Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "Why did Eisenhower stop Devers from crossing the Rhine?" video.

“Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s pause. After that date supply was not a problem. Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen were launched as supply was good. "Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp." - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 “It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “ - CHESTER WILMOT, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. Page 58. Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flown in from England. Half of the troop transport aircraft were taken by Bradley to take parcels, otherwise far more men would have been dropped on the 1st day of Market Garden. Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by First US Army 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans however. This was soon followed up by a larger advance by the US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a larger ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52. "by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended". This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
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Antwerp was a lame duck being 40 miles up a mined river. Time consuming to take while chasing a German army licking its wounds was very important. Eisenhower should have listened to Monty and rammed ahead to a Dutch port on the sea 40 miles ahead while the Germans were still reeling
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Devers could have secured the line from Luxembourg to Switzerland for sure. The US Third Army should have been sent north to support the US First Army and Monty's 21st Army group in securing the Ruhr. General Bodo Zimmermann, Chief of Operations, German Army Group D, said that had the strategy of Montgomery succeeded in the autumn of 1944, there would have been no need to fight for the Westwall, not for the central and upper Rhine, all of 24 which would have fallen automatically. Indeed, had Monty's idea for a 40 division concentrated thrust towards the Ruhr been accepted by Eisenhower instead of messing about in the Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc, it would have all been over for the Germans in the west. "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany." - Gunther Blumentritt in, The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart
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Having a bridgehead over the natural barrier, the Rhine is a good thing to have.
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Most the German army in the west was around the Ruhr.
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Rail lines were brought back to use super quick by allied rail crews. 12,000 men brought back into use 131 miles of track in three days to get the US Third Army moving in Normandy. Read The Liberation Line by Christian Wolmar. Also 2/3 to 3/4 of supplies coming into Normandy came in on the beaches by LSTs. These could easily use beaches in Northern France or Belgium with track run in and marshaling yards built in no time at all by the rail crews. They never did. Why there was an over emphasis by Eisenhower on Antwerp, up a 40 mile long mined river is mystifying.
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@jamesbeeching6138 About 120,000 troops crossed the bridge for 10 days. Operation Plunder, run by Monty was 1,300,000 men. A massive difference. Also the 120,000 were now short of supplies as the bridge collapsed.
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The French Army was expanding like crazy. By April 1945 it was a million strong and would have outnumbered Patch's army. The French were being supplied by mainly the US in arms but also the British.The French were also supplying US armies in food and other essentials like wood for example, so it was not as bad as US authors state. Armies use an amazing amount of wood.
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Antwerp was a lame duck being 40 miles up a mined river. Time consuming to take while chasing a German army licking its wounds was paramount. Eisenhower should have listened to Monty and rammed ahead to a Dutch port on the sea 40 miles ahead while the Germans were still reeling. Rail lines were brought back to use super quick by allied rail crews. 12,000 men brought back into use 131 miles of track in three days to get the US Third Army moving in Normandy. Read The Liberation Line by Christian Wolmar. Also 2/3 to 3/4 of supplies coming into Normandy came in on the beaches by LSTs. These could easily use beaches in Northern France or Belgium with track run in and marshaling yards built in no time at all by the rail crews. They never did. Why there was an over emphasis by Eisenhower on Antwerp, up a 40 mile long mined river which would take weeks to get operational is mystifying.
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Not enough US troops got over the Rhine at Remagen to make a difference.
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@terpfen True but the British went along with all sorts to keep the Yanks quiet so as to get them on with it. Like gagging their own men who fought in the Bulge to keep them happy thinking it was an all US affair - with a British general running it.
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@ArmiesAndBattles Eisenhower: ”I not only approved Market Garden, I insisted upon it.” And it would have been a 100% success had the US 82nd Airborne captured the Nijmegen bridge when there were only 19 Germans guarding it. As it happens they didn’t move on it for hours, allowing time for it to be reinforced. The biggest mistakes historians make is to glorify and narrow mindedly concern themselves with Arnhem and Oosterbeek. The Allies were stopped in the south just north of Nijmegen- that is why Arnhem turned out as it did. - SS Major-General Heinz Harmel, 1987 ”The US history points out that there ‘was no incentive for urgency over taking the Nijmegen bridge as XXX Corps were not yet in Eindhoven’ and it might be some time before they arrived at the Nijmegen bridge. In fact, XXX Corps had already passed Eindhoven and were waiting to cross the Bailey bridge at Zon. The US Official Historian, Charles B. MacDonald, dismisses this casual approach to the question of taking the Nijmegen bridge, stating that: ‘According to this theory, General Gavin had another full day to tackle the Germans at Nijmegen.’ This theory also assumes that one day would be sufficient for a Gavin to take the bridge - from one side only - having already sacrificed the advantage of surprise and with German strength increasing”. -Neillands Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 I recommend Poulusson’s Lost at Nijmegen on this.
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@ArmiesAndBattles “It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “ - CHESTER WILMOT, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. Page 58. Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for the land attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flown in from England. Half of the troop transport aircraft were taken by Bradley to take parcels, otherwise far more men would have been dropped on the 1st day of Market Garden.
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@PhillyPhanVinny In Eisenhower's own words in early September Antwerp was not the priority and that the Ruhr could be advanced upon in the meantime. Although he did prioritise Antwerp weeks later. Not one leading allied commander argued in the first half of September that the British Second Army should halt its pursuit of the Germans after it had just moved 400km in a week, and then stop to open Antwerp and clear the Scheldt. Clearing the Scheldt would have taken at least a month. In early September, SHAEF thought the Germans were nearly finished. No leader at the time said there should be a halt when it appeared a bridgehead over the Rhine could have been achieved and a buffer created to protect Antwerp when online. The idea was to get across the Rhine, break through the Westwall and then halt to open up Antwerp, building up supplies for the next stage. The advance through Germany. Antwerp was never needed for the westwall battles. Supplies were coming via Le Havre, Mulberry harbours and Cherbourg. The allies were not moving anywhere fast so there was no need to get supplies to them from Antwerp to supply the advance quickly - because there was no advance. All the US attack operations of autumn 1944 were well equipped and well supplied. They did not fail because Antwerp was not opened. They failed because of poor US strategy and tactical decisions. An example, was in the Lorraine, with Patton too cautious and hesitant failing to correctly concentrate his forces. Antwerp was fully operational in December. It never put the Germans off in scything through US lines in the Bulge attack. Antwerp was no panacea.
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Devers is Irish. Usually pronounced Deevers.
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@Colonel_Blimp Yes. The French supplied all those sorts of things. Wood, concrete, masonry, food, nails screws, tools, etc, etc. An army of a million men will go through that sort of stuff like crazy.
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@ArmiesAndBattles The air element did not take supplies from any US army. Neither did the ground element. Did you read what I wrote? Seems you never. Gavin was told by his scouts that there were no Germans in the forest. He ignored them. Market Garden was a success. Antwerp was protected from German counter-attack.
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Antwerp was a lame duck being 40 miles up a mined river. Time consuming to take while chasing a German army licking its wounds was very important. Eisenhower should have listened to Monty and rammed ahead to a Dutch port on the sea 40 miles ahead while the Germans were still reeling.
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Eisenhower was named Supreme Commander for Overlord, with British professionals in place to run the land campaign (Montgomery), the naval campaign (Ramsay), and the air campaign (Leigh- Mallory). Meanwhile, Eisenhower could go off and do broadcasts, meet and greet with politicians etc, at various Chateaux, and so on. The problems started when he added another job to his onerous workload, running the land campaign instead of Montgomery, a job he was unsuited for. As the enormity of Montgomery’s victory in France became apparent, decisions needed to be made about how the campaign would be carried forward as the German forces all but disintegrated after Falaise. Montgomery approached Bradley on the 17th August, and then Eisenhower on the 23rd August about the plan to move forward in the North. The need being to make best use of allied resources available at that time and keep the campaign moving forward.The Germans knew that Montgomery's plan was the best way forward for the allies at that time: 'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives - on both sides -would have been saved' - Hasso von Manteuffel. ‘The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.’ - Gunther Blumentritt. Eisenhower ducked the sensible way forward, citing US public opinion in support of his decision to disperse allied resources. The result, the whole advance ground to a halt.Eisenhower’s lack of military expertise was made worse by his failure to keep up with the allied armies, and the communications problems that resulted from him being so far from the front. Examples: His letter to Montgomery of the 4th September 1944 from Ranville in Normandy outlining his plans for 21st Army Group in the weeks ahead took until 9th September to finish arriving at Montgomery’s headquarters. In mid-November, Eisenhower had to get his chauffeur, Mrs Summersby to find out if Bradley’s attack on the Rhine had gone ahead. When the Ardennes crisis unfolded, Eisenhower took five days to go see Montgomery after he had placed him in command of the shambolic US First and Ninth armies, arriving at the nearest railway station to Montgomery’s head in a special train. Eisenhower should have resigned after Market Garden. The undertaking should be set against allied failures in the same period at Aachen, the Hurtgen Forest, Metz, Lorraine and the Ardennes (Bulge) debacle. All were victims of Eisenhower’s failure of command in the early autumn of 1944. And the Germans: MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976, NIGEL HAMILTON, P 98 ‘General Student, in a statement after the war, considered the ‘Market Garden’ operation to have ‘proved a great success. At one stroke it brought the British 2nd Army into the possession of vital bridges and valuable territory. The conquest of the Nijmegen area meant that the creation of a good jumping board for the offensive which contributed to the end of war.’
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@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the US para unit that failed to seize the Nijmegen bridge? 20 points for the correct answer.
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@PhillyPhanVinny You missed this: 2/3 to 3/4 of supplies coming into Normandy came in on the beaches by LSTs. These could easily use beaches in Northern France or Belgium with rail track run in and marshaling yards built in no time at all by the rail crews. Eisenhower never did. There was enough supplies in Normandy, it was getting them to the armies. Moving LSTs to northern beaches was an interim answer. Then they could get a real port on the sea, that was not susceptible to air dropped mines along a 40 mile river and air attack.
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Why would you want "I would love to see you cover some topics about modern day Britain and how the state and socialism is weighing heavily upon British society."? You have already made your mind up.
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@sumivescent A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp, as they had to implement the broad-front strategy. And keeping it from German counter-attack. They had a logistical problem to supply all the thinly spread out allied armies for this broad-front. They had to: 1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp to Nijmegen, or; 2) Take the Scheldt. Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy, a push to the north on his stretched broad-front lines. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower. Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless Being actually a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack. Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation. You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all. SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the British general who had to take command of two shambolic US armies in the German Bulge attack? 20 points for the correct answer. For 10 bonus points if you name the two armies.
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@terpfen They had to as the Supreme Commander said so.
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@terpfen British strategic planning never included a broad front.
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"Devers' army group definitely suffered due to the overall lack of strategic vision from SHAEF and Eisenhower. " That is what Monty said. Montgomery, 12 May 1945 in 21st Army Group Log: And so the campaign in North West Europe is finished. I am glad. It has been a tough business. When I review the campaign as a whole I am amazed at the mistakes we made. The organisation for command was always faulty. The Supreme Commander had no firm ideas as to how to conduct the war and was blown about in the wind all over the place. At that particular business he was quite useless. … … SHAEF were completely out of their depth all the time. And yet we won. The point to understand is that if we had run the show properly the war could have been finished by Xmas, 1944. The blame for this must rest with the Americans.
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@jamesbeeching6138 compare 120,000 with 1,300,000
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@FromPovertyToProgress Stop making things up. Read my posts again.
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@FromPovertyToProgress The main objective for the Germans in the Bulge attack was to split the British and US armies.
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@FromPovertyToProgress Antwerp is a red herring. Antwerp was fully opened by late November yet still Operation Queen failed. Contrary to the myth, Antwerp was not crucial to the westwall battles. The Americans were well supplied in late September, October and early-mid November. Antwerp not open did not make a blind bit of difference. The Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen did not fail because Antwerp was not open. These operations failed because of poor strategy and poor tactical decisions, plus stubborn German resistance. Nothing to do with Antwerp. Antwerp WAS crucial for the next stage, the advance across Germany however. A port nearer to Germany was vital for a continued advance across Germany, but it was never crucial for operations prior to that, and Le Havre was not a great deal further from the US Army than Antwerp was.
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@FromPovertyToProgress Facts are facts. Now stop making things up.
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@TheImperatorKnight Most have not heard of: Simpson, Dempsey, Patch, LeClerc or Carerar. All generals in the ETO from 1944 onwards. Bad US authors, not historians, concentrate on Monty (an army group leader) and a lowly US general named Patton, as they sell in he huge US market.
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@PhillyPhanVinny Who are these everyone?
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@PhillyPhanVinny Antwerp was a lame duck of a port open to counter-attack. Allocating massive resources to clear its approaches is madness when pursuing the German army which is reeling and retreating. You keep repeating the same illogical garbage - pro USA garbage attempting to cover the inadequacies of an incompetent Supreme Commander. Now read again what I wrote. It was very simple.
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@FromPovertyToProgress ‘We do not have the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure,’ Montgomery stated. ‘The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that; if we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success.’
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@PhillyPhanVinny Complete tripe. Now read again what I wrote and move your lips when reading it.
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@FromPovertyToProgress Even the Germans said Monty's plan would have worked. Eisenhower never had a clue.
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@FromPovertyToProgress If Monty was left in command of ground forces it would have been over by Xmas. General Bodo Zimmermann, Chief of Operations, German Army Group D, said that had the strategy of Montgomery succeeded in the autumn of 1944, there would have been no need to fight for the West Wall, not for the central and upper Rhine, all of 24 which would have fallen automatically. Indeed, had Monty's idea for a 40 division concentrated thrust towards the Ruhr been accepted by Eisenhower instead of messing about in the Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc, it would have all been over for the Germans in the west. "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany."- Gunther Blumentritt in, The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart
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Yes, it is Mar-say.
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@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the British general who commanded all of the Overlord Operation? 20 points for the correct answer.
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@FromPovertyToProgress In Eisenhower's own words in early September Antwerp was not the priority and that the Ruhr could be advanced upon in the meantime. Although he did prioritise Antwerp weeks later. Not one leading allied commander argued in the first half of September that the British Second Army should halt its pursuit of the Germans after it had just moved 400km in a week, and then stop to open Antwerp and clear the Scheldt. Clearing the Scheldt would have taken at least a month. In early September, SHAEF thought the Germans were nearly finished. No leader at the time said there should be a halt when it appeared a bridgehead over the Rhine could have been achieved and a buffer created to protect Antwerp when online. The idea was to get across the Rhine, break through the Westwall and then halt to open up Antwerp, building up supplies for the next stage. The advance through Germany. Antwerp was never needed for the westwall battles. Supplies were coming via Le Havre, Mulberry harbours and Cherbourg. The allies were not moving anywhere fast so there was no need to get supplies to them from Antwerp to supply the advance quickly - because there was no advance. All the US attack operations of autumn 1944 were well equipped and well supplied. They did not fail because Antwerp was not opened. They failed because of poor US strategy and tactical decisions. An example, was in the Lorraine, with Patton too cautious and hesitant failing to correctly concentrate his forces. Antwerp was fully operational in December. It never put the Germans off in scything through US lines in the Bulge attack. Antwerp was no panacea.
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@FromPovertyToProgress Do you have a point?
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@FromPovertyToProgress Supply.
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@British_monarchist Read again.
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@TheImperatorKnight Warped right wing Trumpish views? That should be a larf.
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@FromPovertyToProgress Antwerp was 40 miles up a mined river with 250,000 German troops at its mouth. Get it? Understand what I write.
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@FromPovertyToProgress This is getting worse now. Antwerp could have been taken in June 1944? Wow! Should I bother!
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