Comments by "HaJo Os." (@hajoos.8360) on "SMS Scharnhorst - Guide 012 (Human Voice)" video.
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@CaptCondor Most maritime historians estimate von Spee's decision as the most worse one. Von Spee knew about the superiour speed of those battle-cruisers, even the German BCs were much faster than his armoured cruisers and it was 10 o' clock in the morning in good weather. It is a simple calculation, that even with a 2 hours delay instead of one, the Brits will outrun the German armoured cruisers. And in good tradition Craddock led the action out of the range of the German artillerie, something a big part of the worse german officers chorps never understood, a lack of tradition. Von Spee has had 2 better options, the first was to attack immediatly at close range, mainly with torpedos, the Brits could not dodge in the harbour, with the opportunity that German sailors could swim to the shore in case of sinking. The other option had been an escape through the Falkland Sund. This would have forced the Brits into close action, better chances than on open seas, as it happened, and during the night the Germans could have escaped indeed. The braveness of the German Crews was for nothing. Von Spee could be a famous seaman, if he would have attacked Port Stanley with the destruction or only damaging the battlecruisers. From the tactical point of view attacking the harbour would have given the best result. But von Spee panicked, and panic is never a good adviser.
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@TheNecromancer6666 this counts only for the crews and engineers. The social differences and behaviour between officers and crews were not helpful and the circumstances of comeradeship on board were better in WWII. The Germans were enforced to use their experiences, for example 2 aft turrets of Seydlitz out of action at the battle of the Doggerbank, because they were inferior. Admiral Beatty was too arrogant to use conclusions and consequences, because he commanded superiour forces. I do not share Drach's opinion about the biggest calibre is the best. The Germans had in WWI and II more rounds ammunition on board, because their shells were smaller. About speed you are right in the German planning. But in reality German battlecruisers were one or two knots faster than their british opponents. At the Doggerbank Blücher slowed the Germans down. Without Blücher we would not have seen the battle. It is a major mistake to put slow ships into the line of battle, as we have already seen in the battle of Tsushima, but the Germans repeated the mistake at the Doggerbank and Jutland. With a smaller and faster high seas fleet at Jutland Jellicoe would not have been able to cross the German T. The opposite is the case, it is probable that Scheer would have crossed the British T, before the Homefleet would have formed the line of battle. The would have meant a decisive victory for the Germans. At the battle of the Falklands Admiral Spee failed totally, Lütjens failed always, Kummetz failed at the Oslo Fjord, and Captain Langsdorff failed at the battle of River Plate. The Germans admiralty was miserable in tactics and strategics, and they promoted the wrong men. They decided politically, always a mistake. The German admiralty was not even able to calculate the correct fuel demand for their operations, unbelievable.
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@CaptCondor the point is, that the battle costs nearly the entire lifes of all of von Spee's crews, without killing any Brits, so, we see, it was the worst decision. Mainly the escape route to the south, entering the open sea, was obviously the main tactical mistake. In Port Stanley harbour heavy losses were to be foreseen, but the suvivors would have had a chance. A major attack against the British squadron would have had the most efficiency with torpedos. Btw, a british team found the Scharnhorst and made pictures with a robot. You exchanged the situation of von Spee with his commanding officers. Von Spee ordered the attack, his captains were against it. They wanted to avoid the Falklands. Before Scharnhorst sunk, von Spee signalled: "Admiral to Commander Gneisenau, you was right".
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50670743
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@CaptCondor the Wikipedia is correct, in my personal literature, on one hand Adm. Niemitz & Co.'s Sea Power or Pemsel's Seeherrschaft it is mentioned as in the Wiki. And von Spee's famous signal to Captain Maerker, commander of Gneisenau, would have made no sense at all. The German Intelligence detected the departure of 2 BCs to the South Atlantic, but their radio-waves could not reach the south-pole-area.
Von Spee formulated it himself, damaging the enemy, is his main job. He failed to do it. Only an attack on Port Stanley would have given the chance to kill Brits, after Britain declared war as usual. This is for what von Spee's ships were built for. Having a look to the battle itself, it is interesting to check the poor British gunnery. Invincible fired more than 600 heavy shells, nearly the entire ammunition bunker was empty. Against Blücher the Brits might have failed.
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@CaptCondor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Harbour a map of Port Stanley oder Stanley harbour .... you see a close range battle would be enforced. And the Germans would have been outperformed by 2 BCs and 3 armoured cruisers with full ammunition bunkers, of course. The tactical advantage would have been on the German side, because they sailed. Movement is always superiour than a sitting duck. And 500 meters/yards to the shore are not too much to swim in the case of sinking. 2 heavily damaged BCs in Port Stanley would have caused a lot of problems for repairs and we do not know they would have been ready at the Jutland clash. The main point for me is the tactical mismanagement of the German admiralty, flag officers or ship-commanders in both WWs. Their tactical decisions were most times miserable, anyway we have look to WWI or WWII sea-battles. For example, Hipper, not a bad one, failed at the battle of the Doggerbank. To include Blücher into the line of battle-cruisers was wrong, because she was too slow and so slowed the entire line and caused the battle. Without Blücher we would not have seen a battle of the Doggerbank. After the wrong decision to include Blücher the try to escape was wrong. Hipper should have ordered Blücher to leave the line with course to North-East or better, more aggressive, more surprisingly to north-west, to split the british BCs-Squadron, and a course south-south-west for the german 3 BCs-squadron to cross immediatly the british T, a 10 minutes firing superiority, means 8-10 superiour salvos. During to the expectable british turning manoeuvre, the german destroyers would have had the chance to charge an torpedo attack. This is, what a british flag-officer instead of Hipper would have done. And this is, for what warships are built for.
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@Nyctasia No, Sir, on paper British battle-cruisers were faster than german battlecruisers. But after all trials German battlecruisers were faster than the Brits. I believe whether Scheer nor Hipper could exclude slow ships in the line. After Doggerbank the Germans could easily improve engineering matters concerning the magazines, but the SKL was unable to realize the main essence of Tsushima, the Yellow Sea & the Doggerbank. Speed is superiour to artillery. So, Drachinifel might be a German spy in secret. Hippers squadron was only as fast as Blücher. With the understanding of honour in this era, Hipper could not release Blücher from the line of battle, but was allowed to escape, when Blücher was sinking, instead turn around & fight the Brits till death. Hipper could have dispatched Blücher on another escape course & used his superiour speed to dodge the Brits. Even after Doggerbank the German SKL was to stupid to understand the importance of speed & Scheer must include the slow cows, the predreadnoughts into the line of battle. Fortunes were not decided only by the quality of ships, but by the intelligence of their masters. In maritime matters the Germans had no tradition, were idiots. The stupidity of the German admiralty caused the death of more than 1.000 German seamen at the Doggerbank.
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