Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on ""Arnhem" by Antony Beevor Book Review" video.
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T S Birkby wrote:
"https://www.scribd.com/document/33755316/Operation-Market-Garden-1944 APPENDIX 'L', page 93/94"
"So according to PHASE II (a), Guards Armoured Division expected to be at the final objective at Nunspeet on the second day. Meaning in Nijmegen and Arnhem on the second day. There is no other mentions of a time plan in that whole document from 21st Army Group"
The Orders. Not an after match analysis. It says:
PHASE II: (a) The Div will continue the adv two up,
as ordered by GOC at first lt [light] D+1 and will go
through to the final objective.
It says when the the Guards are to be SOUTH of EINDHOVEN at 1st light D+1 to then continue. That is all. No times stated to reach anything else. The document wanted the Guards to be south of Eindhoven on the morning of D+1, that is all in any stated time for an objective. From the starting point to Nijmegen bridge, south of Eindhoven is only one quarter of the distance. So approx 18 hours to travel 11 miles means 72 hours (3 days) to get to Nijmegen. So by simple deduction, that means XXX Corps are expected at 1400 hrs at D+3 at Nijmegen bridge by that rate of travel. They got to Nijmegen at D+2 at first light.
When Browning knew that the bridge was not taken he ordered Gavin to take it by the morning of the 19th (D+2) at the latest - the time XXX Corps actually rolled up to Nijmegen.
Sorry FullMontyUK, I eventually got that document - which is an after match analysis, written 7 years later in 1951. It has no references, and on page 24, it says the Guards as planned were to be at Nijmegen bridge at D+1 at noon. So this document states that a whole armoured corps and its supply and support were to fight 55 miles into enemy territory in 22 hours. To call that highly ambitious is an understatement. The 21st Army Group's Orders prior to the attack, say nothing whatsoever of such a planned time. T S Birkby didn't get it quite right. It is safe to say that document is wrong.
On page 89 it does say:
"It also appears that if elements of the airborne troops had moved to the Nijmegen bridge more quickly and in more strength on D-day the situation there would not have reached such serious proportions"
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ئم وحوادث
http://www.airpowerstudies.co.uk/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Arnhem.pdf
"the composition of the German forces at Arnhem was far more complex than most published histories of Market Garden ha tended to suggest. The two SS panzer divisions had been operating far below their full strength on the eve of the operation and, while 1st Airborne was ultimately confronted by armour in considerable strength, hardly any tanks were actually present in the Arnhem area on 17 September. The vast majority deployed from Germany or other battle fronts after the airborne landings"
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
Some low level pictures of a few Panzer IIIs and IVs were taken in early September for operation Comet. Ryan on speaking to
Urquhart got it wrong. "Urquhart’s account is therefore somewhat perplexing. Further problems arise if we seek to document the events he described. Several extensive searches for the photographs have failed to locate them. Ostensibly, this might not seem surprising, as most tactical reconnaissance material was destroyed after the war, but Urquhart insisted that the Arnhem sortie was flown by a Spitfire squadron based at Benson; this would almost certainly mean 541 Squadron. Far more imagery from the Benson squadrons survived within the UK archives, but no oblique photographs showing tanks at Arnhem. In addition, although the Benson missions were systematically recorded at squadron and group level, not one record matches the sortie Urquhart described."
"The low-level missions targeting the bridges on 6 September were scrupulously noted down, but all other recorded reconnaissance sorties over Arnhem were flown at higher altitudes and captured vertical imagery. Equally, it has proved impossible as yet to locate an interpretation report derived from a low-level mission that photographed German armour near Arnhem before Market Garden." "As for Brian Urquhart’s famous account of how a low-level Spitfire sortie took photographs of tanks assumed to belong to II SS Panzer Corps, the reality was rather different. In all probability, the low-level mission that Urquhart recalled photographed the bridges and not the tanks"
- ARNHEM - THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE STORY by the RAF
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@roodborstkalf9664
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower, approved the under resourced operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the reason why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
♦ Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
♦ Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
♦ Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
♦ Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges;
♦ Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy;
♦ Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgement or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives.
Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 8 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men in the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself.
XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin.
Even the US Official War record confirms this. Charles B. MacDonald wrote the US Official history on Market Garden: https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_19.htm
The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.
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From the US Official History:
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
Page 158:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well," that they could risk sending one battalion in a quick strike for the bridge. This was admittedly a minimum force, but if the Germans were not in strength at the bridge and if the expected counterattacks from the Reichswald could be held with a smaller force than originally deduced, the risk would be justified because of the nature of the prize.
""I personally directed Colonel Roy E.
Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled later, "to commit his first battalion
against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing"
Page 159:
"Landed against almost no opposition."
Page 162:
General
Gavin's understanding, as recalled later, was that Warren's battalion was to move "without delay after landing."
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@seth1422
The Guards Armoured’s Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the [82nd] Airborne division. This left but two armoured groups to go across the Waal. Even those did not make it until next day, D plus 4, 21 September, primarily because of diehard German defenders who had to be ferreted out from the superstructure and bridge underpinnings. Once on the north bank, much of the British armour and infantry had to be used to help hold and improve the bridgehead that the two battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry had forged. By the time the Nijmegen bridge fell on D plus 3, it was early evening and it would be dark before an armoured column could be assembled to march on Arnhem. North of Nijmegen the enemy had tanks and guns and infantry of two SS Panzer divisions, in unknown but growing strength, established in country ideal for defence.
This account [The US Official History The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 185:
] adds that:
At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced by eleven tanks, another infantry battalion, two batteries of 88mm guns, 20 20mm anti-aircraft guns and survivors of earlier fighting in Nijmegen.
"American readers should note that the above comments come from the US Official History, where the notion that Lord Carrington and his five tanks could have penetrated this screen and got up to Arnhem on the night of D plus 3 — even supposing such a move was ever suggested — is revealed as a delusion."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
These numerous attempts to divert attention from this failure, and pass the blame to a captain in the Guards Armoured Division, have been shameful... and highly successful. The myths surrounding the Nijmegen bridge have persisted and been engraved on the public mind by the media and the cinema. Given the US commanders’ chronic tendency to pass the buck and blame their British allies at every opportunity, it certainly might have been better if some effort had been made to get elements of the Guards Division on the move to Arnhem that night.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
That, however, is the romantic view, bolstered by hindsight. In practical terms it takes time to assemble an entire armoured division from a battlefield in the dark streets of a town, issue fresh orders and prepare it for another advance.
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Major-General John Frost, commander of the 2nd Parachute Battalion at the Arnhem bridge:
"The worst mistake of the Arnhem plan was the failure to give priority to capturing the Nijmegen bridge. The capture would have been a walkover on D-Day"
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@seth1422
It is bad enough having brainwashed Rambo with his multiple aliases and disjointed ramblings - fun as he is. No I will not play a different game at all. Your game is trying to say the 82nd on d-day did nothing wrong. They did. They failed to seize the bridge, after being ready to march then only moving towards the bridge after five hours. Men were assigned only for the bridge. XXX Corps seized the bridge not the US 82nd.
The failure point was the US 82nd. Now lets is go to the US Official History: Note: Page 164: the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. Read on......
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
Page 185.
Page 161:
Colonel Lindquist's 508th Parachute Infantry and of Colonel Ekman's 505th Parachute Infantry had assembled within an hour after the D-Day drop.
Page 162:
General Gavin's understanding, as recalled later, was that Warren's battalion was to move "without delay after landing." On the other hand, Colonel Lindquist's understanding, also as recalled later, was that no battalion was to go for the bridge until the regiment had secured its other objectives, that is to say, not until he had established defenses protecting his assigned portion of the high ground and the northern part of the division glider landing zone. Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of De Ploeg, a suburb of Nijmegen a mile and a quarter southeast of the city astride the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway.
Page 163:
Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section. This patrol was to make an aggressive reconnaissance, investigate reports from Dutch civilians that only eighteen Germans guarded the big bridge, and, if possible, capture the south end of the bridge.
Colonel Warren directed Companies A and B to rendezvous at a point just south of Nijmegen at I900
As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight. (2200 hrs)
Page 164:
the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day.
- page 185
For all the concern that must have existed about getting to Arnhem, only a small part of the British armor was freed late on D plus 4, 2 I September, to start the northward drive. As the attack began, British commanders saw every apprehension confirmed. The ground off the main roads was low-lying, soggy bottomland, denying employment of tanks. A few determined enemy bolstered with antitank guns might delay even a large force. Contrary to the information that had been received, Colonel Frost and his men had been driven away from the north end of the Arnhem bridge the afternoon before, so that since the preceding night the bridge had been open to German traffic. At the village of Ressen, less than three miles north of Nijmegen, the Germans had erected an effective screen composed of an SS battalion reinforced with I I tanks, another infantry battalion, 2 batteries of 88-mm. guns, 20 20-mm. antiaircraft guns, and survivors of earlier fighting at Nijmegen, all operating under General Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps.20 Arnhem lay seven miles north of this screen. The British could not pass.
Note: the US history got the times pretty well right but added them up wrong.
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@davemac1197
Browning never put the bridge at a 'lower' priority to the Heights.
The Heights were pretty well between the Waal bridge and DZs. The 508 slowly moved to the Heights nearly unopposed, unlike Frost's men at Arnhem. They reached the Heights with no one there. Now it is time to move "without delay" to the bridge as Lindquists was ordered to move to the bridge when in England. No excuse not to, as the Heights are secure.
They stayed at the Heights. They met Dutch resistance men who said there were 18 old men on the bridge and the town evacuated. Lindquist sent a 40 man patrol to verify what the Dutch were saying, when he should have sent Warrens battalion, as there no resistance to the drop, the march to the Heights and now no one in Nijmegen. A reccie patrol will take time, they never had time. Keeping Warren's men idle on the Heights which was not under immediate threat was a senseless act. The Dutch were correct as three lost men from the patrol took half the guards on the bridge. They left as no one turned up.
Lindquist never sent Warren's battalion, which was earmarked to seize the bridge, _"without delay"_. He sent Warren to the bridge only after Gavin went to him in a Jeep screaming at him to move. "Two hours" later Warren's men moved. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1930hrs. The first attack was just before midnight which the Germans beat off.
After a number of failed attacks, the next morning Browning ordered no more futile attacks wasting ammunition and men waiting for XXX Corps to arrive, then seize the bridge which they did.
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@ToolTimeTabor
The plan was good enough - just about. Only one coup de main which was very poor. No reason why it would not have succeeded if everyone did what they were supposed to do quickly.
On landing, all was going well. Linquist and his men immediately went off to the bridge, as Gavin told him to do in England. Lindquist stopped and dawdled at DePloeg, awaiting orders from Gavin.
Chester Graham's account is invaluable in understanding what went on in the crucial first few hours:
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
1) Lindquist in DePloge was waiting for confirmation that the DZs were cleared then move to the bridge.
2) Gavin was assuming Lindquist's men were making their way directly to the bridge and even making an attack.
Well Linquist's men could have walked on it as only 19 old men were there. No major bridge defenses either.
As the jump was unopposed, and other troops were securing the DZ, Lindquist's men could have made their way to the Nijmegen bridge immediately. No excuse not to if you understood the orders given. Instead they all went to DePloge and set up shop ..... waiting.
Gavin did not give firm written orders to Lindquist, or get any acknowledgement that he understood the orders on the most vital part of the operation - the seizure of the largest road bridge in Europe.
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The 1951 document is definite on target timings, while the Orders are not.
Final point of PHASE I (see T S Birkby above for full points):
(f) The Div may conc SOUTH of EINDHOVEN in areas of the CL
preparatory to further adv.
conc = concentration area:
Which is an area, usually in the theatre of operations, where troops are assembled before beginning, or continuing, active operations.
It says: preparatory to further adv. adv = advance.
So, on phase 1 they were to concentrate South of Eindhoven before (preparatory) to advancing. That is clear. When concentrating that is gathering all vehicles in one location. Vehicles will still be moving into this concentration location at 35 vehicles to every mile of the train at 10 mph. If the vehicles move at 10mph from the starting point the lead vehicles should be south of Eindhoven in 1 hour. But the lead have to stop to concentrate. And 35 vehicles in each mile at 10 mph are pouring into the concentration location. It does not say how many vehicles have to be in the concentration area before moving off again.
Now onto phase 2. Phase 2 clearly states that it will start at 1st light on* D+1.*
It says: PHASE II: (a) The Div will continue the adv
That is advance after phase 1 is concluded of course. To continue the advance you have to be stopped. Phase 1 concludes south of Eindhoven as the force concentrated. Clear. The document says a hoped 10 mih (10mph), but not for phase 1 as the forces are concentrated south of Eindhoven at end of phase 1. South of Eindhoven is approx 11 miles from the start point. It only expects 11 miles of advance in the first 5 hours, which is understandable as German forces formed a line in front of British forces at the north British front on the Belgian/Dutch border. So, on D day XXX Corps have to get to Eindhoven which is 11 miles and depending on tactic conditions it is hoped they will move at 10 mph when moving north from Eindhoven.
There are two different points here:
1. Target time - XXX Corps do not have 100% control of the
time to reach targets, except south of Eindhoven.
2. Rate of Movement, when "moving" - XXX Corps have
near 100% control of this.
XXX Corps when moving were moving as hoped, irrespective of the tactical situation. Reaching hoped for vague target times (which are not specific only roughly deducted) are different indeed as XXX Corps were dependent on the MARKET side of the operation, the airborne units, to move.
My prime point is that XXX Corps were not slow. They maintained the hoped speed of movement, and arguably exceeded that when moving. The only times they did not move were due to the US 101st and 82nd, which was out of their control.
When XXX Corps turned up at Nijmegen at 0830 at D+2, given the 12 hour delay at Son, they were ahead of their rate of movement.
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@jandenijmegen5842
The state of play on the 17th was:
1) the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear;
2) there were concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally;
3) there were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen;
4) then a few troops scattered about along the road;
5) there was no armour in Arnhem.
That was it.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made remarkable progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves ran over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and towards the road, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. It was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2, making up the delay at Zon. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day plus one in the evening. Game, set, and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
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@ToolTimeTabor
It is refreshing to read you posts. To a point. Browning did not prioritise the heights. He gave equal priority. It was Gavin who de-prioritised the bridge after the landings.
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it"
- Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 1955, excerpt in OCMH.
‘Take only the bridges and you probably could not hold them without the high ground. Take only the high ground, the Waal bridge at Nijmegen, and the Maas-Waal Canal bridges, and the ground column could not get across the Maas either to use the other bridges or to relieve the airborne troops.
- US Official History. THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, Page 157.
Gavin thought that the Groesbeek Heights should be taken before Nijmegen Bridge. Again, the US Official History:
'General Gavin saw no solution at first other than to take first the high ground and the Maas and Maas-Waal-Canal bridges - thereby ensuring juncture with the ground column - then Nijmegen.’-- US Official History. THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, Page 157.
Gavin took all his men completely out of Nijmegen town after holding on near to the southern part of the bridge overnight. This was a crass decision. He openly said the Second Army could take the bridge to Browning - after the jump. Maybe he thought they had all the time in the world. Browning did not land at the same time as the 82nd men. He was in the air when they should have been moving to the bridge.
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@ToolTimeTabor
Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Monty was over groups of armies. Dempsey was in command on 2nd Army with Horrocks in command of XXX Corps. Brereton in command of the First Allied Airborne Army. Monty wanted the plan cancelled when he saw how under resourced the operation was - only when V1s were dropped on London did he reluctantly agree.
A division of the US First army was supposed to be on the right flank. The operation was reduced to one corps above Eindhoven. A disgrace. Eisenhower approved, and "insisted", the operation proceed. Two American Air Force generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who:
1) Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy;
2) Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps;
3) Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused;
4) Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet;
5) Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing;
6) Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden;
7) Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Zon, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak".
The above is so bad it is clearly not a Dempsey plan approved by Monty. Monty was meticulous in planning as the Normandy plans show us.
The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends.
General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgment or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with around 600 non-combat troops in the town - Nijmegen was a HQ who started to immediately pull out. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. The road from Zon to Arnhem was fully clear with no armour in Arnhem. This has been confirmed by German archives.
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@ToolTimeTabor
The state of play on the 17th, the jump day, was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. No heavy bridge defences. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. The Germans were is disarray as they were falling back.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made "remarkable" progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or just moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. Also, the thousands of vehicles had to be mustered south of Eindhoven before advancing.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves made the crossing running over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and to the road where they could, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. The road was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving and the German occupying all of the town. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over to Arnhem 7 miles to the north.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day +1 in the evening. Game, set and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras on the bridge at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
The above is the factual overview.
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@Johnny Carroll
“The 82d Airborne Division will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave (with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of the Second Army through). The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosbeek is imperative in order to accomplish the division's task."
That is a deliberate misquote. You have concatenated two sections into one.
From the US Official History:
"I personally directed Colonel Roy E. Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry," General Gavin recalled later, "to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing"
Gavin did give urgency to the bridge for sure. And clearly equal priority.
US Official History:
As darkness approached, General Gavin ordered Colonel Lindquist "to delay not a second longer and get the bridge as quickly as possible with Warren's battalion."
Gavin's men failed to act with urgency dawdling at DePloge
US Official History:
The assembly and movement to De Ploeg took approximately three and a half hours. After organizing a defense of the objective, Colonel Warren about 1830 sent into Nijmegen a patrol consisting of a rifle platoon and the battalion intelligence section.
Until Gavin told them to move when finding they were doing nothing. About 40 men, a patrol, set off to the bridge about four hours after the jump, reaching the vicinity of the bridge over five hours after the jump. Instead of seizing the bridge, with only 19 guards guarding it and the adjacent rail bridge, they found it was now held by an SS recon battalion who moved down from Arnhem, in the time they were dawdling at DePloge. The SS recon men reached the bridge just prior to the Patrol reaching the bridge - about five hours after the jump.
The 82nd had a five hour window in which to launch an attack on a largely undefended bridge with no significant bridge defenses.
US Official History:
the chance for an easy, speedy capture of the Nijmegen bridge had passed. This was all the more lamentable because in Nijmegen during the afternoon the Germans had had nothing more than the same kind of "mostly low quality" troops encountered at most other places on D Day.
US Official History:
As the scouts neared a traffic circle surrounding a landscaped circular park near the center of Nijmegen, the Keizer Karel Plein, from which a mall-like park led northeast toward the Nijmegen bridge, a burst of automatic weapons fire came from the circle. The time was about two hours before midnight.
The first attack on the bridge was 7.5 hours after the jump.
So blaming Browning for the 82nd men dawdling is a slur on Browning in a poor attempt at defecting blame. Gavin did have the bridge as priority as the text above confirms. Blaming Browning for the incompetence of the 82nd in not moving to the bridge quickly is totally out of order. Browning did not order the 82nd men to dawdle at DePloge.
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@ToolTimeTabor
It is worth noting Chester E Graham, the liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters.....
During the Holland operation, I was the liaison officer between the 508th and the 82nd Division Headquarters. I first became the Regimental Liaison Officer after we returned to Nottingham from the Normandy operation.
Prior to the Holland jump, I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible, as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation.
After we were dropped in Holland, I went to the 508th Regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, “As soon as the DZ (drop zone) is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.” So I went cross-country through Indian country [slang military term for enemy territory] to the Division CP and relayed Lindquist’s message to Gavin.
I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his jeep, he told me to, “Come with me — let’s get him moving.” On arriving at the 508th Regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, “I told you to move with speed.”
As the jump was unopposed, and other troops were securing the LZ, Lindquist's men could have made their way to the Nijmegen bridge immediately. No excuse not to if you understood the orders given. Instead they all went to DePloge and set up shop.
Instead of moving immediately toward the Nijmegen bridge, Colonel Warren's battalion was to take an "assigned initial objective" in the vicinity of DePloeg, a suburb of Nijmegen a mile and a quarter southeast of the city astride the Nijmegen-Groesbeek highway. Colonel Warren was to organize this objective for defense, tying in with the battalion near Hatert and the other near Hotel Berg en Dal, and then was to "be prepared to go into Nijmegen later." The assembly and movement to DePloge took approximately three and a half hours.
- US Official History
Col. Warren, who was assigned the bridge, was to move when given orders by Lindquist according to the Official History. He spent most of the time setting up shop in and around DePloge. Gavin told Lindquist, Warren's superior, to move without delay to the bridge, prior to the jump, according to the Official History.
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@Johnny Carroll
1) It is clear Browning gave equal priority to the heights and the bridge prior to the jump. He confirmed this in the 1950s.
2) It is clear Gavin gave equal priority to the heights and the bridge prior to the jump, and on D-day, by his actions, actions of his men, and witness accounts.
Gavin sent men off to the bridge immediately after the jump. That his men failed to move to the bridge, staying at DePloeg losing the opportunity to seize the bridge, is a different matter.
The heights were important enough. But the text of the orders put the bridge first - the military way is the text at the top is more important. The heights were between the bridge and landing zones, being nearer to the LZs. Protect the landing zones then you automatically protect the heights from enemy occupation. So there is no need to put most of your force around the LZs and on the Heights.
Gavin de-prioritized the bridge once his men were unable to seize it. Gavin said to Browning that he was to take his troops from the town near the southern approaches to the bridge to the LZs, as he heard there was tanks in a forest and some German troops about. Browning (who was concerned seeing the bridge not seized) has to take the judgment of his trusted and experienced general, so went along with this - but Browning did not de-prioritize the bridge telling Gavin to get it ASAP, and as a must before XXX Corps arrived. Gavin said to Browning that Second Army (XXX Corps ) could seize the bridge. In short, Gavin had given up the bridge. Browning had not.
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@ToolTimeTabor
The largest airborne contribution was the USAs. The 82nd was the largest division. The bridge at Grave was the only bridge to be taken from both ends as per established tactics.
Monty actually signaled Eisenhower’s headquarters postponing the operation. Eisenhower resurrecting it. A cable from the War Office about V2s committed Montgomery to the operation. Tactical Operation Market Garden was based on Operation Comet, with multiple Rhine crossings, which was a quick pursuit operation formed by Monty. He cancelled it due to reformed German resistance.
From Nigel Hamilton’s biography of Monty:
For Monty now to cancel the British part of ‘the main effort of the Allies because of stiffening enemy resistance, even had he wished to do so, would thus have been tantamount to insubordination, leaving him open to charges of timidity at a moment when American forces were thrusting towards the German border. Moreover the Arnhem-Nijmegan axis had been Monty’s proposal, making it doubly hard to rescind.
Eisenhower’s directive was not the only signal committing Monty to the continuation of his planned thrust via Arnhem on 9 September - for during the afternoon a ‘Secret’ cable arrived from the War Office, sent by VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so-called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to ‘rope off’ the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.
Few people are aware that there were supporting units on either flank who set off to the left and right of Hells Highway shortly after and in fact one of these supporting flanks advances pushed the Germans away from cutting the highway near Eindhoven on the 20th after XXX corps had gone through ahead. They even widened the axis of advance with their follow on actions.
It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had.
Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges First US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance. But Bradley was stealing fuel and other resources from Hodges and giving it to Patton.
Eisenhower:
”I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations”.
Eisenhower insisted it go ahead who also under-resourced it. Market Garden wasn’t even an army just a corps above Eindhoven. A disgrace.
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@ToolTimeTabor
Gavin ducked and dived after the event and way after WW2 to cover his errors. TIK covered this - Search his channel on Gavin wasn't to blame? 'New' evidence on Operation Market Garden's failure?. The US Official History historians batted a number letters to and fro to Gavin after the event attempting to get the true picture. What stuck in the historians minds was why the bridge was not taken and the events around that. They had to record it.
Chester Graham sides with Gavin, saying Gavin verbally told Lindquist in England to go for the bridge. Post war Lindquist says he never, that is why he stayed at DePloeg awaiting orders. There clearly was a breakdown in Gavin's communications - he never put anything in firm writing to Lindquist. Lindquist was at DePloeg doing not much at all relating to the prime objective, the bridge. Warren, Lindquist's subordinate, who was assigned the bridge according to the Official History was "to be prepared to go into Nijmegen later," under orders by Lindquist his boss. Gavin ran to Lindquist's CP by Jeep balling him out when finding out he was static at DePloeg. Then Lindquist only sent a patrol of around 40 men. When sizable forces were eventually sent one company got lost along the way.
You are right, the bridge was the prime objective. Passing blame onto Browning the Corps commander, for not immediately seizing the bridge, who was in the air when 82nd men should have been moving to the bridge, then in communication with three divisional generals on landing, does not hold under scrutiny. Browning was not there to hold Gavin's hand. Gavin was a trusted general with an impeccable record up to that point. Gavin's record after Market Garden was also excellent - he was praiseworthy of Montgomery's leadership in the Bulge.
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@ToolTimeTabor
From Battle of the Rhine by Neillands. Sergeant Peter Robinson, of the of the Guards Armored Division who led the charge over the Nijmegen road bridge in his Firefly tank stated:
"The Nijmegen bridge wasn’t taken [by the 82nd] which was our objective. We reached the far end of the bridge and immediately there was a roadblock. So the troop sergeant covered me through and then I got to the other side and covered the rest of the troop through. We were still being engaged; there was a gun in front of the church three or four hundred yards in front of us. We knocked him out. We got down the road to the railway bridge [in Lent]; we cruised round there very steady. We were being engaged all the time. Just as I got round the corner and turned right I saw these helmets duck in a ditch and run, and gave them a burst of machine gun fire.
I suddenly realised they were Americans. They had already thrown a gammon grenade at me so dust and dirt and smoke were flying everywhere. They jumped out of the ditch; they kissed the tank; they kissed the guns because they’d lost a lot of men. They had had a very bad crossing."
"Well, my orders were to collect the American colonel who was in a house a little way back, and the first thing he said to me was "I have to surrender" Well I said, 'I'm sorry. My orders are to hold this bridge. I've only got two tanks available but if you'd like to give me ground support for a little while until we get some more orders then we can do it. He said he couldn’t do it, so I said that he had better come back to my wireless and talk to General Horrocks because before I started the job I had freedom of the air. Everybody was off the air except myself because they wanted a running commentary about what was going on - So he came over and had a pow-wow with Horrocks.
The colonel said 'Oh very well’ and I told him where I wanted the men, but of course you can't consolidate a Yank and they hadn’t been there ten minutes before they were on their way again."
The 82nd men wanted to surrender! And never gave support which was what they were there to do.
Robinson says:
"We got down the road to the railway bridge"
This is a small railway bridge over the road bridge approach road at the village of Lent, not the main railway bridge over the Waal.
Five tanks initially crossed the bridge, two were hit.
Captain Lord Carington in the 5th tank:
"A film representation of this incident has shown American troops as having already secured the far end of the bridge. That is mistaken - probably the error arose from the film-maker's confusion of two bridges, there was a railway bridge with planks placed between the rails and used by the Germans for [light] road traffic, to the west of the main road bridge we crossed; and the gallant American Airborne men reached it. When Sergeant Robinson and his little command crossed our main road bridge, however, only Germans were there to welcome him; and they didn't stay."
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ORDER
508- P-rcht Infantry will:
(a) Land on DZ "T"
(b) Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633) on order of Div Comdr.
Let us assume pre-jump in England Gavin did not verbally tell Lindquist to go for the Waal bridge overriding the Order. So we have to go by the written Order which is freely available and a section coped above.
Regimental Liaison Officer of the 508th was Chester Graham: "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.'
Two battalions of the 508th were marching for just under three hours from the DZ to the empty Heights, arriving at *5 pm*. One battalion remained at the DZ securing it. The DZ was secure when they left. As soon as they were in the Heights with no Germans in sight the Heights were secure. All secure. Lindquist should have had his two companies prepared which was written in the Order.
Lindquist should have contacted Gavin 'immediately', by radio or messenger, to get the Divisional Order to go to the bridge on reaching the vacant and secure Heights. Lindquist could not move to the bridge without it.
Lindquist:
1) was way too late in obtaining the Order to proceed by radio or messenger;
2) never had the two companies prepared to move to the bridge.
When informed Lindquist was not moving to the bridge, Gavin sped personally to Lindquist screaming at him to move to the bridge at 7 pm, two hours after the 508 arrived at the Heights. Half an hour later the Germans reinforced the bridge. It took another two hours to muster the two companies spread over the Heights under Cnl Warren before they started to march at 9 pm. Far too late.
Lindquist failed on two important points.
Again, this is all assuming Gavin never gave verbal orders to Lindquist in England, only going by the written Order.
Whichever way you cut it, Lindquist was amateurish and to blame. Gavin also takes blame as he never had Lindquist trained and alert enough.
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@ToolTimeTabor
Monty is far less accountable than Eisenhower, who under resourced the operation. Monty wanted it cancelled seeing what was on offer. He thought it may be worth the risk to eliminate V rockets. London was putting pressure on him and Eisenhower to overrun the Dutch launch sites.
Brereton was one of the planners, who is forgotten. If Monty refused to send in the Second Army it would be insubordination. Eisenhower was his boss. Monty was a good professional soldier, he always obeyed orders. He may not agree with the orders, but would carry them out.
Browning was only a corps commander. His say and power in matters was minimal. Drop zones were selected by Brereton and Williams who cajoled Hollingsworth of the RAF, into accepting the drop zones - eight miles away at Arnhem. Browning was threatening to resign when seeing the drop zones.
Since the end of WW2 the US narrative was that Monty insisted the operation go ahead. Monty Planned it. Monty executed it. XXX Corps was too slow (Brereton even said so), US troops took one end of Nijmegen bridge, the Brits sat around drinking tea instead of running up the road to save the British paras at Arnhem. Then a film came out reinforcing that narrative. All the above was wrong.
Many men who were in the operation were still very much alive, who were disgusted at the film. Since the film many historians delved into the records, and many, many, books have been published on the operation. A different true story emerged.
It may be unpalatable to you, but the operation was insisted upon by Eisenhower. Americans, Brereton & Williams planned it. The failure point in execution was that two easy bridges to seize were not seized by two US para units. XXX Corps were not slow being ahead when the moved. XXX Corps seized Nijmegen road bridge. All recorded fact.
BTW, I knew four guys who were at Market Garden. My Uncle, Jimmy, who was with XXX Corps (he pulled out of the Waal the bodies of the 82nd and British Sappers who rowed over the Waal), Billy Dixon who I worked with, who had little respect for the 82nd, as many were running south away from Nijmegen as they were going north into Nijmegen in trucks. Dick Smullens (an Irishman from Dublin), and Johnny McKnight - both paras in Arnhem.
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@ToolTimeTabor
A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp and keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
1) Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
2) Take the Schedlt.
Eisenhower had a Northern Thrust strategy. Taking Noord Babant fell in line with the desires for both SHEAF and Eisenhower.
Noord Brabant had to be taken before the Scheldt, as it was essential. It was taken with limited forces, with forces also sent to take the Schedlt. Market Garden had to go ahead regardless of any threat or Northern Thrust strategy, actually being a success. To use Antwerp and control the approaches, the Scheldt, everything up to the south bank of the lower Rhine at Nijmegen needed to be under allied control. The low-lying lands, boggy ground between Arnhem and Nijmegen with land strewn with rivers and canals, is perfect geography as a barrier against a German counter-attack towards Antwerp. Without control of Noord Brabant German forces would have been in artillery range of Antwerp, and with a build up of forces and supply directly back to Germany in perfect position for a counter-attack.
Market Garden was the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, a prime port for logistics for all allied armies. It made sense as the Germans were in disarray, so should be easy enough to gain. As SHAEF wanted territory up to the Rhine, Monty suggested adding a hop over the Rhine at Arnhem to form a bridgehead, falling in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
You needed Arnhem for an easier jump into Germany. Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all - that is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized within days. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, while the Germans a few miles away and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense at all.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
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@ToolTimeTabor wrote:
"placing 10,000 men on the far side of three 1000' spans plus two other meaningful water barriers is NOT a good plan."
It was thought a good plan to jump the Rhine at the time giving the state of German forces. The road from Zon to Arnhem was devoid of German troops. Only non-combat troops in Nijmegen with no bridge defenses. A properly planned operation of speed and surprise using coup de mains would have worked for sure.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
According to the US Official History, the motivation for Market Garden was driven by Gen Marshal, Gen Arnold and others in Washington. The refusal by Gen Bradley to entertain an airborne operation, but use the ground fighting divisions and keep the aircraft maintaining Patton’s Third Army with fuel, meant that the operation was reluctantly passed to Monty.
US Official History:
One of the principal reasons underlying the creation of the First Allied Airborne Army was the insistence by the U.S. War Department on greater strategic use of airborne troops. From February 1944 Generals George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff, and Henry H. Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, had let General Eisenhower know unmistakably that they attached great importance to the employment of airborne units in actual operations deep in enemy territory.
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@ToolTimeTabor wrote:
"Eisenhower, Brereton, Williams, Gavin and Lundquist are to blame... Monty, Horrocks, Browning and Urquhart (whose life was dangling at the end of this plan) had no responsibility at all"
That was about right. The facts are that planning was primarily American, and the failure points were American. I never made it up.
Market Garden was actually a success:
♦ It kept Antwerp out of German artillery range.
♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines. The German went through a forest rather than the direct route, which would have been through the Market Garden salient.
♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which was used.
♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London.
♦ It split the German armies.
♦ It isolated the German 15th army in Holland.
♦ They reached the Rhine.
♦ The salient was fleshed out to the Meuse.
♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken.
♦ It captured the important Philips radio factory at Eindhoven.
The Germans never thought Market Garden was a failure. It punched a 60 mile salient right into their lines in a few days, right on their border. They saw it as a staging area to jump into Germany - which it was. In late 1944/early 1945, the longest allied advance was the 60 mile Market Garden advance. The only operation to fully achieve its goals in that time period was Monty's clearing of the Scheldt.
'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by XXX Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.'
- OPERATION VICTORY by MAJOR-GENERAL DEGUINGAND, 1947, page 419.
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@ToolTimeTabor
"Maybe their planning for flank security, but not for speed."
VIII Corps were one of the flanking corps. They could hardly move off the starting blocks because of a lack of supply. A division of the US First army was to flank, but never did because Bradley was peeling off supplies from Hodges to give to Patton who was chasing second rate targets in the Saar.
"The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north."
- The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944, by Dr. C Gabel, U.S Army Command and General Staff College, February, 1985.
Bradley was disobeying Eisenhower.
It should be borne in mind that promised supplies from SHAEF failed to arrive, leaving VIII Corps, supposed to attack alongside, mostly stranded in place. “Garden” launched with only half the troops it should have had. Montgomery had also wanted to use Hodges First US Army (and had in fact been promised) as a follow up flanking advance.
- Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe.
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@ToolTimeTabor
Hodges was to be on the flank of Market Garden....
"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Because Hodges was now spread over a 150 miles front because of the broad-front strategy, and short of supplies because Bradley was giving them to Patton, against orders, as the Northern Thrust was priority, he could not give even a division for Market Garden. Patton at least should have been fired.
"Post-Normandy Bradley seemed unable to control Patton, who persistently flouted Eisenhower’s directives and went his own way, aided and abetted by Bradley. This part of their relationship quickly revealed itself in matters of supply, where Hodges, the commander of the US First Army, was continually starved of fuel and ammunition in order to keep Patton’s divisions rolling, even when Eisenhower’s strategy required First Army to play the major role in 12th Army Group’s activities."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army.
"the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The northern thrust was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
My agenda is facts. No excuses to cover rear end of generals.
BTW, I worked with the US Army in the Middle East. Apart from that you will get no more on that.
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@ToolTimeTabor
XXX Corp were to move after the parachute jumps, so as not to alert the Germans who may immediately man the bridges. The 101st and 82nd were to seize the bridge with thunderclap surprise.
From 21st Army Group Orders:
Final point of PHASE I:
(f) The Div may conc SOUTH of EINDHOVEN in areas of the CL preparatory to further adv.
conc = concentration area:
Which is an area, usually in the theatre of operations, where troops are assembled before beginning, or continuing, active operations.
It says: preparatory to further adv. adv = advance. So, on phase 1 they were to concentrate South of Eindhoven before (preparatory) to advancing. That is clear.
When concentrating that is gathering all vehicles in one location. Vehicles will still be moving into this concentration location at 35 vehicles to every mile of the train at a hoped 10 mph. If the vehicles move at 10mph from the starting point the lead vehicles should be south of Eindhoven in 1 hour. But the lead have to stop to concentrate. And 35 vehicles in each mile at a hoped 10 mph are pouring into the concentration location. It does not say how many vehicles have to be in the concentration area before moving off again.
Now onto phase 2.
Phase 2 clearly states that it will start at 1st light on D+1. It says:
PHASE II: (a) The Div will continue the adv
That is advance after phase 1 is concluded of course. To continue the advance you have to be stopped. Phase 1 concludes south of Eindhoven as the force concentrated. Clear.
The document says a hoped 10 mih (10mph), but not for phase 1 as the forces are concentrated south of Eindhoven at end of phase 1. South of Eindhoven is approx 11 miles from the start point. It only expects 11 miles of advance in the first 5 hours, which is understandable as German forces formed a strong line in front of British forces at the northern British front on the Belgian/Dutch border.
So, on D-day XXX Corps have to get to Eindhoven which is 11 miles and depending on tactic conditions it is hoped they will move at 10 mph when moving north from Eindhoven. There are two different points here:
1. Target time -
XXX Corps do not have 100% control of the time to reach targets, except south of Eindhoven. They were depending on airborne units securing bridges for them, which is out of their hands.
2. Rate of Movement, when "moving" -
XXX Corps have near 100% control of this.
XXX Corps when moving were moving as expected, irrespective of the tactical situation. Reaching hoped for vague target times are different - target times were not specific only roughly deducted. Indeed as XXX Corps were dependent on the MARKET side of the operation, the airborne units, to keep up their rate of movement.
XXX Corps were not slow. They maintained the realistically expected speed of advance. The only times they did not move were due to the US 101st and 82nd, when both failed to seize bridges, which was out of XXX Corps' control. XXX Corps had to seize the bridges themselves or create the bridge (Bailey bridge). When XXX Corps turned up at Nijmegen at 0820 at D+2, given the approx 12 hour delay at Zon when the 101st failed to seize the bridge, they were near enough at an expected rate of movement. More than adequate to complete the operation.
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@Johnny Carroll
You do have a point. The less German reinforcement you meet the easier it is to recover from setbacks.
XXX Corp meeting stiff unexpected German resistance, arrived at Zon at 1800hrs on d-day plus 1, unable to cross the waterway. XXX Corps could have been at Nijmegen at at 2045hrs on d-day+1 if the 101st had seized the bridge at Zon, with all vehicles in full flow, as the Germans would not have brought in any significant reinforcements. A few troops would have come in via the ferry onto the island reinforcing the 600 or so non-combat troops in Nijmegen. In short, Nijmegen town would have been easier to clear.
Then the prospect of XXX Corps seizing the Nijmegen bridge. When the ground forces occupied a carpet, they were in command of all troops. XXX Corps saw that the 82nd had failed to seize the bridge so did so themselves, ordering the 82nd to assist in their tanks assisted attacks.
Arriving at the bridge occupied by Germans 12 hours earlier, would it have made it easier to seize the bridge? Probably. By how much quicker than the 36 hours? Six hours quicker, 12 hours quicker? Lets say a total of a 24 hour delay. So that makes it approx a one day delay in total. That gives approx 1900hrs on d-day+2 rolling across the Nijmegen bridge.
Relieving the paras at Arnhem would have occurred, as they were still holding on well on the north end of the bridge, having fought off some some German armour brought in from Germany on d-day+1, the evening before.
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@walterm140
Walter Mitty again!
"I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it"
- Lt Gen Browning to Maj Gen G. E. Prier-Palmer, British Joint Services Mission, Washington, D.C., 25 Jan 1955, excerpt in OCMH.
‘Take only the bridges and you probably could not hold them without the high ground. Take only the high ground, the Waal bridge at Nijmegen, and the Maas-Waal Canal bridges, and the ground column could not get across the Maas either to use the other bridges or to relieve the airborne troops.
- US Official History. THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, Page 157.
Gavin thought that the Groesbeek Heights should be taken before Nijmegen Bridge. Again, the US Official History:
'General Gavin saw no solution at first other than to take first the high ground and the Maas and Maas-Waal-Canal bridges - thereby ensuring juncture with the ground column - then Nijmegen.’-- US Official History. THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN, Page 157.
Gavin took all his men completely out of Nijmegen town after holding on near to the southern part of the bridge overnight. This was a crass decision. He openly said the Second Army could take the bridge to Browning, when Browning saw the bridge had not been seized. Maybe he thought they had all the time in the world. Browning did not land at the same time as the 82nd men. He was in the air when they should have been moving to the bridge.
Now you know Mr Mitty.
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@ToolTimeTabor
XXX Corp were to move after the parachute jumps, so as not alert the Germans who may immediately man the bridges.
From 21st Army Group Orders:
Final point of PHASE I:
(f) The Div may conc SOUTH of EINDHOVEN in areas of the CL preparatory to further adv.
conc = concentration area:
Which is an area, usually in the theatre of operations, where troops are assembled before beginning, or continuing, active operations.
It says: preparatory to further adv. adv = advance. So, on phase 1 they were to concentrate South of Eindhoven before (preparatory) to advancing. That is clear.
When concentrating that is gathering all vehicles in one location. Vehicles will still be moving into this concentration location at 35 vehicles to every mile of the train at a hoped 10 mph. If the vehicles move at 10mph from the starting point the lead vehicles should be south of Eindhoven in 1 hour. But the lead have to stop to concentrate. And 35 vehicles in each mile at a hoped 10 mph are pouring into the concentration location. It does not say how many vehicles have to be in the concentration area before moving off again.
Now onto phase 2.
Phase 2 clearly states that it will start at 1st light on D+1. It says:
PHASE II: (a) The Div will continue the adv
That is advance after phase 1 is concluded of course. To continue the advance you have to be stopped. Phase 1 concludes south of Eindhoven as the force concentrated. Clear.
The document says a hoped 10 mih (10mph), but not for phase 1 as the forces are concentrated south of Eindhoven at end of phase 1. South of Eindhoven is approx 11 miles from the start point. It only expects 11 miles of advance in the first 5 hours, which is understandable as German forces formed a strong line in front of British forces at the northern British front on the Belgian/Dutch border.
So, on D-day XXX Corps have to get to Eindhoven which is 11 miles and depending on tactic conditions it is hoped they will move at 10 mph when moving north from Eindhoven. There are two different points here:
1. Target time -
XXX Corps do not have 100% control of the time to reach targets, except south of Eindhoven.
2. Rate of Movement, when "moving" -
XXX Corps have near 100% control of this.
XXX Corps when moving were moving as expected, irrespective of the tactical situation. Reaching hoped for vague target times (which are not specific only roughly deducted) are different. Indeed as XXX Corps were dependent on the MARKET side of the operation, the airborne units, to keep up their rate of movement.
XXX Corps were not slow. They maintained the realistically expected speed of advance. The only times they did not move were due to the US 101st and 82nd, when both failed to seize bridges, which was out of XXX Corps' control. XXX Corps had to seize the bridges themselves or create the bridge (Bailey bridge). When XXX Corps turned up at Nijmegen at 0820 at D+2, given the approx 12 hour delay at Zon when the 101st failed to seize the bridge, they were near enough at an expected rate of movement. More than adequate to complete the operation.
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The final link-up at Arnhem, was expected on the third day, 20th, D+3, of the operation, if everything went well. All I have read says that the link up at Arnhem was to be the 20th. D+3. XXX Corps got to Nijmegen on the morning of D+2. If the bridge was in the hands of the 82nd, XXX Corps would have reached Arnhem bridge within the 48 hrs Horrocks said he could do it. Horrocks was involved in the planning, however they never all agreed with Horrocks, leaving that time target target down to him, or rough estimation really as is all it could be
Give us a reference that says when XXX Corps reached Nijmegen they were 8-12 hours behind schedule.
The 101st Airborne Division planned to drop closest to XXX Corps’ starting position. The finalized plan called for them to drop into two principle locations with objectives of seizing the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son, liberating Eindhoven, and securing the bridge over the Willems Canal near Veghel (Figure 6). They were supposed to linkup with XXX Corps no later than D+1.
The 82nd Airborne Division planned to drop northeast of the 101st First Airborne Division. They would also drop into two principle areas with the primary missions of seizing crossings over the Maas Canal near Grave, Maas-Waal Canal, and the Waal River near Nijmegen. They expected linkup with XXX Corps sometime between D+2 and D+3.
Just northeast of the 82nd Airborne Division the British 1st Airborne Division and Polish 1st Airborne Brigade would land and secure a river crossing over the Neder River in the vicinity of Arnhem.
The Polish brigade would assault on D+2 and secure the south side of the Neder River bridge. The final plan called for linkup with XXX Corps on D+5.
The above is from:
Once Out the Door: A Study of Division and Corps Level
Airborne Assaults
A Monograph
by
MAJ Kyle W. Anderson
United States Army
School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2016
There was no specific times to reach major crossings. The emphasis was on speed. Speed for all involved in the Market and Garden sides of the operation. XXX Corps arriving at Nijmegen on the morning of D+2 is way ahead of expectations, or put it this way, it was fast. An armoured unit with all its support travelling approx 55 miles through enemy territory, with a 12 hour delay, taking 42 hours, was fast. That is 55 miles in 30 hours when deducting the 12 hr delay at Son, averaging 44 miles in 24 hours. How fast should XXX Corps being going through enemy territory?
The emphasis on speed would have meant that no matter when XXX Corps reached crossings they would be able to cross.
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@davemac1197
ORDER
508- Prcht Infantry will:
(a) Land on DZ "T"
(b) Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633) on order of Div Comdr.
Let us assume pre-jump in England Gavin did not verbally tell Lindquist to go for the Waal bridge overriding the Order. So we have to go by the written Order which is freely available and a section coped above.
Regimental Liaison Officer of the 508th was Chester Graham: "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.'
Two battalions of the 508th were marching for just under three hours from the DZ to the empty Heights, arriving at *5 pm*. One battalion remained at the DZ securing it. The DZ was secure when they left. As soon as they were in the Heights with no Germans in sight the Heights were secure. All secure. Lindquist should have had his two companies prepared which was written in the Order.
Lindquist should have contacted Gavin 'immediately', by radio or messenger, to get the Divisional Order to go to the bridge on reaching the vacant and secure Heights. Lindquist could not move to the bridge without it.
Lindquist:
1) was way too late in obtaining the Order to proceed by radio or messenger;
2) never had the two companies prepared to move to the bridge.
When informed Lindquist was not moving to the bridge, Gavin sped personally to Lindquist screaming at him to move to the bridge at 7 pm, two hours after the 508 arrived at the Heights. Half an hour later the Germans reinforced the bridge. It took another two hours to muster the two companies spread over the Heights under Cnl Warren before they started to march at 9 pm. Far too late.
Lindquist failed on two important points.
Again, this is all assuming Gavin never gave verbal orders to Lindquist in England, only going by the written Order.
Whichever way you cut it, Lindquist was amateurish and to blame. Gavin also takes blame as he never had Lindquist trained and alert enough.
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@seth1422
Market Garden failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. The failure point was not seizing the Nijmegen bridge immediately. At the end of D-Day all crossings were denied to the Germans, except one - the Nijmegen bridge.
General Gavin of the US 82nd was tasked to seize the Nijmegen bridge as soon as landing. Gavin never, he failed with only a few German guards on the bridge. He failed because his 82nd did not seize the Nijmegen bridge immediately. Gavin even de-prioritised the bridge the prime target and focus. The 82nd were ready at 2 pm on the jump day and never moved to the bridge. The gigantic bridge was guarded by only 19 guards. The Germans occupied the bridge at 1900 hrs. Six hours after the 82nd were ready to march.
Events on the 1st day:
♦ "At 1328, the 665 men of US 82nd 1st Battalion began
to fall from the sky."
- Poulussen, R. Lost at Nijmegen.
♦ "Forty minutes after the drop, around 1410, the
1st Battalion marched off towards their objective,
De Ploeg, three miles away." Poulussen,
♦ "The 82nd were digging in and performing recon
in the area looking for 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald
- Neillands, R. The Battle for the Rhine 1944.
♦ The 82nd were dug in and preparing to defend their
newly constructed regimental command post, which
they established at 1825. Then Colonel Lindquist
"was told by General Gavin, around 1900, to move
into Nijmegen."
-Poulussen
Events on the evening of the 1st day:
♦ Having dug in at De Ploeg, Warren's battalion wasn't prepared
to move towards Nijmegen at all.
-Poulussen,
♦ Once Lindquist told Lieutenant Colonel Warren that his
Battalion was to move, Warren decided to visit the HQ
of the Nijmegen Underground first - to see what info the
underground had on the Germans at the Nijmegen bridge.
- Poulussen,
♦ It was not until 1830hrs that he [Warren] was able to send
a force into Nijmegen. This force was somewhat small,
just one rifle platoon and an intelligence section with a
radio — say forty men.
- Neillands. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
♦ This was not a direct route to the bridge from Warren's
original position, and placed him in the middle of the town.
It was also around 2100 when "A" Company left to attempt
to capture the Nijmegen road bridge.
♦ "B" Company was not with them because they'd split up
due to it being dark with "visibility was less than ten yards".
- Poulussen,
♦ The 82nd attacks were resisted by the Germans until the
next day.
Events of the 2nd day:
♦ Gavin drove up in a jeep the next morning and
was told by Warren that although they didn't have the bridge
yet, another attack was about to go in.
♦ Gavin then told Warren to hold because the Germans were
attacking in the southeast portion of the 82nd perimeter.
♦ At around 1100, Warren was ordered to withdraw from
Nijmegen completely.
- Poulussen
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FullMontyUK
Your research is flawed. XXX Corps arrived on time on the morning of the 19th. They were 36 hours behind after XXX Corps themselves seized the bridge. It took 36 hours of fighting to take the bridge, that should have been taken on Day 1 by the 82nd. The 82nd added nothing at Nijmegen that XXX Corps couldn't have done by itself after arriving.
"Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column, reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September."
(Page 174) - US Official History.
XXX Corps met up with the 82nd 42 hours after Warren's 1/508 were ready move from the LZ.
"This they failed to do [seize Nijmegen bridge] and the effect on the entire operation was disastrous, creating a delay of some thirty-six hours after the Guards Armoured Division arrived in Nijmegen, a mere eight miles from Arnhem, on the morning of D plus 2."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"This fact disproves the second Arnhem myth: that XXX Corps were too slow during the advance north. They had been delayed, certainly, but had now made up much of the time lost at Zon and covered more ground in two hours on the morning of D plus 2 (19 September) than they had on the two previous days. Horrocks had promised to be at Arnhem on D plus 2: XXX Corps were now in Nijmegen, just eight miles from Arnhem with the rest of D plus 2 to get up to Lieutenant Colonel John Frost’s positions at the Neder Rijn bridge. They should arrive there well within the time Horrocks had forecast. This happy situation did not endure. As the leading tanks of the Grenadier Guards Group, leading the Guards Division, passed over the bridge at Heumen and entered the outskirts of Nijmegen, they learned that the road and rail bridges over the Waal were still firmly in German hands: unlike all the other bridges on the road to Arnhem, the Nijmegen bridge had not been taken on D-Day. It was still firmly in German hands and fighting was raging within the town. Something had clearly gone wrong."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
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The state of play on the 17th, the jump day, was that the road from Eindhoven to Arnhem was clear. There was concentrated German forces on the Dutch/Belgian border facing the British on the front line - naturally. No heavy bridge defences. There were around 600 non-combat troops in Nijmegen. Then a few scattered about along the road. There was no armour in Arnhem. That was it. The Germans were is disarray as they were falling back.
XXX Corps moved off on H hour on d-day meeting stiffer resistance than they expected. The US official history states they made "remarkable" progress. The US 101st took 3-4 hours to move about 3 km to the Zon bridge with little opposition. The Germans blew the bridge. If they had done a coup de main or just moved faster to the bridge, the 101st would have secured the bridge.
XXX Corps heard that the bridge ahead was blown so slowed up, getting the Bailey bridge ready. Urgency had gone out of the advance until a bridge was erected. Also, the thousands of vehicles had to be mustered south of Eindhoven before advancing.
XXX Corps were delayed 10-12 hours at Zon while they themselves made the crossing running over a Bailey bridge. In this gift of a time window the Germans were running armour into Arnhem, and to the road where they could, which would make matters worse.
XXX Corps moved out of Zon on D-day plus 2 first light. It took them 2hrs 45 mins to travel 26 miles on that road. The road was clear except for some Germans on the road in the gap between the southern 82nd perimeter and the northern 101st's perimeter. The two airborne units were to lay a continuous carpet for XXX Corps to power up. They never met up. The road was still clear from Zon to Arnhem 40 hours after the first jump.
XXX Corps reached Nijmegen about 0820hrs on d-day plus 2. They reached Nijmegen seeing the Germans still on the bridge when arriving and the German occupying all of the town. A bridge the 82nd were supposed to have secured for them to speed over to Arnhem 7 miles to the north.
If the 101st and 82nd had seized their bridges immediately, XXX Corps would have been at the Arnhem bridge on d-day +1 in the evening. Game, set and match.
On arriving at Nijmegen XXX Corps took control, then immediately worked to seize the bridge themselves. This delayed them another 36 hours. This was now a total delay of nearly two days. In this massive and unexpected gift of a time window, the Germans ran armour into Arnhem from Germany overpowering the British paras on the bridge at Arnhem.
XXX Corps could only reach the southern end of Arnhem bridge on the Rhine, only yards away from their objective. A bridgehead was precluded because two US airborne units failed to seize their bridges - easy to seize bridges at that, if they had bothered to move with any speed.
The above is the factual overview.
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@ErikExeu
A few SS troops were in Nijmegen and on the bridge because the 82nd did not move to the undefended bridge immediately.
The dawdling of the 82nd 508 on d-day
Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012), Chapter 9, 'Put Us Down In Hell':
"Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation.
"'Put Us Down In Hell', Chapter 10, 'Use Trench Knives and Bayonets':
"Receiving information from the patrols that no enemy was between them and their objective at De Ploeg [Groesbeek heights], Captain Adams and Company A increased the pace of the advance. “The march to the objective was (almost) uneventful… Everyone started digging in. Everyone had the idea that the rest of the job would be as easy as it had been up to that point. That was somewhat my own impression and I still believe if we had marched straight to the [highway] bridge [in Nijmegen] we would have had it without a fight.
”Captain Ben Delamater, the battalion’s executive officer, got the command post organised. "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective [Groesbeek heights]. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held."__"The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.”
“The regimental and battalion COs then planned to send one platoon of C Company [led by Lieutenant Bob Weaver], plus the S-2 section, plus two light machine gun squads on a reconnaissance patrol to approach the bridge from the south.
"Zig Borough's The 508th Connection (2013), Chapter 6, Holland, Operation Market Garden - Nijmegen bridge:
"A battalion S-2 patrol led the way and reached the Nijmegen bridge during the daylight hours. Trooper Joe Atkins, HQ 1st, told that story: "I was called on to take the point going into Nijmegen. As we entered the city, a crowd of people gathered around us, and we had to push our way through. Three of us in the lead became separated from the other troopers behind us by the crowds of Dutch people. We three continued to make our way into the city until we came to the bridge.
"At the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon. I had a Thompson sub and a .45 pistol. The other two were armed with M1 rifles...”
“The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark, and none of our other troopers showed up. We decided to pull back away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge."
Nordyke, Chapter 10: cont:
"Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liasion officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
On the first afternoon of d-day, the 82nd 508 could have taken the bridge without hardly firing a shot, as there were only 18 German guards on it, with half taken prisoner, until darkness fell then the SS arrived. The 508th PIR only had two bridges to secure in their area of operations, the road and rail bridges at Nijmegen. The division's other tasks were being carried out by the 504th and 505th PIRs. The 508th failed to move, as instructed, against zero opposition in Nijmegen.Gavin specifically instructed Lindquist to send 1st Battalion to the bridge as soon as the Groesbeek Heights were secured. The heights are between the LZ and the bridge.
The main source is 82nd Airborne historian Phil Nordyke's Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2 (2012), but further details are in American historian John McManus' September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far (2012). These are American histories using primary sources.
The evidence of a three man point team from the 1st Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section reaching the bridge and taking seven prisoners without firing a shot (The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs 2013, chapter 6 - Nijmegen Bridge) proves that the whole battalion could have done it, just as Frost's 2nd Battalion at Arnhem had secured their primary objective at about the same time, trapping Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 between the two bridges. The fact that Gräbner's unit was badly shot up on the bridge trying to force Frost's position at Arnhem the following morning suggest's Warren's 1st Battalion 508th could have done the same thing if Gräbner had tried to force the issue at Nijmegen. Instead, Gräbner's unit was able to reinforce Nijmegen uncontested that evening because Lindquist only sent a patrol into the city, which got lost, and only three men detached from their main body reached the bridge an hour before Gräbner arrived, leaving when he did arrive.
Nijmegen was an open city and only a few guards were on the bridges - members of the band. Gavin was the man responsible for his divisional plan not being carried out, and as Lindquist's supervisor, the man to blame for not following Gavin's instructions, he has to bear responsibility for what happened at Nijmegen. Other units involved in this operation were making it work, but the unforced error at Nijmegen compromised the entire operation.
When Gavin found out Lindquist was on the Groesbeek heights and not moving a battalion into the city, he was as mad as the regiment's liaison officer had ever seen him, ordering the officer into a Jeep - "come with me - let's get him moving." Gavin's subsequent behaviour makes more sense as a result. He knew the entire operation was potentially blown by his division and tried to make amends after the 508th's failure.
When XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen, Gavin insisted his own 504th Regiment be used to conduct the river assault, despite the fact that the pre-planned backup for this scenario of the Nijmegen bridges being held in strength by the enemy was for 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division to make the assault crossings with either one or two Brigades.
• Source:Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps During Market Garden (2021) by John Sliz.
Gavin was trying to fix his own mistake, not some perceived failure of planning that happened in Montgomery's caravan - that's an American trope and a prejudice that's not based on any of the established facts.
Sources:
• Retake Arnhem Bridge, Bob Gerritsen and Scott Revell (2010)
• Lost At Nijmegen, RG Poulussen (2011)
• Put Us Down In Hell, Phil Nordyke (2012)
• September Hope, John C McManus (2012)
• The 508th Connection, Zig Boroughs (2013)
• Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story, Royal Air Force (2016, revised 2019)
• Nijmegen Schutzgruppe, Regionaal Archief Nijmegen, NL-NmRAN_80_86_0001 - 0015 (1947)
• Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps During Market Garden, John Sliz (2021).
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@ErikExeu
ORDER
508- Prcht Infantry will:
(a) Land on DZ "T"
(b) Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility, and be prepared to seize Waal River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633) on order of Div Comdr.
Let us assume pre-jump in England Gavin did not verbally tell Lindquist to go for the Waal bridge overriding the Order, he did with witnesses. So we have to go by the written Order which is freely available and a section coped above.
Regimental Liaison Officer of the 508th was Chester Graham:
"I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.'
Two battalions of the 508th were marching for just under three hours from the DZ to the empty Heights, arriving at 5 pm. One battalion remained at the DZ securing it. The DZ was secure when they left. As soon as they were in the Heights with no Germans in sight the Heights were secure. All secure. Lindquist should have had his two companies prepared which was written in the Order.
Lindquist should have contacted Gavin 'immediately', by radio or messenger, to get the Divisional Order to go to the bridge on reaching the vacant and secure Heights. Lindquist could not move to the bridge without it. Lindquist:
1) was way too late in obtaining the Order to proceed by radio or messenger;
2) never had the two companies prepared to move to the bridge.
When informed Lindquist was not moving to the bridge, Gavin sped personally to Lindquist screaming at him to move to the bridge at 7 pm, two hours after the 508 arrived at the Heights. Half an hour later the Germans reinforced the bridge. It took another two hours to muster the two companies spread over the Heights under Cnl Warren before they started to march at 9 pm. Far too late.
Lindquist failed on two important points.
Again, this is all assuming Gavin never gave verbal orders to Lindquist in England, only going by the written Order.
Whichever way you cut it, Lindquist was amateurish and to blame. Gavin also takes blame as he never had Lindquist trained and alert enough.
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@ToolTimeTabor
How Market Garden came about....
The concept was derived from Monty's pursuit operation Comet, which was never presented to Eisenhower. Eisenhower rightly wanted to chase the Germans who were on the retreat. Market Garden was primarily a strategic operation in Eisenhower's eyes, in Monty's it was tactical.
The planning was mainly by Americans Brereton and Williams. Brereton was a no-can-do general, unsuited for risky airborne operations. The end plan had only one corps above Eindhoven - a disgrace.
Eisenhower prioritized the northern thrust over other fronts and even seizing Antwerp and clearing the Schedlt. Clearing the Scheldt would take time as the German 15th SS army, highly experienced from the Russian front, had set up shop in the Scheldt not retreating back into Germany, under Hitler's orders. All available supplies would be directed to this northern thrust.
"Since Eisenhower — the Supreme Commander and Ground Force Commander — approved the Arnhem operation rather than a push to clear the Scheldt, then surely he was right, as well as noble, to accept the responsibility and any resulting blame? The choice in early September was the Rhine or Antwerp: to continue the pursuit or secure the necessary facilities to solve the logistical problem? The decision was made to go for the Rhine, and that decision was Eisenhower’s."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"On 4 Sept, the day Antwerp fell, Eisenhower issued another directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes — 21st Army Group and two corps of the US First Army — to take Antwerp, reach the Rhine and seize the Ruhr"
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Eisenhower did not know Antwerp had fallen to British troops when he issued the northern thrust directive. Montgomery wanted a thrust up and over the Rhine prior to Eisenhower's directive, devising Operation Comet, multiple crossings of the Rhine, to be launched on 2 Sept, being cancelled due to raised German resistance and poor weather. Operation Comet was not presented to Eisenhower for his approval. Montgomery asked Brereton of the First Allied Airborne Army, to drop into the Scheldt in early September - he refused.
Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. "the narrow thrust was reduced to the Second Army and two US corps, the XIX and VII of Hodges’ First Army, a total of around eighteen Allied divisions"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
The northern thrust was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.
"Perhaps not more then, but that much alone would have been very useful — and much more than was actually achieved. This view was confirmed after the war in interviews with the senior surviving German commanders, von Rundstedt, Student, Blumentritt and Rommel’s former chief of staff, General Speidel. They were unanimous in declaring that a full-blooded thrust from Belgium in September would have succeeded in crossing the Rhine and might have ended the war in 1944, since they had no means of stopping such a thrust reaching the Ruhr. In the event, largely due to the faulty command set-up [by Eisenhower] and lack of grip, even a bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter was still a dream in 1944."
- Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower’s reply of 5 September to Montgomery deserves analysis, not least the part that concerns logistics. The interesting point is that Eisenhower apparently believes that it is possible to cross the Rhine and take both the Ruhr and the Saar — and open the Scheldt — using the existing logistical resources."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders — or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called — and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp. In thinking this Ike was wrong."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Post-Normandy Bradley seemed unable to control Patton, who persistently flouted Eisenhower’s directives and went his own way, aided and abetted by Bradley. This part of their relationship quickly revealed itself in matters of supply, where Hodges, the commander of the US First Army, was continually starved of fuel and ammunition in order to keep Patton’s divisions rolling, even when Eisenhower’s strategy required First Army to play the major role in 12th Army Group’s activities."
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
Bradley was starving Hodges' First Army of supplies, against Eisenhower's orders, giving them to Patton who was running off into unimportant territory - again, and being bogged down - again. The resources starved First Army could not be a part of northern thrust as Bradley and Patton, against Eisenhower's orders, were siphoning off supplies destined for the First army. This northern thrust over the Rhine, as Eisenhower envisaged, obviously would not work as he thought.
A lesser operation was devised by Montgomery, Market Garden, eliminating the contribution of US First Army, with only ONE crossing of the Rhine. Market Garden would also eliminate V rocket launching sites, of which London wanted eliminating ASAP, giving a 60 mile long salient buffer between German forces and the important port of Antwerp. This would only have one corps above Eindhoven, a disgrace considering the forces in Europe at the time. Eisenhower had no grasp of the situation as it was and no strong strategy to advance. Eisenhower should have fired Bradley and Patton for sabotaging the Northern Thrust operation.
Montgomery did not plan or was in involved in Market Garden's execution. Montgomery, after fixing the operations objectives with Eisenhower to the measly forces available, gave Market Garden planning to others, mainly USAAF generals, Brereton and Williams. General Brereton, who liked the plan, agreed to it with even direct input. Brereton ordered the drops will take place during the day with Brereton also overseeing the troop carrier and supply drops schedules. Williams forbid fighter-bombers to be used. A refusal by Brereton and the operation would never have gone ahead; he earlier rejected Montgomery's initial plan of a drop into the Scheldt at Walcheren Island.
"it was not until 9 October, more than a month after the fall of Antwerp, that General Eisenhower told Montgomery to devote his entire attention to the clearance of the Scheldt. By that time the Canadians had cleared, or were investing, many of the Channel ports"
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
"Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives:
to get Allied troops across the Rhine
and to capture the Ruhr.
Three major advantages were expected to accrue:
( I) cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland;
(2) outflanking the West Wall, and
(3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent drive into Germany along the North German Plain."
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 120.
"Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed."
- A FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKS
by JAMES V. SCHULTZ
AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE,
ALABAMA
JUNE 1996. Page 50.
"later, on 15 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal"
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN. Page 210.
One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the the pincer on the Ruhr. Wayward Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
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FullMontyUK
The 1951 document can be dismissed as not being too accurate.
If at the end of phase 1 they are to be south of Eindhoven, then where would they be when phase 2 starts? They would be were they where at the end of phase 1.
The 21st Army Group document states in appendix G to part 2, number 5 (a). Rate of Movement:
The rate of movement depends clearly on the tactical situation.
It is, however, hoped to move at approximately 35 vtm and 10 mih.
This is key: The rate of movement depends clearly on the tactical situation. Movement is approx from 0600 to 1900. It says, 13 hours flow daily. It says that movement is "hoped" to be 10 mih (miles in the hour, equiv to mph) and 35 vtm (vehicles in each mile of the train). That is an aspiration. South of Eindhoven is approx 11 miles from the start point. So from south of Eindhoven at 1st light D+1 to Nijmegen they hope to be 44 miles up the road in 4.5 hours. However the hoped means realistically mid to late afternoon on D+1 - depending on the tactical situation, which may mean they would not be so fast. But XXX Corps were delayed 12 hours as the 101st never took the Son bridge, so that means XXX Corps would be at Nijmegen at D+2 about 11 am to noon at the earliest going by the hoped times. They arrived at Nijmegen at 0830 D+2, ahead of schedule given the delay.
Hence XXX Corps were not slow and in no way compromised the operation. They kept roughly to their rate of hoped speed, in fact they were slightly ahead of it. They were doing exactly what they were supposed to do. It was based on speed and hopes of advance. Irrespective of what time they reached a crossing, it was supposed to have been in allied hands, so they just roll over as was the case at Grave.
The only time objective specifically stated in the document was to be south of Eindhoven at the end of D day. The rest is not specific at all. In an operation like this specific target times are not realistic so were sensibly not put in. The only specific time, south of Eindhoven, could be pinned down being about 11 miles from the start point. The further up the road, schedules cannot be guaranteed.
But irrespective of turning up at Nijmegen on the afternoon of D+1 or first thing on D+2, the bridge was not seized by the US 82nd, so XXX Corps speed of movement was insignificant up to Nijmegen. If XXX Corps did roll over Nijmegen bridge at around noon on D+2, and they could have if the bridge was in the hands of the 82nd, they would have reached the British paras who were still on Arnhem bridge on the afternoon of D+2, as at that point there was little German resistance between Nijmegen and Arnhem.
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