Comments by "" (@walterkronkitesleftshoe6684) on "The Loss of HMS Hood - But why did it blow up??" video.
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@WorshipinIdols I've only just spotted your first reply.
The "ALL" of the "all or nothing" armour scheme refers to the "box" that covers the machinery spaces, magazines, shell handling, barbettes and turrets, and the "NOTHING" refers to the rest of the ship. Its pretty self explanatory really. Compare a diagram of the armour distribution on KGV and Nelson classes to that of the German ships. you'll notice that apart from the armoured "box" of the citadel (and one or two minor localised areas on their superstructure) the British battleships have virtually NO thinner armoured areas, as opposed to the German ships using the outdated "incremental" armour scheme, where multiple decks and vertical surfaces have armour of between 1 and 4 inches of armour just ripe enough to activate the fuses of incoming shells whilst not being proof to those same shells, as well as sizeable chunks of much heavier armour dotted around her superstructure.
The hit on PoW's bridge as the photos you have no doubt already viewed will attest (they'll be there with the photos of PoW's perforated rear funnel) CLEARLY show the torn splinter plating on BOTH sides of the "flying" bridge and NOT the small area of 4 inch armour you suggest that actually faced the sides of the armoured conning tower 1 deck below.
You're ALMOST correct in saying that the main armoured belt of the KGVs covered the area between the front of the A turret barbette and the rearmost point of the Y turret barbette in the same manner as Bismarck, but like Bismarck it did actually extend BEYOND those points with both fore & aft lower belt extensions, as well as having much heavier horizontal deck armour both fore and aft of the main turrets than Bismarck.
I thought that we'd established that the idea of picking specific areas of a ship to target from 9 miles away was very much in the realm of "fantasy land", as the target you're aiming for is simply "the ship", with the precise point of impact being in the lap of the gods. Your erroneous "one bullseye is a lucky hit, 2 bullseye’s is skill and quality"s is once again drifting into the area of "nazi fanboism". You do realise that buying 2 lottery tickets does not halve the odds of winning, it merely gives you two chances at exactly the SAME outlandish odds that one ticket gives you. in the same manner two lucky shots are exactly that... two lucky shots. You cannot use a blunderbus of 8 x 15in shells to "snipe a bullseye" from 9 miles away.
I'm glad you've given a fair appraisal of Bismarck's design, I'd equally like to state that I am NOT ignorantly attempting to diminish the quality of the German gunnery at Denmark Strait, but merely hoping to "keep it real".
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@WorshipinIdols So now you've changed your original assertion from "Bismarck's hit wasn't luck but skill", to "everyone has a degree of luck". Thats fine by me. Of course the specific point of impact of ANY shell at longer ranges is affected by luck. The skill in long range naval gunnery is simply getting the shells within a couple of hundred feet of your intended target, the rest is providence.
As for Bismarck "scoring hits with every salvo" that means that Bismarck must've only fired 3 salvoes at PoW, as that is the number of hits she achieved, when the truth is that there were plenty of salvoes that scored no hits (which is not to mock German gunnery, its just the nature of the game ), and as we agree none of the three hits detonated as intended, due to the design of PoW's armour scheme.
Seems your entrallment with the German ships knows no bounds, attributing torpedoes to Bismarck (she had none fitted) and Prinz Eugen Who at no point during the Denmark Strait engagement was anywhere near in range to use her G7a TI steam torpedos even at their lowest speed setting.
In what way do you consider that the RN "lost the battle"? Because of the loss of the Hood? What about the fact that Hood and PoW were tasked with preventing the German ships from breaking out into the Atlantic, and as a result of the action "operation Rhineübung" was stopped in its tracks and Bismarck then had to futilely run for its life back to France? Job done.
Its the same reason that the RN won the battle of Jutland. German high seas fleet sets out to ambush the Home fleet with a view to breaking the RN North sea blockade, the RN suffers heavier losses BUT the blockade remains intact and the German fleet skulks back to port never to show its face again (except when it was surrendering to the RN at Scapa Flow).
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No there was a HUGE amount of luck involved in Bismarck's hit on Hood's magazine.
A full salvo of main gun fire from a battleship is analogous to a scatter of lead shot from a shotgun. During the battle of Denmark Strait, the Bismarck aimed at Hood from 8-9 nautical miles away. At that range the 38 cm SK C/34 (Bismarck's main armament) had a CEP (circular error probability - effectively the radius of a circle within which 50% of its shots would fall) of 100m. That means that if 8 of Bismarck's 15in guns fired at a single point 8-9 nm away, 4 of her shells would be expected to land (with completely random distribution) within an ellipse (think of it as a stretched circle, due to the angle of fall of the shells) measuring approximately 200m (660ft) wide, (or to put it another way 76% of HMS Hood's 860ft length), by more than two thousand feet long. The other 4 shots would land even further away from the aiming point. That being the case, how can an individual shell be aimed specifically at a tiny part of HMS Hood's structure, namely the 4in HA magazine, that its believed triggered off Hood's detonation? I'll give you a hint, there's a little clue in my paragraph above....where it says "completely random distribution".
A simplified analogy is that if you prop a dartboard up 50 yards away and can consistently knock it over with a shotgun at that range then that is pretty good shooting, just as Bismarck / PE achieved during the Denmark Strait encounter.
Now you can "knock the dartboard over" all day long with the shotgun and STILL NOT hit the bullseye (magazine) with an individual pellet. As opposed to being a skillful shot by knocking over the dartboard, whether you hit the bullseye with an individual pellet is complete luck.
The idea of HMS PoW not being more heavily damaged because of the failure of the German fuses, was less to do with luck and much more to do with the KGV class's "all or nothing" armour scheme. PoW was hit by a total of seven German shells during the battle of Denmarck Strait and not ONE of them detonated as designed. This is because in the "all or nothing" system of armouring only the most vital "citadel" is heavily armoured, the rest of the ship's superstructure being comprised of standard naval "splinter" plating. This meant that a shell hitting non vital areas of the ship, instead of having their fuse activated by the shock of impacting on a substantial piece of armour instead passed through without detonating (or only partially detonating or with a delayed detonation) menaing that far less damage was inflicted on the ship.
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Whilst concurring with most of your comment, I'd like to add some of my own thoughts.
Yes, in the engagement of Bismarck / PE Vs Hood / PoW there was on paper a superiority in RN firepower BUT.
1. The 2 RN heavy cruisers were at no time in gunnery range of the Denmark Strait engagement, being in a tail chasing position and with V/Adm Holland electing to retain radio silence and not communicating his intentions to Wake-Walker in HMS Norfolk. Norfolk did fire a couple of wishful salvoes at the German ships which fell woefully short.
2. The Destroyer escort that had accompanied Hood / PoW had been detached to search northwards for the German ships when Suffolk / Norfolk had temporarily lost contact with the German ships earlier in the night, and as a consequence of their detachment were NOT at the scene of the battle... Though they did arrive shortly after the engagement had concluded and it was the destroyer HMS Electra that finally rescued the three Hood survivors.
It's all very easy to make a charge of a "poor management of resources" in hindsight. But I wonder how the many armchair admirals that haunt comments would have handled a high speed interception at long range with the enemy on the very border of his intended scene of operations, in an era before satellites, over the horizon radars, GPS or even comprehensive air coverage, and then just as the plan was falling into place as planned through the "fog of war" the shadowing cruisers lose contact with the quarry shortly before contact, and all the careful plotting of the interception course has come to nought.
Sitting on the sidelines picking fault, is a universe away from being in sole command of major units in a bleak stormy North Atlantic with imperfect intelligence to base your decisions on.
Holland was not alone in making a "wrong call", Lütjens was in hindsight equally faulty in some of his decisions, in the immediacy of a fast moving dynamic engagement snap decisions have to be made. Make the right one and its "V/Adm Holland, the Hero of Denmark Strait"... make the wrong call and its "Why did the fool do that"?
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@Project_Prescott I apologise for my late reply. I did reply earlier to your message above but YT LOVES randomly deleting my posts. My now deleted message said...
I don't know if you're aware that the HMS Hood association website has a memorial page for EVERY known member of the ship's crew. A lot of these memorial pages contain photographs and history of the individual concerned, and they are a means to keep alive their memory for the future. There currently exists a page for Ordinary Seaman Leonard Moyal Peckham, Service Number: P/JX 158236, born on 04 December 1922 at Fratton, Portsmouth, Hampshire, but unfortunately there is no photograph and no further information. If you have a confirmed family photograph of Leonard the association would be delighted to receive a copy (and any other related information) which they will be only too glad to place on Leonard's page.
There is currently NO corresponding page for James William, but if you have his details (service number / dates of service aboard Hood etc) they will create a new page especially for him.
I would post a link to Leonard's page, but if I do so Youtube "kindly" delete the message, if you put leonard's name in google, his page at the website will be the first result that will show up. I hope this is of some use to your family. All the best, Project Prescott.
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@vincentlavallee2779 During the battle of Denmark Strait, Bismarck's "killing shot" was fired at Hood from 8-9 nautical miles away. At that range the 38 cm SK C/34 (Bismarck's main armament) had a CEP (circular error probability - effectively the radius of a circle within which 50% of its shots would fall) of 100m. That means that if 8 of Bismarck's 15in guns fired at a single point 8-9 nm away, 4 of the shells would be expected to land (with completely random distribution) within an ellipsis (due to the angle of fall) measuring approximately 100m (330ft) wide, (or to put it another way 38% of HMS Hood's 860ft length), by close to 2500 feet long. The other 4 shots would land even further away from the aiming point. That being the case, how can an individual shell be aimed specifically at a tiny part of HMS Hood's structure, namely the 4in HA magazine, that is believed to have triggered off Hood's detonation? I'll give you a hint, there's a little clue in my paragraph above....where it says "completely random distribution".
A simplified analogy is that if you prop a dartboard up 50 yards away and can consistently knock it over with a shotgun at that range then that is pretty good shooting, just as Bismarck / PE achieved during the Denmark Strait encounter.
Now you can "knock the dartboard over" all day long with the shotgun and STILL NOT hit the bullseye (magazine) with an individual pellet. As opposed to being a skillful shot by knocking over the dartboard, whether you hit the bullseye with an individual pellet IS complete luck.
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During the battle of Denmark Strait, the Bismarck's killer blow was fired at Hood from 8-9 nautical miles away. At that range the 38 cm SK C/34 (Bismarck's main armament) had a CEP (circular error probability - effectively the radius of a circle within which 50% of its shots would fall) of 100m. That means that if 8 of Bismarck's 15in guns fired at a single point 8-9 nm away, 4 of the shells would be expected to land (with completely random distribution) within an ellipse measuring approximately 100m (330ft) wide, (or 38% of HMS Hood's 860ft length), by more than two thousand feet long (an ellipse due to the angle of fall). The other 4 shots would land even further away from the aiming point. That being the case, how can an individual shell be aimed specifically at a tiny part of HMS Hood's structure, namely the 4in HA magazine, that triggered off Hood's detonation? I'll give you a hint, there's a little clue in my paragraph above....where it says "completely random distribution".
A simplified analogy is that if you prop a dartboard up 50 yards away and can consistently knock it over with a shotgun at that range then that is pretty good shooting, just as Bismarck / PE achieved during the Denmark Strait encounter.
Now you can "knock the dartboard over" all day long with the shotgun and STILL NOT hit the bullseye (magazine) with an individual pellet. As opposed to being a skillful shot by knocking over the dartboard, whether you hit the bullseye with an individual pellet IS COMPLETE LUCK.
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@VincentComet-l8e Don't for one second think I'm justifying Holland's decisions, yes they were flawed especially with the advantage of cool, unpressured hindsight... but he's not alone in making such bad calls, when the chips are down, the pressure is very much on, and a fluid situation calls for an immediate decision.
I'm aware of and agree with the points you make. On the other side of the scales of history is the fact that the inexperienced and mechanically imperfect HMS PoW singlehandedly stopped the German's plans to wreck the Atlantic convoy system, and that whereas the RN lost a revered and venerable 20 year old battlecruiser which comprised a relatively small part of the RN capital ship establishment and whose loss was replaced manifold, in exchange the Germans due to events precipitated at Denmark Strait lost a much vaunted nazi "uberschiff" who after 9 days at sea was put on the bottom of the ocean, a loss of 25% of the Kriegsmarine's capital ship force which was never replaced.
In all likelihood this only happened because of Holland's initially unplanned interception at Denmark Strait. Unplanned in the sense that his force was originally tasked to sail to Reykjavik to refuel and from there backup the Norfolk & Suffolk, but instead had to plot a long range, high speed interception course "on the fly", which as we know would have been a perfect interception but for the temporary loss of contact with the German ships at a CRUCIAL moment just hours before battle was joined.
What would have been the outcome if Holland complete with his attendant destroyer screen (which had been detached earlier to attempt to regain contact with the Germans, and as a consequence took no part in the action) had instead crossed the German's "T" at Denmark Strait, something that could easily have been achieved had it not been for the unfortunate crucial loss of contact in the early hours of 23rd May which threw all of his planning to the wind?
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