Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "Gavin wasn't to blame? 'New' evidence on Operation Market Garden's failure?" video.
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'Any overal field commander of Market Garden should be on top of the main points. Proven by the Germans in 1940 using seaplanes in Rotterdam. And by the capture of the Orne bridges at D Day.'
Apart from Eisenhower, in his role as Supreme Commander, and as allied land forces commander, there was no overal field commander of Market Garden until Brereton's MARKET forces linked up with Dempsey's GARDEN forces, at which point, Dempsey would be he overall field commander. By then, the type of things you have mentioned, would have been decided by the FAAA. Montgomery had no final say in FAAA planning for MARKET.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
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@gerhardris
OK. Its your funeral.
'placing Market Garden in all aspects under one agressive overall commander of US forces. Preferably Patton with a few of his staff.'
Why? What had Patton ever done?
'And to make clear that anything needed such as flighingboats or whatever that was difficult to get could go through him. Direct line to Eisenhower and Churchill would work wonders.'
Err... Montgomery had a direct line to Eisenhower, albeit, Eisenhower was in Granville in Normandy. Before, and during MARKET GARDEN, Churchill was travelling to, attending, and coming home from the OCTAGON conference at Quebec, in Canada. In any case, why would Churchill have involved himself in such a limited matter as MARKET GARDEN?
'Yet, granted logistics permitting to have both the Schelde as priority and MG as a nice to have. Then Monty's plan of MG would with the benefit of hindsight probably have worked. As would the subsequent thrusts into Germany the broad front being in supply after Antwerp was open.'
Rubbish.
Opinion has it that even if the allies could have turned the entire 21st Army Group towards the Scheldt, opening up the estuary would have taken a month. You name the date, say 4th September, 1944? Then, as Admiral Ramsay had warned, there would be a three week campaign to clear the estuary of mines. That takes until almost the end of October. Thus, MARKET GARDEN, that was devised to take advantage of German weakness in the wake of the German defeats in Normandy and Belarus would have been overtaken by events.
'The newly formed FAAA (first allied airborne army under Brereton) was placed under command of the 21st Army Group thus under Monty.'
But as the evidence shows, command of the FAAA by 21st Army Group did not extend to 21st Army being able to control any detail of Brereton's plan. It did lead to Brereton agreeing to FAAA units taking part in INFATUATE.
The USAAF man, Brereton would not even yield to his own airborne forces commanders in regard to the air plan for MARKET:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
'have Bradley in charge of Pattons former command. All on the defensive.'
Then you would be back to something like Montgomery's proposals to Eisenhower on the 23rd August, based on the then current supply situation: that First Canadian Army, and US Third Army be stopped to allow British Second Army, and US First Army to advance in the North. OR, that First Canadian Army, and British Second Army be stopped to allow US First Army, and US Third Army to advance in the South. Eisenhower did neither, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt, giving the Germans what they most needed, time and space to rebuild their forces in the West.
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@imperialcommander639
'Anyone visiting the battlefield will be struck by the strategic value of the Groesbeek Heights, which form some of the highest ground in the Netherlands.' Your words.
Get real. Groosbeek is 112 ft above sea level.
I have been to the highest point in the Netherlands, Drielandenpunt, at the Town of Vaals in Limburg. Its 700 feet above sea level. Even Deelen, North of Arnhem is 282 feet above sea level.
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS. 1994.
Preface
P xiii
‘However, by far the worst mistake was the lack of priority given to the capture of Nijmegen Bridge. The whole essence of the plan was to lay an airborne carpet across the obstacles in southern Holland so that the Army could get motor through, yet the capture of this, perhaps the biggest and most vital bridge in that its destruction would have sounded the death-knell of the troops committed at Arnhem, was not accorded priority. The capture of this bridge would have been a walk-over on D-day, yet the American 82nd Airborne Division could spare only one battalion as they must at all costs secure a feature called the Groesbeek Heights, where, incidentally, the H.Q. of Airborne Corps was to be sited. It was thought that the retention of this feature would prevent the debouchment of German armour from the Reichwald in Germany. This armour was there courtesy of a rumour only and its presence was not confirmed by the underground. In fact, as a feature it is by no means dominating and its retention or otherwise had absolutely no bearing on what happened at Nijmegen Bridge.'
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@johnlucas8479
Comparisons of casualties for MARKET GARDEN, AACHEN, METZ, and the HURTGEN FOREST are noted by me as a response to a multitude of comments (99% American) about 17,000 killed in MARKET GARDEN, which I then correct to 17,000 killed, wounded, and missing. Those American posts normally go on to state that Montgomery should have been in front of a court martial, or in the case of Para Dave, that he should have shot himself.
Responsibility (not blame) for MARKET GARDEN, must surely start with Eisenhower, who, as you know, was both supreme commander and allied land forces commander by the time that MARKET GARDEN was proposed. If Eisenhower does take any responsibility for MARKET GARDEN then he is off the list for NORMANDY, the RHINE and so on. Which one do want? Brereton would seem to have been able to veto proposals by Montgomery for the deployment of airborne troops (as evidenced by his veto of use of airborne forces on WALCHEREN),and was clearly involved in the planning for MARKET. And yet, in American histories, films, moronic American comments on YouTube, Brereton, the head of the FAAA hardly ever gets a mention. No doubt there is a Brereton memorial library, or something similar, in some US state. As the person who proposed MARKET GARDEN to Eisenhower, and as the commander in the area where the operation took place, Montgomery takes his share of responsibility for MARKET GARDEN, something he always accepted. As to this stuff about Browning and Gavin at Nijmegen, for me you would have to have been there, and I was not there, and nor were you.
As someone who was not there, and who has zero military experience, I am in no position to pass judgement, leading to blame, on MARKET GARDEN, and similar events. As far as I see, the decision to undertake MARKET GARDEN was a reasonable one, given the circumstances of those times, which included the perception (which was backed up by solid evidence) - that the Germans were not strong enough to withstand the operation, the need to counter the V2 rocket attacks on Britain, the need, on Britain’s part to keep the war moving, and the desire by allied leaders to see the FAAA in action.
As to the new insights you mentioned, Churchill’s words were in print in the early 1950s, Eisenhower’s before then, Gavin’s words were in print by the late 1970s. Even Martin Middlebrook (who was not around at the time of ARNHEM), and the quote from Staff Sergeant Joe Kitchener, were published 38 years ago.
There is more…
ARNHEM
BY MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
Page 204
‘In my official report of the battle in January 1945 I wound up by saying the operation was not one hundred per cent successful and did not end quite as we intended.
The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.
We have no regrets.’
I hold the same view today, when the survivors are scattered all over the world, some of them still in the Army; when Arnhem is a busy and architecturally attractive post-war city with most of its scars healed. A new bridge spans the Neder Rhine. Sometimes a Dutchman finds a mortar splinter in his garden, and people on their Sunday walks come across spent British ammunition in the pine woods and the polder-land by the river.’ His words.
Here is an opinion from someone who was there :
MONTGOMERY
Alan Moorehead
First published in the United Kingdom by Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1946
This White Lion Edition 1973
Xll Great Argument
P 214
‘With the aid of three airborne divisions at Grave, Nijmegen and Arnhem. The battle began on September 17th and reached a stalemate eight days later with the honours standing fairly even: we took two bridges and failed at the third—Arnhem. Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’ His words.
A high proportion of the comments on YouTube items about MARKET GARDEN / ARNHEM, are posted by Americans. As are comments on YouTube items about Montgomery – usually linked to MARKET GARDEN, CAEN and so on.
Why is this so? For the USA, there was no Dunkirk, Battle of Britain, Blitz, Moscow, Leningrad, or Stalingrad. They have production figures for lorries, loans, reverential works about their war leaders.
Perhaps many of these Americans who post comments on YouTube see the likes of MARKET GARDEN, or Russian excesses in occupied GERMANY, and so on, as somehow evening up the score, like their people made a difference or a unique contribution on a one to one basis. Perhaps many of these Americans who post comments on YouTube are just thick. Who can say?
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@valerieclark4580
Fault? where did it start? Where did it end? What judgements are being made about people's actions at that time?
Eisenhower: with no combat experience, and little command experience, he failed to make best use of the opportunity that was presented to the allies at the beginning of September 1944, by failing to adopt a forward strategy made best use of the available resources, that led to a series of under resourced operations, of which MARKET GARDEN was but one?
Brereton: with no experience of airborne operations, he created the MARKET airborne plan which failed to meet key airborne forces requirements in order to protect the airforces involved in the undertaking? He then went onto to write his wartime diary after the war?
Browning and Gavin: Between them, decided not to capture Nijmegen bridge on the first day, as discussed here. What fault lies there?..
The US soldier that took a complete set of the MARKET GARDEN plan in a US glider to the combat zone, only to be killed when the glider crashed in a US combat zone: How much fault lies with him?
For me, any opinion about how people acted at that time can only be set against the circumtances that those people were in at that time. I have not been in a war, nor have I attempted to plan and execute an airborne operation. This makes me a bit averse to attributing fault. How about you?
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'monty after demanding market garden failed to show up and direct - getting his picture painted' Big Woody (aka Para Dave)
'By a curious coincidence, both Montgomery and Bradley, the two Allied army group commanders of the Normandy campaign, happened to be sitting that day [01.09.1944] for portraits at their respective headquarters. Bradley near Chartres was being painted by Cathleen Mann, who was married to the Marquess of Queensberry. Meanwhile Montgomery, wearing his trademark outfit of grey polo neck sweater, corduroy trousers and black, double-badged beret, was sitting for the Scottish portraitist James Gunn. His tactical headquarters and caravan were in the park of the Château de Dangu, halfway between Rouen and Paris.'
Source: Antony Beevor.
'and before you pop off i'll pst the link' Para Dave
Any idea what link that would be?... The American schoolboy's book of history? How the USA won the war, the Hollywood way?
'Monty even admitted it was a mistake - after the war of course' Para Dave
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY
1958
Published by The World Publishing Company
2231 West 110th Street, Cleveland 2, Ohio
P 267
'I remain MARKET GARDEN S unrepentant advocate.'
Para Dave is from Cleveland, Ohio, USA. Perhaps he should nip down there and get himself a copy - if they have not sold out.
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@johnlucas8479
Yep, Para Dave uses the name Big Woody as well. Whichever name he uses, its the same stuff: Everything that goes wrong is Montgomery's fault', Carrington (who Para Dave calls Scarrington), was a coward, XXX Corps were cowards, my uncle was a coward, and so on and so on. He gives utter credence to post war writers like Antony Beevor, Max Hastings, some bloke called William Weidner, a Dr Barr, and so on, and so on, rolling out their academic credentials, as if they give some these people some sort of insight into the thoughts of Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, and so on. According to Para Dave, this William Weidner has stated that Carentan was a British objective in the Normandy campaign. That is a new one on me.
What do these writers bring to bring to the subject?..Every time they quote decision makers, thy are referring those people's own works, or to interviews with Chester Wilmot, Liddell Hart, etc. Nearly all of the useful statistics they trot out have long since been in the public domain, usually since about five years after the war ended. Even the Ultra Secret has ben in the public domain for not far short of 50 years.
There is another guy, one Rick Atkinson. I have exchanged emails with him, he seems to be a nice person. But what is new in his works?...The number of paper clips used by SHAEF in 1944? The VD rates for troops in liberated Luxembourg?
Evey time a book about MARKET GARDEN is published by these people, its always the definitive account, the final word, or whatever.
I have the Antony Beevor definitive account of MARKET GARDEN, or whatever it is supposed to be, here. What is its big claim? That people in the occupied part of the Netherlands endured privations in the Winter of 1944-45 and through to VE-Day. Yep, a big secret - that only came out as recently as 1945. What a waste, of his time writing this, what a waste of my time to read it, what a waste of the trees used for the paper to print it on. Still, its not all bad...it makes a good door stop.
Lyndon CMP states a lot of things that I agree with. You now state things that I agree with.
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@davemac1197
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody)
'"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.'
This is what Alnbrooke wrote in his diary for the 5th October, 1944, in the edition that I have:
'October 5th. A conference by Ike at 11.30 of his Army Group commanders. Ike ran the conference very well. It consisted first of all of statements by Army Group commanders, followed by the Air and Navy. Ike then explained his future strategy which consisted of the capture of Antwerp, an advance to the Rhine in the north and south, forcing the Rhine north and south of the Ruhr, capture of Ruhr, followed by an advance on Berlin either from Ruhr or from Frankfurt, depending on which proved most promising. Meanwhile Devers in the south to threaten Munich as a cover plan. During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that (access to) Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay."
" I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely. Ike nobly took all blame on
as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem.¹ The atmosphere was good and friendly in spite of some candid criticisms of the administrative situation."
" After lunch I flew back, doing the journey Paris-London in one hour and ten minutes. Found Gammell in the office and had a long interview with him to discuss plans for Istrian operations."
" After dinner called up by P.M. to go round to him. All he wanted was to discuss with me my visit to Eisenhower and to hear the gossip. I found Portal there fixing up final details for the trip to Moscow which are now settled." '
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
Pags 291-292
I shall 'examine' the rest of Para Dave's 'stuff' in due course...
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@johnlucas8479
‘I have read all the source you quote from. here an other quote for your records
"The plan agreed between Dempsey and Browning for MARKET was for the American 101st Airborne Division to be dropped to secure the bridges north of Eindhoven;"
Rostron, Peter. The Military Life & Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey GBE KCB DSO MC: Monty's Army Commander (p. 190).’ Your words.
So what does this add to the understanding of decisions regarding airborne landing at Zon Bridge?
Also, is there a contemporary source to support what the author stated here? Further what are the credentials of Peter Rostron? I would doubt that he would have been there at that time. From his photograph, he looks to be a lot younger than me. Who can say?
‘As to your comment relating to Brereton and the 2 lifts, you know my position and the sources I used to support my position, especially the reference to the weather. Both the source you mention in your comments makes no reference to the weather conditions on the day or the fact that Williams was responsible for both Operation Dragoon and Operation Market Garden as well as D-Day and Operation Husky. He was the most experience airman with regards to airborne operation. Ask you self this question: "If Williams plan for 2 lifts on D-Day for Operation Dragoon, why did he only plan for a single lift for Market Garden? Clearly, he had a very good reasons behind his decision. One factor was the weather, morning fog as reported by 21st Army Group.’ Your words.
Not really… What I consider to be reliable sources, have stated the opinion that the lack of two air-lifts on the first day of MARKET GARDEN was a contributory factor in the Arnhem not being taken, and that Brereton was ultimately responsible the lack of two lifts on that first day. For me, it is a reasonable assumption, that any such opinion would not have been stated if two lifts were not doable.
‘You blame the American for running down the British War effort, yet you are quick happy to rundown the US effort at every chance possible. Are you any different?’ Your words.
I note what I consider to be pertinent facts and reliable testimony. If people consider that as running down the US war effort, so be it. Whatever, there are so few of us trying to fight back against a tsunami of American chauvinistic books, films, TV programmes, press articles, lectures, social media items, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on. It all seems to have he same message - We are America, we are better than you.
‘You known my position regarding Market Garden, which is "The Operation was high risk, but the potential benefit if successful was worth the risk of Failure." In hindsight should the operation have been cancelled due to the issues with the air plan, you can argue both ways.’ Your words.
I have previously agreed with the opinion that in the circumstances at the time, MARKET GARDEN was a worthwhile undertaking.
‘You quote Brereton refusal to permit an airborne drop on Walcheren Island. If you thing about it, It a relative small island and heavy fortified, we don't know what support was to be provided to the air drop. Would it be another Arnhem with the airborne force effectively destroyed before relief arrived. Who knows. All you need to read the accounts covering the attack on Walcheren Island to realise dropping Airborne troops on the island was not a good idea.’ Your words.
Opinions after the event are two a penny. What accounts from people that were there apart from Brereton, make clear that ‘dropping Airborne troops on the island was not a good idea?’
My father took part in the assault on Walcheren, an event he considered to be more scary than his landing on D-Day. We never discussed this particular point, but I can only think that he would have considered the help to the amphibious landings from an airborne landing could have been very helpful.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
Its Americans that want it both ways. Heaping the failure at Arnhem on Montgomery and the British. E.G. The thicko comment from Eodyn7. And then denying the British, the credit for sorting out the Northern half of the Bulge, Normandy, Sicily, North Africa, and so on.
About 90% of the comments on here are attempts by Americans to denigrate the British war effort - and you are one of the most prolific in regard to comments.
The USA was only in the fighting against Hitler from 1943, by which time Hitler could not possibly win the war, thanks to the efforts of Britain and Russia. The USA was 3,500 miles from the nearest threat to its homeland and civilian population. And yet American come on to YouTube and have the bare faced cheek to try to tell Britons all about what they think that Britain did wrong in the war.
I do not know this TIK is, or what his credentials are, but his presentations are necessary.
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@johnlucas8479
This is what Student said about the bridges in 101st Area
In Christer Bergstrom “Arnhem 1944 Vol 1 Page 135” we find the following, while it applied to the bridges at Veghel, we can assume the second part would also apply to the Son Bridge.
“The fact that all these bridges had fallen into the enemy hands undamaged came as a shock to the German Paratroop General Student. “According to the plans for a further German withdrawal,” he recounted “all bridges had been prepared for demolition and were guarded by strong detachments and special demolition commandoes. Each bridge had a responsible bridge commandant who had orders to blow up the bridge in case of immediate danger.”
Does this Christer Bergstrom note a source for the General Student comment?
‘So there a strong possibility that even if 101st land south of the bridge the Germans would still have been able to blow up the Son Bridge. We would never know.’ Your words.
I agree, but the point in question here is who had the final say.
Also, Montgomery had the opportunity, to insist that his plan for 101st be carried out.
Operation Market Garden page 24
‘"General Taylor protested against such extreme dispersion of his division and was strongly supported by Brereton. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery, who agreed after a rather sharp exchange of views to let the matter be settled between Taylor and Dempsey. They meet at Montgomery HQ on the 12th, Dempsey was confident that his Army could slice through unaided to Eindhoven, they readily reach a solution. "
Clearly, Montgomery had the opportunity to no to Brereton.
Clear? How so?
Brereton’s ‘Diary’ shows him to have been in Ascot (Sunninghill) on the 11th September, in Paris on the 12th September. So when did the ‘rather sharp exchange of views’ take place? How did it take place? By dog and bone? Brereton noted that he was informed about those drop points by Browning, and then decided to send Taylor to see Montgomery about this matter. But on the 13th, safely back in Britain, he notes that the matter was settled with Dempsey, making no mention of Montgomery.
That Arnhem book by Sebastian Ritchie noted that Montgomery did see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.
It seems to have been stated somewhere that Montgomery refused to get involved with proposed alterations to the US airborne plans for D-Day. Would he have done so for MARKET, which was on a much tighter timescale? What seems not to be in doubt, is that Brereton had the final say on the use of airborne forces at WALCHEREN.
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Raymond Reaney
The final word on the 'Market' air plan belonged to the US commander of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA), Lewis Brereton. He made no to an attempt to make a second landing on the first day, he also had the final word on where the airborne troops would land. Dragoon, in August had included two drops on itd first day. That Market was a month later made no difference to the ability of the allies to land twice on day one of Market. That the fog did not lift until 9am on day one does not let the American FAAA commander, Brereton out, he had no plan for a second landing on day one that was displaced by the weather. The idea that the American FAAA commander Brererton was bound by decisions on landing ground at Arnhem made for Comet would seem, to have been absurd.
The Germans had a copy of the entire Market Garden plan as soon as the operation started, due to a copy of the plan being found on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in a US combat zone.
The film, 'A Bridge Too Far, produced by the American Joseph E Levine fails to include any mention of the American FAAA commander, Brereton, and wrongly shows a German soldier getting a copy of the Market Garden plan from a British glider.
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@johnlucas8479
John Lucas
‘Operation Comet involved British 1st Parachute Brigade with the objective the Arnhem Bridge. Operation Market Garden involved 1st British Airborne Division with the objective the Arnhem Bridge. Simple common sense and logic would indicated that the landing zones for Market Garden would use the same DZ as Comet, especially for the 1st Parachute Brigade. It would have been absurd not to use Comet landing ground if the objectives of the 2 Operations were the same.’
Not really…
It seems that MARKET GARDEN replaced COMET because changing circumstanced led to the decision that a much larger force would be needed for each of the major objectives. With a division to be landed at Arnhem, it beggers belief that that the whole plan, including the location of the landing zones was not reassessed by Brereton.
‘As your claim of 2 airlifts on the 17th. Provide the evidence that at no point 2 lifts was not considered by Williams for Market.’
But I have made no such claim about anyone regarding two lifts.
What I stated was this:
‘That the fog did not lift until 9am on day one does not let the American FAAA commander, Brereton out, he had no plan for a second landing on day one that was displaced by the weather.’
So… Can anyone supply evidence that when it got to the morning of the first day, Brereton said “sorry, no can do with that second lift that was planned for latter today because of the unexpected change in the weather”, or words to that effect?..
‘As to the capture plan I refer to Karel Margry "Operation Market Garden Then and Now" page 173’
OK.
I however, have to make do with this:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@johnlucas8479
Its a definate no.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.'
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING1994
P17
‘This was Roy Urquhart’s first airborne operation, but he felt that the combination of the lift spread over three days and the distance from his landing areas to Arnhem would prevent his division from carrying out its task. He asked Brereton and Williams if the Arnhem force could have two lifts on the first day, as had been envisaged for the recent Operation ‘Comet’. His request was refused.’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘The second complication was evident just by counting noses: barely half of the 3.5-division force designated for MARKET was on the ground, and no more troops would arrive until the following day or later. General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.
It beggars belief that the airborne forces commanders would have pressed for two lifts on the first day if such a thing was impossible. What would be the point? Also after the event, what would be point in noting the lack of a second lift, if such thing had been impossible? It would have been as pointless as if Gavin had stated in later years that MARKET would have workd out if the transport fleet had included Lockheed Hercules aircraft instead of Douglas Dakotas.
I am in little doubt that if there is certainty that two lifts on the first day were not doable , American films, TV programmes, books, lectures, and Antony bloody Beevor would have heaped this onto Montgomery on an industrial scale, probably to rival the amount of material produced in the USA on the assassination of John Kennedy.
'You and Lyndon both blame Brereton for the fact that a single lift occurred on the 17th.' Your words. I would not use the word blame. A wrong decision need not lead to blame.
Brereton was the head of the FAAA. It stands to reason that he takes responsibilty for FAAA decisions, whether they are right or wrong. Of course, with Americans, the stadard procedure is that everything that went right was due to the USA, and everything that went wrong was due to the British.
Btw. Where was this Rithie during the war?
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@johnlucas8479
TheVilla Aston quote what he claims are reliable source say two lifts was doable. So, I ask him this question, “Do those sources provide sufficient information for you to made an independent assessment as to whether a second lifts was doable?
Not really...
I have no miltary experience, and as a consequence, I have not been involved planning major airborne operations. Therefore I tend to rely on the opinions of people who were there, or who have comparable military experience.
If those people cite the lack of a second air drop on Day 1 of MARKET GARDEN as a reason why Arnhem was not taken, then I am inclined to believe them. After all, there would be no point in citing the lack of a second air drop on Day 1, as a reason why Arnhem was not taken, if a second drop could not be undertaken, would there?..
I cannot remember what sources you cite in support of your claims. Young Para Dave cites a list of authors with their PhDs, Pulitzer Prizes, and so on. The problem is almost none of them were even born before the war ended. Almost all of them did not get to interview the key people, almost all of the key facts, and the relevent documents have long since been published. Beevor, Barr, Buckingham, and so on...Every time they being out a book on Arnhem, or MARKET GARDEN as as a whole, they are always the definitive account, or the final word, or whatever.
Long experience of knowing people from from those times, and reading the words of people from those times has convinced me of one unavoidable point. You were either there when the bullets were flying, and the bombs were going off, or you were not. Therefore, unless those words are contradicted by known facts then the words of the people involved are more or less final.
I was not there. Where you?
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@johnlucas8479
But of course, the us of capital letters for the words DAY and NIGHT is yours. The original document uses lower case for these words in that place in the original document.
Without me going through the whole thing again, where does it state that this order came from Montgomery? In any case, this wording would imply intention rather than an outright ban. A reasonable guess would be to avoid the road being clogged up due to accidents, which would doubtless have ben much more likely at night. My own father was nearly killed in an comparable incident at night during that time, in Belgium. Bridging equipment for the Son Bridge was probably moved at night, and it It beggars belief that on the spot decisions could not have been about movements at night. There may well have been different judgements about movements at night in territory thought to be in allied hands, rather than movements at night in territory thought to be in enemy hands. Who can say?
Travelling by night or not travelling by night, XXX Corps was at Grave on the early moring of the third day. And we all know what happened then...
Still, if there was an outright ban, then that further lets out the XXX Corps troops on the Nijmegen Bridge on the evening of the third day.
Which one do you want?
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@johnlucas8479
Does 'page 24 Market garden Now and Then [Then and Now] "' provide a source for that sharp exchange'? Ah, ah, ah... before you state it...I know that Chester Wilmot did not provide a source for the words that I quoted.
However...I'd wager that Chester Wilmot was a lot closer to the subject than this Karel Margry... Shall we run through their respective CVs?..
Further, there is more on the subject of who had the final word on MARKET:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
This seems to have been OK for this Rick Atkinson, and his Pulitzer Prize, or whatever it is. And also, the US official history of the campaign.
Even more than this, there is the evidence of Brereton's final say in all airborne matters at that time. Example: Brereton's refusal to permit an airborne drop on Walcheren Island.
All reasonable people that read these comments can understand that you are not an idiot like Para Dave. However, you are continuing an American 50 year plus campaign, led by Hollywood, and hack US historians of running down Britain's war effort at every possible opportunity in order to pander to American chauvinistic emotions. The decisions and actions of the likes of Montgomery, Alexander, and so on are examined to a degree that they do not in any way apply to Eisenhower, Bradley, and so on. Hairs are slit, the slit again in regard to Arnhem, Caen, and so on... without regard to the circumstances those people faced at those times.
Whereas American shortcomings are washed over, and American leaders are portrayed in glowing terms, and spoken of in hushed, reverential terms, as if they belong alongside Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and so on.
And all this muck, from a country that I, and doubtless many others, naively thought of as our closest allies...
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@johnlucas8479
Perhaps you could help with this one, not from one of your comments:
'From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations.'
How is 'misused' defined. I would expect to see evidence of those Airborne Divisions being wanted elsewhere but retained in the Netherlands in spite of those needs if this claim could be believed.
What is a 'considerable amount period'? Is 25.09.44 to 11.11.44 'considerable amount period'?
'suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations.'
But there are no figures cited. Either for the two airborne divisions, or for XXX Corps units that were there as well, by way of comparison.
As it happens, the figures for the two US Divisions were:
US 82nd 1,682 (Killed, wounded and missing)
US 101st 1,912 (Killed, wounded and missing)
What rubbish some people write.
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@nickdanger3802
Your question:
'BA 6th AB and US 82nd and 101st landed on D Day with 1st AB in reserve.
So how was it the 82nd and 101st got tagged for MG, but not 6th AB?'
Clearly, this was because King George VI, Churchill, Alanbrooke, Montgomery, Browning, Gale, the United Grand Lodge of England, and Vera Lynn were all in it together to make sure that British 6th Airborne would be able to put their feet up, have an easy time of it, with all of the work loaded onto the US 82nd, and 101st Airborne divisions.
It had nothing to with the US 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions being withdrawn to England in the middle of July 1944 and the British 6th Airborne being still in the front line at the beginning September 1944.
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@nickdanger3802
The Long Range Desert Group mainly used wheeled vehicles made in Canada. That is the Canada that at the started the war with a population of just 11 million people. The Canada, that of its free will joined Britain in the war against Germany from almost the start of the conflict. The Canada had had an outstanding military production record. The Canada that has not spent the seventy years plus since the end of the war, trying to ram what it did down peoples throats using a never stopping conveyor belt carrying trashy, chauvinistic films, TV programmes, and historical novels written by the likes of Stephen Ambrose and others.
The US Waco Glider could carry one Jeep or 13 troops. Therefore, the 740 Waco gliders supplied to Britain could carry 740 Jeeps or 9,620 troops.
The British Airspeed Horsa Glider could carry two Jeeps or 28 troops. Therefore, the 400 Horsa gliders supplied to the USA could carry 800 Jeeps or 11,200 troops.
The idea that it took hours to pry Jeeps that had been loaded into the Horsa gliders used in action is absurd. All that was required to unloaded those gliders was to undo eight spring loaded bolts and to cut a couple of metal cables using metal cutters that were supplied for each glider. Further, the AS.58 Mark II Horsa Glider featured a hinged cockpit section which reduced the modest amount of work required to unload the earlier types of this excellent glider.
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@nickdanger3802
Get lost. Those bases were not rented, and they were built by significant numbers and with significant amounts of British materials. Those bases enabled the USA to fight its war with Germany 3,000 miles from the US mainland.
Further, of the five main belligerent nations (Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia), Britain was the only one to go to war on behalf country - Poland. Of course, a number of other countries took part in the war, among them, the USA. However, the USA does not get to join the main group of belligerents as their homeland was 3,000 miles from any hint of danger to their homeland. Also, they only joined the war when they were attacked by other countries.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
None of this changes what I stated.
Themain five beligerents:
Britain. In the war from 03.09.1939 to 02.09.1945. Fought in every theatre of war, bombed and blockaded by the Germans. Fought the Germans on its own for a year, went to war on behalf another country - Poland.
Italy. In the war from 10.06.40 when it declared war on Britain and France. Surrendered to the allies 03.09 1943. Italy was fought over from then until the end of the war.
Germany. Invaded Poland 01.09.1935. Declared war on Poland, and multiple countries thereafter, including Russia and the USA. Had its country fought over in 1944 and 1945.
Japan. Declared war on the USA, Britain and others December 1941 Had it its homeland bombed (and nuked by the USA). Occupied in 1945.
Russia. Attacked by Germany, had the Western part of its country occupied for three years. Later declared war on Japan.
The rest:
Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa. Volunteered to join the fight from the start of the war. India was part occupied.
France. Like Britain, went to war on behalf of Poland, but bailed out in 1940 when it was occupied by Germany.
The odds and ends:
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland etc. All attacked and occupied by Germany, but did what they could.
The USA. Eventually joined the war in December 1941, when Germany, Italy and Japan declared war. Did not volunteer to fight for anyone else, its mainland was never attacked or occupied. Subsequent generations of US citizens have got bare faced cheek to try to tell everyone else all about it.
For simplicity, look on the war as an Olympic event:
Gold for Britain.
Silver for Russia.
Bronze for Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa.
Personal bests for the rest of the allies.
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@davidrendall7195
Big Woody (it seems, he is sometimes also known as Para Dave on YouTube).
You can debate with who you want, but you should know that he has called Montgomery everything under the sun, XXX Corps cowards, Carrington a coward, my Uncle a coward, Churchill a drunk. He has desparaged a US author called Dupay because he caught cancer, and so on and so on about Britain and the war. He has even tried to blame Montgomery for the defeat in France in 1940.
This stuff is about his norm.
'I'm not a MacArthur or Clark fan either. Guys like O'Connor,Collins,Middleton,Krueger,Slim,Simmonds were much better than those knobs. Monty was shyt and almost cost an alliance and in fact did after the war.' His words.
Like he is supposed to know. He is no more better qualified than me to pass judgement on these people. I have not been in the military, and I was not in the war. Neither was
he . As best I can judge, he is about 20 years old. He has confirmed that he has not been in the US military, that he lives in Cleveland, Ohio, USA, and that he hates me.
'Poulussen/Neilands write rags 70 yrs later and that gets traction?LMAO.' His words.
Yet this is the boy that lauds Beevor, Buckingham, one William Weidner, who it seems claimed that Carentan was a British objective on D-Day. What have these people all got in common.? They were all nowhere near the war.
'As you told Cornell I'm a user not a pusher. All these guys full of it c'mon you've been converted by carnival barkers if you believe that.' His words.
Do you know what he is on about?
'Beevors Books were released 3 -4 months before I could read it here state side. Hardly pandering to the American Market' His words.
So what does Beevor bring to these subjects...He was born after the war, he was in and out of Army inside four peacetime years, its seems with not even a patrol in Northern Ireland to his name. All the key people were long dead before he put digits on a keyboard, and had already been interviewed by real historians. Nearly all the key documents have long since been released. How many books had already been published about Market Garden before Beevor? 50+ maybe. What has Beevor, or Buckingham got of any importance that is new?..
'It's called research evidently the British like everyone to take their word for it. Right now I'm reading Winston's War by Hastings - very balanced .I had read Overlord/Armageddon also - I recommend them.' His words.
Hastings was at Saigon in 1975, the Falklands in 1982, that was about it. Beyond that he about like Beevor, but slightly less irritating to listen to.
'Read Willaim Weidner - Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap very well sourced. Again Monty may have been shot had Brooke not punched his ticket' His words.
Ah yes, Weidner and his Carentan being a British D-Day objective. Also it seems, his evidence for the Falaise Gap is Montgomey shouting out of his caravan at someone not to close the gap. As iff...
You throw credible evidence under the table to rescue a questionable commander.Prove them wrong,America has nothing to do with the fact the BEF didn't cross their own channel in 4 years. Does the UK always have blame assigned before your allies arrive? 3 miles in Monty's plan was getting blasted by Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans. TIK's hive of hallucination is one big echo chamber.' His words.
What rubbish. The BEF was dissolved in 1940, how was it supposed to cross the Channel afterwards? 'Monty's plan blasted' What rubbish.
There is a Dutch Poster on here somewhere who lived along the HighWay and studied the battle here is what he said.' His words.
'Yet NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November' That Dutch Poster's words.
Nothing established in the rest of 1944. What cheek. British and Canadian forces cleared the Scheldt. They got themselves ready for Veritable, only to have it postponed while Montgmery went down to sort out the American mess in the Northern half of the Bulge.
'how come indeed' His words., whatever they are supposed to mean here.
Big Woody has been on another YouTube thread asking for a person who goes by the YouTube name of akgeronimo501 to come onto this thread - perhaps because he needs support.
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@davidrendall7195
I have not actually watched this film through and I have not read A Bridge Too Far for over thirty years. Are the '82nd Airborne's post-op reports from July 1945' on line?
I tend to trust the words of the people who were actually there, unless, of course, what they state can be disproved. Likewise, contemporary documents, unless they can be shown to be misleading. Statistics, etc fine. Antony Beevor, Max Hastings, this Buckingham bloke and so on, passing judgement on people and their actions decades before their time is of no interest to me and I largely disregard such opinions.
I think I remember that you stated on another thread, some time ago, that the oblique aerial photos of German armour in the Arnhem area were never actually taken? Have I got this right? All that seems available on line are overhead shots, with the German vehicles heavily, heavily, camoflaged.
I really only come here to shoot down thicko Americans who get their history from Hollywood, and uncritical, chauvinistic US authors. Overall, I would much rather see more coverage devoted to the less glamorous Scheldt campaign, which my own father took part in, and a bit less on Market Garden. But there we are, its not going to happen.
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@davidrendall7195
All I have seen is an RAF Air Historical Branch document by one Sebastian Ritchie which is on-line. It seems state that photos were of a thought to be of a unit called the Hermann Goering Parachute Panzer Training and Replacement Regiment with Mark III Tanks. It must have been a really lenghty process for people to scour the original prints from the negatives. Obviously, the copies in the pdf document are of no real help to the likes of me. From memory, some of these types shots were on display in the Airborne Forces Museum in Aldershot. Interviews with people like Constance Babbington Smith regarding Peenemünde give some insight to a layman like me of the difficulties involved in this work.
You made some very good points which I have not seen before in regard to Market Garden, including:
'You fly PR aircraft back and forth over the same spot for days on end, high and low level, the enemy might notice your intent.' A very good point.
'Some amateur sleuths have gone through the flight logs of RAF Benson and found no evidence of any low level PR flights purposefully sent to Arnhem in this period'.
A new point for me.
'I suggested some photos and reports from Dutch resistance were exaggerated to cover the secret of ULTRA. Greater things were sacrificed than 1stAB Div to keep the secret of ULTRA' For me, another interesting point.
'As Browning and the Airborne officer corps were not cleared to read ULTRA - Brian had to find a way of convincing them in another way. A common method was to send PR aircraft to double check ULTRA intel and provide legitimate disclosable evidence.'
I did no know that 'Browning and the Airborne officer corps were not cleared to read ULTRA'. I have read that any Ultra information that was passed down had be covered by another source, photography, prisoner interrogations etc.
From what I, as a layman can see, the available aerial photo intelligence for Market Garden was cause for concern. But should it have caused enough concern for decision makers to say no to Market Garden, when it was put alongside other information? Who can say? I could not. How did it compare say, with the intelligence available before other operations launched in a similar timescale?
As for Big Woody...make what you will of his comments.
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@davidrendall7195
A few things if I may:
The ll SS Panzer Corps.
I did not know that the II SS Panzer Corps was located in Alsace before it was sent to the Arnhem. Can this be referenced easily?
You stated this:
‘This is where Monty may be at fault - he definitely was ULTRA cleared and should have been aware of Bittrich's forces disappearing from the American front in Alsace and then ULTRA reporting him between Arnhem and Deelen a reasonable time fo travel allowance later.’
But Montgomery stated this in his memoirs:
‘The 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem area, having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew
it was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively; its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was
quickly brought into action against the 1st Airborne Division’.
Brigadier Hackett
You stated this:
When Brigadier Shan Hackett (CO 4th Para Brigade, scheduled to drop at Renkum heath on D+2) saw the intel report he made his own assessment "This seems a very complicated way to commit suicide, we'll all be lucky to be alive in two days!"
But surely Brigadier Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade landed at Ginkel Heath, on D+1, did it not?
This is the quote I have read regarding Hackett’s assessment of Market Garden before it started, as related by one Captain Nick Hanmer:
‘Shan' Hackett said he didn't wish to disagree with the general but, in his opinion, if 50 per cent of us were alive and on our feet within two or three days of this operation commencing, we should consider ourselves fairly lucky. As it turned out, he was exactly correct; thirty-one officers from my battalion flew to Arnhem and fifteen were killed or died of wounds; none returned to British lines.’
The points you made about intelligence work are fine but what would interest me most would be what did the decision makers, Brereton, Eisenhower, Montgomery etc. see and what effect did that information have on their decision making in regards to Market Garden.
This is what I have found:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P509
‘On the day after the fall of Paris [26th August 1944], the SHAEF Intelligence Summary, reviewing the situation in the West, declared:
"Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”
P523
When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.
P598
The crucial factor, however, was not man-power but fire-power. So many weapons had been lost and so few had been replaced that in his three armies Model had only " 239 tanks and assault guns " and " 821 light and heavy cannon," less armour and artillery than had been available in Britain after Dunkirk. Model had barely sufficient tanks to refit one armoured division; the Allies on his front alone had the equivalent of twelve armoured divisions.
The SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 assured Montgomery that the Germans facing his British 2nd Army was: "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
A 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary of 13th September 1944.states that:
"the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
The questions that would spring to mind are:
Is there important written information available, that key people would have seen, that is not shown above?
Was the assessment of intelligence reports as good as it could have been?
When intelligence reports were placed alongside the other considerations such as weather forecasts, the state of readiness of allied forces, external pressures and so on, was the decision to go ahead by Brereton in his mansion at Sunninghill, Eisenhower in his chateau in Normandy and Montgomery in his caravans in Belgium the correct one?
Here are some views on the subject...
General Eisenhower:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P340
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
Roy Urquhart:
ARNHEM
BY MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD
1958
P204
‘In my official report of the battle in January 1945 I wound up by saying:
The operation was not one hundred per cent successful and did not end quite as we intended.
The losses were heavy but all ranks appreciate that the risks involved were reasonable. There is no doubt that all would willingly undertake another operation under similar conditions in the future.
Also, Brian Urquhart, as related by you:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dvv8GQIRYVU&lc=z230dp0ictretve4504t1aokgxpo54nbd50e0avc4emnrk0h00410.1572219754468033&feature=em-comments
‘Surprisingly given his role in warning of the dangers Uncle Brian always said the mission should have gone ahead regardless.’
The author Martin Middlebrook was not there but seems to have thought this:
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING
1994
P441
‘Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.’
The author Antony Beevor not there, and I have zero interest in anything he has to state on the subject.
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@OneHitWonder383
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@johnlucas8479
Buckingham.
Buckingham, Beevor, Barr and co can post the statistics, dates, etc., they wish. But almost all of them have already been published. They have to refer to others who went before them in regards to interview with the key people of that time. None of them were there so they do not get to pass judgement on those that were there. Further, any speculation like this Buckingham did with ‘concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations’, based on what is shown in the posted her, has not a shred of evidence to back up this outrageous speculation. Still, its not all bad, it seems that this Buckingham stated that Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until 15th September 1944.
RAF Transport Command and Market Garden.
As for Hollingshurst: As the RAF, unlike the USAAF was a separate service, therefore the RAF units assigned to MARKET were not formally part of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA). However those RAF units came under the command of the commander of the FAAA, the American General – Brereton. On this, the evidence is clear:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 128
General Brereton had assumed command of the First Allied Airborne Army on 8 August 1944. He was
given operational control of the following: headquarters of the XVIII U.S. Corps (Airborne), commanded by Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway; headquarters of the Ist British Airborne Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. F. A. M. Browning, who served also as deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army; the IX U.S. Troop Carrier Command under Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams; and two Royal Air Force troop carrier groups (38 and 46) . American airborne troops under General Brereton's control were the veteran 82d and I0Ist Airborne Divisions and the untried 17th Airborne Division,
the latter not scheduled to participate in MARKET. British troops at his disposal were the 1st Airborne Division and the 52 Lowland Division (Airportable), plus special air service troops and the 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade, the latter to serve in MARKET under command of the 1st Airborne Division.
Chester Wilmot.
Chester Wilmot noted the intended role of the 52nd Lowland Division at Arnhem so, as there was nothing secret about most of MARKET GARDEN in 1952, it is reasonable to interpret Wilmot’s remarks regarding the 4th Parachute Brigade as a criticism of the decision not attempt to drop it South of the Arnhem bridge rather than any lack of knowledge of the broad terms of the plan for Arnhem.
‘Do you discount all sources by writers because they were not present or did not interview participants. As new documents are release or archives are open up, or documents translated later writers have the benefits of this new material to incorporate into their work which will enhance our understanding.’ Your words.
Not all. I have quoted from some of these oppos in YouTube comments. The problem is, the interviews have been published before, as have most of the statistics and the contemporary documents. Just what do these people like Barr, Beevor, and Buckingham, bring to the subject? Certainly not personal experience of the events they write about. And yet, as can be seen, that does not stop them from wild speculation, passing judgement on those that were there. Horrible.
Market Garden weather.
‘No one can provide evidence regarding the morning of the first day, because none exists. if two lifts were plan the final decision was made the night before and the decision would be to go or postpose for 24 hours or cancel the operation. Not do what you suggest delay one lift and cancel the second, because of the impact on D-Day +1 Operations.’ Your words.
The idea that there was no option to alter operations on D-Day+1 (and D-Day) would seem to be absurd. The weather delays the first lift, and they can’t change the timing? Surely this happened on D-Day+1 when the 4th Parachute Brigade lift was delayed. What seems to be certain is that the US General, Brereton had no plan in place for a second lift on D-Day that was scuppered by the weather.
Montgomery.
I never quote any retrospective opinion offered by Montgomery. The footage of the Dr. Harold R. Winton talk is of interest to me because he puts a slightly different opinion in regard to Montgomery than the usual moronic, chauvinistic American view on the subject. He was not there, whether he is correct or not I would not care to state.
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@johnlucas8479
‘The questions I would ask are:
1) Why were the 2 Division retain after the operation as both were highly trained specialised units and only light weight infantry division compare to normal Infantry division.
2) Why not fly in the 52nd Lowland Division to relieve at least one division. Being a fresh full strength division would provide more troops and firepower than an airborne division. Their also the 6th British Airborne Division was also at full strength and available. So why not use the two fresh British Divisions.’
Misuse is define as "to use wrongly or incorrectly, to treat badly".
No not sure about concern for US casualties, I think it was more that Montgomery wanted control of US troops, in the same way prior to Market Garden he push for control of the US 1st Army as part of his single thrust agenda. After the battle of the Bugle his push to retain the 9th US Army.’
Not really…
Its all about this oppo Buckingham suggesting that Montgomery and Browning being less concerned about US casualties than British casualties without offering a shred of evidence to back up his outrageous and suggestive comment, which no doubt Americans will lap up. As far as I can tell, there is a widespread belief from people who were there (unlike this Buckingham) that Montgomery went to great lengths to minimise casualties in his commands, For example, with his multi-national army at Alamein. Michael Caver (who was there) mentions this in his work ‘El Alamein’.
I don’t know about the 6th Airborne Division, I thought that I read somewhere that they were in the frontline from D-Day to into September 1944, and were then withdrawn for training for the Rhine crossing. But this might not be right. As for the 52nd Lowland Division, surely that cannot be right?
Were they not in the Scheldt? Even my own father mentioned seeing them on South Beveland. I will have to check this out.
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@nickdanger3802
Further to the question from Para Dave:
Chester Wilmot.
Second World War: Greece, Syria, North Africa, including reporting from Tobruk during the siege, Crusader. The Far East, the, Kokoda Track campaign. Europe: D-Day (He landed with 6th Airborne), and through to VE-Day.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2jDCwF5j8E&ab_channel=VariousArtists-Topic
He regularly broadcast throughout the campaign, becoming a well known voice to BBC listeners in Britain, and around the world.
As interviews by Chester Wilmot - its all very sparse...as he admits in 'The Strugle for Europe':
['German] Generals Halder, Blumentritt, Westphal and Bayerlein.'
'So far as Allied operations are concerned I have relied very largely on
documentary material which has not yet been published and on my own interrogations of the principal commanders and staff officers concerned. During the campaign from Normandy to the Baltic I was in the fortunate position, as a
correspondent for the B.B.C., of being an eye-witness of many of the major
operations, particularly on the British and Canadian fronts, and I kept a detailed day to day record, much of which could not be published at the time. After the war, in the winter of '45-'46, through the help of General Eisenhower and Field-
Marshal Montgomery, I was able to travel freely throughout the American and
British Zones-of Occupation in Germany, examining the records and interviewing the officers of formations and units in their respective commands. The material gathered then was subsequently supplemented by the examination of official records and reports made available to me by the War Cabinet Historian's office
in London, and the historical sections of the British Admiralty and Air Ministry,
the Canadian Army and the U.S. Army and Navy. For this assistance I must record my great indebtedness to the following officers and officials: Brigadier H. B, Latham, Col. A. E. Warhurst, Lt.-Col. Graham Jackson and Mr. Brian Melland of the War Cabinet Historian's Office; Rear-Admiral R. M. Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander D. W. Waters, and Mr. G. H. Hurford at the Admiralty; Mr. J. C. Nerney, Squadron-Leader L. A. Jackets, Squadron-Leader J. C. R.
Davies and Mr. C. L.James of the Air Ministry; Col. C. P. Stacey, the Chief
Canadian War Historian and Lieut.-General G. G. Simonds, now Chief of the Canadian Army General Staff; General J. Lawton Collins, now Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and Rear-Admiral J. B. Heffernan, USN, Director of Naval History and Records.'
'I am under a great obligation
to those who have helped me and particularly to: Air Chief Marshall Lord
Dowding; Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Tedder; General W. Bedell Smith,
Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, General Sir Frederick Morgan, Major- General K. W. D. Strong and Brigadier E. J. Foord (all of SHAEF) ; Major- General Sir Francis de Guingand, Major-General Sir Miles Graham, Brigadier R. F. K. Belchem, Brigadier E. T. Williams, and the late Col. J. O. Ewart (of 21st Army Group) ; Air Marshal Sir Philip Wigglesworth, who was Chief of Staff to the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Admiral Sir George Creasy, who was Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay;
General Sir Miles Dempsey and Col. L. M. Murphy (of Second British Army);
the late Lieut.-General George S. Patton, Lieut.-General W. H. Simpson, Major- General Clift Andrus, Major-General H. W. Blakeley, Major-General James M. Gavin, Major-General C. H. Gerhardt, Major-General R. W. Grow, Brigadier- General E. L. Sibert, and Col. B. A. Dickson (of the U.S. Army); General Sir Evelyn Barker, Lieut.-General G. C. Bucknall, General Sir John Crocker, Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks, General Sir Richard O'Connor (all of whom commanded corps in Second Army) ; Major-General C. M. Barber, Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, Lieut.-General Sir Richard Gale, Major- General Sir Percy Hobart, Major-General G. P. B. Roberts, Major-General D. C. Spry, General Sir Ivor Thomas (all of whom commanded divisions in Second Army) ; Major-General G. W. Lathbury, Major-General J. H. N. Poett, Brigadier K. G. Blackader, Brigadier B. A. Coad, Brigadier J. W. Hackett, Brigadier C. B. C. Harvey, Brigadier S. J. L. Hill, Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde,
Col. A. Jolly, Lt.-Col. R. M. P. Garver, Major A. D. Parsons, and Dr. J. M. Stagg.'
The rest of time he just sat on his hands.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave, 27 05 22 Part One:
‘Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."’ Para Dave.
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’. Notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. After five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
'Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
‘The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"’ Para Dave.
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the
Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
'From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem' Para Dave.
So how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave, 27 05 22 Part Two:
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’ Para Dave.
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’ Para Dave.
Why go to Max Hastings, when you can get it straight from de Guingand:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
'How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" ' Para Dave.
The old div, Max Hastings, the Golf club bar bore, reported on the from the Falklands war, and then appointed himself an expert all things Second World War. He should have checked first.
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
'How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies'
Para Dave.
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact Montgomery until 5th September, and due to him being located Ranville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands.from Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
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@nickdanger3802
From Para Dave, 27 05 22 Part Three:
‘And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later’
Rubbish, from a chancer who crashed in on the Second World War history scene decades after the war ended, with nothing new to add to the subject. ‘Monty,who was not interested in the estuary’ How is Beevor supposed to know what Montgomery was not interested in?.. The Scheldt could be blocked with ease in September, October, November, and so on. Taken together, both banks of the Scheldt were 100 miles long, and the Germans were still in strength of the south of the estuary in September 1944. Even if Montgomery had turned the entire 21st Army onto the Scheldt, it is hard to see how Antwerp could be used before the end of October. Meanwhile with no attempt on the Rhine, and with V2 rockets hitting London, the Germans continue their recovery after their defeat at the hands of Montgomery in Normandy. 'Para Dave.
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’ Para Dave.
This no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
Page 269
‘Former Naval Person to President 1 Oct 43
…‘2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.”’
P374
It now fell to me, as British Minister of Defence responsible to the War Cabinet, to propose a British Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean. This post we confided to General Wilson, it being also settled that General Alexander should command the whole campaign in Italy, as he had done under General Eisenhower in Tunisia. It was also arranged that General Devers, of the United States
Army, should become General Wilson’s Deputy in the Mediterranean, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder General Eisenhower’s Deputy in “Overlord,” and that General Montgomery should actually command the whole cross-Channel invasion force
P376
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 18 Dec 43
…9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
P393
‘I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When
he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once,
“This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.’
So there you have it, contemporary documents, Churchill’s own words, not a hint that ‘based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’. Why would there be? Montgomery had excelled in difficult circumstances as a single division commander in France in 1940, he had won in as a single army commander in North Africa, he sorted out Patton’s nonsense plan for Sicily, he had warned about Eisenhower lunatic plan for Italy, and had ben proved right.
Who else was there? Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers, forget it. Patton?.. It was of little consequence to the British, but he seems to have been unable to stop himself from assaulting US soldiers, and Sicilian civilians. Beyond that, it seems to have been Montgomery or Alexander.
‘Fancy some more?’ Para Dave.
From Para Dave, that is like being faced with person holding a gun that shoots out a flag with the word ‘bang’ on it, when he (or she) pulls the trigger.
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@nickdanger3802
Montgomery was a single division division commander in France in 1940. He perfomed with distiction in trying circumstances to bring his division home almost intact when so ordered to do so. Further, his nightime march to covered the allied left flank, after the Belgians had suuredered to the Germans, having given Britain and France one hour's notice of that surrender.
The idea that Montgomery took the credit for, or was given the credit for the Dunkirk evacuation is absurd.
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
P 81
‘All three were commanded by fine soldiers, and one-the 3rd-by a trainer of genius. Major General Bernard Montgomery was then a man of fifty-two, with only a year’s experience as a divisional commander. But Brooke’s diary that winter contains many references to the progress of the defensive works made by his division and its impressive training Exercises. ‘It was a matter’ he wrote, ‘of the greatest interest watching Monty improving every day as he began to find his feet as
a Divisional Commander….These Exercises, all of them admirably run …were an eye opener to me as to his ability as a trainer. Their value was more than proved when we finally carried out our advance, as his 3rd Division worked like clockwork.’
P 107
‘Monty with his quick brain for appreciating military situations was well aware of the very critical situation that he was in, and the very dangers and difficulties and difficulties that faced us acted as a stimulus on him; they thrilled him and put the sharpest edges on his military ability.’
P 138
I proceeded to Bondues to see Monty at the 3rd Division H.Q., as I wanted to find out how he was getting on with the preparations for the very difficult move that lay ahead of him. He had to evacuate his present position and lead his division under cover of darkness across the Lys just east of Armentières, past Ploegsteert Wood and up by second-class roads northward within 4,000 yards of the fluctuating front of the 5th Division, to the north of Ypres, where he was to prolong our eastern defensive flank north of the 50th Division. It was a task that might well have shaken the stoutest of hearts, but for Monty it might just have been a glorious picnic. He told me exactly how he was going to do it, and was as usual exuberant in confidence. There is no doubt that one of Monty’s strong points is his boundless confidence in himself. He was priceless on this occasion, and I thanked Heaven to have a commander of his calibre to undertake this hazardous march.’
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@johnlucas8479
As far as opinion on people actions is is concerned, I quote the people who were there.
They nealy all had their say in the 1940s and 1950s.
As for the rest, Chester Wilmot was there, he went right through. His reports from the front are in the BBC archives. He interviewed the key people immediately after the war, found all the key evidence, apart from Ultra, which seems to have changed the story of events to no great extent. Britain and the USA have long since released their official histories of the war.
Cornelius Ryan was there, but waited too long before he began to write. Also, he was a nasty little Mick.
This bloke Buckingham was nowhere the events he writes about, he never interviewd the key people. All the evidence has long been available since before he started writing. Yet he has the bare faced cheek to call his work the complete story of Arnhem or some such rubbish. Ditto one Antony Beevor. He was in and out of the army inside four peacetime years. Then there is William Weidner, or whatever his name is, and so on, and so on. What have any of them brought new to subject?: The VD figures for troops in Luxembourg?, the colour of the carpets at Eisenhower's headquarters?
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