Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Montgomery vs Eisenhower on Operation Market Garden's True Purpose | History Debate" video.
-
8
-
6
-
6
-
5
-
Back to France 1944 (Yawn).
‘nine American division involved in the D-Day invasion’
The allied divisions employed on D-Day (06.06.44) were:
British 6th Airborne Division.
British 3rd British Infantry Division.
British 50th Infantry Division.
British 79th Armoured Division.
Canadian 3rd Infantry Division.
US 1st Infantry Division.
US 29th Infantry Division.
US 4th Infantry Division.
U.S. 101st Airborne Division.
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.
The number of allied divisions landed by 02.07.44 was:
British: 11, Canadian: 1, US: 13.
Mobilization:
Across SIX years of war, Britain, the British Commonwealth and British Empire mobilized 9 million people into in land forces. This figure of course excludes auxiliary, naval and air force personnel.
As for the USA, the following would seem to explain that 55% reduction in divisions:
file:///C:/Users/A%20User/Desktop/Misc%20Leisure/90-Division%20Gamble.html
ROTFL.
GDP
Total British GDP in the SIX years of war amounted to $2,622 billion with approx. $200 billion spent on the war.
Lend-lease
To Britain amounted $21.6 Billion (Net) between 1941 and 1945.
Aircraft Production (1939-45)
Britain: 131,000, Germany: 119,000, USA 300,000.
Peak allied aircraft strengths in Europe (December 1944) amounted to 14,500 British, 12,200 US and 15,800 Russian machines. The opposing German Strength amounted to 8,500.
Trump
Word is that he is busy trying to get Russia back into the G8 – as of course he owes Putin for fixing the US presidential election. Also, he is waiting for an answer from Canada as to when they burned down the US capital.
5
-
David Olie
Normandy and France 1944.
As allied land forces commander Montgomery created the plan for Overlord which targeted allied forces at the Seine by D+90 – which was achieved earlier than those 90 days. The only channel port specifically targeted was Cherbourg which US forces took 10 days behind schedule. Le Havre was liberated on 12.09.44, Dieppe on 01.09.44, Boulogne 22.09 .44, Calais 01.10.44. The North Sea port of Antwerp was liberated 04.09.44. Of the Atlantic ports, Brest was liberated 19.09.44, Saint Nazaire, La Rochelle and Lorient were not liberated until VE Day.
The allied divisions employed on D-Day were:
British 6th Airborne Division.
British 3rd British Infantry Division.
British 50th Infantry Division.
British 79th Armoured Division.
Canadian 3rd Infantry Division.
US 1st Infantry Division.
US 29th Infantry Division.
US 4th Infantry Division.
U.S. 101st Airborne Division.
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division.
Montgomery’s astute leadership created conditions that led to almost complete destruction of German forces in Normandy, coping with, and turning the concentration of German forces in front of British and Canadian forces and the great storm of June 1944 which destroyed the shoddily installed US artificial harbour and damaged the properly installed British artificial harbour.
A performance that drew this comment from Eisenhower:
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.’
Also:
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
Regarding the Falaise Pocket and the subsequent breakout, this is what the US General Bradley had to say:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
‘In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise’.
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
British expertise dominated the planning for D-Day and Overlord with artificial harbours, PLUTO, assault armour and a vital deception plan.
Events prior to that entirely vindicate the British stance regarding any attempt to invade France before June 1944. In 1942, General Marshall badgered for an invasion of Europe but was only able to offer two US divisions for such an enterprise to go with the available seven British Divisions, the necessary landing craft were not available, the U-boat war was not won, the Luftwaffe was still too powerful to preclude overwhelming allied air superiority. Put this against 25 German divisions in France that would have dealt with any allied incursion without taking any resources away from the Russian front.
In 1943, as in 1942 the shipping for a full scale cross channel invasion was not available. Even the agreed start date for Overlord of 1st May 1944 had to be put back until June 1944 due to need to provide the necessary shipping for the troops at Sword and Utah beaches which Montgomery added to the Overlord plan at the beginning of 1944.
The charge that Churchill was reluctant to support a cross channel invasion is nonsense. As evidenced by what was stated at that time:
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt 24 Nov 42
‘2. It seems to me that it would be a most grievous decision to abandon “Round-Up”. “Torch is no substitute for “Round-Up”, and only engages thirteen divisions as against the forty-eight contemplated for “Round-Up”. All my talks with Stalin, in Averell’s presence, were on the basis of a postponed “Round-Up”, but never was it suggested that we should attempt no Second Front in Europe in 1943 or even 1944.’
As for Teheran, These are Churchill’s words:
‘Before we separated Stalin looked at me across the table and said “I wish to pose a very direct question to the Prime Minister about ‘Overlord’. Do the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff really believe in ‘Overlord’? I replied, “Provided the conditions previously stated for ‘Overlord’ are established when the time comes, it will be our stern duty to hurl across the Channel against the Germans every sinew of our strength.” On this we separated.’
What reasonable person can argue with that?
I will be back to deal with the remainder of rubbish spouted by the little shit in due course.
5
-
5
-
5
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
David Olie
Casualties
British and Colonial deaths for their 72 months of combat amounted to 383,786 military plus 60,595 British civilian deaths. The number of Colonial civilian deaths is not known. In addition, the Dominions lost the following military deaths: Australia, 40,040. Canada, 45,383. India, 87,032, New Zealand, 11,929. South Africa.
Here is an American view on how Britain waged war and its casualties:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=opDuw4OZ3QI (39 minutes 37 seconds onwards…)
Aircraft Production 1939-45
Britain 131,000, Germany 119,000, Russia 158,000, USA 300,000.
Italy
The campaign in Italy tied down 25 German divisions, the landings at Salerno and Anzio made zero difference to the timing for Overlord. As for the idea that the USA was going to fight in the Far East rather in Europe:
‘Memorandum for Hon. Harry L. Hopkins, General Marshall and Admiral King
Subject: Instructions for London Conference, July 1942
16 July 42
9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that the defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatre and in the Near east. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably of without firing a shot or losing a life.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Commander-in-Chief.
Misc.
Nothing on Frederick the Great, Frederick Forsyth, the War of Jenkins Ear, Gone with the Wind, the death of Elvis or the lunatic proposition that a broad front strategy prevented German disobedience after the war.
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
4
-
On the 8th September 1944, the first German V2 rockets landed in London, launched from the Western part of the Netherlands, in the area around The Hague. An urgent signal was sent from London to Montgomery about know what could be done about those attacks. The rockets could not be intercepted once they were in flight, and given they were launched from mobile launchers, usually in built up area, thus the chances of hitting their launch equipment were almost zero. Therefore, the only thing that could be attempted was to stop delivery of rockets to the western part of the Netherlands. When Montgomery met Dempsey on the 10th September, they discussed whether MARKET GARDEN should end at Nijmegen or Arnhem. Montgomery showed Dempsey the signal from London which settled the matter.
Where is the ego in that?
Prior to that, Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken over the available resources being spread out over all four armies – leaving the allies being not strong enough to advance properly anywhere – which is what happened.
Where is the ego in that?
4
-
4
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Land Forces 1939-45
Australia 751,729
Britain 3,510,309
B. Indian Ocean 6,500
Canada 730,625
Cyprus 30,000
East Africa 200,000
Fiji 3,050
British Guiana 42
Hong Kong 2,200
India 2,455,779
Kenya 98,240
Malaysia 1,500
Nepal 250,280
Newfoundland 4,005
New Zealand 128,905
Nigeria 121,652
Sudan 20,000
South Africa 334,000
Southern Africa 77,767
West Africa 200,000
West Indies 10,000
Any questions?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Tim 0neill
During 4th September, 1944, from his headquarters in Granville, Normandy, issues a directive to Montgomery (at Saulty. Hauts-de-France) and Bradley (Château-Thierry Hauts-de-France), ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes (21st Army Group and two corps of First U.S. Army) “to secure Antwerp, reach the sector of the Rhine covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.”
On the evening of 4th September, as soon as he learned of the capture of Antwerp, Montgomery sent a signal to Eisenhower suggesting that the time had come to make “one-powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”
‘The state of Eisenhower's communications was such that his 'Most Immediate' signal, sent from Granville on the evening of September 5th in reply to Montgomery's proposal about Berlin, did not reach the Field-Marshal's H.Q,. near Brussels until after breakfast on the 7th. Even then the signal was not complete and the missing paragraphs did not arrive for another two days!
The final part of Eisenhower’s 'Most Immediate' did arrived at Montgomery’s headquarters until 9.15am on the 9th September and read:
The bulk of the German Army that was in the west has now been destroyed. Must immediately exploit our success by promptly breaching the SIEGFRIED LINES crossing the RHINE on a wide front and seizing the SAAR and the RUHR. This will give us a stranglehold on two of Germany's main industrial areas and largely destroy her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take.
On the same day (9th), Montgomery received a 'Secret' cable from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMS-TERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels Airport on the 10th, their first meeting since Eisenhower had taken over command of the allied land campaign, 10 days earlier. Eisenhower noted the outcome of that meeting:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces. The target date for the attack was tentatively set for September 17, and I promised to do my upmost to for him in supply until that operation was completed. After the completion of the bridge-head operation he was to turn instantly and with his whole force to the capture of Walcheren Island and the other areas from which the Germans were defending the approaches to Antwerp. Montgomery set about the task energetically.’ His words.
Sources: Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe. Nigel Hamilton, Monty The Field Marshall 1944-76. Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe.
Where is there evidence of Montgomery disobeying orders?
Why can't people like this Edward Chandler check thing out before coming up with half-baked attempts at history?
Why do gullible idiots like Para Dave buy into this Edward Chandler nonsense?
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Hardly...
Montgomery ripped to bits the the lunatic plan to land all around Sicily and instead, concentrated resources to land all the forces together, in one place. The outcome was a an allied success, despite Patton deserting the battlefield o seek personal glory in Palermo.
Caen had little bearing on the outcome of Overlord, which saw Montgomery beat the scheduled completion date of D+90 by 12 days, and with 22% fewr han expectd casualties.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@mgt2010fla
'The Bismarck wasn't damaged until the night before by Swordfish so it wasn't damaged when the US plane, a PBY, sighted the Bismarck it was under control although damaged in the bow and leaking oil by a hit from the PoW!'
Bismarck's prime mission ended with the hit it took from Prince of Wales causing a fuel leak that stopped its Atlantic raiding mission. Lutjens's continued radio transmissions led the Royal Navy to him. The RAF flying boat that spotted him had one US serviceman onboard and therefore to imply that the USA had some sort of crucial role in its destruction is absurd.
'The distance didn't stop the JIN from attacking Pearl Harbor and invading and attacking Alaska! '
It must have been terrifying in Alaska. Thank god Britain was such a backwater with regard to enemy activity!
'Where did 50 of those destroyers come from!'
Err.. It was 46 actually. By May of 1941 not even 30 of them wee fit for action - by which time British escort construction had rendered their presence all but a burden on manpower. I believe that it was said of the US President Nixon: 'Would you buy a used car from this man.' The same might be said of the US President Roosevelt: 'Would you buy a used destroyer from this man.'
'Also, the US move the escort line to reach Iceland and US sailors were killed before the US entered the war!'
US goods, occasionally in US ships. A good way of protecting US Markets.
'The Atlantic Charter made Germany the primary enemy, but the Japanese made the Americans hate them and the US was losing men and land to the Japanese.'
Why would Americans hate Japan in September 1941?
'why have ships in the Atlantic at all?'
Who can say?
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME I THE GATHERING STORM
BOOK I The Fall of France
Chapter 1: The National Coalition
P5
‘Out of 781 German and 85 Italian U-boats destroyed in European theatre, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, 594 were accounted for by British sea and air forces, who also disposed of all of the German battleships, cruisers and destroyers, besides destroying or capturing the whole Italian Fleet.’
There was of course the exeption of the German cruiser Blucher which was sunk by the Norwegians but apart from that what reasonable person can take issue with the words of the outstanding war leader of the Second World War.
You must try to do better...
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@Jerry-sw8cz
'elevated to this post based on myths spread about his personality and military achievdements...'
Myth?
Montgomery fought with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO.
In trying circumstances in France in 1940, in command of single infantry division, Montgomery performed with distinction as the night march of his command closed the gap on the allied left, after the Belgian capitulation. He then got his division back to Britain almost intact.
In North Africa, in his first major command, Montgomery, reorganised, and reinvigorated 8th Army, and won a campaign ending victory.
For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up the lunatic plans to scatter allied landings all around Sicily, and contrated the effort in the South East of the Island. The island was wholly in in allied hands within six weeks.
For Italy, Eisenhower, not for the first time, and not for the last time, Eisenhower failed to concentrate allied forces. In this instance, despite warnings from Montgomery, he imposed BAYTOWN and SLAPSTICK on Montgomery. The resulting near disaster at Salerno was wholly down to Eisenhower, and nothing to with Montgomery.
Why was in the myth Montgomery about Montgomery's achievements prior to his elevation to army group command?
3
-
3
-
3
-
2
-
korbell
Here is the link to that Big Woody forgery.
YouTube item:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=em-comments
Lead Comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
25th reply.:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This was his source, as well he knows:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
RAM, July 28 2010
This will be waiting for Big Woody, every time he posts a comment on YouTube.
2
-
2
-
2
-
In Noth Africa, Montgomery's forces advanced 700 miles from El-Alamein to Benghazi in nine days - 700 miles. In the desert, with one intermediate port, Tobruk. With one road, and one rail line. Both of which had suffered from multiple demolitions from the retreating Axis forces. 700 miles is London to Berlin. Compare all that to US forces in Tunisia, after they had faced the Vichy French...
Italy... Montgomey's meagre forces were spread around Sothern Italy, due to Eisenhower's BAYTOWN, and SLAPSTICK. After Montgomery had warned about the consequences of those undertakings.
Normandy...
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
Ike, Brad, Beetle, Lightening Joe, etc., atc. Are we supposed to believe that people who comment on YouTube actually knew these people?
2
-
2
-
2
-
Here is the General Marshall Speach as I found it. Which stats have I missed?
'I'm profoundly grateful and touched by the great distinction and honor and great compliment accorded me by the authorities of Harvard this morning. I'm overwhelmed, as a matter of fact, and I'm rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you've been generous enough to accord to me. In these historic and lovely surroundings, this perfect day, and this very wonderful assembly, it is a tremendously impressive thing to an individual in my position. But to speak more seriously, I need not tell you, gentlemen, that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.
There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.
It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.
An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.
I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?
Thank you very much.
'
2
-
2
-
@mvies77
‘When you speak of a theatrical movie, it is well known virtually none, unless they are a documentary, and even then it is affected by bias, portray events accurately due to dramatic license, etc. So well made simply meant, quality actors, cinematography, etc. It was just an example of a part of the total mass of info on the subject.’
The film is chauvinistic US tripe, designed to belittle Britons. Americans love it and believe it to be true.
‘As far as your citing Eisenhower, etc. The quote I read and also saw as part of a documentary on Montgomery questioning the true purpose of the actions goal as to opening a supply route for the allies. The question concerned the opening of the routes location and where it truly lay. It quoted Eisenhower as livid at Montgomery, with his staff meeting with Montgomery's staff and finally walking out after accusing the British of betrayal.’
But where is there reliable evidence that Eisenhower was livid with Montgomery in 1944? There might be some. Eisenhower met with Montgomery at Conde-sur-Noireau on 23rd August, when Montgomery stated that there was not enough resources to maintain the allied advance across the whole front and that therefore a decision had to be made to prioritize one advance. Preferably that advance should be made in the North, by British 2nd Army and US 1st Army with Canadian 1st Army and US 3rd Army halted. Failing that, British 2nd Army and Canadian 1st Army should be stopped and the allied advance be concentrated in the South by US 1st and 3rd Armies. Eisenhower chose neither and the whole allied advance ground to a halt.
At the beginning of September, Eisenhower made the FAAA available for use by 21st Army Group – the only allied close enough to Britain to be able to make use of this force. At this time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces on the western front than Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
On September 10th, Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels. Eisenhower again failed change his broad front strategy he did approve Market Garden, which would be carried out without denuding either of the US armies of their existing resources.
Where is the betrayal?
‘Morale? There were soldiers whom died and were captured and interred unnecessarily due to the intel that was ignored because Montgomery would not wait.’
But how does Arnhem differ from other allied failures in the Autumn of 1944? Or indeed any other situation where soldiers are captured? Where is there evidence that Montgomery acted with impatience?
‘The Polish General was charged with the failure of the action taking the blame, when according to the documentary it was Montgomery.’’
Sosabowski was not charged with any blame for Arnhem not being captured. He took criticism regarding his performance, but that is quite a different matter.
‘Everything I have seen and read states it was a faulty plan from the top and as usual the infantry, etc paid the price due the ego of Montgomery whom was a thorn in Eisenhower's side.’
What have you read? Where is it proved that any price was paid due to Montgomery’s ego? There were a number of good reasons why the operation was launched. The need to hinder V-2 launchings alone justified the undertaking. Martin Middlebrook, author of Arnhem 1944 The Airborne Battle stated:
‘Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.’
If Montgomery was a thorn in Eisenhower’s side then so be it. Eisenhower did not have a day of personal combat experience and did not command above brigade level before September 1944. His was political appointment and he should never have been put in charge of the allied land campaign.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@John Burns
Big Woody is a liar, and this is why:
Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
Member
Joined:Dec 11, 2007
Messages:507
Likes Received:9
...
'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ...
RAM, July 28 2010
...From another opnion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
From now on I refer to Big Woody as The Liar.
2
-
2
-
John Cornell
From the Liar...
'Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy. Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a road sign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometres to Caen'
There is no sense in that. Minsk to Caen has Berlin roughly in the middle - between the two. This could easily be construed as a comment that Germany's day were numbered, they were facing enemies on two fronts, and so on and so on. Further, Caen was the most important and best known town in the allied bridgehead, that it was in the British sector would have been of little importance to people 1,400 miles away. Further, surely it would have been Eisenhower’s name that those Russians would have known rather that Montgomery. After all, US propaganda had spread the word far and wide that Eisenhower was the supreme commander of the expedition. The fact that he did next to nothing towards Overlord's success would not have been known to those Russians.
If this Gelb oppo can produce evidence that the road sign was aimed at Montgomery then so be it. Until then, Gelb's interpretation can only be described as dubious. Notice how the Liar accepts Gelb's interpretation hook, line and sinker.
If, in the unlikely event that evidence shows that this sign was aimed Montgomery, then the Russians can fuck off. Britain was fighting Germany on its own while the USSR was allied to Germany.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@johnlucas8479
‘So was you are saying Monty know on 23rd of August that there was a supply shortage and he start the push for a single northern thrust.’
Your words.
Of course. Any real soldier could have seen that the supply situation and the need to exploit the defeat of the German army in France dictated a concentration of resources. Of course, Eisenhower failed to see that.
‘Then once Antwerp was capture intact, clearly getting Antwerp operational ASAP the supply problem would be resolved. So why did Monty Directive M525 dated 14th Sept place the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary after the capture of Boulogne and Calais. Your words.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
‘Clearly Montgomery made a poor decision about Antwerp, as he wasted resources, men and time when he should have focusing the 1st Canadian Army on clearly out Antwerp at the same time as he focus on Market Garden.’ Your words.
I cannot see what point you are trying to make here.
‘As you claim Monty had little involvement with Market Garden and he was focus Not on opening Antwerp, so were was Monty focusing on.’ Your words.’
Where have I claimed that ‘Monty had little involvement with Market Garden’? I have posted evidence that Montgomery had no final say on the Airborne part of the operation. But that is quite different to having ‘little involvement’ in the operation.
‘By the 9th of September the German forces in front facing 2nd British Army was already being re-built so that operation Comet was cancelled.’ Your words.
But Comet involved only 1st Airborne and the Polish Brigade. That should not lead to a conclusion that Market Garden should not have gone ahead, based on what the allies knew of German strength.
‘If the Ruhr was so important the direct approach would have been Wesel / Aachen direction, so why did Monty directed 2nd Army North towards Arnhem?’ Your words.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
‘While Italy and Dalmatian were important from a British point of view, clearly was you are claim the quickest way to defeat Germany was the capture of the Ruhr. The Italian Campaign was not going lead to the capture of Ruhr. So why should USA continue to support a secondary theatre that would not lead to a quick ending of the War in Europe.’ Your words.
As I have shown, the lack of USA interest in the Italian campaign had no consequential benefit the fight in North West Europe. The campaign in Italy tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans, and maintaining troop levels there could have aided the collapse of Germany and could have aided the western allies in the post-war world.
This is what US General Mark Clark stated on the matter in June 1944:
“The Boche is defeated, disorganised and demoralized. Now is the time to exploit our success. Yet, in the middle of this success, I lose two corps headquarters and seven divisions. It just doesn’t make sense.”
Later (in 1951) Clark reflected:
‘A campaign that might have changed the whole history of relations between the Western world and the Soviet Union was permitted to fade away, not into nothing, but into much less than it could have been. …not alone in my opinion, but in the opinion of a number of experts who were close to the problem, the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war. …
Stalin knew what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he most wanted was to keep us out of the Balkans. … It is easy to see therefore, why Stalin favoured ANVIL at Teheran…but I could never see why as conditions changed, the United States and Britain failed to sit down and take at the overall picture. …There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British minds, but…the American top level planners were not interested. …I later came to understand, in Austria, the tremendous advantages that we had lost by our failure to press on into the Balkans. …Had we been there before the Red Army, not only would the collapse of Germany have come sooner, but the influence of Soviet Russia would have been drastically reduced.’
‘Morgenthau Plan was agreed by USA, UK and USSR, so that no repeat of what happen at the end of WWI would occur.’ Your words.
Churchill was pressurized by Roosevelt into agreeing the Morgenthau Plan, but this plan was rejected by the government and it was put aside by Truman. But by then, the damage was done. Whether the USSR as in agreement was of little consequence, Germans were already fearing what the Russians would do as they overran German territory.
2
-
@johnlucas8479
What did the allies know?
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P509
‘On the day after the fall of Paris, the SHAEF Intelligence Summary, reviewing the situation in the West, declared: " Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”’
What did Montgomery propose?
When Montgomery met with Eisenhower on the 23rd August (1944), he stated:
“Administratively, we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
What did Eisenhower decide to do?
He rejected Montgomery’ advice and proposal to concentrate resources, as had worked well in North Africa and Normandy. At that meeting on the 23rd August, Eisenhower rejected the sensible course of action, to concentrate resources in the North of allied front, and the option to put all allied forces there under the command of 21st Army Group on political grounds, stating to Montgomery that "The American public, would never stand for it”.
What happened?
When Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander (01.09.44), the allied advance ground to halt, with each army taking on under-resourced undertakings, all of which failed (apart from the attack on the Scheldt). All of this gave the Germans time and space to stabilize their western front, stabilize their eastern front and to re-build forces, many of which were later used in their counter attack in the Ardennes in December 1944.
Again, Chester Wilmot provides the important information:
‘German records reveal that, of the divisions which took part in the Ardennes counter-offensive in December, very few were in existence as fighting formations during September. The training of the new Volksgrenadier divisions had only just begun, for the bulk of the troops who were drafted to them and to the depleted infantry units in the West during the autumn had been called up only in the last week of August. The spearhead of the Ardennes attack, Sixth SS Panzer Army, was not
formed until September and its divisions were not fit for battle until November.’
Eisenhower’s failure to create a plan suited carrying the war forward by capturing the Ruhr, an area that was producing 51.7 per cent of Germany’s hard coal and 50.4 per cent of Germany’s crude steel? Across the Germany economy the period September, October, November saw the Germans produce 1,764 tanks. Assault gun production rose from 766 in August to 1,199 in November. Rifles, machine guns, mortars artillery, ammunition etc continuing to be produced in substantial numbers.
Other poor American thinking in 1944 was the decision to withdraw US troops from Italy for Dragoon, which had little effect on the war in France but signalled to Germany a slackening off of US interest in Italy – leading Germany to withdrawing troops from that front and doubtless allowing the Germans to further prioritize North West Europe and the east over Italy.
Alanbrooke noted in Triumph in the West:
‘The situation awaiting the C.I.G.S. in Italy was dominated by three factors. The first was the withdrawal from General Alexander’s command, at the instance of the American Chiefs of Staff, of seven American and French divisions at the very moment when victory seemed within his grasp and their descent, on August 15th, on the South of France, where during the next few critical and decisive weeks they could play little or no part in either the Italian or the Overlord campaign. The immediate effect of their appearance on the Riviera had been, as Brooke had foreseen, the despatch by Hitler—sure now that no further landing on either the Italian or Dalmatian coast was to be feared—of three crack divisions from Italy to Northern France.’
Beyond that, there was publicity surrounding the Morgenthau Plan served stiffen the resolve of the Germans – moving the Nazis, the armed forces and the population as a whole closer together.
Any questions?
2
-
@johnlucas8479
Not really...
The Ruhr was there was there for the taking when the battle of France ended, as the Germans well knew:
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine"'
German general Gunther Blumentritt
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
The time to act was at the beginning of September, based on decision that should have been made before then. At that Model had only 239 tanks and assault guns and 821 artillery pieces less armour and artillery than had been available in Britain after Dunkirk. Model had barely sufficient tanks to refit one armoured division.
Even if an attempt to clear the Scheldt had been made at this time, many of the assets needed for an assault were some way from being ready to deploy there, the Germans still held the Breskens Pocket, which would have precluded the use of the estuary. Further, the clearance of mines would still have taken three weeks. The moment to would have gone, the Germans would still have gained the time they wanted to re-equip their forces.
2
-
2
-
@johnlucas8479
‘The point I was making is the important of having Antwerp operational ASAP for the future war effort.’
But Antwerp was not vital for a twenty division thrust into Northern Germany to cut off he Ruhr from the Rest of Germany. This could have been accomplished with existing supply quantities. Quantities that were soon to be added to by the availability of Dieppe and Le Havre.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944." ‘
‘With the benefit of hindsight clearly the opening up of Antwerp should have been Monty priority. But at the time Monty though he could do both.’
With the benefit of hindsight, the allies should have had a workable to attack Germany as soon as it was clear that the battle of France was coming to an end. That would have entailed Eisenhower getting out of the way of the work of professional soldiers and thus allowing clear headed thinking to prevail over US self-interest.
‘Image the problems the Germans would have faced with Antwerp Operation by end of Sept, Monty Launching Operation Market Garden with the 1st Canadian Army supporting 2nd Army. 1st US Army attack to Hurtgen Forrest and Aachen as well as 3rd US Army attacking Lorraine simultaneous and all well resourced.’
But how was the Scheldt to be cleared by the end September? The amphibious forces were not in place for an attack on Walcheren, the Germans would still have mined the estuary – which would still have taken three weeks to clear.
The idea that the Scheldt could have been taken in a week is absurd.
‘Maybe if these operation Germans may not have been able to mass the Troops and tanks used in the Ardennes offensive.’
The way to stop the Germans from massing troops and tanks used in the Ardennes offensive would have been to do what the Germans last wanted us to do – as noted above.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@dmbeaster
'Your version is typical British obfuscation. Unfortunately, Montgomery's memoir preserves the evidence that his number one reason for proposing Market Garden was a path to Berlin. It was Eisenhower who dismissed that notion, but approved Market Garden based on much more limited objectives, as he makes clear in his memoir.'
Se below.
Eisenhower also never passed the buck on the failure of Market Garden to Montgomery - he accepted joint responsibility for the mistake, which had the consequence of badly delaying the entire war effort.
'Accepting responsibility went with the job, along with the cars, the champagne, the big chateau, the big parade in Paris, and first crack at the female drivers.' On what basis do you claim that MARKET GARDEN 'had the consequence of badly delaying the entire war effort'?..
'It is a certainty that Montgomery never gave up on his dream for Berlin based on something Eisenhower said and thought - he said nothing to that effect at the time. In the time frame, Montgomery never retracted his expectation to drive to Berlin.'
And why not?.. Montgomery was proved to be right. It as only cock-sure American politicians like Eisenhower, and Roosevelt who, in 1944 thought that Berlin did not matter.
'In a typically dishonest fashion, he subsequently pretends that Eisenhower's more limited objectives was allegedly his own idea.'
Not really...
Montgomery spoke with Chester Wilmot about Market Garden's objectives in 1946. I have quoted this already. Montgomery work 'Normandy to the Baltic' appeared in 1947, with no mention of Berlin in relation to Market Garden...Eisenhower's memoirs did not appear until 1948.
'But Montgomery's "path to Berlin" rationale was preserved in his own letters to Eisenhower proposing Market Garden.'
Which letters?.. The first time that MARKET GARDEN was proposed was when Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels on the 10th September 1944.
'There is no honest way to spin it any differently.'
Any spin has come from chauvinistic Hollywood films, US TV proframmes, and a bevy of US authors who have re-written history.
Harsh but fair.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
'Monty was a nasty piece of work--obsessed with his own image, much like MacArthur, but without MacArthur's talent (and Mac was no Patton or Slim or O'Connor). He was embarrassed because he had focused on taking Antwerp while ignoring the undefended Scheldt estuary until it was too late and the Germans occupied it in force--as Antwerp fell.’
Deferring an attack on the Scheldt was agreed by Eisenhower, who by September 1944, as well as being Supreme Commander, had taken over from Montgomery as allied land forces commander.
Eisenhower later acknowledged that he had agreed to Market Garden ahead of the Scheldt:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
Further, the need to degrade the German V-Weapon attacks on Britain and Belgium from the western part of the Netherlands was a major driving force behind the launching of Market Garden. Obviously no American can relate to this.
‘Taking the Ruhr, let alone Berlin, was utterly impossible without Antwerp as a functioning port--so Monty's later story made no logistical sense, whereas Ike's story was quite sensible and consistent with every other strategic decision he made throughout the war. Ike was always very attentive to his logistics.’
In September 1944 21st Army Group and 12th Army Group were each receiving 7,500 tons of supplies per day. Enough to sustain 20 divisions for a combined thrust against the Ruhr by the British 2nd Army and the US First Army. Opposing those 20 divisions, along entire Western Front the Germans could muster fewer tanks and artillery pieces that Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
‘Churchill and Britain needed a hero in late 1942 and after sacking Auchinleck and then winning at El Alamein, Churchill and Brooke (always Monty's sponsor) built Monty up far beyond his real talents, and then everybody was stuck with the great "hero" and his great ego: a decent general for 1918 set-piece battles but not for highly mobile combined arms offensives in 1943-44.’
Churchill and Britain needed victories in late 1942. There was no desire to see heroes in Britain during the war from the upper echelons in all parts of public life. The whole thrust of ‘propaganda’ or government messages based on MPs own anecdotes from their contact with the public, and evidence acquired from ‘mass observation’ was to emphasize the collective effort, particularly the men and women in street. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. Montgomery became well known through he enthused his troops and by winning battles.
‘It was no fluke when Patton beat him to Messina in Sicily, or when Rommel was able to salvage what was left of his forces after Alamein and reconstitute his army in Tunisia, when a vigorous pursuit (think, Patton or Guderian) would have left him without a functioning force.’
Correct. It was no fluke:
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
'Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
If there was any chance Market-Garden could have worked, it would have been with the two Army Groups reversed, with either Patton or Hodges (not that Hodges was so great by late 1944, but think Collins' corps and Ridgway's airborne troops) with the pedal to the metal. Monty, Dempsey, and Horrocks were NOT the people to lead such a bold, combined arms, "time is of the essence" operation deep into enemy territory on a single axis. But Monty in the North and Bradley to his South was forced by logistical necessities recognized back in 1943, and they were what they were.
But all of the major set backs happened to the Airborne forces which were under the command of the US General Brereton and over which 21st Army Group had no direct jurisdiction: The choice of landing zones and the decision to delay an attempt to capture Nijmegen Bridge. XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on the third day, in time to reach the troops at Arnhem Bridge, only to find that Nijmegen was still in German hands.
‘The only real question is whether Ike recognized the futility of all this and acquiesced in Churchill's and Montgomery's pressure for the sake of Allied unity, knowing that with Monty-Dempsey-Horrocks in charge its chances were slim to none, but at least the casualties would be British and the responsibility of the Brits who were forcing it on him--or did he talk himself into thinking against all reason and his usual cautious nature, that it might work?’
What futility? Eisenhower had this to state about Market Garden:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
His words.
2
-
2
-
2
-
John Voltaire
'Monty is that he is a coward for dodging responsibility for the train wreck that was Market Garden,'
Where is there evidence that Montgomery dodged responsibilty for Market Garden?
If market Garden was a train wreck, what are the Siege of Metz and the Battle of Hurtgen Forest to be described as?
'dropping the entire thing on Gen. Sosabowski, the one person who pushed back realizing that this will lead to senseless deaths.'
Where is there evidence of this?
Montgomery criticized Sosabowski's work at Arnhem. That is quite different from blaming Sosabowski for the entire operation. In any case, why would he? Market Garden was largely successful.
'Additionally, Eike was going to fire him because Monty would not do anything unless it was pretty much a guaranteed win.'
First, Ike (Eike) could not fire Montgomery. Montgomery was in a different army and was accountable to the CIGS. Eisenhower could only request that he be replaced.
Second. Montgomery was thorough. A thoroughness saved many allied lives. Unlike Eisenhower and most US commanders, Montgomery had personal combat experiece - in the First World War and this experiece undoubtly influenced in approach to war.
'It's same as a boxer choosing his own opponents'
Why is it? Montgomery was appointed to command 8th Army in Africa, Sicily and Italy and his battle plans all met with agreement by other allied commanders. For D-Day, the landing location was chosen and Germans the put nearly all of their forces in front of he British 2nd Army. In the Bulge, Eisenhower asked Montgomery to take command of the northern armies.
'His victory in Africa was due more to lack of resources and stretched supply lines of Germans than efforts by the Brits.
If 'lack of resources' means that Montgomery's victory was devalued then that also applies to every single US victory in Europe during the war. They only ever fought German forces that had a 'lack of resources'.
Which one do you want?
'Hitler never really cared for Africa especially after Barbarossa started.'
That is nothing to do with Montgomery.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@USAACbrat
No.
The evidence is clear in regard to the Montgomery's auhority ot undertake Market Garden:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. '
US General Dwight D Eisenhower. His words.
As far as Market Garden was concerned, Berlin was not the target, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics confirmed:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 49
In fact by 10September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:
I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.
Eisenhower's broad front policy gave the Germans what they most wanted, time and space to reoganize and rebuild their forces. As the Germans themselves confirmed:
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved"
German General Kurt von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really
strong striking force with which to break through to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open."
German General Günther Blumentritt.
'Monty's need for glory'? He had already offered to stop 21st Army Group and leave all of the available resources to put into a US drive in the South, providing Eisenhower made a decision regarding a single thrust strategy instead of his broad front lunacy. A proposal that hardly displayed a 'need for glory'.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@11nytram11
Just to recap. Big Woody (aka Para Dave), has called XXX Corps cowards, Carrington Scarrington, Montgomery every name under the sun. He has disparaged cancer sufferers and he has stated that hates me. Where does all the hate come from?
As for Alanbrooke, he took part two world wars, he saw Alexander and Montgomery perform with distiction in difficult circumstances in 1940, and knew that they were men to be trusted. That trust was fully justified. He was proved right on most of the big issues facing the allies during the war, whilst having to deal with Churchill, the know nothing Eisenhower, and the poor judgement of Marshall.
As for Alanbrooke's diary, the idea that it was written after the war is absurd. Brereton's diary as written after the war, Butcher's diary was doctored after the war.
As for the Mediterranean, victory there freed a million tons of shipping for use with Overlord. The Italian campaign tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans - divisions that would otherwise have been facing Overlord or the Russians. No British interests were served by continuing the war in the Mediterranean in 1943, but European interests would have been seved if the Russians had been kept out of the Balkans. But thanks to the bozo Roosevelt who probably thought he was being all very clever by ganging up with the Stalin against Churchill, the Western allies ended up fighting the war just the way that Stalin wanted them to.
2
-
@dougdenhamlouie
OK. So you made it up Montgomery being threatened with the sack.
As for the rest...your words in 'single quotes '.
'The only thing you did well was the merlin engine and the 17lb antitank gun.'
Who can say? Perhaps also the Spitfire, the Wellington, the Mosquito, the Lancaster, the Meteor. Perhaps, also the Churchil tank, the Universal Carrier, the Cromwell tank, the Comet tank, the six pounder gun, the 25 pounder gun. Perhaps also the armoured aircraft carriers, the Hunt class escorts, the Tribal class destroyers. Perhaps also, the Cavity Magnatron, the proximity fuse, the world's first electronic computer.
Who can say...
'When we took over Britain was on the ropes leaving everything you had in France.'
The USA never took over. Recovery was swift in regard what was left in France. By the end of August 1940, we were able to send 250 tanks to the Middle East. By early 1941, we had two million fully armed men in Britain...It was not likey they show it in Hollywood films.
'From Dec 7 1941 we cranked up our industry and sent ya our rejects.'
Yea, having bled Britain and France white. Meanwhile, on its own, Britain out-produced Germany.
'The early Sherman tommy cookers we sent you had the rotary B17 engines. Your tankers loved them compared to every one of your shitty tanks.'
Err...fraid not. My father was in a tank division that used both Churchill and Sherman tanks. The first thing that anyone sent to the Shermans did was to write their last will and tetament.
'We did not like em. Even the Grant was a big hit. So we sent em to you.'
And why not? The USA had no use for them, they were not doing any fighting.
'My dad flew with the 15th 333 and liked flying the spitfire Mk V and IX until he got the P51.'
And he then liked the Spitfire even better.
'So when my dad was in England...did he fuck your slutty Grandmother. Is that the deal?'
Both of my grandmothers were in the 50s during the war, and neither lived the West of England, were the US Army wasted space. Doubtless, a few slags went with Americans, its the same in every country. Word is, the American level of performace was like that of their tanks, very disappointing. Still, as anyone Briton who has visited the USA can testify, American birds are easy. As soon as they hear that British accent, they are soaking wet. Even easier, were the US farming girls who came over every year on the US 4H scheme. We all used to make a diary note of their arrival date. Perhaps your wife was one of them?
'Want to know my revenge?'
Nope, I could'nt care less.
'I'm going to shoot a feral hog tonight with a thermal sighted AR15 6.5mm I built last week.'
What sort of revenge is that?
'I'm betting you can't even own a .22.'
I hope not. We have just about the lowest gun crime rate of any major country, because we have the strictest gun ownership laws. I wish they were stricter. Even our police are unarmed. This pandemic has cost a lot of American lives. But think how many have been saved with the US schools beimng closed. None of those weekly campus mass shootings...
0/10 for competence.
10/10 for giving me a good laugh.
Got any more pearl's of wisdom?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@mgt2010fla
'Cambridge, Oxford, same thing to me! '
I thought it might be.
'I was pointing out that he is one of the best historians, anywhere, on the battles in the ETO!'
But Eisenhower, Bradley, DeGuingand, Montgomery and others who were there have all written accounts. Chester Wilmot who was also there has writen what is possibly the definative account of the campaign in Western Europe. The Enigma secrets, which only slightly modified the story of events came out in the mid-1970s. What does Histings bring to the party that is new?
'the British would not have won the war vs Germany without the US!'
No one would have won without Britain hlding out in 1940. Not Russia they would have been attacked earlier. Not the USA - how would they have got there?
'Because they protect minors in the US so I've never seen his name, but, he would at least 85 years old by now.'
But Europe does things differently, so, to an extent does Britain. How would such a story have been kept under wraps. Dont guees - find an answer.
'Monty didn't open any of the Channel ports heading northwest, and, was almost canned for running his mouth! ' He opened up Dieppe, Le Havre and Boulogne.
'His aide Freddie de Guingand saved Monty from being sent home in disgrace.'
Hardly in disgrace - he would have got a hero's welcome for telling the US.
''Monty apologized to Eisenhower and after that Monty was given the job of guarding Bradley's flank and securing the Danish border to keep the Russians out!'
While the USA helped itself to everything in the Ruhr that was not nailed down.
'While Monty was preparing another set piece battle to jump the Rhine, Bradley, with Courtney and Patton, beat Monty over the river! '
Read this:
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower.
MUST DO BETTER...
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@mgt2010fla
'Lie! Lie! Lie! Patton went to Brittany then east and north and still beat Monty, the Ground Commander, to close the Gap! Monty went due north and Patton went across north and east in France to the German border! You are a fuking liar! Read Max Hastings, the Cambridge Don, and he tells the truth! Ambrose, Atkinson, et al all back it up! '
Your words.
This is what the US General Bradley had to say on the 'Gap':
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
'"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise"'.
His words.
Where did Hastings, Ambrose and Atkinson serve in the Second World War?..
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Walter Model was in Oosterbeek when MARKET GARDEN started . Just as anyone would, he cleared off straightaway. In his case, to Castle Wisch in Terborg 20 miles from Arnhem Bridge, safely in German held territory. There, he was able to direct the German battle without distractions. After all, the Americans were not giving the Germans any real problems in other parts of the front.
During Market Garden, Montgomery was at Hechtel, between nine and ten miles from the the front line at the start of the battle. By the end of the battle Montgomery was at Eindhoven, as evidenced by General Urquhart. Montgomery's counterpart in the FAAA, Brereton was in Britain. The allied land forces commander, Eisenhower, wat at Ranville, in Normandy, France.
What do people expect? That Montgomery drive up to Nijmegen in the lead tank?
Bradley was not in the front at Aachen or Metz.
Of course, unlike Bradley and Eisenhower, Montgomery had personal combat experience. He fought in the First World War, being wounded twice, and being awarded the DSO.
As for Montgomery's personal courage...
'Monty's own fearlessness was legendary. Standing on the beaches of Dunkirk he had berated his ADC for not wearing a helmet after a shell had landed almost beside them. 'But sir, nor are you,' the helpless young officer had complained. Landing in Sicily, Monty had toured the bridge-head in a DUKW with Lord Louis Mountbatten, C-in-C Combined Operations. When a German aircraft screamed very low over their heads Mountbatten had wisely thrown himself to the floor of the vehicle. 'Get up, get up,' Monty had chided him impatiently. Though he was conscious and careful of his health, with a near-fetish for pullovers worn one on top of the other, he seemed to feel no fear of enemy sniper, artillery or aircraft fire. Indeed so oblivious did he seem to the danger of snipers in Normandy that the War Office had sent a special cable pleading with him to wear less conspicuous 'uniform', lest like Nelson he fall needless victim to an enemy sharp-shooter—a cable that amused Monty since it so patently ignored the dictates of great leadership in battle, that a commander must be seen by his men and recognized.'
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
2
-
2
-
2
-
Wall to rubbish.
The only political pressure on Eisenhower came from the US :
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P520
The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 261
‘Under relentless pressure on Eisenhower from George Marshall and others in Washington to get those airborne divisions into the fight, the plan had been slapped together in less than a week. The First Allied Airborne Army, also created at War Department insistence, and the corps headquarters that preceded it had drafted and discarded eighteen operational plans in the past forty days.’
Montgomery wanted to keep the war moving , preferably in the North, where the Ruhr is. Failing that, Montgomery offered to halt 21st Army Group and allow Bradley to advance further south provided that a decision to move forward somewhere was made. Hardly and act of self interest, was it?
Your comparison with Galipoli is absurd.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
1
-
@nickdanger3802
Total rubbish.
Read and learn:
CHESTER WILLMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P393
Montgomery's memorandum to O'Connor of the 15th July 1944 stated:
‘On July 15th, when he saw the Second Army Instruction, Montgomery gave O'Connor a personal memorandum which made his intention clear beyond dispute. This note began:
1. Object of this operation.
To engage the German armour in battle and * write it down 1 to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle. To gain a good bridgehead over the Orne
through Caen and thus to improve our positions on the eastern flank. Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel.
2. Effect of this operation on the Allied policy.
We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas. A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank. But the eastern flank is a bastion on which
the whole future of the campaign in North-West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it were to become unstable, the operations on the western flank would cease.
Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base.’
P404
‘Accordingly, on the eve of Cobra, the German armour in Normandy
was deployed as follows:
On the Second Army front: Seven Panzer Divisions (of which five and
a half were east of the Orne) and four heavy tank battalions.
On the First Army front: Two Panzer Divisions, one Panzer Grenadier Division, 1 and no battalions of heavy tanks.’
Chester Willmot landed in France on D-Day and reported from the front through to VE Day.
He personally interviewed key people in the events of that time.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON. 1947
P 406
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
The battle of Normandy, with Montgomery as allied land forces commander, ended ahead of the scheduled completion date (D+90) with 22% fewer than expected casualties.
Read what the people who were actually there have to say about these events.
All these people like Beevor, Hastings, the turd Ambrose, none of them were there. All they do is dig out the odd new statistic, re-print previously published quotes and pronounce judgement on events decades after they happened. All with aim of making a few bob.
As far as I am concerned, they can all fuck off.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
How did the whole plan collapse? The allies advanced 50 miles, stretching the German resources still further, hindered German attempts to launch V Weapons at Belgium and Britain and freed a fifth of the population of the Netherlands.
The allied operations that began that autumn, none of which were any more successful than Market
Garden, cost the allies 20,000 casualties at Aachen, 45,000 casualties at Metz and 55,000 casualties at the Hurtgen Forest. Market Garden cost the allies 15,000 casualties.
Further, the intelligence was seen by all allied leaders and included inconclusive aerial photography and Ultra decrypts and reports from the Netherlands, which were being routinely ignored since before Market Garden, due to the German 'Englandspiel' penetration of the the Dutch Underground.
It ain't like they tell it in Hollywood.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
John Cornell
The Netherlands had population of about 8.8 million at that time. It seems that about 4.5 million were affected by the hunger winter, of which I believe that the figure for deaths due to malnutrition was 22,000.
Market Garden must have liberated somewhere in the region of 500,000 people in Asten, Eindhoven, Elst, Grave, Nijmegen, Uden, Valkenswaard and Veghel. This is apart from the many other places in North Brabant and Gelderland that were freed
Further, there seems to be no evidence anywhere that there would have an attempt to liberate the remainder of the Netherlands in 1944 if Market Garden had not gone ahead. Therefore to blame Market Garden for the Dutch hunger winter is a nonsense.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
John Cornell
'It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction.' Big Woody.
What utter rubbish - a 16 year old has read a comic book about the war.
Bradley crossed the Rhine on a fluke in the same month that Montgomery did. And, Montgomery had to cancel Operation Veritable - scheduled for the beginning of January in order for him to sort out the American mess in the Bulge.
'Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - Corelli Barnett'
Corelli Barnett. Second World War experience: with the British Army in Palestine 1945-48.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@rzafft
CHESTER WILLMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 589
‘When Eisenhower placed the Airborne Army at Montgomery’s disposal on September 4th, he was committing his strategic reserve, the only major force he could throw in to clinch the victory that had been won in France. But he did not make available to Montgomery the supply resources necessary to ensure that the maximum advantage was drawn from the commitment of this precious reserve. Montgomery, it will be recalled, reached the Meuse-Escaut Canal, the start-line for Market
Garden, on September 10th without any logistic help from Bradley or Eisenhower, apart from some five hundred tons a day which had been delivered by air during the previous week.'
'It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September16th.'
1
-
1
-
@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears.'
Unless Para Dave can supply a source for these words, they must be deemed to be his words, and therefore worthless.
1
-
1
-
@dmbeaster
'This is from the Market Garden chapter and describes his effort to get his plan approved. Eisenhower initially said "no" resulting in Montgomery's personal lobbying effort on September 10, which worked in a way. Eisenhower describes it the same way, and his response that the idea of getting to Berlin was nuts. Eisenhower approved it because he thought that it could get to the Ruhr, and end the war early. It was Eisenhower, and not Montgomery, who saw the plan as practical for a more limited objective.'
Your words
Tedder attended he meeting on the 10th September. Teder never hid his opinion of Montgomery, and yet his account backs Montgomery, as do the contemporary documents. This stuff about monty you're nuts or whatever it was joined the account many years later via Cornelius Ryan, or the plagiarist Stephen Ambrose, or whoever.
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He made a muck of planning the invasion of Italy, he seemed to be incapable of undrstanding the Normandy campaign, and when he had appointed himself as land forces commander he brought the entire allied campaign to a halt.
1
-
@dmbeaster
'Montgomery's memoir is absolutely clear that he proposed Market Garden as a path to Berlin.
"I decided to make one more approach to Eisenhower, in my efforts to get a sound plan adopted. I sent him the following message on the 4th September, the day we captured Antwerp and Louvain:
'I would like to put before you certain aspects of future operations and give you my views.
1. I consider we have now reached a stage where one really powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin is likely to get there and thus end the German war.' "
Not really...
The 4th September signal was re-stating what Montgomery had already proposed on the 23rd August. That allied resources should be concentrated for one thrust into Germany. A thrust that would have involved up to 20 divisions. MARKET GARDEN was not even proposed until the 10th September, and was was on a much reduced scale than previous proposals, leaving MARKET GARDEN as no bigger undertaking than a numbr of allied operations at that time.
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1946
P 214
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter. ”’
Regarding MARKET GARDEN's objectives, I have already noted what one of Montgomery's harshest critics, Tedder, stated on the subject. This from Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
N.B. VCIGS is Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff - to save you looking it up.
There can little doubt that if Annhem had been taken then the GARDEN forces would have struck North, to the IJsselmeer in order to stop the flow of V2 rocket equipment and supplies into the Western provinces of the Netherlands, before ground forces were turned Eastwards towards Germany.
1
-
@dmbeaster
"And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part—I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong." ("while" is emphasized in original - the comment font will not let me italicized it)
In other words, Market Garden was a mistake because it resulted in an inadequate force to secure Antwerp - the Canadian force was not enough. He could not do both at the same time, which was a mistake. Your interpretation is wrong. Your words.
Its a definate no.
Montgomery had already decided to leave the 1st Canadian Army to take the approaches to Antwerp as far back as late August 1944, when Eisenhower turned down Montgomery's proposals either to stop Canadian 1st Army and US 3rd Army so that British 2nd Army and US 1st Army could advance together into Germany, or to stop Canadian 1st Army, and British 2nd Army, while the US 1st Army, and the US 3rd Army advanced into Germany. MARKET GARDEN had no influence on a previous decision regarding the tasks facing the 1st Canadian Army.
From Montgomery's memoirs:
'In my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed
from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and adminstrative resources necessary for the job it would have succeeded
in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of
the 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET GARDEN S unrepentant advocate.' His words.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Bil Slocum
What sort of idiot would post this:
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success' Probably a teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
Field Marshall Model was there because his headquarters was in Oosterbeek. He soon fucked off when the fighting started, As I would have done. Student was there to command his forces. Army Group Commander Montgomery was at Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was England.
V2 attacks on Britain were hindered by the increasing pressure that the allies were able to put on German communications after Market Garden.
As Antwerp was never a Market Garden objective, and as Eisenhower approved the deferment of the campaign to clear the Scheldt to allow Market Garden to go ahead, any attempt to put the inability to use Antwerp as the fault of Market Garden is absurd.
The 17,000 losses were not entirely made up of Paratroops, and those losses compare with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
The Dutch Honger Winter was not caused by Market Garden. It was caused by the Germans, and the German treatment of the Dutch at that time was entirely consistent with German treat of other occupied areas at that time. Market Garden displaced no plan to liberate the bulk of the Netherlands at that time. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than died in that winter.
Deportation of Dutchmen to Germany as forced labour started long before Market Garden.
Market Garden was not designed to take the allies to Berlin, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics has confirmed:
'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.'
Arthur Tedder, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue.
None of the allies would cross the Rhine for another six months. US 9th Army was assigned to 21st Army Group because they were where the Germans were providing the stiffest opposition.
The SS Man Prince Bernhard was distrusted by both British and US intelligence, both of whom, rightly showed him the door. Only his Royal status kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@kenmazoch8499
‘actually, it is well documented that monty tried during the entire campaign to be named land force commander.’
Not really…
Montgomery tried repeatedly to get a land forces commander appointed for the period after his appointment in that role ended on 31st August 1944. When he met Eisenhower on the 23rd August, he stated that as the allies had logistics only for half of its forces to advance then the right course of action was to halt Canadian 1st Army, and US 3rd Army, and advance in the north with British 2nd Army, and US 1st Army together to take the Ruhr. Failing that, Montgomery would stop his armies, leaving Bradley to advance with the two US armies in the South, provided that a decision was made to make proper use of the available resources. Thereafter, when he raised the matter of an land forces commander, he stated that he would accept Bradley as land forces commander, provided that land forces commander appointment was made. Hardly the attitude of someone hoping to be ‘the hero who won the war, and everything else be damned’, was it?..
‘some circumstantial evidence that the germans intercepted the broadcast and made it worse. Montgomery Ardennes press conference’. Your words.
It’s a bit more than circumstantial evidence…this from one of Montgomery’s harshest critics:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 636– 637
‘When de Guingand saw the British reporters in Brussels on 9 January, they were able to prove to him that their articles had given a balanced view of the picture, but that their editors had been responsible for the flaming headlines which told the British public that Montgomery had defeated the Germans in the salient. It was also learned that the radio station at Arnhem, then in German hands, had intercepted some of the despatches and had re-written them with an anti-American slant. They had been put out and mistaken for BBC broadcasts.’
And this from a reporter at the press conference:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P683
My dispatch to the B.B.C. was picked up in Germany, rewritten to give it an anti-American bias and then broadcast by Arnhem Radio, which was then in Goebbels's hands. Monitored at Bradley's H.Q., this broadcast was mistaken for a B.B.C. transmission and it was this twisted text that started the uproar.
15th September 1944.
Where is the evidence that Bedell Smith warned Montgomery about German strength in the Arnhem area, and advised Montgomery to increase the forces for the Arnhem landings?
Major-General Strong in ‘Intelligence at the Top’(1969) mentions a meeting between Bedell-Smith and Montgomery but states that he (Strong) was not present and he does not mention a date for that meeting. Chester Wilmot, who was advised by Strong and Bedell-Smith for his work, ‘The Struggle for Europe’ does not mention such a meeting, Nor did Nigel Hamilton, a critic of MARKET GARDEN, mention such a meeting in the third volume of his three part biography of Montgomery. Antony Beevor, who sells books by criticizing Montgomery does mention the meeting. Sebastian Richie, in ‘Arnhem: Myth and Reality’, so often quoted by people, and also by Big Woody, merely notes that Montgomery saw the airborne (MARKET) for first time on 15th September.
Horrocks stated that at the capture of Antwerp, his forces had 100 kilometres of fuel to hand, and another 100 kilometres of fuel about 24 hours behind. That amounts to about 120 miles of travel for XXX Corps. He also stated that he could have ‘bounced’ the Rhine, cut off all the Germans in the Netherlands, and ‘got round behind the Ruhr’. 120 miles of fuel might have got XXX Corps to the Ijsselmeer to cut off German forces in the Netherlands, it would not have got ‘round behind the Ruhr’.
1
-
@kenmazoch8499
‘the real reason was monty wanted to take over the ground campaign and be the hero who won the war, and everything else be damned.’ Your words.
Where is there a shred of evidence to back up this claim. By evidence, I mean documents, testimony of words spoken by Montgomery. An opinion is not evidence.
There is, however, reliable evidence of one matter that did influence decision making in regard to Market Garden:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
‘during the afternoon [9th] a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.¹
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites.’
‘monty thought this would be a backdoor operation, by-passing the main german forces. he also took advantage of the pressure ike was under from the chiefs of staff to use the 1st allied airborne army in a major op ( and alanbrooke would have kept monty informed of) monty, at that time, did not care about antwerp.’ Your words. This is just opinion.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 261
‘Even Montgomery seemed exasperated by the frantic cycle of concocting and scuttling plans to sprinkle paratroopers across the continent. “Are you asking me to drop cowpats all over Europe” the field marshal had reportedly asked his subordinates.’
‘in fact, the german 15th army crossed the scheldt and was a major factor in the defeat of the op. monty was just trying shift the blame to others, as always.’ Your words.
Again: XXX Corps were at Grave in the early morning of the third day, in enough strength, and with enough time to reach Arnhem Bridge. The German 15th Army was unable to stop this.
‘both dempsey (co 2nd army) and smith (ike's chief of staff) tried to get monty to change the plan.’ Your words.
Dempsey argued for the operation to be confined to the area north to Nijmegen, rather than including Arnhem. There is no reliable evidence that Smith tried to get Montgomery to change the MARKET GARDEN plan. On the contrary, there is evidence that Smith promised more resources to Montgomery for MARKET GARDEN, when the two met on the 12th September, 1944:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P547
‘On the 12th Bedell Smith flew to Montgomery's H.Q,. and, with Eisenhower's authority, promised to deliver 1,000 tons a day to Brussels by road or air.’
‘cutting off the 15th army never entered into the picture, monty ignored ike about antwerp. monty was counting on a bridgehead over the rhine, ike would not be able to stop him.’ Your words.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
1
-
1
-
1
-
@johnlucas8479
Not really...
"Three American divisions were to be grounded and their transport used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group."
But of course those divisions were not grounded.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
‘Additional resources were not provided for Montgomery, or for Hodges, because Eisenhower still thought in terms of advancing to the Rhine on a broad front with a succession of thrusts, of which Montgomery’s was merely to be the first.’
The additional 500 tons of supplies ferried to 21st Army Group in the week before Market Garden were previously use to supply the civillian population of Paris, not 12th Army Group.
In the same period:
Dieppe was operational by 5th September delivering 3,000 tons per day, increasing to 6,000 to by the end of the Month.
Le Havre, exclusively for American use, was providing 3,200 of supplies from the 13th October.
Ostend was liberated on 9th September, Calais was liberated on 30th September.
Back to CHESTER WILMOT:
'The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later.'
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
Tim 0neill
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P536
‘On the evening of September 4th, as soon as he learned of the capture of Antwerp, Montgomery sent a signal to Eisenhower suggesting that the time had come to make “one-powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”
P537
‘On September 4th, before receiving this proposal, Eisenhower issued a fresh directive, ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes (21st Army Group and two corps of First U.S. Army) “to secure Antwerp, reach the sector of the Rhine covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.”’
‘The state of Eisenhower's communications was such that his ' Most Immediate ' signal, sent from Granville on the evening of September 5th in reply to Montgomery's proposal about Berlin, did not reach the Field-Marshal's H.Q,. near Brussels until after breakfast on the 7th. Even then the signal was not complete and the missing paragraphs did not arrive for another two days!'
[9th September].
P543
the first V.2s, which had landed on London on the 8th, were launched
from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office inquired [of Montgomery] whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany.'
line
Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels Airport on the 10th September. Eisenhower noted the outcome of that meeting:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
Chester Wilmot was a BBC reporter and author who reported on from the front line from D-Day to VE Day. He had direct experience of the events that he wrote about, and he was in position to be able to interview many of the major participents in those event during the early post war years.
Dwight D Eisenhower was allied supreme commander for the campaign in Europe, and had appointed himself allied land forces commander on the 1st September 1944.
Big Woody (aka Para Dave) is a youngster from Cleveland, Ohio, USA, who has a thing about Britain, and Montgomery in particular. Tragic.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@renard801
From Para Dave / Para Dave:
‘Slappy so which one of theses guys who all state the same thing is wrong.Brooke,Tedder,Ramsay?Unlike you they were there’
‘Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem’
How does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. After five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed
Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the
Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
Anyone care to state if this, Neil Barr and Rick Atkinson where there?
1
-
1
-
1
-
@11nytram11
'Sitting on your ass usually will do that,1,500 miles he never caught rommel with every advantage - BIG advantages as he faffed and made up stories'
Big Woody/Para Dave.
Montgomery. 8th Army, Alamein to El Agheila, 850 miles in 20 days, on one major road, across the desert. The first port of any size, Tobruk was 450 miles from Alamein, the Martuba airfields, another 100 miles further on. The only way that Rommel got clear was to take all of the Italian transport, and to personally fly to Germany to beg Hitler to allow an evacuation by sea.
Compare this with the American, nancy boy efforts in the wake of Torch, Bradley's subordinate, Patton, and his punching his way through nothing, after others had done the heavy fighting in Normandy, and so on.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
@tomsexton3625
'YOUR DESCRIPTION SLAPPED TOGETHER IN ABOUT A WEEK CERTAINLY DESCRIBES THE PLANNING'
Its the description by one Rick Atkinson, not me.
But surely the idea was to try to get Germany defeated asap in order to keep the Russians as far east as possible. To that end, Market Garden was a modest undertaking, a sixty mile dash with one armoured corps and three airborne divisions. Even the inclusion of Arnhem in Market Garden was only down to the need to try to curb V2 attacks on London.
As for Patton. He as not senior enough to be part of the big decisions, those decisons were down to Bradley, Devers, Eisenhower and Montgomery. When Patton stopped at the end of August 1944, he was a hundred miles from the Rhine, let alone Berlin.
Eisenhower's broad front policy set the stage for the Bulge, Montgomery warned him about giving the Germans time and space, and the vulnerabilty of Eisenhower's spread of forces to a German counter attack. One of Bradley's subordinate commanders, Patton later warned about the danger of a German attack in the Ardennes.
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1
-
1