Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Why didn’t Hitler End the War when he Failed to get the OIL of the Caucasus?" video.
-
Rommel's tanks did not have enough fuel because of the RN blockade.
Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze: page 411:
"In Feb 1941. The Italian Navy was to drop all naval operations unless Germany provided 25,000 tons of oil. The German surface navy was neutralized in port through lack of fuel. Lack of oil was a big Axis problem."
Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze: Page 439:
"In November 1941 the fuel oil situation of both the Italian and German navies was described by the Wehrmacht as 'catastrophic'. In May 1941 the Royal Navy had sunk the battleship Bismarck as it made a futile bid to escape into the Atlantic shipping lanes. By the autumn the rest of Germany's surface fleet was confined to harbour, not only by the British but also by the chronic lack of fuel."
Wages of Destruction: page 442:
"Shipments of oil to Britain peaked at more than 20 million tons, nine times the maximum figure ever imported by Germany during the war. In January 1941, when Germany is sometimes described as being 'glutted' with oil, stocks came to barely more than 2 million tons. In London, alarm bells went off whenever stocks fell below 7 million tons. So great was the disparity that the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, charged with assessing Germany's economic situation, had difficulty believing its highly accurate estimates of German oil stocks. To the British it seemed implausible that Hitler could possibly have embarked on the war with such a small margin of fuel security, an incredulity shared by both the Soviets and the Americans, who agreed in overestimating Germany's oil stocks by at least 100 per cent."
During 1941, Italy was only able to import 600,000 tons of fuel with 163,000 tons given to the navy. At this point the monthly consumption had to be reduced to 60,000 tons. The total amount of oil fuel available at the end of the year was about 200,000 tons. During this period it was decided to remove from service the older battleships. After the November British attack in Egypt, the high command and Mussolini requested that the Italian fleet defend the Libya-bound convoys. This paid off and was only possible by the special shipment of 80,000 tons of German oil fuel delivered at the end of the year.
On January 10th, 1942 the Italians informed the Germans that their navy’s supplies of fuel had dropped to 90,000 tons. During these months, the bottom was hit with reserves down to 14,000 tons. The situation deteriorated by the shipment of 9,000 tons of German oil fuel of quality too low to use. At the end of April, it was possible to import 50,000 tons of fuel oil per month from Romania. Suspending escort and mining missions by Italian cruisers reduced consumption. These cuts and new shipments allowed for the deployment of the whole Italian fleet during the battle with the British of mid-June. The Germans supplied fuel oil of only 10,000 tons in July 1942 and 23,000 tons in September. At the end of November 1942 the oil fuel reserve was about 70,000 tons plus all which was stored aboard the ships, This was enough for one sortie of the whole fleet. At the end of December, the old battleships Cesare, Duilio and Doria were removed from service.
The allied landing in North Africa in 1943 put the Italian navy in another state of fuel crisis. New missions were made possible by the shipment of 40,000 tons of quality German fuel oil. In January 1943, the fuel oil crisis reached its climax and the three modern battleships had to be removed from service eliminating the Italian battle force. The only naval division still operating was in Sardinia. Only 3,000 tons were received in February 1943 and in March and April the modern destroyers had to be removed from escort missions. By the 10th of April, the only major naval force was annihilated when the Trieste was sunk and the Gorizia seriously damaged by allied air attack. Expecting a possible Allied invasion, the remaining destroyers were reactivated along with the battleships which had only half their bunkers filled with diesel fuel.
In April 1943, the Italian navy was partially active and destroyers were used in escort missions. But there was no reserves of fuel oil left. The Germans "loaned" 60,000 tons of fuel oil captured from the French fleet at Toulon, allowing the three battleships to be reactivated with some cruisers. When Italy surrendered on September 8th 1943, their fleet only had enough fuel to reach Malta to surrender.
Such was the effect of the Royal Navy blockade, the most effective and forgotten operation of WW2.
“Unfortunately, our petrol stocks were badly depleted, and it was with some anxiety that we contemplated the coming British attack [Battleaxe], for we knew that our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge than by tactical requirements.”
- Rommel in - Hart, L. The Rommel Papers. 1953.
1
-
1