home Fleet ( Washington, Alabama, Wasp Ranger with supporting Cruisers and Destroyers), Operation Touch Attack on the Tirpitz (Ranger) ; Arctic (2) - Russian Convoys (PQ 17 cover force included the Battleships HMS Duke of York and USS Washington); Indian Ocean (3) USS Saratoga operation with the Eastern Fleet in 1944, US submarine base Fremantle Aust and Pacific (4).
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@davemac1197 Dave your statement “Three Scout troopers from the 1/508th S-2 (Intel) Section secured seven prisoners at the southern end of the bridge without even firing a shot, and stayed for one hour before the SS panzer troops arrived at dusk, and nobody showed up to reinforce them. Most of the patrol got lost in the back streets and eventually left without reaching the bridge.” Is not supported by Phil Nordyke “Put us Down in Hell” or John McManus “September Hope”
Phil Nordyke pages 275 -276 Phil narrative of the patrol
On page 276 ”The firing alerted a German machine gun position down the road, which open fire pinning down the patrol. Fifteen members of the patrol were slightly wounded by ricocheting machine gun bullets.”
McManus, John C.. September Hope (pp. 159-160) “Once the lieutenant obtained a guide, he resumed the search for the bridge. Before they had even gone a block, they encountered two Germans and captured them. At the end of the next block, a German voice challenged them. One of Weaver’s machine gunners opened fire, killing him. No sooner had the echoes of the shooting died out than they heard a truck approaching. “The men lay flat on the sidewalk, unobserved, and fired with machine guns, BARs, bazooka, and grenades, stopping the truck and setting it afire,” an after-action report stated. Out of the darkness somewhere to the right, they began to take heavy machine gun fire. Bullets ricocheted off the pavement, wounding fifteen of the soldiers. The patrol’s greatest asset, surprise, was gone. They were compromised. They responded with enough fire to disengage and retreat. All of the wounded men were ambulatory. The guide led the patrol through several dark side streets, all the way to the traffic circle, known locally as Keizer Lodewijk Plein, that led to the bridge (nowadays the circle is known as Keizer Traianius Plein). With German strength in Nijmegen clearly building, and his patrol’s presence revealed to the enemy, Weaver decided that there was no sense in moving on the bridge itself. To do so would invite slaughter. His job was reconnaissance, not assault. He gathered up his men and started back to the battalion.”
From both accounts it was the Germans that stop the patrol from reaching the bridge.
If both accounts are correct then the standard statement that “highway bridge guarded by an NCO and seventeen men” is questionable. Why it may be true that the only 18 men were physically at the bridge, the approaches to the bridge clearly were cover by additional German forces.
McManus, John C.. September Hope on p. 162 states “In fact, they were members of an SS reconnaissance battalion, probably from the 9th SS Panzer Division, and they had traveled from Arnhem to Nijmegen to buttress the bridge defenses. They were arriving just in the nick of time. Unbeknownst to the Americans, they were joining a 750-man Kampfgruppe (roughly analogous to an American battalion) made up of reservists, NCOs, antiaircraft men, and parachute trainees, under a colonel named Henke and named for him. Only a few hours earlier, Henke had placed the bulk of his force in fortified pockets defending the railroad bridge and the road bridge. These were the actual defenders of the Nijmegen bridges, not the paltry squad of misfits portrayed in the Dutch resistance reports. Henke had placed outposts at the traffic circles that led to the bridges. These were the defenders of the Keizer Karelplein who had originally opened fire on A Company. At almost that exact moment, their SS reinforcements arrived. Collectively, these enemy soldiers now stood between the Americans and the bridges.”
As the common narrative is that 9 SS Recon arrived at Nijmegen at 2000 hours, it would imply that Henke had his men deployed by 1800 Hours. On page 274 Phil Nordyke states “Lieutenant Colonel Warren 1st Battalion arrived at De Ploeg at around 18.30pm 5 hours after landing.”
If John McManus and Phil Nordyke are both is correct Henke men reached the bridge 30 minutes before Warren men reached De Ploeg.” Thereby challenging the narrative the bridge was undefended.
Here the Nijmegen story becomes very interesting, what time did Warren and his men reached De Ploeg? Phil Nordyke states 1830 hours but is this correct because Poulussen and the US Official History states different time.
Poulussen, R.G.. Lost at Nijmegen: A rethink on operation "Market Garden" (p. 75) states “around 1400, 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, some three miles away. Around 1600, they arrived there - without German opposition - and dug in.”
US Official History The Siegfried Line Campaign p. 163 narrative “Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen a mile and a quarter southeast of the city astride the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway. Colonel Warren was to organize this objective for defense, tying in with the battalion near Hatert and the other near Hotel Berg en Dal, then was to "be prepared to go later." into Nijmegen. The assembly and movement to De Ploeg took approximately three and a half hours.”
So, who is correct? Because it would impact what time Warren could have reach the bridge if there was no delay and level of opposition he would have meet at the bridge.
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@davemac1197
So, Brereton and Williams compromise plan Sixteen, well maybe the Operation Sixteen timing and the distance may have contributed to the decision.
See the following analysis I did.
Have you actual studied the effects on the original air plan for Operation Sixteen which was air plan for Operation Linnet that used to develop Operation Sixteen Air Plan.
In the meeting are Browning, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst they produce the air plan for Operation Linnet as the starting point for Operation Sixteen. Due the change of date for Operation Sixteen from 3rd of September to 17th of September and the extra flying time due the longer distance to DZ/LZ they would realize that 4 factors have impact the ordinary air plan.
For this exercise we assume that Operation Linnet timing of the two lifts maximizes the time the Air Force has to turn around the 1st lift.
1. Dropping of the double tow
As part of the Linnet plan the USAAF were planning to use a double of gliders. However, the extra distance of Operation Sixteen is beyond the range of C-47 towing 2 Gliders. So only a single tow is possible, which has the following impact on the Air Plan. Operation Linnet would deliver the entire US division in 2 lifts due to double tow. Operation Sixteen due to the single tow will now require a third lift to deliver the entire Division, thereby reducing the number of troops and equipment delivered in the 2nd lift.
2. Shorter daylight hours.
Double daylight-saving time ended on 17th September hence the difference in the time between 3rd and 17th.
"Double DST ended – Clocks were turned back from double DST (2 hours ahead of standard time) to DST (1 hour ahead of standard time). Sunday, September 17, 1944, 2:00:00 am local daylight time instead."
On the 3rd of September the sun rise was 07:19 and sunset at 20:42 giving 13 hours 23 minutes of daylight. On the 17th sun rise was 06:41 and sunset at 19:10 giving 12 hours 29 minutes of daylight.
From Linnet to Operation Sixteen the amount of daylight is reduced by 54 minutes. The impact on the Air Plan is a reduction in the amount of time the Airforce have in turn around the 1st Lift which means a marginally smaller second lift for Operation Sixteen compared to Linnet.
If we look at Civil twilight on the 3rd it’s starts at 06:44 for morning ending in the evening at 21:17 time difference of 14 hours 33 minutes. On the 17th the times are 06:07 to 19:43 a difference of 13 hours 36 minutes a reduction of 57 minutes.
3. Extra distance.
Dave, I have yet to find a source that actual identify the extra distance or flying time between Linnet and Operation Sixteen. If we assume the extra time is 30 minutes each way of a total of 90 minutes.
If we underestimated the extra time than the total time will increase. If overestimated the extra time than total time will decrease.
The impact on the air plan is 90-minute reduction in the turnaround time which further reduces the number of aircraft that will be available for the 2nd lift.
4. Change in the moon cycle.
On the 3rd of September the moon rises at 20:17 setting at 06:59 with illumination of 99%.
On the 17th of September the moon rises at 06:04 setting at 19:48 with illumination of 0%
For Operation Sixteen with a new Moon period the dark moonless nights, which means no night operations.
We can only speculate the change in the cycle would have on the plan, my guest at best it would have no impact. The worst case it would further reduce the amount of time the airman would have to turn around the 1st lift.
Clearly, Dave just the change in date and the extra distance efficiently reduced the turn around available to the airmen to turnaround the 1st lift by 2 hours 30 minutes.
It would therefore have the following impact on the Air Plan for Operation Sixteen
1. The risk that the reduction in time could mean that only a single lift was possible because the aircrew have run out of time to prepare the second lift. or
2. Reduce time to for the ground crews to turn around the first lift would lead to a smaller second lift for Operation Sixteen compared to Linnet. Then the question is size of second lift a viable force? and or
3. The amount of time available to the air crews due to the reduction in time allow for the turn around will allow sufficient rest to enable the crew to undertake a second mission.
The last would also impact the pilots of the fighter escorts of the 2nd lift and the crew of the flak suppression mission for the second lift.
That before considering how the weather forecast for the 17th of September would impact the Air Plan.
At the end of the day maybe the decision reducing the number of lifts was decided for the Air man by the change in date and the extra distance.
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@davemac1197
So, Dave you claim that Gavin compromise Browning Plan by refusing to land a battalion on the north side of the Waal River. On what information did you use to reach that conclusion.
You reference the conversation between Gavin and Ryan date 1967.
“The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by a coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. for days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.”
But you fail to include the following comment
“Gavin hesitated to speculate what might have happened if he had put troops down on the northern end of the bridge, however, He did not, think a company could have held it and he openly wondered if even a battalion might have. “
At the time Gavin was making the decision, he had the following intelligence reports.
One: The presentence of 4,000 SS Troops See the reference in the following sources:
From Jeffson, Major Joel. Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored.
“In the general enemy situation section, the annex states, “There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group Area.”{132} In describing the German units in the area of operations, it is noted that a “broken” panzer division is reported in the vicinity of Arnhem and that it may yield up to fifty tanks. It also addresses 4,000 SS troops that are reportedly in Nijmegen after relocating from Amsterdam.{133} “
Note 132 and 133 82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11, 11 September 1944.
From Warren Dr. John C.. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater [Illustrated Edition] (p. 294).
“General Gavin had directed that if all went well in these operations a battalion should be sent as soon as possible to take the Nijmegen bridge. More than 4,000 SS troops had been reported in Nijmegen, but the bridge was essential and a bold stroke might take it. With surprise and darkness to aid them the attackers might bypass the main German garrison and reach the bridge, which was on the eastern edge of the town.”
Two: In one of your comments about tanks near Nijmegen especial in the Reichswald.
“Gavin was given a steer (stripped of unit IDs to protect 'Ultra' as a source) that "a regiment of SS" may be in Nijmegen, and possibly drawing tanks from a depot thought to be near Kleve, behind the Reichswald forest. The Frundsberg were actually at Ruurlo in the Achterhoek and the panzer depot was actually near Münster, deeper into Germany. I don't know what the source of the Kleve intel was, but it was false.” How and when did you know the Kleve was False?
Gavin in his planning unless he received updated intel that both previous reports were either false or that both groups have left the Nijmegen. Any competent Planner must assume both would be in the Nijmegen area on the 17th.
I know that you state for a Business Analysis the first rule is near assume. However, for strategic planning the two thing you learn is that assumes based on known information or data are part of any planning process. The second, plan for the worst and hope for the best. That way you reduced of any adverse surprises.
Gavin in planning an attack on the Nijmegen Bridge would also assume that the Germans may have garrison and fortify the village of Lent just north of the Bridge. Only when the force lands and approach's Lent would Gavin know for sure if Lent had been occupied and fortified.
There is 3 possible plan Gavin could implement with the single Battalion he had available to attack the bridge.
Plan A is to replica Tucker’s plan for the Grave Bridge by landing one company on the north side of the Waal River and the other 2 companies on the south side. (Coupe de main approach). The company on the north side is isolated from the rest of the Division and cannot be supported or extracted if it runs into difficulties. There also the question would it be able to overcome the possible German force in Lent and the question could this company be resupplied until contact the rest of the Division is achieved.
Plan B the Browning request to land the entire battalion on the north side. Therefore, under this plan no troops would be available to attack the south side. As with Plan A the battalion would be isolate and cannot be support. The same question, what would happen if the Battalion failed to overcome the possible German defenses at Lent.
Plan C The plan Gavin implemented, land the Battalion on the south side, and if require Gavin could commit his reserves to directly support the attack on the bridge.
I know if I ask which plan you would implement you will go with Plan B.
Before you come back about that both Intel reports were false, ask yourself how you I know these reports are false and how and when Gavin would know the reports are false or both reported forces have left the Nijmegen area by the 17th.
Finally, Dave there a difference between taking a calculate risk bases on known information and situation and being reckless.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Tony, the problem is that either Rotterdam or Amsterdam was target for Market Garden.
From Montgomery Memoirs
The orders issued by me on the 14th September are interesting as showing how I was trying to carry out his intentions. I give them in full below. Paras. 2 and 10 seem to be especially important. OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE: M 525
Para 2 We have captured the port of Antwerp, but cannot make use of it as the enemy controls the mouth of the Scheldt; operations to put this matter right will be a first priority for Canadian Army.
Para 4 Together with 12 Army Group, we will now begin operations designed to isolate and surround the Ruhr; we will occupy that area as we may desire.
Our real objective, therefore, is the Ruhr. But on the way to it we want the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, since the capture of the Ruhr is merely the first stop on the northern route of advance into Germany.
INTENTION
Para 5. To destroy all enemy west of the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Cleve-Venlo-Maastricht, with a view to advancing eastwards and occupying the Ruhr.
Canadian Army (6 Divisions)
8. Complete the capture first of Boulogne, and then of Calais.
9. Dunkirk will be left to be dealt with later; for the present it will be merely masked.
10. The whole energies of the Army will be directed towards operations designed to enable full use to be made of the port of Antwerp.
Airborne troops are available to co-operate. (what airborne troops was there are committed to Market Garden)
Air operations against the island of Walcheren have already commenced and these include: (a) the isolation of the island by taking out road and rail bridges. (b) attacks on coast defence guns. (c) attacks on other artillery, including flak.
13 Having completed the operation for the opening of Antwerp, vide para. 10, Canadian Army will operate northwards on the general axis Breda-Utrecht-Amsterdam.
Inter-Army boundary, all inclusive Canadian Army: Herenthals-Turnhout-Tilburg- s’Hertogenbosch-Zaltbom-mel- Utrecht-Hilversum. Task: To destroy all enemy to the west of the Army boundary, and open up the port of Rotterdam.
SECOND BRITISH ARMY
15. The first task of the Army is to operate northwards and secure the crossings over the Rhine and Meuse in the general area Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave. An airborne corps of three divisions is placed under command Second Army for these operations.
16. The Army will then establish itself in strength on the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Arnhem, facing east, with deep bridgeheads to the east side of the Ijssel river.
From this position it will be prepared to advance advance eastwards to the general area Rheine-Osnabrück-Hamm-Münster.
In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards Hamm, from which place a strong thrust will be made southwards along the eastern face of the Ruhr.
You see Tony Rotterdam was only to be attack once Antwerp and its approaches were secured. It was the cases of Rotterdam replacing Antwerp.
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John Cornell You still wishing to blame Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst about the single lift decision.
Ok John you have overall control of the Air Plan you order Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst to arrange for 2 lifts on the 17th Sept which they agree to do, with the first lift at 0830 (Bombing Mission 0630 to 0830) and second lift at 1830. On the 18th the 3rd lift will be at 1200. Clearly you, Monty and Airborne Commanders would be happy. The Airborne Commanders would develop their individual Divisional plans based on these times.
John as you have overall you are advised that both the 1st British Airborne and 82nd US Airborne airfield have good weather, however reports from 101st they are experience thick fog (Which occurred historically) but it should be clear by 0900.
You meet with Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst to discuss options. You are advised that the weather for the 18th would be similar to 17th.
The options are:
1) Follow the 21st Army Group Directive and postpone the operation for 24 Hours.
2) Allow both the 1BA and 82nd to takeoff as plan, but delay the 101st with a revised takeoff time of 0900 and a new H-Hour of 1200. (Historically 101st Take off was 1000 with H-Hour 1300). The revised 2nd lift will be 2200, as this would involve a night operation, it would be cancelled as per current decision about night operations involving Gliders. The 2nd Lift will be rescheduled for 18th and 3rd Lift will also be rescheduled. Gen Taylor is informed so he can revise his plans. There no revision of XXX Corp starting time. The risk with this option the Germans will have 3 ½ hours warning in the 101st Sector and would therefore have time to destroy the bridges.
3) To delay the entire Airborne operations, with a revised takeoff time 0900 and H-Hour of 1200. XXX Corp is advised and their revised H-hour is 1300. Due to the delay the second lift is cancelled due to current policy regarding night landings, and rescheduled for 18th with the 3rd Lift is also rescheduled. All Airborne Commanders are informed so they can amend their plans for later arrival of 2nd and 3rd lifts.
So, John what option would you approved.
Clearly option 3 is identical to the historical plan, except the Airborne Commanders Plan would have factored in the later arrival times.
With what happen historical with the weather on the 17th, do you still think their decision of a single lift on the 17th was the wrong decision.
My Source about the fog : Buckingham Arnhem, Divisions Airborne Operations WW2: European Theatre
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@thevillaaston7811 What Bombing missions, the source is Operation Market Garden Now and then pages 91 -92
"Before the carpet could be laid, the ground had to be cleared. This work was begun by 282 RAF bombers which on the night D-1 attacked airfields at Leeuwarden, Steenwijk-Havelte, Hopsten and Salzbergen within fighter range of Market objectives and formidable flak installations around the bridge at Moerdijk which menaced planes flying the northern change.
On the morning of September 17, the 8th Air Force dispatched 872 B-17's to attack 117 installations mostly anti-aircraft batteries along the troop carrier routes. Schedule to arrive at 0900 hours, they were delayed for 30 minutes, but did their bombing between 0930 to 1130 hours.
Another operation that morning was an attack by 85 Lancasters and 15 Mosquitos of the RAF escorted by 53 spitfires against coastal defences on Walcheren"
I refer to YouTube channel WWTV video "They were all over the sky, Market Garden Bombing"
"A very neglected aspect of Operation Market Garden is the American bombing raids just before and during this operation. Hundreds of American B-17 'Flying Fortress' bombers from a total of 22 Bomb Groups of the 8th Air Force were sent to target German air defenses and other military targets spread over 119 locations in the Netherlands. These bombings were not always very accurate and claimed many victims among the Dutch civilian population, including many children. The versatile P-47 Thunderbolt fighter-bombers equipped with bombs and rockets were also used during this combat period to support the Allied airborne troops and to disrupt the German forces in the Netherlands.
Antoon Meijers is a former captain at the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service (EOD) in the Netherlands. His book "They were all over the Sky" is a chronicle of the American bombing raids during Operation Market Garden - September 1944"
So, The Villa Aston that a brief summary of the Bombing Mission
Also the impact of the bombing mission on the timing of the Airlift on the 17th, clearly the bombing mission need to be undertaken before the lift on the 17th takeoff.
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@thevillaaston7811 That right just compare Allied losses is a pointless comparison as you did by posting "Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties)."
As is often mention in sources German losses are difficult to count with precision, as well as distance gain. Do you use maximum distance achieve or average across the entire front or area captured.
What I used in my comment was reported minimum and maximum from various sources. As I send "Clearly it is difficult to get accurate totals for the German Losses."
I was comparing German losses to Allied losses to see how each operation compares. Hence I used both the low and highest, with the actual number lying in-between the two. This would remove the difference in length and size of the battle.
An other comparison is Allied losses per day of operation. From Highest to lowest Bulge (2,275) Market Garden (1,889) Hurtgen Forest (625 ) Lorraine (511). The problem here is the intensity of the Battle, size of forces involved. Clearly large the battle high would be day losses. So here we would also be comparing Apples to oranges and the results would be meaningless. Just as total losses, the longer the battle high would would be the total losses, an other meaningless comparison.
As to Aachen you quoted 20,000 which I could not verify, One source quote 5,000 allied and 10,600 German just for the town itself with the battle from 2/10/1944 to 21/10/1944 (19 days). As to total operation I can not obtain any reference to German Losses. So I excluded because I was not confident in using what Data I had.
As to outcomes, How do you measure outcomes. Montgomery claims Market Garden was 90% successful, but the operation failed to reach the stated end goal of Usselmeer. So how did Montgomery calculate the 90%?
So were do we start and finish, I say, if you going to quote casualty figures you need to qualify them by either comparing them to German Losses or at least length and size of battle. Unqualified allied losses is a pointless by themselves.
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@thevillaaston7811 Your comment “Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).”
TheVilla Aston you are comparing apples to oranges and only providing part of the story as usual which favour your weak argument.
Firstly, Market Garden was only 9 days operation Patton’s Lorraine campaign which include Metz was 108 days Hurtgen Forest was 88 days.
Clearly longer the action higher would be the aggerate casualties.
How about the relative German loss?
Clearly it is difficult to get accurate totals for the German Losses.
Market Garden Low estimate 6,315 high 17,200 giving a ratio for each Allied casualty a range of 0.37 to 1.01 based on your 17,000
Patton Lorraine German captured 75,000 (low estimate) the high estimate 180,000 giving a ratio of 1.36 to 3.26 Germans loss per Allied loss.
Hurtgen Forest German loss 28,000 ratio of .51 battle lasted 88 days.
The Battle of the Bulge, lasted 40 days, Allied losses of 90,980 German low 63,222 to high of 98,000 ratios of between 0.69 to 1.08.
Clearly Hurtgen Forest was the worst at 1 Allied to 0.51 German casualty.
Market Garden ratio is about the same as Battle of the Bulge based on the highest German loss estimates (1.01 to 1.08) If the lower estimate is used for Market Garden has the worst outcome of only 1 Allied to 0.36 German Casualty.
Clearly Germans paid a very high price in stopping Patton in Lorraine at some were between 1.36 to 3.26 per Allied casualty.
Yes, Lorraine and Battle had higher loss but both last a lot longer than Market Garden, but then German losses were also higher.
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John Cornell From the same source
Arriving at Nijmegen, Gräbner met the men of Kampfgruppe Henke, under the command of Oberst (Colonel) Fritz Henke (Fallschirm-Lehrstab 1 – (Parachute Teaching Staff 1) who, at that time, commanded the defence of Nijmegen and the Waal bridges. Kampfgruppe Henke was, in addition to its own staff (Stab Fallschirm-Ausbildungs-Regiment also Fallschirm-Lehrstab 1), composed of: Ersatz-Bataillon 6, Replacement Battalion 6 (Wehrkreis (military district) VI with 3 companies), Hermann Göring Kompanie (Company) "Runge", a training unit for NCO's and a company of the Ordnungspolizei Rüstungsinspektion (Order Police Armament Inspection) Holland who had to guard the bridges. This defence was supplemented with some Flak units that were mounted as air defence at the railway bridge and the road bridge, two 88 mm Flak of 4. Kompanie, 572 schwere (heavy) Flak Bataillon, five pieces of 47 mm ordnance and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. Henke had a total of about 750 men at his disposal for the defence of Nijmegen.
In Lent, a village in the vicinity of Nijmegen on the northern bank of the Waal river, the defence was deployed by the Landersschützen Kampfgruppe Assault Group Hartung. From the Betuwe area, the 21. Batterie, SS-Artillerie-Ausbildungs-und-Ersatz-Regiment (21st battery, SS artillery training and replacement regiment), along with the Stabsbatterie und Stab (Staff battery and Staff), under the command of SS-Sturmbannführer (major) Oskar Schwappacher, was sent to Oosterhout (Gelderland) in support and defence of both the Waal bridges. Schwappacher himself established his headquarters near the traffic bridge on the Nijmegen side in the Belvedère, a 15th century watchtower overlooking on the Waal river. Although Gräbner retreated northbound to Elst around 21:00 hrs., where he could send his unit either to Nijmegen or Arnhem, he left one Zug (platoon), (unit of 5 Panzerspähwagen) (armoured scout car) in the vicinity of the Waal Bridge. This unit was going to be withdrawn in the direction of Elst, but before that, skirmishes with American units at the Keizer Karelplein would occur.
From Kershaw, Robert. It Never Snows in September:
As news spread in Nijmegen about airborne landings south of the city, Colonel Henke, commanding a spare Fallschirmjaeger Training Regiment staff headquarters, was ordered to co-ordinate the necessary measures to safeguard the two bridges crossing the Waal in Nijmegen. Henke ‘alarmed’ all in situ local forces and took them under command. Kampfgruppe ‘Henke’,
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@davemac1197
Dave from Atkinson, Rick. The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945 (Liberation Trilogy Book 3) (p. 713)
"Boy Browning declared himself ready to sacrifice a third of his MARKET force in simply laying the airborne carpet, but such a gallant immolation would prove unnecessary."
Note 264 Boy Browning declared himself ready: memo, G-3, 82nd Airborne, Oct. 23, 1945 [sic], JMG papers, CJR, box 100, folder 3; SLC, 137–39; Hills, Phantom Was There, 251 (“That means business”); Saunders, The Red Beret, 216 (British sergeant strutted).
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@davemac1197 Your talk about proposal SIXTEEN, having check the air plan presented to Montgomery on the 10th of September was from Operation Linnet not operation Comet. As Operation Comet only involved a single division, were as Linnet included the 3 divisions planned to be used for Operation Sixteen.
The Air Plan for Operation Linnet included:
1) Day time Operation
2) 2 lifts on first day
3) The USAAF was planning to use double tow of Gliders
But not coupe de main. Therefore, coupe de main would have to be added to Operation Linnet Air plan for Market not deleted has you Brits like to claim, because you cannot delete something that did not exist in the first place. If Operation Comet was the starting point for Market Garden, then it would be correct that the coupe de main was dropped.
The double lift was dropped as the distance for Market Garden exceed the endurance of C-47 towing 2 Gliders, hence the need for a 3rd lift for the 2 American Divisions for market Garden.
As to the difference approaches regarding the use of Glider Pilots between to Airforce is the same as the British Policy of Glider First vs US approach of paratroops first. Both coming from each approach to doctrine based on experience based on exercises.
How do you know that the US Glider infantry were not trained as assault Troops? It's the same as saying the British paratroopers were not trained as assault troops because they arrived after the Air landing Troops had secured the landing zones.
As to 33% lost only relating to Coupe de main
Cooper, Alan W.. Air Battle for Arnhem (p. 45)
The plan was for eighteen selected crews flying Horsas’s from Harwell. The man standing by to fly the first glider was Staff Sergeant James (Jimmy) Wallwork who had landed with great skill the first of three gliders to land at Pegasus Bridge on the evening of the 5 June prior to the Normandy landings: Jimmy thought the idea not practicable and today glad it did not take place. The Arnhem Bridge being much larger than the Pegasus Bridge and had a garrison of soldiers, where as the Pegasus was only lightly defended. The plan was for six Horsa gliders to be led by Captain Buchan of the K.O.S.B the famous whisky company and who made sure that a good store of whisky was aboard the glider. James would have had his No 2 pilot Stan Pearson who was a No 1 on the Normandy Coup de Main, also flying one of the three gliders that landed at the Pegasus Bridge as they were the only crew with the experience required and the other five would follow them down in line astern. He thinks now after sixty years that they would be the only ones with lights on, having been released at a height of 2,500 feet. They were to land on the riverbank at low tide, up the steps and over the bridge, the odds were so much against this that Jimmy feels now that they would have been the only ones to make the landing zone. He remembers that they actually loaded up and then it was called off at the last moment, and the next day it was cancelled for good.
From one of the Pegasus veterans though the losses would be close to 83% at Arnhem, he also mentions the inexperience of the other 5 Glider crew.
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TheVilla Aston you claim that two drops on the first day were entirely doable (your words), the real question, was two drops practicable?
If we assume for this exercise except for daylight hours the weather for Dragoon and 17th Sep were the same, later we look at the actual weather later.
As Operation Dragoon plan by Williams included 2 drop it is the logical starting point for planning Operation Market.
For the 101st and 82nd Market plan 1st lift was paratroopers and a small Glider element and 2nd lift entirely Gliders. Dragoon Timetable subject to weather would work for 101st and 82nd, as the 1st lift arriving at 0430, with the Glider element arriving at 0800 and 2nd lift at 1800.
However, for the 1st British based on the Market plan the 1st and 2nd lifts were a combined Paratroop and Glider force. Based on Dragoon the first lift would not arrive until 0800, 3 ½ hours after the 2 American Divisions. Clearly Dragoon timetable while doable was not practicable for Operation Market.
If we adjust Dragoon so that the entire 1st Lift arrives at 0800, therefore based on the Dragoon time gap of 13 ½ hours the 2nd lift would arrive at 1930 which would mean a night landing for Glider, so based on policy no 2nd lift would be practicable.
If assume the 2nd lift H-hour was schedule for 1800 a time gap of only 10 hours, is this possible?
If we breakdown the 10 hours, the first component is time the 1st Lift need to return to based, (no information is available) if we assume 2 ½ to 3 hours. And the time to fly from base to drop zones based on historical 1st lifts timetable of around 3 hours. That would leave 4 to 4 ½ hours for the ground crew to prepare the second lift. Clearly its doable the question is how many aircraft would be available for the 2nd Lift as well as how many aircraft would be available to escort the 2nd Lift. Clearly no information is available to make a realist estimation.
So, based on the above 2 lifts may be doable in theory, would the size of the 2nd Lift make it practicable force? Clearly how knows?
Who state that Brereton would have a get out only if a 2 drop plan on the 17th had only been thwarted by the weather. So what was the weather forecast and actual on the 17th?
This what was reported by 21 Army Group
“16th Period 17-20 Sept suitable for airborne operations with fair weather apart from morning fog light winds.
17th Fog over bases clearing by 1000 with moderate amounts cumulus 3000 ft thereafter and good visibility. Summary of Actual Weather – Similar to forecast”
Clearly TheVilla Aston fog on the morning of the 17th would have caused a delay of the 1st Lift and cancelation of the 2nd Lift, as the takeoff time for 1st Lift would be 1000 and the 2nd lift 2000 which would result in a night operation which is not possible for large Glider Force.
If Brereton informed the 3 Airborne Commanders that he was planning for 2 lifts on the 17th and they planned accordingly, their plans would have been throw into chaos when Brereton cancelled the 2nd lift on the evening of the 16th due to expected fog on the morning of the 17th.
As to whether to plan for 2 lifts verse the decision of single lift? We do not known the detail weather forecast available to Brereton when he made the decision to authorize a single lift each day. We do know however, that except for the 16th the days leading up to 17th experience morning fog. So it safe to assume the forecast would have included some reference to the possibility of morning fog on the 17th.
Based on the actual weather on the 17th only a single lift was practicable, even Montgomery in this summary blame the weather as a factor in the failure of the Operation.
So why blame Brereton and Williams for the failure of the operation when they cannot control the weather or the lack of aircraft. Especially as they need two days of clear weather with no fog to flying the entire force to fulfill Montgomery Plan for Market.
As to whether Brereton and his Organization was fit for purpose? Clearly it was fit for purpose for Operation Varsity.
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@johnburns4017
1) "That the Germans that occupied and reinforce Nijmegen on the 18th, if the 82nd had captured the bridge would have fortified the island,"
That is a bad excuse for not taking the bridge. Apart from the slow ferry, they could not fortify the island with much at all."
Firstly, I did not give say that the Germans would have reinforce the island as an excuse for not capturing the bridge, but what you never consider the possible German reaction if the bridge had been captured on the 17th.
2) "one of the reasons XXX Corp stop at Lent on the evening of the 20th because they lack infantry to lead the advance from Lent to Arnhem."
Nope. The tanks were exhausted of fuel & ammunition with the crews needing sleep, because they were aiding the 82nd retake Nijmegen, which the 82nd gifted to the Germans."
You provide a valid reason why XXX Corp on the evening of the 20th was not in a position to move on Arnhem.
Yet in your pervious post "Use simple sums. XXX Corp reached Zon at 1900 Hours on D-Day plus 1. If it took them 2 hrs 45 mins to run up 26 miles of road, they would have been in Nijmegen at 2145 hrs d-day plus 1, seven miles from Arnhem. If the 82nd had seized the Nijmegen bridge, XXX Corps would have reached the south of the Arnhem bridge probably around 2300 hrs on d-day plus 1." I would image that XXX Corp on the 18th would have reach Zon after a day of heavy fighting short of fuel and needing rest, but you claim that they would have been able to cover 70 klm to Arnhem in 4 hours. But on the 20th in the same condition unable to cover a shorter distance to Arnhem.
3) "For all the concern that must have existed about getting to Arnhem, only a small part of the British armor was freed late on D plus 4, 21 September, to start the northward drive. As the attack began, British commanders saw every apprehension confirmed. The ground off the main roads was low-lying, soggy bottom-land, denying employment of tanks.
A few determined enemy bolstered with antitank guns might delay even a large force."
Yet again in your pervious post you claim XXX Corp would have cross the same terrain in the dark in 1 hour 15 minutes.
It appears to me your previous post about your claim XXX Corp would have reach Arnhem by D+1 by rapid movement, if the bridges were capture as a way of blame the two US Divisions. Yet in your latest post you provide evidence to justify the delay by XXX Corp in moving towards Arnhem after both bridges were in Allied hands.
I have yet to see from your any evidence that proves with 100% Certain the 101st could have captured the Zon Bridge or 82nd the Nijmegen Bridge, all I see from you are unsupported speculative claims.
Have you ever considered that the German had a say in the matter regarding the 2 bridges.
How do you know if the German had already prepared the Zon bridge for demolition even before 101st actually landed and was always in the position of destroying the bridge once the 1st Allied soldier appeared. Also, in an alternative history the 101st and British 1st switch assignments and British were responsible for the capture of the Zon Bridge, and they failed to capture intact would you be as critical of the 1st as you are of the 101st.
Believe what you what to believe.
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@johnburns4017 Yes they cover the distance from Zon to Nijmegen on the 19th in quick time.
Your statement "Use simple sums. XXX Corp reached Zon at 1900 Hours on D-Day plus 1. If it took them 2 hrs 45 mins to run up 26 miles of road, they would have been in Nijmegen at 2145 hrs d-day plus 1, seven miles from Arnhem. If the 82nd had seized the Nijmegen bridge, XXX Corps would have reached the south of the Arnhem bridge probably around 2300 hrs on d-day plus 1."
Assumes the following:
1) XXX Corp would disobey the standing order from 21 Army Group to only operate during daylight hours. (Source: 21 Army Group Operation Market Garden page 12 Section 5 part 21 Period of Movement and Harbouring (a) The Principle of movement was that movement should take place by day only. (b) Formation and units would harbour along the road each night, retaining their order of priority.
2)Hence one of the reasons XXX Corp stop at Lent on the evening of the 20th because they lack infantry to lead the advance from Lent to Arnhem. Why did XXX Corp only start north on the 21st at 1330 hours, why not at 0630 hours. The reason the delay in the 43rd Division reaching Nijmegen to lead the advance over the Island.
3) That the Germans that occupied and reinforce Nijmegen on the 18th, if the 82nd had captured the bridge would have fortified the island, On the 21st when XXX Corp started north from Nijmegen towards Arnhem were quick stop just north of Lent at Ressen. Only reaching Elst halfway to Arnhem on the 23rd and Driel on the evening of the 22nd.
Your calculation of time from Nijmegen to Arnhem of 1 hour 15 minutes can only assume the Germans that arrived in Nijmegen historically on the 18th including 4 Jagdpanzers and artillery would just disappear if the 82nd had captured the bridge. On the 21st it took just "1 Sturmguschutz opened fire down the road as the leading troop came into the open and quickly knocked out 3 Shermans. Source the Island Nijmegen to Arnhem page 52." It was supported by 7 old 75mm French Guns with no AP Rounds effectively stop XXX Corp for the whole day.
Yet you believe XXX could cover the distance in only 1 hour 15 minutes. get real.
So, based on 21 Army Group orders XXX Corp would have stop at Zon for the night of D+1.
Montgomery set the date as the 17th, not Eisenhower. read his memoirs.
As for XII and VIII Corps problems Montgomery and Dempsey would have known their problems but still issue the following.
Garden plan approved by 21 Army Group for 2nd Army
"Summary of 2nd Army Plan Operation Market Garden
3 Task of Flanking Formations and Airborne Troops.
VIII Corp
ViII Corp consisting of 3 British Division was to move up on the right of XXX Corp and carry out the following task
1) Protect the right and rear of XXX Corp
2) On Advance of XXX Corp progressively to relieve 30 Corp of responsibility for right flank protection
XII Corp
XII Corp consisting of 7th Armoured Division, 4th Armoured Brigade 15th Division was to continue to operate on the left flank of XXX Corp and carry out the following tasks
1) Progressively relieve XXX Corp of responsibility for left flank of XXX Corp by capturing Rethy 1599, Arendonck 1505 and Turnhout 0606.
2) Subsequently to advance to River Maas and possible beyond."
Clearly, Montgomery and Dempsey were aware of what division were available on the 17th. The decision to go to Arnhem was Montgomery, if he lacked the resource to complete Market Garden, he could have either cancel the operation in the same way he canceled Operation Comet due to growing German resistance or delay the operation which it proposed on the 11th (See his memoirs) to 26th due to lack of resources.
Montgomery made the decision to proceed on the 17th.
But you know all this anyhow.
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@johnburns4017
Talking about facts
"The road from Zon to Arnhem was still clear 40 hours after the jump. If the two US para units had taken their bridges XXX Corps would have been in Arnhem on d-day plus 1 in the evening." Where is your evidence the road was clear for 40 hours? Which source shows the road was clear? You talk about me be slaughter by facts, yet where are your facts. I never said the US never screwed up. But what I read and studied, there is no concrete evidence that proves with 100% certain that US 101st could have captured the Zon bridge intact.
The same with 82nd at Nijmegen. At Nijmegen, you have conflicting accounts for 1) The size of the force guarding the bridge (Either less than 20 to Ad-Hoc force of second line troops of 750 back by 88mm and 20mm Guns) 2) The time Warren actually reached the bridge. (The earliest I have read is 2200 hours and the latest 2400 hours). 3) The time 508th reached De Ploeg either at 1600 (Poulussen) or 1700 (US Official History). 4) The delay De Ploeg again depending on the sources 2 - 5 hours. So how can you say with 100% certainty 82nd should have capture both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge, especially when you know Frost was unable to capture the southern end of Arnhem bridge due to German resistance.
Facts easy source from any accounts shows that your claim the road was clear is incorrect
1) German was in strength in Nijmegen by the evening of the 17th (H-hour + 12), German blocking force were at Elst on the island and Southern end of the Arnhem Bridge. From Source Devil Bridge by Anthony Tucker-Jonesdate 18/9 "a) The Jagdpanzers rumbled over the road bridge, (page 138) b) While the German defence was short of infantry the 10SS was clearly able to provide reasonable level of Artillery support (page 139)
2) XXX Corp only reach Zon at 1930 Hours on D-Day plus 1 so how could they had reach Arnhem by D-Day plus 1 still had over 70 Klm away.
As for VIII Corp lack of supplies, If VIII Corps could not move on the 17th, and Montgomery and Dempsey would have been aware of VIII Corp position, Both, decided to push ahead with the operation knowing XXX Corp right flank could be exposed to counterattack.
The force that cut the highway came the west flank of XXX Corp which was covered by XII Corps, clearly was unable to stop the Germans reaching the highway.
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@thevillaaston7811 Yes, my view is also based on the various book I have read as well as studying the issues raised by various Authors.
In your comments “For me it would be Brereton's air plan, the failure to agree the the RAF proposal to mount two airlifts on the first day, poor choices of landing sites”.
Let’s look at the Air Plan, the first decision was a daylight drop. This was based on the experience of the D-Day drops. The only alternative would be a night drop with the possibility a repeat the D-Day experience. Question was this the right decision at the time.
The second decision was single drop per day. The initial drop was plan for 13:00 hours on the 17th, The second 10:00 hours on 18th a delay of 21 hours. The 3rd drop was on the 19th so the entire Market force will arrive within 48hours. However due to weather both the second and third drops were delayed.
With regard to Operation Dragoon Air Plan which was produced by General Williams, did included two drops on the same day. The initial drop occurred at 04:00 hours and the last drop at 18:20 a delay between drops of 14:20 Hours. Sources Operation Dragoon Robin Cross
If we apply Operation Dragoon time gap between lifts to Operation Market the second lift would have arrive at 03:20 on the 18th.
Operation Comet Arnhem timing of the lifts are as follows 1) Coup-de-main 04:30, 2) Main drop 07:30 3 hours later and final lift 18:40 hours, 11 hours after the main drop. Source Arnhem William Buckingham
. So, if we apply Operation Comet time gap the second lift would arrive at 24:00 hours.
Clearly the second drop would involve a night drop which has previously been rule out. The only solution would be to bring forward the timing of the H-Hour, but the issue of weather would need to be considered as well as the bombing mission and the impact on 2nd Army plans. Remember the second lift was delayed by 4 hours due to weather.
As to the landing and drop zones being poor, question is where there better alternative sites available which were nearer the Bridges. The location of the Arnhem site for Market Garden was the same site as Operation Comet which was proposed by the RAF. The location of the sites was based on avoiding AA positions plus a site big enough to handle Gliders and Paratroopers.
Initial Plan for 101st included a drop site south of the Zon Bridge. However, General Taylor based on his D-Day experience request a change which was approved by General Demspey, so the drop zone south of Zon bridge deleted from the list. Must accounts with regards to Zon bridge simply state the Germans blow-up the bridge just as the Americans arrived. The unanswered question could the 101st captured the bridge if they arrive earlier. The answer is who knows.
With the benefit of hindsight, you can argue the Air Plan did contribute to the failure, the real question is was there a variable alternative Plan. Or was it the Plan fell short of what was need simply due to lack of aircraft.
As to comment about Montgomery, I agree with you.
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@johnburns4017 John when did I every claim that 82nd never screwed up. My view is that clearly Gavin and Browning decision at Nijmegen when viewed with prefect 20: 20 hindsight are questionable, but using the Fog of War lens and having all the facts available that product that decision I may come up with a different point of view.
As TIK is blaming Gavin for the failure of Operation Market Garden his implying that if Col Warren was not delayed for what every reason Market Garden would have been successful, which I assuming is also your position.
For Market Garden to be successful TIK is also implying that Nijmegen would have be capture and on arrival XXX Corp would have been able to cross the island in time to save 2nd Paratroop Bn. Again, I assume that your support TIK position
My comment was to test TIK implied position regarding the cross of the Island. I applied Evidence Based methodology using the historical evidence and timeline based on XXX Corp actual advance from Lend on midday of 21st to attempt to create and alternative timeline with XXX Corp advancing form Lent on 19th the day XXX Corp arrived at Nijmegen. Clearly a number of assumptions are used in the alternative timeline which I outline in my initial comment. As the methodology has produced an outcome clearly you disagree with. The first step in my analysis was ensure the starting point for XXX Corp in the alternative timeline was the same as the Historical record i.e. starting from Lent. The next step was to compare the position German facing XXX Corp on the 19th against historical force which face XXX Corp on the 21st. The third step was to use the same historical timeframe for the capture of Elst and apply it to a start date of the 19th to see if XXX Corp could have reach Arnhem in time. My conclusion was No XXX Corp could not have reach Arnhem in time.
So, in response to your Reply:
1) XXX Corp was ahead of schedule. My source is 21st Army Group, Operation - Market Garden page 44 section 8 XXX Corps operations 19th September section 20 Ground Troops "By 1400 hours, leading patrols of 2HCR had reached the River Waal and 5 Guards Brigade was concentrated south of Nijmegen. As the original timetable was for XXX Corp to reach Arnhem in 48 Hours which was 1300 hours on 19th, clearly XXX Corp was still behind schedule.
2) Harmel comment related to the German situation the evening of the 20th relating to their position on the Island my source Arnhem by William Buckingham.
3) Few German Troops between to two Bridges, I assume you mean during the period 17th to 19th. I agree with you because the troops were defending Nijmegen. Clearly the Germans had sent troops to Nijmegen on the 17th and 18th which TIK claimed fortified Nijmegen. If the 82nd had captured the Bridge clearly these troop would available to fortify the various village on the island on the 18th and morning of the 19th.
4) On the 21st when XXX Corp start north at 1300 hours, they were stop at Ressen crossroad which is short of Elst by antitank guns not Tanks. XXX Corp would not capture Elst until 23rd.
Before you reply place yourself in Model shoes. Model order the 10SS Panzer Div to Nijmegen to prevent the Americans in Nijmegen linking up with the British’s at Arnhem. If the 82nd had capture the Bridge on the 17th, where would now deploy the 10 SS Panzer Divison to prevent the linkup.
Inconclusion, my comment was to see if there was evidence to support TIK position, as TIK in his presentation didn’t provide any evidence to support this position.
In your reply I would be interested in reading your methodology, evidence and analysis that support your position
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@lyndoncmp5751 John your comment about the air plan, so the question is what changes would you make to the air plan taking into account the difficulties and issues faced Brereton and Williams as discuss below.
Yes, Brereton was responsible for the decision daylight drop. The alternative would have been a night drop. With the experience of D-Day where virtually the majority of drops were inaccurate and widely dispersed. Therefore, without additional training of aircrews, a night drop would not be a viable option.
The problem facing Williams:
1) Increase in aircraft with no increase in ground crew (Sources, Arnhem Buckingham)
2) Shortage of Navigators was so acute that four out of every ten C-47 crews employed on D-Day, the situation is unlikely to improve by September. (sources: Arnhem William F Buckingham)
3) Due to supply missions, aircraft of 1AAA there has been no night assembly training for 3 months (sources: A Magnificent Disaster by David Bennett page34)
Due to lack of aircraft 3 lifts would be required to transport the airborne force. This will lead to two key decisions.
The first is the route and landing zones:
To maximise the second lift capacity Williams would need to minimise the loss from the 1st lifts. Hence the route and landing zone location would need to avoid AA concentrations. Each 1% reduction in loss would add about 15 aircraft to the second lift which translate in addition 240 men or 30 tons of supplies. There also increase in 3rd lift.
The second decision relating to number of lifts on the 17th.
In David Bennett book on page 226 makes the following statement "a second lift would arrive, at the earliest, eight hours after the first (21:00 Hours), due to flying time, maintenance, assembling the second lift and refuelling. The turnaround time for Comet was in fact ten Hours (23:00 Hours)”. In book Operation Market Garden by John Buckley & Peter Preston-Hough on page 28 for Linnet operations the theoretically turnaround time of the two lifts was 12 hours, it goes one to state the time between the 1st and 2nd lifts for Market garden was 20 hours weather permitting.
Williams options therefore would be:
1) One lift per day
2) Second lift to arrive ASAP after the 1st, the earliest arrival time between 21:00 to 23:00 hours. The risks would be a) repeat of D-day drop without the benefit of surprise, b) possible higher aircraft losses due of night flying by inexperience aircrew, and c) due to short turnaround time a possible smaller second lift.
3) Allow Hollinghurst and RAF a 2nd lift to Arnhem using only RAF aircraft on 17th with rest of 2nd lift arriving on the 18th.
4) Bring forward H hour from 13:00 hours to allow the 2nd lift to arrive in daylight. The risks are the weather could cause a delay in takeoff of the 1st lift as what happen on the 18th, plus possible of higher aircraft loss from 2nd lift and due to short turnaround smaller 2nd lift. This would also impact on the start time of Garden Force.
So, John which option would have improved the air plan, as each option trades one benefit against a new risk. Clearly the only way the air plan could have been improve if more aircraft could have been made available.
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@johnburns4017 What Blumentritt may have been right, the question did the Allied truly know the real state of the German Army in the west. Remember the comment made that if the British had advance on the evening of the 20th, after capturing the Nijmegen Bridge, the road was open to Arnhem. In this case British were not in a position to move forward and did not know the road was open to Arnhem.
Even Monty reported that the level of German resistance facing the British 2nd Army was increasing in the period between establishment of a breach head at Johns Bridge and launching of Market Garden.
While Monty's Plan of a strong 40 Div Northern Thrust may had ended the War in 1944. For the thrust to reach Berlin would require the Port of Antwerp to be operational, otherwise the Northern Thrust could have face the same supply problem Patton in Lorraine, when between 28th Sept to 8th Nov 3rd Army was dormant due to lack of Supplies. (source the PDF attached to one of your comments page 22).
With British and 1st US Army north of the Hurtgen Forest and the Ardennes Forest and the 3rd US Army south, there would have been a significant gap that would have require troops cover.
Also a single thrust would have allowed the limited Germans forces to concentrate against it. Remember the size of the German force involved in the Battle of the Bulge, which did not exist in early September. Highlight the ability of the German Forces to recover quickly.
Even if Lorraine was of limited military value a thrust through Lorraine in support of the Northern Thrust would have forced the Germans to split their limited resource, otherwise the Lorraine thrust could possibility turn north in support of the Northern Thrust.
You talk about Eisenhower under resourced and refused a use of a single US Div. You made the following comment "The US 7th Armor was sent into Overloon. It was pulled out unable to take the town."Overloon was in the 21 Army Group sector, Monty requested and was granted a change in the boundary so that Overloon area became the responsibility of 12 Army Group and he request an Attack be made, 7th Arm Div moved 50 miles north to launch the attack. Clearly Eisenhower did give Monty the use of US Div.
You might say that Monty's decision to launch Operation Market Garden before attempting to open Antwerp lend to the entire Allied effort being under resource.
Hindsight and prefect information relating the enemy strong is a wonderful tool for Monday morning Quarterback to pass judgement on how battles and campaigns should have been fought.
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@thevillaaston7811 Operation Comet does not let Brereton out.
Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 156-7). Crowood. Kindle Edition.
Arnhem was first selected as the objective for Montgomery’s proposed Rhine crossing on 4 September. That morning, Browning held a meeting with the principal airborne and air commanders involved, and afterwards travelled to France to meet Montgomery and Dempsey. He returned to England on the 5th, but telegraphed Dempsey that evening to advise him that it had not been possible to identify any suitable DZs or LZs near the bridges at Arnhem and Nijmegen. For this reason, coup-de-main operations were being planned to capture them; the main airborne formations would land outside the two towns.19 On the following day, written orders for Operation Comet were issued, which included sketch maps showing the same principal landing areas as were ultimately used in Market Garden. (AIR 37/979, 38 Group Operation Order 524, ‘Comet’, 6 September 1944.)
Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality (p. 157). Crowood. Kindle Edition.
During the deliberations on Comet it appears that Hollinghurst raised objections to staging daylight landings close to the bridges; his reasoning was presumably supported by the Air Officer Commanding 46 Group. In the case of Nijmegen, Hollinghurst’s stance has never generated any controversy. Broadly the same landing zones proposed for Comet were subsequently employed in Market Garden by 9th TCC and 82nd Airborne.
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@warspite1807
No because You assuming 1) that Warren would have chosen a different route, hence question why Warren would have the change in route, 2) you say he would have reached the bridge by 1710 (another assumption) and 3) you would then need to make an assumption about the German strength at the bridge to determine if Warren would have captured the bridge. It still a what if situation because change an assumption would change the outcome.
Based on times provided by Poulussen, R.G.. Lost at Nijmegen: A rethink on operation "Market Garden"
1) Time the 508th Reached De Ploeg Source
page 75 "Around 1400, 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, some three miles away. Around 1600, they arrived there - without German opposition - and dug in."
page 31 "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the 1st Battalion marched off towards their objective, De Ploeg, three miles away. Four hours later, around 1825, the regimental command post was established."
So did it take 2 hours or 4 hours it appears Poulussen is stating the time of 2 relates to the 1st Battalion and the 4 Hours to 508th HQ.
2) The time they reached the bridge
page 75 "Around 2100, "A" Company finally left and at midnight - ten hours after leaving the drop zone - encountered the first real opposition, in the middle of the city of Nijmegen.
I calculated with no change in route Warren would have reached the bridge at 1900 hours being 1600 plus 3 hours it took Warren to reach the bridge once he started (2400 - 2100 hours). I would still need to make an assumption regarding the German strength. Depending on the last assumption will determine if Warren captures the bridge. Again, what if siutation because change the assumption will produce a differnet outcome.
3) your point 5
Page 31 "The planned defences were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying underground credentials of some sort told the Colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and highway bridge were lightly held."
I see no reference about Lindquist being Way-Off and no time is mentioned by Poulussen when the Dutch resistance reach Lindquist.
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@warspite1807 From Mead General 'Boy': The Life of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning
"5. That he was wrong to instruct Gavin to focus on the defence of the Groesbeek Heights and to treat the capture of the Nijmegen road bridge as of secondary importance.
There is no doubt that Boy explicitly instructed Gavin, at a divisional commanders’ conference on 14 September, not to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge until he had firmly established control of the Groesbeek Heights. Gavin, for his part, needed no pressing on this, writing subsequently: ‘After a thorough study of the Nijmegen area, and after consulting a Dutch officer who was to accompany the 82d Airborne Division, it became clear that the key to the accomplishment of the 82d’s mission would be the prompt seizure, thorough organization and tenacious holding of the Groesbeek heights.’2 There was no difference between him and Boy over the priorities, which were first the heights, then the Grave bridge, then the bridges over the Mass-Waal Canal and only last the Nijmegen road bridge."
So, Mead claims that Browning did give the order not to go to the Bridge.
"As CO 1st Airborne Corps (British), Browning could not exercise command over XVIII Airborne Corps (USA), though he could as a deputy to Brereton." You are missing the point for Operation Market Garden both 101st and 82nd was place under the control of 1st Airborne Corp. Where your source relating to Ridgeway having an active part in plan Market Garden.
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@warspite1807 As to Williams had very little experience, Williams was responsible for Airborne Operations for Husky, D-Day, and Dragoon plus the cancelled Operations Linnet 1 & 2. If you consider as little experience, how many operations would he need to have plan before you an experience planner? As to Brereton appointment who know the reason behind the appointment and if there were better alternatives.
As I point out, Williams plans for Dragoon, Linnet 1 & 2 all included 2 lifts on D-day. again, the question is having plan 2 lifts for the last 3 operation, in Ritchie Arnhem Myths and Reality page 195
"So, the First Allied Airborne Army planners sprang into action, examining Browning’s outline, the number of aircraft available and the potential combinations of the three airborne divisions that might be infiltrated in any given period with the resources available. Within hours they had become concerned over the prospect of achieving two daylight lifts on the same day: With the shortening of the days at this time of the year, and complications of turn-around, it is believed that future plans should be made on the basis of one lift per day, with all US aircraft available. This will permit an operation to be carried through in spite of a late start due to bad weather, whereas tight schedule plans based on two lifts per day could not be met if early morning weather were bad. By 12 September Williams (who had overall command of the airlift) had accepted this advice. At another planning meeting, General Williams pointed out that owing to the reduced number of hours of daylight and increase in distance, it would not be possible to consider more than one lift per day. Williams had a long-standing and deserved reputation for close co-operation with the airborne forces. He had commanded the US troop carriers in Husky, Neptune and Dragoon, and was thus one of the most experienced of all the Allied airborne commanders."
Why could Browning go to Montgomery? It was Montgomery, Browning and Dempsey who meet on the 10th to discuss plans that ended up as Operation Market Garden.
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@warspite1807 Market flaws 1) Lack of Aircraft to fly in the entire Market force in 1 lift 2) Weather see 21 Army Group Operation Market Garden Appendix R of Part 3 which provided the daily weather condition before and during Market Garden. 3) Dark moonless nights on 16/17th and 17/18th rule out and night landing especially Gliders which made up the bulk of the 2nd lift.
Because of the lack of Aircraft 3 lifts were required to deliver the entire Market Force. The impacts are 1) Part of the initial force would be required to defend the DZ/LZ of the 2nd and 3rd Lift reducing the force available to capture each division objectives. 2) Decision by each General how to allocate the division across the 3 lifts. You can see how each commander made different decisions.
1st Lift 101st and 82nd allocated 3 paratroop regiments with minimal Glider element 1st British 1 Paratroop and Air Landing Brigade plus Divisional Troops.
2nd Lift 101st Glider Infantry Regt, 82nd Artillery and 1st British 4th Para Brigade
3rd Lift 101st Artillery 82nd Glider Infantry Regt and 1st British Polish Brigade.
In the case of Gavin, the Groesbeek heights were the location of DZ/LZ, so they need to be protected. The real issue was he too conservative, or did he underestimate the time the Germans need to react to the landing. How much weight did he give to the intelligence report that reported the arrival of 4,000 SS Troop in Nijmegen area from Amsterdam and the photo recon report of tanks in the Reichswald Forest. We will ever know.
As Williams also planned a number of Airborne Operation. You should ask you self if William plan 2 lifts on D-day for Operations Dragoon, and cancelled operations Linnet 1 & 2 what information made he decide that only 1 lift was doable on the 17th.
If Market was so flawed ask yourself why Montgomery allowed the operation to proceed after he received the Market Plan on the 15th?
Source of 4,000 SS Troops Jeffson, Major Joel. Operation Market-Garden: Ultra Intelligence Ignored . Lucknow Books. Kindle Edition.
In the general enemy situation section, the annex states, “There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group Area.” In describing the German units in the area of operations, it is noted that a “broken” panzer division is reported in the vicinity of Arnhem and that it may yield up to fifty tanks. It also addresses 4,000 SS troops that are reportedly in Nijmegen after relocating from Amsterdam. {82nd Airborne Division, Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11. date 11th of September 1944}
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@thevillaaston7811 No here are the extracts
Chester Wilmot The Struggle for Europe page 539
“Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded”
Sources for Objectives:
Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (p. 212).
“In spite of this dissent, Montgomery remained fixed on Arnhem. The V2 rocket attacks on London that began on 8 September were a cause of some political concern and Monty argued that a drive northwards to Arnhem would ease this crisis as it would threaten the V2 launching pads in the Netherlands. Whilst this was true, Arnhem had already been targeted in COMET before the V2 attacks began, so this was at best an extra factor rather than the decisive one.”
21st Army Group Operation Market Garden 17-26th September
“The object of Second Army (with airborne force under command after landing) was to position itself astride the rivers Maas, Waal and Neder Rijn in the general area Grave 6253 – Nijmegen 7062 -Arnhem E 7575 and to dominate the country North as far as the Zuider Zee thereby cutting off Communications between Germany and low Countries.”
Field Marshall Montgomery Memoirs page 291-2 M525 dated 14/9/44
“16. The Army (2nd) will establish itself in strength on the general line Zwolle – Deventer - Arnhem facing east, with deep bridgeheads to the east side of the Ijssel river.
From this position it will prepared to advance eastwards to the general area Rheine – Osnabruck – Hamm – Munster.
In this movement its weight will be on its right and directed towards Hamm, from which a strong thrust will be made southwards along the east face of the Ruhr.”
All I did to to summaries the points.
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@thevillaaston7811 If you looking for source that covers the Air Plan you have:
1) Warren, Dr. John C. Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater
2) Ritchie, Sebastian; Ritchie, Sebastian. Arnhem: Myth and Reality
3) Buckley, John; Preston-Hough, Peter. Operation Market Garden
Also, Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe give a good analysis of Market Garden issues.
“I am therefore left with the opinions of those people that were involved at the time.”
Both General Gavin and Urquhart in their respect books never mention requesting a second lift on D-day. Even Montgomery in his Memoirs does lift the reason for the failure of the operation only a single lift on the 17th.
Chester Wilmot was a correspondent; he would not have been present at the meeting when the plans were discussed.
The quote by Air Chief Marshall Scarlett- Streatfield
“Air Chief Marshall Scarlett-Streatfield, produced a combined 38-46 Group report on Arnhem which reads: ‘In future operations against an organized enemy, it may be found necessary to complete the entire lift within a matter of hours,”
His is absolutely correct, but that implies there sufficient aircraft and glides to carry the entire force. In the case of Market Garden there was insufficient aircraft. Maybe the solution was to scale back the Market Force to a single lift size. But then would there been sufficient men to take all the objectives. Who knows? The Lift on the 17th was a maximum effort, the question were there any additional aircraft from Bomber Command of 8Th Airforce they could have been used, if so, was there sufficient time the train the crews. Who knows the answer?
As you say ‘The Buck Stops here’ So who is ultimately responsible for the failure of Operation Market Garden. Reading the various comments blame appears to link to Eisenhower, Montgomery, Browning your favourite Brereton, TIK - Gavin, Johns Burns - Taylor and Gavin. Clearly, they all cannot be solely to blame for the failure.
You can add XII (Ritchie) and VIII Corp (O’Connor) commanders to the list, because both Corps failed to prevent the Germans cut Hell’s Highway.
Each have quoted from different source to justify their position.
So, is everyone from Eisenhower down to Divisional General must accept some responsibility.
Should the Operation be had been cancelled, in which case was there an opportunity would have been missed.
Alternative the old proverb “Its better to have tried and failed then never to have tried at all”.
My position based all I have read and Video I seen is that Operation Market was high risk operation that require everything to go right.
The potential reasons why the operation was justified in going ahead.
1) Intelligence Report of the 4th Sept states that the German Army facing 2nd Army was weak and disorganised and that a strong attack would see 2nd Army over the Rhine before reinforcements arrive or the German could reorganise their forces. But how long will that window of opportunity exist. However, one of the reason Operation Comet was cancel was stiffing resistance in front of 2nd Army. Was the window already closing by the 17th?
2) If the operation is successful the following objective would be achieved:
1) Either the elimination or a dramatic reduction of the V2 threat
2) The isolation of 15th German in Holland from the Germany effectively cutting the supply of men and equipment.
3) The 2nd Army would be well place on the logistic problems have been resolve to launch an assault on the Ruhr Valley and Northern Germany including Berlin.
I personal not think anyone is solely responsible. Clearly as the quote below states there plenty of reason why the operation failed. Question is there a single decision if reverse guarantee 100% the success of Market Garden. Who know, because how would the Germans plan be altered to meet the new reality.
From Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (p. 231)
“Such was the small chance of resounding success in MARKET GARDEN when it began on 17 September, that any analysis should not look for reasons for failure as they were all too apparent, but more for why it came as relatively close as it did to succeeding.”
Buckley, John. Monty's Men : The British Army and the Liberation of Europe (p. 231)
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@thevillaaston7811 Reply 2
This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave. Yep, this this in particular is about Zon. There is zero chance that decision making on Zon DZ/LZs was any different to decision making for Arnhem DZ/LZs, and that Brereton was not involved in this process.
Buckingham, William F.. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (p. 110)
“Major-General Taylor’s reaction was somewhat different and justifiably so, for the 101st Airborne Division had been allocated a string of individual battalion drop zones running north from Eindhoven through Son, St. Oedenrode and Veghel. Taylor consequently wasted no time in voicing his objections to Browning at having his Division scattered in highly vulnerable increments across southern Holland. According to the 101st Airborne Division’s semi-official history, Browning responded by inviting Taylor to travel to British 2nd Army HQ in Belgium to explain his objections to Lieutenant-General Dempsey in person. When the latter accepted Taylor’s objections, Browning in turn persuaded Brereton to permit the 101st Airborne Division to modify its landing zones.64 Once again, it is unclear precisely what authority or expertise permitted Dempsey to adjudicate on such matters,”
Operation Market Garden Now and Then (p24)
“Montgomery proposal called for it (101st) to be strung out like a Kite string over 30-mile stretch extending from to within Artillery range of 2nd Army Front. Major General Taylor protested against the extreme dispersion of his division and was strongly supported by Brereton. No decision was reached at Sunninghill Park meeting, but Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery who agreed after a rather sharp exchange of views to let the matter settled by direct discussion between Major General Taylor and Lieutenant General Dempsey. They meet at Montgomery Headquarters on Sept 12th. Since both were good diplomats and General Dempsey was confident that his Army could slice through unaided to as far as Eindhoven, they reach an agreement.”
Page 41 “Faced with a problem of taking objectives strung out over more than 15 miles of highway Taylor decided to bring most of his division to a single area midway between St Oedenrode and Zon from which he could strike against both places.
So TheVilla Aston we have 2 version of the event, clearly Dempsey made the final decision.
Clearly, Dempsey, Browning, Brereton and Montgomery had input into the debate.
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@davemac1197 You what a source
McManus, John C.. September Hope: The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (p. 37)
His intended drop zones were based on a considerably smaller area of responsibility for the 101st than originally envisioned in Montgomery’s Market Garden plan. Rather than the thirty-mile perimeter earmarked by Monty, Taylor wanted responsibility for half of that. Montgomery’s plan would force Taylor to drop his troopers in small, scattered groups, thus increasing their vulnerability to strong enemy counterattacks and weakening their overall effectiveness. Brereton had already taken up Taylor’s cause with the field marshal and, after some debate, persuaded him to reconsider his orders. Montgomery agreed to let General Taylor discuss the matter with Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army. Since XXX Corps was part of Dempsey’s army, he was in the best position to determine the validity of Taylor’s proposed amendments. Dempsey and Taylor met on September 12 at Montgomery’s headquarters, and the British general readily agreed to Taylor’s requests. The 101st Airborne commander and his staff officers collectively breathed a huge sigh of relief. Note 4
Note 4 Pages 451-452
82nd Airborne Division, Market Garden field orders, Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 11753, Folder 1; 101st Airborne Division, Market Garden field orders, Record Group 407, Entry 427, Box 11776, Folder 3; IX Troop Carrier Command, AAR, all at National Archives; Gavin diary, September 14, 1944; Parks diary, September 11–12, 1944, both at USAMHI; Norton meeting notes, September 11, 1944, Mahn Center; Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, pp. 90–91; Gavin, On to Berlin, pp. 161–64; Airborne Warfare, pp. 86–92; Ryan, Bridge Too Far, pp. 134–36; Rapport and Northwood, Rendezvous with Destiny, pp. 263–65; Brereton, Brereton Diaries, pp. 341–42; Margry, Operation Operation Market Garden, Then and Now, p. 24. The Market Garden plans were, of course, more complex and detailed than I have outlined here. In the interest of clarity, I related them as simply as possible without bogging down in operational minutiae. For the purposes of this book, the most significant aspect of the British drop zone plan at Arnhem was the considerable distance they chose to land from their key objective, the city’s main highway bridge.
Also, it would make more sense to have the meeting ASAP to allow time for the detail planning based on the final decision.
The 14th Telegraph may have been confirmation of the 12th Decision
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@davemac1197
1) Again, blaming Williams for a decision he did not make.
"With that in mind, Browning had originally selected drop zones for the 101st Airborne south of the Wilhelmina canal at Son and south of Eindhoven near Aalst to assist the capture of the Son bridge - the canal was the main German defence line in the area and the remaining bridges were all prepared for demolition with standing orders to detonate if threatened - the four bridges in the centre of Eindhoven, and a small bridge over the river Dommel at Aalst. The idea was to create an airborne 'carpet' over which XXX Corps could pass, and securing these southern targets would assist the XXX Corps breakout and reduce the distance to the first airborne linkup, hopefully on the first day.
Unfortunately, General Paul Williams of the US IX Troop Carrier Command objected to the drop zones because of the flak around Eindhoven and General Lewis Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army removed them from the plan. Browning could not object to any of the changes Brereton made to his his operation SIXTEEN outline to create MARKET, because he had already threatened to resign over a previous Brereton plan for LINNET II (Liege-Maastricht bridges), and knew if he did it again his resignation would be accepted and he would be replaced by Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation."
The decision relation to the drops some south of Wilhelmina was made by Taylor not Williams and after decisions between Montgomery and Brereton on the subject. Montgomery allowed Taylor to discuss the matter with Dempsey and for Dempsey to make the final decision. (Operation Market Garden Now and Then page 24)
2) your statement
"So the implication is that they would have had to stop somewhere in the 101st Airborne area between Eindhoven and Veghel anyway. There was a gap between the 501st PIR (101st Airborne) at Veghel and the 504th (82nd Airborne) at Grave that was effectively 'Indian country' that could contain a German ambush, so the delay to XXX Corps' linkup to the 82nd at Grave was unavoidable without the bridges at Aalst and Eindhoven in American hands on the first day, otherwise the tanks might have been passed through to Veghel on the first night instead of stopping at Valkenswaard."
In the same comment you state "
"XXX Corps stopped at Valkenswaard because they realised they would not reach Eindhoven before it got dark, and it was doctrine not to advance tanks at night - they could not fight in the dark during WW2. Corps commander Brian Horrocks said in his book Corps Commander (1977) that he had gambled twice in his career by advancing with tanks at night and on both occasions it had paid off, but he felt for MARKET GARDEN it would be pushing his luck to try it a third time. So, he gave strict instructions for no movement at night except in friendly held territory."
If they stop at Valkenswaard on the night of the 17th because they could not reach Eindhoven, how could they have reach Veghel on the evening of the 17th if the bridge at Son was captured?
21st Army Group directive is for travel only in daylight hours source 21st Army Group Operation Market Garden page 12.
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@johnburns4017 John the so call 40 Division thrust.
Montgomery Memoirs page 266
Date 17th August
“1. After crossing the Seine, 12 and 21 Army Groups should keep together as a solid mass of some 40 Divisions which would be so strong that it would fear nothing. This force would move north-eastward.”
Clearly by early September Montgomery had shifted his is proposal to a 20 division Thrust due to supply issues.
Atkinson, Rick. The Guns at Last Light (Liberation Trilogy) (p. 243). Little, Brown Book Group. Kindle Edition.
Date 10th Sept
The field marshal settled in his seat with a weak smile. “I’m sorry, Ike,” he said. For a long hour they bickered, “a complete dogfight,” in Graham’s description. Montgomery restated his case for a single thrust; if given transport and fuel from the Canadians and Third Army, plus the four airborne divisions, he was certain he could capture the Ruhr with twenty divisions from the British Second and American First Armies, opening the road to Berlin".
Chester Wilmot “The Struggle for Europe” (1954) page 489
Date 10th Sept “Montgomery warned Eisenhower that the supply lines of all the Armies were already stretched to breaking point and that could not be no substantial advance anywhere unless one Allied Army was halted. He asserted that, on the other hand if the transport resource of 3rd US and 1st Canadian Armies apart from what was needed to maintain them in a defensive position, were immediately made available to support 2nd British and 1st US Armies, the 16 Divisions, reinforced by four Division of Airborne Army, would be able to capture the Ruhr.”
The following shows Montgomery did not need Antwerp for his plan.
Atkinson, Rick. The Guns at Last Light (Liberation Trilogy) (p. 243-4). Little, Brown Book Group. Kindle Edition.
Following the meeting, Montgomery sent a carping, thirty-three paragraph note to Brooke. The supreme commander, he complained, is completely out of touch with what is going on; he tries to run the war by issuing long telegraphic directives. Eisenhower himself does not really know anything about the business of fighting the Germans…. Just when a really firm grip was needed, there was no grip.
Regardless of American requirements, Montgomery had privately concluded that 21st Army Group did not need Antwerp to drive halfway across Germany. Graham, his logistics chief, posited that a fighting division could get by with 350 to 400 tons of daily sustenance, barely half the SHAEF estimate. British units had done so in Africa, albeit under very different combat conditions. If two Allied corps reached Berlin, Montgomery believed, German defenses would be in such “disorder” that the Third Reich would disintegrate. Lesser ports, such as Dieppe and Le Havre, could sustain an advance on the enemy capital; just “one good Pas de Calais port,” Montgomery added, would suffice to reach Münster, fifty miles beyond the Rhine, if augmented with daily airlift and more trucks.
John the final say on the topic should be Brooke.
Arthur Bryant “Triumph in the West” 1960 page 232
October 5th “I feel that Monty’s Strategy for once was at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.”
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@thevillaaston7811 You talk about that there were sufficient supplies to support a 20 Div force with the reason remaining static for a Northern Thrust but no details.
I assume your force consist of 2nd BA, 1st US A and 1st Airborne Corp. So, as at beginning of September 1st US had 3 Corps containing 5 Inf and 3 Arm. The 2nd BA for Market Garden deployed 3 Corps (2 Arm 4 Inf) and 1st Airborne Corp (3 Airborne and 1 Air Landing Div) Total of 18 Divisions.
I assume the axis of advance of your force would be 2nd Army axis is towards Arnhem and 1st US towards Aachen.
The Historical order of the Corps were from left to right XII British, XXX British, VIII British, XIX US, VII US and V US. The responsibility for British Drive would be XXX Corp (3 Divs) and the US VII Corp (3 Divs).
As the two key Corp advances, in the British Sector XII Corp (2 Divs) would be responsible for XXX Left Flank. It left wing due to Germans 15th Army would be anchored near Antwerp and its right wing would move north In line with XXX Corp resulting in the stretching of its Front.
British VIII Corp (1 Div) would cover XXX Right Flank with its left wing inline with XXX Corp and the right wing in line with the left-wing 1st US Army. As the Armies boundary axis is projected North East, as with XII Corp it front will by stretched.
The US Sector XIX Corp (2 Div’s) would cover the front from British VIII Corp to left wing of VII Corp. Again, as the advance continues it front will also be stretched. Last, US V Corp (3 Divs) will cover the Gap between VII Corp and US 3rd Army. As the US 3rd Army will be stationary, its right wing will be anchored at the inter Army Boundary and its left will need to move in line with VII Corp.
Looking at the Map for V Corp to maintain the shorts possible front its left wing will need to move through the Hurtgen Forest. As you point was a failed Operation. The alternative cover the boundary of the Forest, but that would extend V Corp Front.
Clearly as both XXX and VII Corp push forward, the question is do the Flank covering Corp have sufficient strength.
As Market Garden would be the initial 2nd Army Operation, we know historically both XII and VIII Corps were unable to maintain contract with XXX Corp thereby exposing XXX Flanks.
The 1st US Army historically faced problems clearing out the Hurtgen Forest and its drive for Aachen.
Would an additional 2 Divs make a difference.
Without looking why Market Garden failed, would the additional Divisions make a difference. The key problem with Market was lack of Aircraft and the weather. Garden, they may have help XII and VIII Corp.
For the 1st US Army, it would difficult to say if additional Division would have help.
So a 20 Strong Northern Thrust based on Historical outcomes of 2nd and 1st Armies Sept and Oct operation would indicate no improved results.
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@thevillaaston7811 In a Book Titled 21 Army Group Operation Market Garden 17-26 Sept 1944 page 7 part of section 4
Extract
'H' hour had been fixed provisionally for 1300 hours 17 Sept and was to be confirmed.
Postponements would be for a period of 24 Hours
(c) 'Z' hour was the time at which leading troops taking part in Operation Garden would advance . 'Z' hour was likely to be one hour after 'H' hour and would, in any case, not be earlier. The exact time of 'Z' hour was to be notified later.
On page 10 "(iii) Arrangement were made to counter Motor Torpedo Boat activity in the Nijmegen Area" an interesting note
On page 12 under section 5 under the heading Period of Movement and Harbouring "21. (a) The principle of movement was that movement should take place by day only." Did this influence the decision after the bridge was captured on the 20th.
These are Contents pages Appendix s included RArt task table, REng aspect of Operation Garden, XXX Corp signals Instruction etc
Operation “Market Garden” 17-26 September 1944
CONTENTS Part 1
Introductory para 1-4 page 1
1. General Situation and setting para 1 page 2
2. Summary of 2nd Army Plan. Para 2-3 page 3-4
3. The Planning and Preparation of 30 Corp para 4 page 5
4. Outline of 30 Corp Plan for Operation Garden para 5-16 pages 6-11
5. Organization for Movement of XXX Corp Traffic para 17-21 pages 12
6. Summary of XXX Corp Maintenance Plan para 22-38 pages 13-17
Plus Appendix and Annexure ( Appendix J Topographical Appreciation of the Axis of Advance and the rivers Waal and Neder Rijn)
Part 2
7. General Situation on XXX Corp front 17th Sept para 1-4 page 36
8. Narrative XXX Corp and 1st Airborne Corp execution of Operation “Market Garden” period 17/26 September 1944 para 5-66 pages 57-72
9. Execution of Movement and Traffic Plan of XXX Corp during the Operation. para 67-79 pages 72-74
10. XXX Corp and 1st BAC Administrative Arrangements para 80-86 pages 75-77
Plus Appendix and Annexure
Part 3
11. Important Lessons pages 113-118 (topic General, Weather, Planning, Use of Airborne Troops, Communications, Effecting the Break-out, Organistaion Airborne Corp, Air Support, Administration lessons)
Extract page 115 "The Dropping Zone of the 1AD was too far from their objective this was because the terrain and flak made it impossible to land the Division close to Arnhem" Clearly the RAF did the best they could with regard to Drop zones.
Appendix “R” Meteorological Data pages 119-122
The book has a lot of interest instructions and data
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Some comments blame the failure of Operation Market on the shoulders of Brereton and Williams because they claim the Air Plan was faulty and Brereton and Williams were responsible for all key decisions and that even Montgomery was unable to persuade Brereton to include a second lift.
Or was it the case that the Air Plan while not ideal was the best possible under the circumstance at the time. Let look at the decision made any possible alternatives to see if the Brereton and Williams made the right decisions based on information available at the time without the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.
The first decision was whether a Daylight or Nighttime Drop.
The problems with a night drop for Operation are,
1) The night of the 16/17th was a dark moonless night which would have made navigation difficult. Both doctrine and experience warned against attempting airborne missions in total darkness.
2) Since Sicily it was policy that large scale Glider Operation will only be conducted in Daylight Hours.
3) Experience of previous night operation on how widely the troops were landed.
Clearly the only opinion was Daylight drop.
The second decision was the timing of H-Hour
So, what influence the timing of H-Hour.
With a daylight drop and depth penetration over enemy territory, there was a requirement for USAAF to fly anti Flak mission to reduce the risk to transports and gliders. The USSAF will need to fly the mission in daylight to identify AA positions along the air routes to be used.
The second was a directive issued by 21 Army Group “postponements would be for a period of 24 hours.”
The last was the expected weather conditions on the 17th.
Ritchie in his book Arnhem: Myth and reality on page 210 provide the following information relating to the weather condition leading up to 17th.
Prevailing weather conditions in the week leading up to Market Garden, which were characterized by early morning fog on every day except the 16th. His Source was AIR 27/2017, 542 Squadron F.540, September 1944. This unit diary records weather conditions at Benson in Oxfordshire daily throughout this period; identical conditions would certainly have affected the British air transport bases, which were nearly all located in central southern England.
Ritchie on page 198 also made the following statement. “Overcast conditions rendered glider operations all but impossible.”
Further on page 199 Ritchie states “the planners had been able to observe the way in which adverse weather had caused the postponement of both Linnet and Comet, and had evidently concluded that they were most likely to obtain favourable conditions by avoiding the dawn lifts that had been proposed for both operations. Hence, as the records show, the attraction of scheduling successive lifts slightly later in the morning was not only that they could be flown at full strength but also that they could exploit the best available periods of visibility.”
Dr Warren, in his book Airborne Operations In World War II, European Theater provides addition insight to weather and timing when the final decision was made.
At 1630 on 16 September (D minus 1) the experts delivered a favorable report on the coming four-day period. A high-pressure system was approaching Belgium from the southwest and would be over it next day. Fair weather with little cloud and gentle winds would prevail until the 20th. The forecast did predict fog on and after D plus 1, but only during the early morning.
The weather on the 17th was almost exactly as promised. Fog, present in the early morning, had cleared by 0900. A little thin, low stratus persisted longer but had dissipated by take-off time.
Again, the only decision was a historical H-Hour of 13.00 Hours with a takeoff time starting from 09.45. An earlier takeoff time could run the risk of being postponed or cancelation of the Operation due to weather.
The last decision the number of lifts on the 17th.
This decision is the most controversial, and people that criticize the decision for a single lift often use Operation Dragoon to show that even with bad weather 2 lifts were doable.
Operation Dragoon Air Plan prepared by Williams contain 4 missions, the first Mission Albatross the main paratroop drop involved 396 aircraft with H-Hour of 04.25. The next mission Blue, the first Glider mission involved 75 aircraft with H-hour of 08.00. The third was Canary the second paratroop drop of 41 aircraft with H-hour 18.00. The last mission Dove, involved 332 Gliders with H-hour of 18.10. The time gap between 1st Lift (Albatross) and 2nd lift (Canary & Dove) is 13 Hours and 30 minutes. The effect of the adverse weather was that Mission Albatross achieve only a 60% accuracy and mission Blue 50% of the Gliders were force to turn back because of fog.
On 17 September sunset occurred at 18.11 hours and nautical twilight ended at 19.26 hours. With H-Hour set at 13.00 and landing continuing until after 14.00 hours that would leave only between 4 hours to 7 hours and 30 minutes as a time gap for a second lift compared to 13 Hours and 30 minutes for Operation Dragoon.
Clearly a second lift was not possible on the 17th due to policy relating to night operations and the adverse weather conditions.
Therefore, Brereton and Williams Air Plan, while not ideal, provide the only viable option if the Operation was to proceed. The only alternative would be for Brereton to go back to Montgomery and recommend the Operation be cancelled because 1AAA lack the capacity to deliver the Market side of the Operation as original proposed by Montgomery, i.e., deliver the entire Market Force in one lift.
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@davemac1197 Dave
Your problem is you cannot see the difference between military discipline which I agree do not cross national boundaries and operation orders given by a superior commander to a subordinate regardless of nationality.
I do fully understand the James Blunt story, but that incident occurred in NATO role in the civil war.
Browning as Gavin superior could have ordered Gavin to drop a Battalion north of the Waal. If Gavin refused the order Browning could have raise the matter up with either Ridgeway or Brereton both could have discipline Gavin.
This is from Mead, Richard. General 'Boy': The Life of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning (p. 277)
That he was wrong to instruct Gavin to focus on the defence of the Groesbeek Heights and to treat the capture of the Nijmegen road bridge as of secondary importance There is no doubt that Boy explicitly instructed Gavin, at a divisional commanders’ conference on 14 September, not to attempt to capture the Nijmegen road bridge until he had firmly established control of the Groesbeek Heights. Gavin, for his part, needed no pressing on this, writing subsequently: ‘After a thorough study of the Nijmegen area, and after consulting a Dutch officer who was to accompany the 82d Airborne Division, it became clear that the key to the accomplishment of the 82d’s mission would be the prompt seizure, thorough organization and tenacious holding of the Groesbeek heights.’2 There was no difference between him and Boy over the priorities, which were first the heights, then the Grave bridge, then the bridges over the Mass-Waal Canal and only last the Nijmegen road bridge.
Verdict. Not guilty. The priorities were correct, in the light of the intelligence and the available resources, but they were the product of a thoroughly bad plan.
So, if Mead is correct then it's unlikely Browning would have suggested Gavin drop a battalion north of the Waal River. You forget that at the time Gavin was working with an intelligence report that 4,000 SS troops were in the Nijmegen area. If Gavin had dropped the Battalion north of Waal it would be isolated if it failed to capture the bridge and Gavin would not have any troops to attack from the south until all other objectives have been secured or the arrival of XXX Corp or 325th Glider regiment.
It would also explain Lindquist Order no 1 issue 13/9/1944 from Poulussen Lost at Nijmegen page 83
2. a 508 PIR will land during daylight hours DDay on DZ T seize organize and hold key terrain features in section responsibility, be prepared to seize Waal River crossing at Nijmegen (714633) on Div order and prevent all hostile movement S of line Hatert (681584) - Klooster (712589)
You also have Col Frost comments (Frost, John. A Drop Too Many (p. 322))
Surely, the Corps Commander, having laid so much stress on the need to capture Arnhem bridge, would have put the same degree of priority on the taking of the Nijmegen bridge, for without that we were in jeopardy however weak the immediate opposition. But, in fact, it turned out that he had not. The same voice that had so firmly said to Roy Urquhart: ‘Arnhem Bridge. And hold it,’ said to James Gavin, G.O.C. of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, ‘The Groesbeek Heights. Nijmegen Bridge later.’
Buckingham, William F.. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (pp. 163-164)
After Gavin had finished outlining his Divisional plan, Browning specifically forbade him from moving on the Nijmegen bridges until the whole of the Groesbeek Heights had been secured.
Clearly the debate whether Browning order Gavin not to seize the Bridge is not clear cut, it depends on your source you trust. Therefore your statement about Browning Ordering the drop is also depended on your source. No publish source I have read on the subject mention Browning or British ordering or requesting the drop.
If Browning or British only requested or wanted a drop north of the Waal River then Gavin refusal after consideration would not have raise a disciplinary matter under Military Law only a direct order refusal.
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@davemac1197
Some examples
Atkinson, Rick. An Army At Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (Liberation Trilogy Book 1)
Page 569 And in the center, where II Corps remained under Anderson’s tactical command, the Americans buried their dead, turned their backs to Kasserine Pass, and waited to see who would lead them forward.
Page 575 Beginning on March 8, II Corps was no longer part of Anderson’s First Army but directly under Alexander and his 18th Army Group as part of the field marshal’s reorganization.
Page 614 As Montgomery prepared to give battle 120 miles southeast at Mareth, General Alexander had ordered the Americans to liberate Gafsa yet again.
Page 617 Allen’s 1st Division was ordered to “assist the advance of the British Eighth Army from the south” by building a supply dump in Gafsa and protecting Montgomery’s left flank as he drove toward Sfax and then Tunis.
Page 636 Alexander’s new orders to II Corps on March 22—the revision that prompted Terry Allen’s plan to attack from El Guettar, preempted when 10th Panzer attacked him first—set in train an ordeal no soldier in Old Ironsides could have foreseen. To further threaten the Axis flank, 1st Armored was directed to continue eastward.
Page 661 On Tuesday night, Alexander issued his sixth and final change of orders to the Americans: II Corps was to attack in the morning without regard to armor losses, in a last attempt to ram the Axis flank.
Atkinson, Rick. The Day Of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy 1943-44
Page 522 Eighth Army would also attack but with twice the strength and more: two Polish divisions up Monte Cassino rather than just the 4th Indian,
Page 522 To keep secret the presence of the Polish corps at Cassino, Leese had refused to let Anders reconnoiter the terrain.
Page 531 Leese at seven A.M. on Wednesday, May 17, once again ordered Anders and his Poles into the breach.
Saunders, Tim. The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem (Battleground Europe)
Page 359 Consequently, it was an uncontroversial decision for an American division to remain under command of the British. The, 101st US Airborne Division’s paratroopers, trained as shock troops, found themselves in the unfamiliar role of static defence along ten miles of the Rhine between Elst and Opheusden.
Page 360 The Sherman tanks of the Scots Greys (4th Armoured Brigade) and the infantrymen of 5 DCLI, who had been the Wessex Division’s reserve, were also to remain on the Island under command of the 101st. Lieutenant Colonel George Taylor, commanding 5 DCLI, recalls that General Horrocks thought that to be attached to 101st Airborne ‘is a great honour’. However: ‘A great honour it might have been, but I could only reflect ruefully at the time that “bang goes four days rest out of the line!” As the American General’s mobile reserve, we set up headquarters in a railway station near Andelst.’
Atkinson, Rick. The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945
Page 500 The entire U.S. Ninth Army would reinforce Montgomery in the north,
Page 541 Simpson now proposed a quick amphibious assault over the Rhine north of Düsseldorf. A thrust by XIX Corps could shorten the war by weeks, he believed; patrols reported that “the enemy is completely disorganized and has neither defensive forces on this side nor the far side of the Rhine capable of stopping a fast crossing.” Montgomery declined with a curt “Don’t go across,”
You already have Browning example of his refusal to Gavin plans.
You could say Montgomery decision to include US 82nd and US 101st Division in Market Garden was an order to those divisions.
Then you have Montgomery orders to 1st Canadian Army to undertake various actions for example opening up the Channel Ports and Antwerp.
Montgomery orders to 1st and 9th US Armies during the battle of the Bulge.
Montgomery at El Alamein orders Australian, Indian, New Zealand and South African Division to lead the attack with British Divisions.
Does that satisfy you
Also, in a coalition how can any battles be fought if the commanding General cannot give orders to his subordinate commanders from another National Army.
You mention Military Discipline, now that a different matter, as each Military has its own codes of Military Justice.
For example, during WW1 British Army had capital punishment with around 300 executed by firing squad for various offenses. The Australian Army abolish capital punishment when it issues its own code in 1908. Hence no Australian soldier was executed during WW1 even for the same offense that a British soldier was executed.
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@davemac1197
Your Statement " The reason all of this happened, or was allowed to happen, was because of the nature of the Anglo-American alliance. The Americans would not submit to British control, so no senior British commander could compel an American officer of lower rank, or vice versa. "
Example of how your statement is incorrect
US II Corp was under the command of Gen Anderson 1st British Army in North Africa
Montgomery commanded 1st and 9th US Army during the Battle of the Bulge and 9thUS Army until the crossing of the Rhine and Ruhr campaign
Montgomery was in commanded for Overload and the 1st US Army.
Field Marshall Alexander in Italy commanded the 5th US Army.
No US General except Eisenhower were ever in commanded of a British Army until Clark replace Alexander as Commander 15th Army Group in Italy
"In October, Lieutenant General Sir Richard McCreery succeeded Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese as the commander of the Eighth Army. In December, Lieutenant General Mark Clark, the Fifth Army commander, was appointed to command the 15th Army Group, thereby succeeding the British General Sir Harold Alexander as commander of all Allied ground troops in Italy; Alexander succeeded Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson as the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre. Clark was succeeded in command of the Fifth Army by now-Lieutenant General Truscott In the winter and spring of 1944–45," The British held the position of Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean.
Then you have Browning refusing Gavin request on the 18th of September to launch a 2-battalion attack on the bridge.
From Buckingham, William F.. Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944 (p. 454).
"Gavin responded in his unfailingly correct manner by rapidly drawing up a plan for a three-pronged assault using the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a battalion from the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. When presented with the plan Browning initially endorsed it but he then vacillated and reverted back to his original flawed preoccupation with holding the Groesbeek Heights in their entirety on the grounds that ‘the retention of the high ground South of Nijmegen was of greater importance’ than securing the crossings over the River Waal.124 [ Quoted from ‘82nd Airborne Division Chief of Staff Journal, entry for 07:00, 19 September 1944, reporting conference held at 15:30, 18 September 1944’; cited in MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, footnote 66, p.168]
Show that Browning did have authority over Gavin and therefore could have ordered Gavin to drop the battalion on the North side of Waal River.
In the Pacific the US Navy did not have direct control of British Pacific Fleet which was equal in size to 1 US Task Group.
From Herder, Brian Lane. British Pacific Fleet 1944–45: The Royal Navy in the downfall of Japan (pp. 110-111).
From now on Third Fleet would always include a British contingent. Rawlings, Vian and their staffs transferred to Halsey’s flagship Missouri to conference. Halsey provided Rawlings with three possible alternatives:
1.TF-37 would operate close aboard, as another task group in TF-38; it would not receive direct orders from me, but would be privy to the orders that I gave TF-38; these it would consider as ‘suggestions’ to be followed to our mutual advantage, thereby assuring us a concentrated force with concentrated weapons.
2.TF-37 would operate semi-independently, some 60–70 miles away, thereby preserving its tactical identity at the cost of a divided force. I stipulated that I would consent to this only if the request were put in writing.
3.TF-37 would operate completely independently, against soft spots in Japan which we would recommend if so desired.
According to Halsey: ‘Admiral Rawlings did not hesitate. He said “Of course I’ll accept Number 1.”
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@johnburns4017 So now you are saying that the road between Eindhoven and Arnhem was blocked at Nijmegen by the evening of D-day. So, it was open for 40 hours after the landing.
As to want I know, you are not interested because you cannot prove that "The 82nd could have walked on the bridge whistling Dixie, if they had not dawdled hanging around DePlogue" as no evidence exits that can tell with 100% accuracy what time the 82nd would have reached the bridge if there was no delay.
Because based on my research into the question trying to create a time from when the 1/508 left the DZ at 1400 hours they reach the DePlogue either at 1600 hours (Poulussen) or 1700 Hours (US Official History)
The delay at DePloque, max 5 hours (Poulussen), min 2 Hours (Buckingham assuming 1/508 reached the DePloque at 1700 Hours) and time taken to reach the bridge from DePloque Max 3 hours (Poulussen and Buckingham) Min 2 Hours (Neilland).
Final the time 1/508 actual reached the bridge 2200 hours (Buckingham and Neilland) to 2400 Hours (Poulussen)
So, from my calculation the earliest 1/508 would have reach the bridge is 1800 hours and the latest 2000 Hours. 9th SS Recon were at the bridge by 2000 Hours.
Also based on what happen at Arnhem when Frost attempted to cross the bridge and failed. I cannot see based on what limited information how anyone can say with 100% certainty 1/508 would have captured the bridge. I would say that it was possible, especially the capture of the southern end, but the crossing of the bridge and the capture of the northern end at best would be based solely on speculation, because once sufficient German strength was in place at the northern end Warren would have faced the same problem Frost face at Arnhem.
I know you will disagree and think what I said is rubbish, so i challenge you to tell be the following backed with supporting evidence or source.
1) What time the 1/508 would have reached the bridge with no delay
2) The number of Germans defending the bridge at that time
3) How those troop were deployed around the bridge including the northern side
4) the location of 88mm and 20mm AA Guns and how many could be used in supporting the bridge defends.
If you can answer those questions and provide the evidence that is 100% reliable, I will accept that I am wrong. If you can answer the questions or provide the evidence, will you admit that you are wrong?
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