Comments by "Kenneth Dean Miller" (@kennethdeanmiller7324) on "The Drydock - Episode 245 (Part 1)" video.

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  3. Yeah, in my personal opinion the US Navy never really fought a typical line of battleships type engagement even at Surigao Strait considering that by the time the Japanese ships encountered US Navy battleships there was only one Japanese battleship left so even though the US Navy was arranged in a battle line formation the one Japanese battleship left can hardly be considered an opposing battle line. Therefore the US Navy never really participated in a "typical line of battle" with their battleships. And when operating in typical line of battle with cruisers they were usually met with a large amount of long lance torpedoes causing catastrophic consequences for most of the sailors aboard, or at least during the Guadal Canal campaign. And this was usually due to some incompetent rear Admiral showing up & not knowing his business enough to allow his ships to fire upon enemy ships at the earliest possible moment. ☆☆☆When studying Naval doctrine the US Navy at Guadal Canal should be looked at very closely as to "what NOT to do" when a Navy all of a sudden finds that it's at war. While inexperience could maybe justify the losses at the 1st Battle of Savo Island, after that, the only excuse is ignorance of an enemy that has fully shown that it is VERY CAPABLE. And, even in the First Battle of Savo Island, A Captain not knowing & understanding the full capability of his ships radar and believing that it makes the ship vulnerable in some way during the night & orders it to be turned off. This ignorance confounds me. And I'm not sure if it's the Navy's fault for not teaching him properly or if it was simply his fault for not learning the truth of it's capability. It would seem the latter considering Admiral Lee was able to use the Washington's radar & guns to devastating affect upon Kirishima saving the South Dakota from further salvos from the Japanese war ship. But also, sending a ship to that area with an Admiral aboard that out ranks the Admiral already on that station is a bit counter productive considering the Admiral already there should have a better idea of his surroundings. And a better understanding of previous actions. Ànd it also seems that neither of these Admirals would ever know the true capabilities of the radars that were on the ships around them. Considering that "Roger" meant "yes" & also meant "receipt of transmission" would at least let the ships that had a target start firing at said target would at least save some of the ships & some of the sailors aboard. Even though the 2 Admirals would both be lost. And although the Guadal Canal campaign was a huge embarrassment for the US Navy imho the major saving grace for US Forces in the area was the US Marine Corp. Because they were able to hold the airstrip against Japanese forces on the island they were also able to form the Cactus Air Force. I imagine at first it was a logistical nightmare to populate the area with planes, fuel, bombs & torpedoes. But it also made for huge deterant for enemy supply ships that were not capable of a lot of speed. Cuz although supply ships could make it there under the cover of darkness they would just be beginning to unload at sunrise & get bombed out of existence by the Cactus Air Force. Which is one part of the war that I have ever heard little about. The logistics of the Cactus Air Force. How did they get their first planes? How did the get replacement planes? Fuel? Bombs? Food? Were they able to create underground bunkers for large fuel tanks? & bombs? & AA ammunition & food stores? Or was everything above ground & vulnerable to sea to land bombardment? Or aircraft bombing? How quickly were they able to set up radar installations? And how often was it damaged and/or replaced with newer & better radar?
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