Comments by "Colonel K" (@Paladin1873) on "The Armchair Historian" channel.

  1. Meanwhile the Third Army was deprived of supplies during Market-Garden despite their availability.
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  2.  John Cornell  Third Army was stalled because of Eisenhower's "pause" decision. Supplies were rationed and redirected as part of the buildup for Market-Garden. For Patton the timing could not have worse. The Germans feared he would avoid the fortresses protecting Metz and attack north of the city where Allied success was almost guaranteed. But Eisenhower's "pause" decision deprived Patton of the supplies to do this, so he engaged in something he personally despised, limited frontal assaults. Historians believe that after he made this choice, he then became obsessed with the idea of taking Metz, if for no other reason than he wanted to ensure his replacement troops were kept "blooded". The moment the Allies stopped their advance, the initiative was lost, and the Germans were handed the one gift they most desperately needed, the opportunity to organize and prepare an adequate defense. The broad front strategy had been swapped for a narrow front strategy, and Patton's front was not the one selected, so the great dash across France was over. Eisenhower's decision to switch strategies was born of necessity. It had taken much longer to secure the necessary ports to support the broad front strategy, and the supply lines had grown ever more tenuous as they continued to stretch closer to Germany. The Brits were having a rougher go up north because they faced stronger resistance than units further south. Since Ike lacked the resources to continue the broad front campaign, he faced a tough choice. Patton wanted to smash through the Siegfried Line while it was still undermanned. Monty wanted to drive into the Ruhr Valley, which was Germany's industrial center. Hodges was stuck in the middle between these two flamboyant leaders and would be required to support whichever plan Ike chose. Some strategist argued that southern Germany was of little strategic value, while occupying the Ruhr could end the war quickly. I'm not sure I fully subscribe to this theory. A drive through the south would have cut off German forces in Italy. In any case, Eisenhower was under enormous political pressure to allow Monty's plan to be executed, and I suspect a good part of this pressure was Churchill's desire to keep the Soviets out of western Europe, particularity areas as industrially rich as the Ruhr Valley. In theory, Monty's goal seemed more desirable, but his plan was a shambles, as events later proved. Ironically, it was Monty's failure in Holland that set the stage for the Battle of the Bulge and Patton's redemption when he wheeled his army 90 degrees north and rushed to save the beleaguered forces at Bastogne.
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  3.  John Cornell  According to Third Army records they lacked sufficient supplies to continue the assault, particularly munitions, which were theoretically limited to seven rounds per soldier per day. In addition, Patton was under orders not to conduct any major advances. I don't know what source material you are consulting, but it does not correspond with what I've read over the years. From an operational standpoint it can be argued that Patton did not employ his forces wisely around Metz in the early stages of the operation, and at the tactical level they had to be retrained for the final assault, but at the strategic level he was boxed in. An army has a lot of moving parts. If critical components are lacking, the army grinds to a halt. Any pause in operational tempo, regardless of cause, gives advantage to your enemy. This was the situation around Metz, and with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight we can easily point out the mistakes and plan a better course of action. I have little doubt the planning staffs were working with the best information they had available at the time, otherwise they would have taken a different course of action. As for the Hurtgen Forest, it reminds me somewhat of the Battle of the Wilderness in the War between the States, a bloody, inconclusive campaign that leaves one wondering why it was fought.
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  4. Part of my comment is missing. It would have been more accurate in my second post if I had said Monty's failure in Market-Garden helped set the stage for the Battle of the Bulge. I did not mean to imply the Bulge was the German response to Market Garden. I meant that the failure to access the Ruhr Valley in the fall of '44 meant there would be no further major Allied offensives that year, thus the Germans were given an opportunity to mount a winter offensive in the Ardennes, something the western Allies considered to be highly unlikely, if not impossible, at this stage of the war. Patton's chance to redeem his tarnished image came about as a result of this surprise attack.
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  5. The unofficial total war dead, after nearly eight years of fighting, is cited as being over one million.
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  6. I believe it is pronounced Be-zert-ee. The troops in North Africa would recite a ditty about Dirty Gertie from Bizerte.
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  7. You left out the M24 Chaffe, M41 Walker Bulldog, M47 Patton II, and M48. All four tanks were important players in US tank development. I don't know why, but the M551 Sheridan was not classified as a light tank, but as an Armored Reconnaissance/Airborne Assault Vehicle. As an aside, my brother was the navigator onboard one of the C-141s that air dropped the Sheridans during the Panama invasion of 1989, the only time this was ever done in combat. I'm not sure where his vehicle landed, but two landed in a swamp near the airfield and could not be used.
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  8. I wonder if it looked any better before they hit it.
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  9. The morale, and therefore the combat effectiveness, of Italian units varied greatly in WWII. When the Allies encountered pro-fascist forces, they proved to be a tough nut to crack. But there was great dissension among the troops, and when Italy capitulated, antifascist Italians warred with pro-fascist Italian and German troops. As the Germans showed us, Italy is well suited to protracted defensive warfare. German troops, augmented by pro-fascist Italian support in northern Italy did not end their resistance until a week before Germany surrendered. Even after American troops moved into northern Italy, it was obvious the pro-Austrian people of the region would not readily submit to Allied rule if it meant remaining under Italian control. It would take years to extinguish the flames of animosity and hatred, but today it is largely overlooked and forgotten history.
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