Comments by "John Burns" (@johnburns4017) on "The Desert Fox | Rommel's FIRST Battle in the North African Campaign | BATTLESTORM" video.

  1. At then end of Operation Compass the British tanks were worn out from moving around 800 miles through desert. They never had tank transporters. Few tanks were operational to move around and fight another battle. The sand was highly abrasive. In those days they never had the bearings, filters and lubricants we have today. Even a small car in those days was full of grease nipples that needed greasing every 1,000 miles or so. The Germans moved into the desert new armoured vehicles and naturally would roll over the British forces in their clapped out vehicles. The British supply chain, around the Cape and up to Suez was exceptionally long with long lead times for equipment orders to be fulfilled. It never helped at all that Churchill moved forces from the desert to Greece near the end of Operation Compass. The Greek PM told Churchill not to move men to Greece as in doing so the Germans would move into Greece. That is exactly what happened. Churchill said it was his biggest mistake of WW2. Churchill had the chance of securing all the southern coast of the Med and blew it. I agree with Prof Adam Tooze, who says that Churchill's biggest mistake was not concentrating on the bomber forces to destroy the Ruhr. Destroy that and together with the RN blockade, Germany is dead as a fighting machine.
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  2. +tigerhunter77 Rommel is elevated to a position by the allies he does not deserve. The allies make excuses for their mistakes, like the Germans had better tanks, a general who thought like a fox, etc.
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  3. Peorhum It is likely the Germans would have never even attempted to move into Africa or Greece. When Hitler decided that German forces move into Africa they had not decided if Barbarossa was 100% on. A decision on an 'invasion' attempt of French NA would have been way after the decision for Barbarossa and not committed troops. They moved into Africa to help their friends, the Italians. If they are not there it is highly unlikely they would move into the desert. Those old tanks needed constant maintenance. They needed greasing by the day, especially in desert conditions. The lubricants were not of the quality we have today, neither was the metal coating. A modern car engine can easily run up to 200,000 miles without any major problems as long as it is serviced properly with quality filters and oils. Pre WW2 if you got 50,000 miles out of your engine without a rebuild you were doing well. Within that 50,000 miles you would have expected to have replaced a water pump, the odd valve, etc. The tanks went through tracks like wildfire even in the best conditions. One of the reasons the Germans gained a foothold in North Africa was that the British tanks that just about wiped out the Italians, were worn out. The Germans came in with fresh equipment.
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  4. Montgomery had the equipment and men so why should he move before he was 100% sure of victory. It would be foolish to move before you can assemble all those men, of which he had available. He was acutely aware of the supply problems of the desert battles and ensure the logistics was in place. Everything had to be brought to the Middle East via the Cape. He wanted this to be the battle that drives the Axis out of North Africa - and it worked. Rommel was short of all sorts and had to take gambles. Rommel had a very strong habit of over stretching his supply lines.
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  5. In France? Napoleon said and army marches on its stomach (supply). The Germans supplied via slow horses. The German armour had outrun their infantry and supplies, having advanced far, faster than they expected. Their advance surprised themselves. They were seriously running out of fuel and ammunition. The German troops had been fighting for two weeks straight without a break. They rested, replaced their losses, re-supplied (by slow horses) and reorganize their forces, which had taken heavy losses in France. The ground around the Dunkirk area was not ideal for tank operations being full of the marshes and canals that had bogged down German soldiers in WW1. Hitler's "Halt Order" was given in support of Generals von Kluge and von Rundstedt's request to halt. They knew the situation. The other generals were gamblers. General Franz Halder wrote in his diary: "The Fuhrer is terribly nervous. Afraid to take any chances." Too much had been achieved already to take the risk of falling into an Allied trap at that late stage, with still large French forces and reserves to deal with south of the Somme and Aisne rivers. Street fighting in Warsaw had shown the uselessness of tanks in built-up areas, such as Dunkirk. The RAF, with the Spitfire just introduced en-mass, were getting the best of the Luftwaffe - their first defeat. Hitler's Halt order was given after a meeting at Army Group A's headquarters in the Maison Blairon chateau at Charleville-Mezieres. Only after von Rundstedt had said he wanted to conserve the armour for a push to the south, to Bordeaux, where he feared the British would open another large front. He knew the British were taking men back to England fearing they would be shipped to southern France boosting the forces there. British and French forces were not far to the south of the Germans lines ready to attack threatening the left flank of the German advance. The numerous canals in Flanders and northern France also made it bad country for tanks. Hitler merely agreed with von Kluge and von Rundstedt, the men on the ground. The German front line was clearly poorly supplied. They had overstretched their supply line moving far faster and further than they ever thought. A blitzkrieg line can only reach so far then it has to stop. That is reckoned to be about 150 miles at the very most, they were way over that limit. A fleet of trucks and fuel tankers running up and down 150 miles is lot of trucks which are open to air attack. They have to consolidate. The fear of encountering the new Matilda 2 was also on their mind, after a bad experience meeting it at Arras. Only the big 88mm AA guns levelled could stop it. The Matilda 2 could knock out any German tank, but no German tank could knock it out, unless they hit a track. Then the British and French forces to the south counter-attacking, was their main concern. The French started some excellent and effective hedgehog tactics on German lines late in the day. Hedgehogs were used by NATO up until the 1980s. In 1944 the Canadians, Poles and Czechs with the RN controlling the Channel and able to give naval gunfire support and the allies with total control of the skies, attempted to take Dunkirk off the Germans but failed. Dunkirk stayed in German hands until the end of the war. In 1940, with the British having infinitely more men and far more equipment in 1940 than the Germans in 1944, after falling back with their equipment, and also controlling the Channel, and forming a CAP, the Germans could never take Dunkirk. On 26 May the Germans resumed the attack after re-supply. The Allies had improved their defences and offered stiff resistance. The Germans held off, consolidating, fearing massive losses or counter-attacks from the south and from Dunkirk. The Germans had to stop, as they could not take Dunkirk. If the British decided to make an issue of it and stay, the Germans most probably would have been mauled in and around the Dunkirk pocket.
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  6. No one knows that the Chinese fought the Japanese all through our WW2
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  7. It is best to bottom line it. Rommel did actually get beat. The "invincible" German army met the British army 7 months after the fall of France. They, with their allies this time, spent the best part of the next two years trying to defeat the British army - and failed. And about 75% of all supplies to Africa from Italy got through. The Italians largely won the convoy war in the Med. So supply routes was not a real big problem to the Axis. They did not have to take all around the bottom of Africa like the British had to. A lot was in their favour.
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  8. The Royal Navy blockade of Germany was one of the most effective campaigns in WW2. It went from the 1st day to the last. The RN also blockaded Italy. No oil tankers got through the straights of Gibraltar. In Feb 1941. The Italian Navy was to drop all naval operations unless Germany provided 25,000 tons of oil. The German surface navy was neutralized in port through lack of fuel. Lack of oil was a big Axis problem. Wages of Destruction by Prof Adam Tooze : Page 439: "In November 1941 the fuel oil situation of both the Italian and German navies was described by the Wehrmacht as 'catastrophic'. In May 1941 the Royal Navy had sunk the battleship Bismarck as it made a futile bid to escape into the Atlantic shipping lanes. By the autumn the rest of Germany's surface fleet was confined to harbour, not only by the British but also by the chronic lack of fuel." Wages of Destruction: page 442: "Shipments of oil to Britain peaked at more than 20 million tons, nine times the maximum figure ever imported by Germany during the war. In January 1941, when Germany is sometimes described as being 'glutted' with oil, stocks came to barely more than 2 million tons. In London, alarm bells went off whenever stocks fell below 7 million tons. So great was the disparity that the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, charged with assessing Germany's economic situation, had difficulty believing its highly accurate estimates of German oil stocks. To the British it seemed implausible that Hitler could possibly have embarked on the war with such a small margin of fuel security, an incredulity shared by both the Soviets and the Americans, who agreed in overestimating Germany's oil stocks by at least 100 per cent." During 1941, Italy was only able to import 600,000 tons of fuel with 163,000 tons given to the navy. At this point that monthly consumption had to be reduced to 60,000 tons. The total amount of oil fuel available at the end of the year was about 200,000 tons. During this period it was decided to remove from service the older battleships. After the November British attack from Egypt (Operation Crusader), the high command and Mussolini requested that the Italian fleet defend the Libya-bound convoys. This paid off and was only possible by the special shipment of 80,000 tons of German oil fuel delivered at the end of the year. On January 10th, 1942 the Italians informed the Germans that their navy’s supplies of fuel had dropped to 90,000 tons. During these months, the bottom was hit with reserves down to 14,000 tons. The situation deteriorated by the shipment of 9,000 tons of German oil fuel of quality too low to use. At the end of April, it was possible to import 50,000 tons of fuel oil per month from Romania. Suspending escort and mining missions by Italian cruisers reduced consumption. These cuts and new shipments allowed for the deployment of the whole Italian fleet during the battle with the British of mid-June. The Germans supplied fuel oil of only 10,000 tons in July 1942 and 23,000 tons in September. At the end of November 1942 the oil fuel reserve was about 70,000 tons plus all which was stored aboard the ships, This was enough for one sortie of the whole fleet. At the end of December, the old battleships Cesare, Duilio and Doria were removed from service. The allied landing in North Africa in 1943 put the Italian navy in another state of fuel crisis. New missions were made possible by the shipment of 40,000 tons of quality German fuel oil. In January 1943, the fuel oil crisis reached its climax and the three modern battleships had to be removed from service eliminating the Italian battle force. The only naval division still operating was in Sardinia. Only 3,000 tons were received in February 1943 and in March and April the modern destroyers had to be removed from escort missions. By the 10th of April, the only major naval force was annihilated when the Trieste was sunk and the Gorizia seriously damaged by allied air attack. Expecting a possible Allied invasion, the remaining destroyers were reactivated along with the battleships which had only half their bunkers filled with diesel fuel. In April 1943, the Italian navy was partially active and destroyers were used in escort missions. But there was no reserves of fuel oil left. The Germans "loaned" 60,000 tons of fuel oil captured from the French fleet at Toulon, allowing the three battleships to be reactivated with some cruisers. When Italy surrendered on September 8th 1943, their fleet only had enough fuel to reach Malta to surrender. Such was the effect of the Royal Navy blockades.
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  9. jorelemes The Guardian is not impressed with Hamilton's work: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/sep/22/biography.highereducation
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  10. US officer Bonner Fellas was giving info to the Germans unwittingly at first. Although he kept on broadcasting when his signals were highly suspected of being intercepted. Rommel knew a hell of lot about the British situation. A fox? Nah. The files on Bonner Fellas was secret until 2002. The Americans gave him a medal. http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/american-colonel-bonner-fellers-was-erwin-rommels-good-source/
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