Comments by "Mitch Richards" (@mitchrichards1532) on "Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944" video.

Sure.... Considering that the Germans had enough reserves to effectively counter a single narrow thrust, but were completely incapable of resisting a broad front and in the end, they would lose more men, equipment, etc. and that it also served many political ends all around, I guess the "amateurs" won out on that one. Good thing 🙂
7
@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- How do you explain the Ardennes offensive with only 13 weakened divisions available? 🤔😂 Odd how all those non-existent reserves showed up during Market Garden, eh? The German retreat outpaced the Allied advance and the Germans had begun reconstituting in late August/first week of September and did so very rapidly. Any attempt by the Allies to pursue a single thrust during that time puts pressure in only that area and the Germans had enough resources to take advantage of the territory.
4
" It was the Airborne element planned by the Americans that ultimately failed." How long did XXX Corps take to reach Arnhem? Any plan that involves a timetable dependent upon taking multiple enemy bridges intact is a fool's errand.
3
@davemac1197 Like I said: "Any plan that involves a timetable dependent upon taking multiple enemy bridges intact is a fool's errand." A plan that requires perfection or something close to it will inevitably fail when the enemy gets his say in the matter. Market Garden defied one of the main principles of war; simplicity which is the key reason it failed.
3
@billballbuster7186 And what of the other 6 bridges and Groesbeek Heights that commanded the area and the bridge in question? These are your secondary objectives? Personally I would say that the failure of Market Garden had more to with the German 15th Army being heavily engaged in the battle rather than cut off, bottled up in France, and left to die. No? Who's failure was that?
3
@billballbuster7186 No, the 15th Army escaped due to a purely British/CW error, and it in many ways eclipses the failure of Market Garden. Large elements of the 15 Army were engaged in Market Garden as well. The 2nd and 3rd order effects of not sealing the 15th Army's ferry route were the long and painful clearing of the Scheldt, the failure of Market Garden, and the denial of use of Antwerp until 28 Nov. According to Horrocks, “With the capture of Brussels and Antwerp 30 Corps was ordered to halt. The reason given was that we had out-run our administrative resources.” Brian Horrocks, Corps Commander (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977) The failure of the British to cut off the South Beveland peninsula allowed the majority of the Fifteenth Army to escape into Holland, where they would later be utilized to oppose Operation Market-Garden. and defend the Scheldt.
3
@billballbuster7186 lol, changing the topic, moving the goal posts, etc. Nope...
3
@billballbuster7186 Bother? I'm laughing at your mental gymnastics. I pointed out a clear British failure related to Market Garden, and you squirrel off to something unrelated to compensate. Odd behavior, but 🤣
3
@billballbuster7186 Your struggle is real... 🤣
3
So there were Allied logistical constraints to be considered in the narrow vs broad front strategy. I believe what the SHAEF G5 was looking at was the fact the German logistical and personnel replacement constraints would be further strained by a broad front than a narrow stab. More Allied forces engaged means more German forces engaged and at a severe disadvantage. On a broad front, German transportation capabilities were paralyzed, as opposed to a narrow sector where they could concentrate limited resources. I could elaborate on many points, but the situation is clear. All of this is in the context of the territorial agreements drawn up at Tehran, the political considerations detailed in this vid, etc.
3
@davemac1197 Your idea of military strategy is demonstrating concepts better applied to the operational level, not the strategic level which 100% involves politics. SHAEF G4 is just one staff component, one war fighting function that gets a say in informing the Commander. In this situation of what to do in Aug/Sep of 1944, the G2 and G5 would be far more influential in shaping the decisions of leadership. G2 provides the enemy situation, their capabilities, etc. and the G5 is taking that into consideration against Allied capabilities (which includes G4 statistics, etc.) within the confines of an overall strategy. After Falaise, German transportation and logistics were a shambles, and the opportunity to liberate France on the cheap was there to be had as a result. The broad front was a low risk/high reward proposition that put great pressure on the Germans everywhere at the same time while also serving the political agenda in regard to restoring France as a power. Monty's ideas are sound at the operational level and make sense given the situation, but they are riskier, remain below the level of grand strategy, not synced with the Tehran agreements, and inferior to the broad front in terms of coalition warfare.
3
@davemac1197 Ugh, modern organization... I was a DIV G5 (Plans) just 18 months ago, so in 1944 I believe we're talking about G3 Plans? no? My mistake.
3
@billballbuster7186 Oh now its a "tantrum" 🤣 Your argument was crushed, you tried to divert, you got called out on it. Get over yourself, you suck at trolling. 😂
2
@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- So y this plan you would forgo the Falaise pocket, leave the German armies intact? I'm not buying the wisdom you're seeing in it.
2
@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Please check a map, refernce Cobra, the Cobra timeline, the end of the Falaise battle, then point out when/where/how this concentrated attack by 21st AG could happen. After Cobra/Falaise, the 21st AG DID get priority of supply, so... When/where/how was this concentrated attack to happen in the 3 weeks between Falaise and Market Garden.
2
@johnpeate4544 John, a great post and far better than a Youtube comment section deserves. Better to bring the effort to a proper forum. That said, you talked past my point which was the 15th Army, not the Scheldt itself: "The 2nd and 3rd order effects of not sealing the 15th Army's ferry route were the long and painful clearing of the Scheldt, the failure of Market Garden, and the denial of use of Antwerp until 28 Nov. According to Horrocks, “With the capture of Brussels and Antwerp 30 Corps was ordered to halt. The reason given was that we had out-run our administrative resources.” Brian Horrocks, Corps Commander (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1977)" -a true military blunder...
1
@johnpeate4544 Sealing the 15th Army off on the Western side of the Scheldt cuts them from supply, degrades their combat capability, and strikes them from the German order of battle for Market Garden and beyond, where they played a pivotal role. It also facilitates opening Antwerp much earlier because they wouldn't play a role in the Scheldt fighting either. "A swift strike after seizing the Albert Canal bridges intact across the South Beveland isthmus on to Walcheren Island had the potential for isolating the Germans on the Scheldt’s south bank and expediting the clearance of the estuary, resulting in the opening of the port." "The Allies’ Biggest Blunder?" Brig. Gen. (ret.) Raymond E. Bell, Jr.
1
@johnpeate4544 Fair points. Sorry I'm a bit too busy to engage in depth on this. Great content so far. Cheers
1
Broad Front strategy vs one that didn't happen, and we can only speculate about... If the Western Allies did go with the narrow front, the enemy still would have gotten a say in the situation and there's no guarantee of success. The strategy employed DID work regardless of nit-picking.
1