Comments by "HaJo Os." (@hajoos.8360) on "Bismarck and the James Cameron Expedition - What it actually says vs what you hear on the internet" video.

  1. This was a lot of work for nothing. Even Scharnhorst's 11 or worse Italian 12,5 inch guns could penetrate Bismarck's or Iowas or Yamato's armor belt. There is no point. In the final battle of Bismarck British shooting performance was really bad, point blank range and 6 of 7 shots missed a 250 meter target. 2,5 years later, with the development of radar, the Brits improved a lot. 14 hits on Scharnhorst by DoY, 1 decisive hit on turret A and one slightly above the armor belt into the propulsion room, which lowered Scharnhorst's speed to become a stitting duck as Bismarck. But to sink Scharnhorst the Brits needed 10 ship-to-ship-torpedos (not such a toy like a Swordfish-torp). The small calibre-fireworks on Bismarck made a lot of sense. Nobody could leave the infrastructure for repairs or firefights. Fact is, a british battleship could never sink a german battleship by artillery, in reverse, yes. Drachs idea, that 3 Dorsetshire-torps caused the sinking of the Bismarck is not very plausible. Bismarck sunk over the stern, because the bulkheads were opened from the stern. So it could be possible, that the Dorsetshire-torps penetrated Bismarck's hull above the main belt while sinking. The main reason for the loss of Bismarck is the idiocy of the highest ranking officer. His miserable decisions and his cowardess caused the loss. So the incompetent German SKL wears the responsability for choosing such an idiot for the position of a vice-admiral with a big bunch of useless staffofficers in his towline. The order to scuttle Bismarck was a fool's mission, too. To generate a prize of war, the Brits must have entered Bismarck to fight Bismarck's remaining crew man against man.
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  2.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  2 entire BBs, nearly 4k men (crews of 40 subs) on sea for 22 merchant ships out of convois. Do You really think, this is a success? I dont think so, much too expensive. The point is, that Kriegsmarine ordered BBs (4), without to use them what they are built for. Pocket BBs or Subs were much better for the task, you mentioned and cheaper. The SKL was a bunch of cowards, not to use BBs for their main purpose, fighting other BBs. You mentioned Operation Berlin. The Germans spotted Convoy HX 106. Scharnhorst reported the escort HMS Ramillies to Lütjens, so Lütjens broke the attack up according to the standing orders of the SKL. Captain Hoffmann, commander of Scharnhorst tried to draw Ramilllies away from the convoy to give Gneisenau the chance to sink the convoy. Hoffmann was reprimanded for this by Lütjens. Hoffman was a real sea-officer, Lütjens omly a coffeehouse-baffoon. So 3 of 4 BBs were lost by action from the air, better to sink in a real battle. And Scharnhorst was lost by the lack of experience of a destroyer-officer, same story with Graf Spee. In case of Scharnhorst it was a strategic wrong decision to use her with radar which was not comeptitive in the arctic winter. Scharnhorst was superiour at daylight with her rangefinders. So SKL has to use her in areas where she finds some daylight. This is obvious or not? The SKL had never a strategic plan, already in the High Seas Fleet. Those fine german ships were only built for a yachting tour in the North Sea. Hipper-class heavy cruisers were the best ever built, but they consumed so much fuel, that they had no range, an obvious & decisive failure. But anyway the German navy suffered most under a lack of navy-tradition and a misconcepted promoting system. This is a typical german weakness.
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  3.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  order to scuttle came between 09 : 15 and 09 : 21 personally by the I. Officer. Dorsetshire launched the 3 torps after 10 : 15. Any questions?
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  4.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Read simply the Bismarck's wikipedia with all related sources, including Baron Burkhard von Müllenheim-Rechberg. But Baron Burkhard von Müllenheim-Rechberg was on his battle-station & had, as you said, no idea, what was going on. According to Bismarck's wikipedia the 1. officer, Fregattenkapitän Oels, gave the order personally to scuttle in each engine room. About Lütjens at Berlin is to say, that all his predecessors were sent home on different opinions with the SKL. Lütjens said to his predecessors personally, he will take care not to get sent home. To support wrong tactical or strategic decisions means he was a man of no honour and as usual in the Kriegsmarine responsable officers were overchallenged, failed and get promoted. Usually British convoys were protected by a single BB-escort. The Germans could always gain a local superiority, overpower against the escort to sink ship by ship. This is what all smart German officers, as Hoffmann, thought. For his behaviour at Denmark Strait Lütjens, as a british admiral, would have been shot on his quarterdeck by a court-marshal decision for cowardess facing the enemy. The reason vice-admiral Holland attacked immediatly the German squadron at Denmark Strait, without waiting for Norfolk and Suffolk was related to British tradition, which was founded by the death sentence of the court-marshall against admiral Byng for his strategic defeat at the battle of Minorca in 1756. The decisive sentence, was .... "not doing his utmost", which inspired all british commanding officers till 1942. With the loss of PoW and Repulse, this old tradition was cancelled.
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  5.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  No Sir, the listing of Bismarck does not give any indication for the Baron about the reason of listing. At Denmark Strait the German squadron could not dodge the engagement, because there was the ice border in the German firelee. And your interpretation of Lütjens orders not to engage equal ships is not complete or very personal. The original idea of Rheinübung was, that Bismarck is able to engage every escort while Prinz Eugen is sinking the convoy. And Hitler asked Raeder why Lütjens did not finish off PoW? And you still ignore, that the British splashes into the water around the German squadron at Denmark Strait made it obvious that the enemy ships were BBs. Lütjens waited for more than 2 minutes without giving permission to fire, an infinity in a modern seabattle, means already around 3or 4 British superiour salvoes from 10 heavy guns. Lindemann was not smart enough to release Lütjens from command, because Lütjens was obviously not fit for it and to assume command by himself. Lindemann and Brinkmann gave the order to fire, which is a clear evidence for Lütjens' failure and cowardess facing the enemy.
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  6.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Your answer explains nothing. There was no escape at Denmark Strait. Every midshipman was able to evaluate this. Lütjens gave no orders at all, even not to alter course. He had a blackout. And he did not gave any order before the enemy was in sight. The hydros of Prinz Eugen stated loud turbine noises of heavy units. The only alternative would have been to alter course for 180 degrees into the arms of 2 heavy cruisers, additionally. The Germans made ready for action, nothing else, because there was nothing left to do. Bsmarck's speed after the bow hit of PoW was reduced to 27 knots. Hood was blown up at 06:00. After the dodging maneurvre of PoW Leach remained on parallel course till 06:04. 4 minutes Lütjenis did not closed in. Every admiral of any other nation would have immediatly gave this order. This was war. Tovey was far enough away. And, Sir, PoW was damaged, so it is not plausible, that PoW could reach her top speed of 28,3 knots. There would have been no way to escape for PoW. About the orders of the SKL is to mention, that the Germans were not able to lose their shadows. So the entire german plan to get through into open waters failed at this point. And if Lütjens does not sink PoW, PoW would remain among his pursuers. Only in the situation at Denmark Strait the Germans could gain any superiority against this enemy ship. In any future there would be more of them.
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  7.  @dovetonsturdee7033  You are here the professional commentator on Drach's channel. You can check the battle-sketch of Captain Leach and inform us with your wisdom. If Lindemann would have seen no chance to outran PoW, he would not have demanded it 2 times from Lütjens to allow it.
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  8.  @dovetonsturdee7033  You consider that the Brits had better intelligence than the Germans. This might be true, of course. KGV or Prince of Wales made not so a big difference for the Germans, can you agree with that? The Brits did not hesitate to throw PoW to early into battle. The Germans hesitated to send Tirpitz after only 2 months trials. A considerable shock sighting Holland's squadron is off limits for a midshipman, but not for an admiral. If PoW was faster than Bismarck after the battle of Denmark Strait, he must fight PoW, because otherwise PoW will join the persuing heavy cruisers, which Lütjens could not shook off. In your logic which is Lütjen's logic he cannot dispatch Prinz Eugen, what he did. Furthermore Bismarck could have refueled from the same tanker as Prinz Eugen did it.
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  9.  @dovetonsturdee7033  Prinz Eugen consumed so much fuel, this ship could not sail anywhere to refuel permanently. The shipyard or turbine-producer promised too much or cheated. Infight the Hipper-class was maybe the best heavy cruiser class ever built, but the range was a real misconstruction for a ship of 200 meters length. As you said Bismarck was the main prize. So Lütjens major task was to bring her home to Brest. So Lütjens had to keep Prinz Eugen in the squadron. Air defense in a crossfire would have been more effective against those swordfishs and after a fatal torpedo hit, destroying the rudder, Prinz Eugen would have been able to tow Bismarck into Brest.or the protecting Luftwaffe bomber zone. It is very unusual to split squadrons. As you know Schneider was not not shocked at Denmark Strait, he asked several times for the permission to fire. After Hood opened fire, the intention of the Brits to attack, was obvious, don't you think so? Both ship commanders gave the permission to fire, Brinkmann after Lindemann. They judged the situation nearly properly or not? Please do not ignore my former argument, that there was no possebility to dodge the Brits, whether by speed nor altering the course. Not to shot back is simply cowardice, anyway to get the insight that the mission is failed. This was war, unleashed by the Brits & on the 7 seas a warship has to sink the enemy & always there is the possebility to get sunk. A sea-officer has to know it and to do his utmost, as the court-marshall of admiral Byng said.
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  10.  @dovetonsturdee7033  The Luftwaffe was, of course alarmed. Of course, later in the war they sunk the Roma. After Lütjens intelligence failed already at the Denmark Strait, he knew that the Brits were hunting him, with everything they could scratch, even aircraft carriers. This conclusion, Sir, is not so speculative. Baltimore had nearly the same size as the Hipper-class, same guns in 3 tripple turrets & came 1943 into service, and speed was not really higher, Blücher made 32,8 knots. So, where is the advantage? Luftwaffe Kampfgeschwader 77 was on the way, but the Homefleet was out of range. Doenitz sent several subs out. Every seamile in direction to the French coast would have made a survival of Bismarck more possible. And, Sir, the AA of 2 ships is obviously better than of one. There is no debate about it.
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  11.  @dovetonsturdee7033  You talk bull-excements. Baltimore was a newer development. The Hipper-class top-speed was Prinz Eugen 32.2 knots, Hipper 32,5 knots, Blücher 32,8 knots, in spite off a larger tonnage. Baltimore had 6 130mm secondaries, Prin Eugen 12 105 mm secondaries. So your broadside weight of Baltiomore is defined by one 8 inch gun more. Usually he germans used shorter projectiles than the Allies, so they could load more of them. The fully loaded tonnage of Baltimore and Prinz Eugen are nearly the same. Prinz Eugen had 200 men more on board, so more space for the provisions were needed. The real advantage of Baltimore were 4 and smaller engines and top-new radar-systems. Drach already failed to analyze the tonnage-difference to british heavy cruisers in one of his shows properly. To install 3 or 4 turrets is a philosphical question. In consideration to prolongate the original mission, Lütjens had to decide the priority. Some sunk merchants are nothing in comparison to bring a damaged BB home. Knowing that a big part of the Royal Navy is hunting him, he needed every help he could get. As i said, each mile closer to the French coast would have been raised the chances of Bismarck to survive. The destroyer Mashona was in Luftwaffe's range and Luftwaffe sunk it. What is easier to hit via planes? A destroyer oder a BB? Yes, the BB. Of course, Prinz Eugen could have towed Bismarck.
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