Youtube comments of HaJo Os. (@hajoos.8360).

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  74. Weserübung was improvised...and the Germans had no time to lose by the necessity to secure Narvik's iron ore rail-road. This is proved by the fact, that the Brits reached Narvik at the same day. Every heavy cruiser passing Oscarsburg in slow speed would have been sunk. What Drachinifel missed to mention, is that the failure of Blücher was caused again by those miserable German flag officers, in this case rear-admiral Kummetz. He ordered slow speed. His flag-captain Heinrich Woldag demanded to sail as fast as possible to avoid Norwegian attacks. And as usual those useless guys in the Kriegsmarine were promoted. Drach's comparison with county-class heavy cruisers, i beg pardon, is totally useless. PE's Gunnery was quite superiour, the guns longer and heavier, more AA-gun-batteries, more and better 2nd artillery, 30 meters more length, 2 meters wider beam, (same speed), more torpedos. This caused a much bigger crew (including prize-crews), nearly doubled numbers, means more mess-rooms and supply-storage, and PE loaded respectively the double weight of ammunition. So, it is easy to understand where the additional displacement of PE is coming from and out of question, a little bit more research and less prejudice would be appropriate. After HMS London's refit the ships superstructure stressed under the new heavy weight. The ship was too small, the refits misconstructed. Remaining inside the treaty was seen as a ridiculous punctiliousness in Britain. Drach's beloved triple-gun-turrets are fine for a fleet in superiour numbers of ships, but impair the ships's stabilty, shifting weight out of the mid-centre. For minor navies fighting against superiour sqadrons more turrets to fight multiple targets are the correct construction-style.
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  78.  @rambysophistry1220  this is what they tell us in school or at the university. Wilson admitted in 1919 that the founding of the FED as it happened during Christmas holidays, was his main failure, because the FED is not federal, the ownership consists of US private banks, funny isn't it? During the Weimar Republic the Germans debated, too, the question of a private National-Bank or a public one. The Bank of England was a private bank, too, till 1948, after Bretton Woods there was no use of it anymore. The founders of the Bank of England in 1694 are still blacked. The II. Reich could refinance the war alone with war-bonds. Britain could not. JPMorgan gave big loans to Britain. In 1916, after Galipoli Britain loses the war, what meant, the JPs loans to Britain were going into default. Let die some unexperienced GIs to save those loans. Maybe you should hear the famous Freedman-speech (1961), available on YT. About Russia is to say that at the beginning of the Russian Civil war, the Entente Powers supported the White Guardists against the Red Army. The Red Army was in a bad state until Trotzki came back from his Canadian exile with a lot of money loaned from US bankers (mainly Jacob Schiff). With this money Trotzki managed the re-organisation of the Red Army, (the Entente Powers stopped the support for the Whites), won the Civil War, fought back the aggressive Poles who invaded Russia (Polish army stood beyond Kiev) during the Polish-Sovjet-War, lost only the last battle of Warsaw, what definded the ridicoulous border the Poles still demand. About WWII read Churchill-quotes. Churchill did not care about Hitler or any other Reichs-Government. Churchill aimed the destruction of Germany and the genocide of German people. After the war, he admitted, "we slaughtered the wrong pig". Churchill was the worst European politician in human history. He destroyed the biggest empire that the planet had ever seen, and additionally the continent of Europe in a lifetime.
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  176. Again a lot of work, Drach made, to present us the well documented sea-history, exspecially Nelson, of this age more lively. 3 decisive points in this fine documentation are false, from my point of view. 1. Nelson was not that genius, he was a propaganda figure. Of course, he was a good officer, a fine seaman, but no gentleman (easy to realise, how he handled the fate of Admiral Carraciolo). He won only against the amateurs & idiots, he failed against the professionals, for example at Tenerife. Sidney Smith & Thomas Cochrane were much more talented than Nelson & Nelson knew it, followed them with his jealousy. In my personal view both guys were the best sea-officers of all time. 2. Nelson did not invented the frontal attack against the enemy-line with 2 columns. Another more genius scotsman did it before. Admiral Duncan, a very smart giant, able to do the job of every able seaman, invented it 8 years before Trafalgar at the Battle of Camperdown against the Dutch. Unfortunately for the Brits, Duncan died already in 1804. He obviously would have avoided all those wrong decisions made by Nelson following the idiot Villeneuve. 3. Villeneuve was brave. Of course not, he was a coward & never fit for command. It was Boney's failure not to know his admirals by character. At the Nile the Frogs had only amateurs in command. Brueys sent the half of his crews to land for fetching water, instead to demand soldiers from Alexandria for the job. He knew that Nelson was after him, so the Frogs fought only with a half crew. Brueys anchored only by bow anchors, too frenchie lazy to bring out a spring on stern anchors. During the battle Villeneuve, commanding the rear, had enough time to establsih a spring for 2 ships of the line, to hammer the british bows of their leading vessels, let's say Bellerophon and Orion. And of course Boney had a better admiral relegated as a governor in the Carribean, Villaret-Joyeuse. Villaret-Joyeuse was educated by the best French admiral ever, Suffren (more british than the Brits, always demanded close action on pistol range). Villaret-Joyeuse (before the war a post-captain) fought without educated crews (with merchant sailing-masters on board) against Howe at the Glorious First of June. He was defeated tactically and won strategically. With his miserable crews this was an outstanding performance. Villaret-Joyeuse would have sailed into the channel and you, guys, would have to listen now a Froggish docu.
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  182.  @TheNecromancer6666  this counts only for the crews and engineers. The social differences and behaviour between officers and crews were not helpful and the circumstances of comeradeship on board were better in WWII. The Germans were enforced to use their experiences, for example 2 aft turrets of Seydlitz out of action at the battle of the Doggerbank, because they were inferior. Admiral Beatty was too arrogant to use conclusions and consequences, because he commanded superiour forces. I do not share Drach's opinion about the biggest calibre is the best. The Germans had in WWI and II more rounds ammunition on board, because their shells were smaller. About speed you are right in the German planning. But in reality German battlecruisers were one or two knots faster than their british opponents. At the Doggerbank Blücher slowed the Germans down. Without Blücher we would not have seen the battle. It is a major mistake to put slow ships into the line of battle, as we have already seen in the battle of Tsushima, but the Germans repeated the mistake at the Doggerbank and Jutland. With a smaller and faster high seas fleet at Jutland Jellicoe would not have been able to cross the German T. The opposite is the case, it is probable that Scheer would have crossed the British T, before the Homefleet would have formed the line of battle. The would have meant a decisive victory for the Germans. At the battle of the Falklands Admiral Spee failed totally, Lütjens failed always, Kummetz failed at the Oslo Fjord, and Captain Langsdorff failed at the battle of River Plate. The Germans admiralty was miserable in tactics and strategics, and they promoted the wrong men. They decided politically, always a mistake. The German admiralty was not even able to calculate the correct fuel demand for their operations, unbelievable.
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  222. The Union knocked out many federal forts with Monitors, at this time a necessary performance, which otherwise would have cost many lifes of Union-soldiers storming those forts. Ironsides were limited, because there are not so many white oak-trees on the planet. Iron ore is available. And the Union-engineers invented the turret. The HMS Captain was an idea, which failed, so she had done her job. But no one needs an historian to get this conclusion. Round ships were again an idea, which failed, but for inventions failures are programmed, only the US heroes land on the moon with trials of those modules. The Russians suffered a lot at Kinburn under the bombardement by the French swimming batteries Lave, Tonnante und Dévastation. About the Russian battleships at Tsushima is to mention, their crews were not trained, the shells were miserable, and they had too many slow ships in the line, so the Japanse could always cross the T. And the Russian admiral was sleeping when Togo ordered the koop of his line. Oslyabya seems to be a failed construction with a too high main emphasis, so the ship capsized easily. And the british pre-Dreadnought Mikasa was even not looking so good after Tsushima. The Japanese had a better admiral and better trained crews. In WWII the Brits were enforced to buy 53 US destroyers and they paid with their main military overseas bases on the planet, this is defeat of Britain by the US. What Preston is talking about the quality of US destroyers? In the age of warships Mr. Preston is talking about, engineers had no computer-models, they had to try and error. If Mr. Preston would have been responsable for warschip-building we would still row galleys.
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  260. Iowa-class battleships were a failed investment at all, a lot of money for nothing, often happens still today in the industrial military complex. The Iowa-class were useless as battleships, only used to transport US presidents & as batteries without the chance to receive unfriendly fire. The Panama-canal limit of a 33 meter beam & the monstrous propulsion enforced the reponsable engineers to prolongate the long straight mid-section of the ships, which implies a worse artillery-platform during a battle led at full speed & made the hull very vulnerable against incoming fire. Compare Bismarck's hull. Only a short part of the mid-section reaches a beam of 36 meters, a much better shape to stabilise the hull during action & delivers much better streamlines. That's the reason the US navy never exposed the Iowas to unfriendly fire. The Iowas are crap, armed pesidental yachts. All the new US battleships had that wide mid-aft section. USS Washington was critized for her seakeeping qualities when she served with the Home Fleet. And Iowa could not keep up with HMS Vanguard during heavy weather in post war NATO exercise "Mariner" in 1953. Vanguard's rounded hull looks very German, with a length of 248 meters & a beam of 33, a ratio better than Hoods with 262 & 32. But Hood was still better than the Iowas with 270 & 33. In comparison the Scharnhorsts relatively good 235 & 30, but they received always sea-damages & were wet as Hood. Bismarck tops all with 250 & 36. PoW & Repulse sunk already after a ridiculous pounding. Scharnhorst took more poundings than the Yamatos before she sunk. The shape of the hull is a decisive factor. This diminishes the theory of the British torpedo sinking of Bismarck to 0. 4 torpedo-hits were, of course, not enough to sink Bismarck, when Scharnhorst sunk just after the 14th ship-to-ship-torpedo-hit.
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  408.  @CaptCondor  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Harbour a map of Port Stanley oder Stanley harbour .... you see a close range battle would be enforced. And the Germans would have been outperformed by 2 BCs and 3 armoured cruisers with full ammunition bunkers, of course. The tactical advantage would have been on the German side, because they sailed. Movement is always superiour than a sitting duck. And 500 meters/yards to the shore are not too much to swim in the case of sinking. 2 heavily damaged BCs in Port Stanley would have caused a lot of problems for repairs and we do not know they would have been ready at the Jutland clash. The main point for me is the tactical mismanagement of the German admiralty, flag officers or ship-commanders in both WWs. Their tactical decisions were most times miserable, anyway we have look to WWI or WWII sea-battles. For example, Hipper, not a bad one, failed at the battle of the Doggerbank. To include Blücher into the line of battle-cruisers was wrong, because she was too slow and so slowed the entire line and caused the battle. Without Blücher we would not have seen a battle of the Doggerbank. After the wrong decision to include Blücher the try to escape was wrong. Hipper should have ordered Blücher to leave the line with course to North-East or better, more aggressive, more surprisingly to north-west, to split the british BCs-Squadron, and a course south-south-west for the german 3 BCs-squadron to cross immediatly the british T, a 10 minutes firing superiority, means 8-10 superiour salvos. During to the expectable british turning manoeuvre, the german destroyers would have had the chance to charge an torpedo attack. This is, what a british flag-officer instead of Hipper would have done. And this is, for what warships are built for.
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  515. With changes of the secondaries I would be d'accord. But the advantage of 5,9 inches (15 cm) is the ability to harm heavy cruisers or the superstructure of BBs. In the case of a bow- or stern chase, 8 secondary-guns could fire at the enemy. Cables outside any armour are not worthy any debate. I think the German slacker-engineers forgot simply some of them at the planning stage. I know about Drach's beloved tripple-turrets. But twin-turrets give the ship more stability. The weight is more centered. I think the Germans were oriented to the most British constructions with 4 twin-turrets. If Gneisenau's conversion would have happened, the main armament would have been the same like the Renowns. But some of Kriegsmarine's officers were against a conversion. They had reasons. Maybe You could tell us something about the British aspect of 4 twin-turret-constructions? Bismarck's hull had the best shape ever built, maybe in line with HMS Vanguard. The hulls of the late US fast BBs & the Yamatos were crap. Miserable streamlines, extremly vulnerable against incoming fire and bad seagoing- &- keeping capacities. USS Washington was critized for her seakeeping qualities when she served with the Home Fleet. And Iowa could not keep up with HMS Vanguard during heavy weather in post war NATO exercise "Mariner" in 1953. So the US navy never exposed their weak fast BBs to unfriendly fire. They remained armed presidental yachts or counter-shore-batteries, except Washington. The toughest ship ever, which was sunk, was Scharnhorst. So the British torp-sinking-theory of Bismarck remains useless. Scharnhorst sunk after 14 ship-to-ship-torp-hits, not air-to-ship- playmobil-torps in the cases of PoW, Repulse, Yamato & Musashi. What I evalue as a total German misconstruction is the German turret-shape, with 90 degree-sides. I think the British turret-design was the best ever built.
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  540.  @dovetonsturdee7033  Prinz Eugen consumed so much fuel, this ship could not sail anywhere to refuel permanently. The shipyard or turbine-producer promised too much or cheated. Infight the Hipper-class was maybe the best heavy cruiser class ever built, but the range was a real misconstruction for a ship of 200 meters length. As you said Bismarck was the main prize. So Lütjens major task was to bring her home to Brest. So Lütjens had to keep Prinz Eugen in the squadron. Air defense in a crossfire would have been more effective against those swordfishs and after a fatal torpedo hit, destroying the rudder, Prinz Eugen would have been able to tow Bismarck into Brest.or the protecting Luftwaffe bomber zone. It is very unusual to split squadrons. As you know Schneider was not not shocked at Denmark Strait, he asked several times for the permission to fire. After Hood opened fire, the intention of the Brits to attack, was obvious, don't you think so? Both ship commanders gave the permission to fire, Brinkmann after Lindemann. They judged the situation nearly properly or not? Please do not ignore my former argument, that there was no possebility to dodge the Brits, whether by speed nor altering the course. Not to shot back is simply cowardice, anyway to get the insight that the mission is failed. This was war, unleashed by the Brits & on the 7 seas a warship has to sink the enemy & always there is the possebility to get sunk. A sea-officer has to know it and to do his utmost, as the court-marshall of admiral Byng said.
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  545.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  Read simply the Bismarck's wikipedia with all related sources, including Baron Burkhard von Müllenheim-Rechberg. But Baron Burkhard von Müllenheim-Rechberg was on his battle-station & had, as you said, no idea, what was going on. According to Bismarck's wikipedia the 1. officer, Fregattenkapitän Oels, gave the order personally to scuttle in each engine room. About Lütjens at Berlin is to say, that all his predecessors were sent home on different opinions with the SKL. Lütjens said to his predecessors personally, he will take care not to get sent home. To support wrong tactical or strategic decisions means he was a man of no honour and as usual in the Kriegsmarine responsable officers were overchallenged, failed and get promoted. Usually British convoys were protected by a single BB-escort. The Germans could always gain a local superiority, overpower against the escort to sink ship by ship. This is what all smart German officers, as Hoffmann, thought. For his behaviour at Denmark Strait Lütjens, as a british admiral, would have been shot on his quarterdeck by a court-marshal decision for cowardess facing the enemy. The reason vice-admiral Holland attacked immediatly the German squadron at Denmark Strait, without waiting for Norfolk and Suffolk was related to British tradition, which was founded by the death sentence of the court-marshall against admiral Byng for his strategic defeat at the battle of Minorca in 1756. The decisive sentence, was .... "not doing his utmost", which inspired all british commanding officers till 1942. With the loss of PoW and Repulse, this old tradition was cancelled.
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  547.  @walterkronkitesleftshoe6684  2 entire BBs, nearly 4k men (crews of 40 subs) on sea for 22 merchant ships out of convois. Do You really think, this is a success? I dont think so, much too expensive. The point is, that Kriegsmarine ordered BBs (4), without to use them what they are built for. Pocket BBs or Subs were much better for the task, you mentioned and cheaper. The SKL was a bunch of cowards, not to use BBs for their main purpose, fighting other BBs. You mentioned Operation Berlin. The Germans spotted Convoy HX 106. Scharnhorst reported the escort HMS Ramillies to Lütjens, so Lütjens broke the attack up according to the standing orders of the SKL. Captain Hoffmann, commander of Scharnhorst tried to draw Ramilllies away from the convoy to give Gneisenau the chance to sink the convoy. Hoffmann was reprimanded for this by Lütjens. Hoffman was a real sea-officer, Lütjens omly a coffeehouse-baffoon. So 3 of 4 BBs were lost by action from the air, better to sink in a real battle. And Scharnhorst was lost by the lack of experience of a destroyer-officer, same story with Graf Spee. In case of Scharnhorst it was a strategic wrong decision to use her with radar which was not comeptitive in the arctic winter. Scharnhorst was superiour at daylight with her rangefinders. So SKL has to use her in areas where she finds some daylight. This is obvious or not? The SKL had never a strategic plan, already in the High Seas Fleet. Those fine german ships were only built for a yachting tour in the North Sea. Hipper-class heavy cruisers were the best ever built, but they consumed so much fuel, that they had no range, an obvious & decisive failure. But anyway the German navy suffered most under a lack of navy-tradition and a misconcepted promoting system. This is a typical german weakness.
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  548. This was a lot of work for nothing. Even Scharnhorst's 11 or worse Italian 12,5 inch guns could penetrate Bismarck's or Iowas or Yamato's armor belt. There is no point. In the final battle of Bismarck British shooting performance was really bad, point blank range and 6 of 7 shots missed a 250 meter target. 2,5 years later, with the development of radar, the Brits improved a lot. 14 hits on Scharnhorst by DoY, 1 decisive hit on turret A and one slightly above the armor belt into the propulsion room, which lowered Scharnhorst's speed to become a stitting duck as Bismarck. But to sink Scharnhorst the Brits needed 10 ship-to-ship-torpedos (not such a toy like a Swordfish-torp). The small calibre-fireworks on Bismarck made a lot of sense. Nobody could leave the infrastructure for repairs or firefights. Fact is, a british battleship could never sink a german battleship by artillery, in reverse, yes. Drachs idea, that 3 Dorsetshire-torps caused the sinking of the Bismarck is not very plausible. Bismarck sunk over the stern, because the bulkheads were opened from the stern. So it could be possible, that the Dorsetshire-torps penetrated Bismarck's hull above the main belt while sinking. The main reason for the loss of Bismarck is the idiocy of the highest ranking officer. His miserable decisions and his cowardess caused the loss. So the incompetent German SKL wears the responsability for choosing such an idiot for the position of a vice-admiral with a big bunch of useless staffofficers in his towline. The order to scuttle Bismarck was a fool's mission, too. To generate a prize of war, the Brits must have entered Bismarck to fight Bismarck's remaining crew man against man.
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  562.  @dovetonsturdee7033  you know nearly nothing about anything, or worse, you do not understand your own knowledge. German ships, as Bayern-class, were all sunk at Scapa Flow and the Austrians had no port anymore. So Frenchies and Italians were left in Europe with bbs, beside Britain, there was no competition. You could classify Hood as a battlecruiser, but Hood was more a bb and fast. As i quoted already, you see the performance of a sailing Hood at Mers-el-Kebir firing at modern French bbs in port. At least, speed is a major aspect to counter the enemy's rangfinders. And You know the result, a lot of dead Frenchie-seamen. Bismarck's crew came from 6-month-trials in the Baltics. Hood's and PoW's crews at Denmark Strait were not trained enough, but Tovey and Churchill did not care and sent them into battle. The Germans hesitated to send Tirpitz, with only 2-month-trials, out into the Atlantic to escort Bismarck. Captain Topp, commander of Tirpitz, proposed this. The amateur-failure of the coward Lütjens was not to keep squadron tactics and to send Prinz Eugen away, a fool's decision. No experienced admiral would have done this. And please, Doveton, do not ignore the facts. Hood's shooting performance at Denmark Strait was even more worse than the performance of PoW. It was no Sitting-Duck-shooting. The German squadron sailed with 27 knots, and Bismarck speeded up, during the battle up to 30 knots, overhauling PE. The inch-fetish of many bb-lovers is and was useless. Renown's performance (with a trained crew) at the coast of Norway was much better in really worse weather conditions, 3 hits on Gneisenau, and even Gneisenau made 2 hits with the 11 inch-guns, simply penetraiting, destroying the galley of Renown, meant some days cold food for the crew of Renown.
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  618.  @deankruse2891  Britain was liberal in Britain for the upper - and small middle-class, of course, but not the empire. Do you think the Empress of India was elected? I make not a real difference between feudalism and fascism. Drach is teaching us about RN action against slavery between around 1803 and 1863. But in Europe the first guy who forbade serfdom was Frederik the Great after the 7-years-war on Prussian royal properties. In Britain we had remains of serfdom till 1850. Prussia started in 1717 the project of compuslory education, with the success in 1816 of 60% registered students. Britain, at least, started compulsory education in 1914. About the US is to say, they are/were structured as the Republican Roman Empire. For US citizens (comparable to Roman citizens) it was a democracy till corps were allowed to refinance election campaigns, what means the US are in the process to become an oligarchy as their western partners, too. For non-US-citizens, as the West-Indians till 1903, the US are a fascist state with the business model of permanent war of aggression. With the exception of the British-US-war of 1812, the US soil was never attacked by foreign invaders, but the US were permanently attacking others. From the historical point of view, Trump was an exception, he was one of the most peaceful presidents of the US ever, except small gifts to the hardliners as the execution of the Iranian general Soleimani and 80 Tomahawks targeting the Syrian desert. But Trump is over, the fascist warmongers are back.
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  679.  @jackwardley3626  The 80 cm at Sevastopol needed a crew of more than 2.000 men. Maybe the Germans could knock out several deep digged bunkers, but the battery is very vulnerable. A ship is always more practicable for big guns than a land battery. Already the effort for German 11 inch guns on land was enormous. Coastal batteries are an exception, they work like ship-guns. Your mentioned performance about the superiority of big guns, is only on paper valid, not in the reality. There is a docu by Drach about ship's artillery on paper. When USS Washington ambushed Kirishima and hit Kirishima on point blank range several times with full 16-inch broadsides the performance was in the real result very poor. In 1941 British gunnery with rangefinders was poor. But in 1943 DoY's gunnery with more developed radar was superb. DoY hit Scharnhorst around 13 times & the decisive hit was slightly above the main belt into the propulsion room, which reduced Scharnhorst's speed significantly. It did not matter DoY made this hit with 14 -, 11- or 16 inch guns. The hit itselfes was decisive. Bigger guns need more storage for shells & charges. As Drach mentioned the Yamatos had only 900, a 100 as per gun in such a big ship. Watch Drach's docu about Seydlitz (11 inch guns) at the Jutland Clash, how much shells & charges remained after an entire battle. The Yamatos & the modern US battleships had really bad constructed hulls. They had never any chance in a real battle between battleships/battlecruisers, like Jutland or the Doggerbank. Both types, the Yamatos & the Iowas, would have been sunk immediatly.
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  706. Again, Hood in the list is a useless judgement. Hollands approach to use a Nelsonized tactic is not the ships fault. Holland and not the ship decided to close up to Bismarck in a 90-degree-T-angle. @Drachinifel .... Duquesne was a french admiral in french and swedish services. Already 10 ships were named after him and this ship was very fast, ok, no armour. But with this speed-ability she could, of course, outgun every destroyer or light cruiser at a long range. Pocket-Battleships were nothing else than Pocket-Battleships and they gained their speed with simple Diesel-engines, a great advantage for long-term-projects. Spee's battle at River Plate was miserable led by her captain, but the ship is not responsable for that. HMS Renown had a range of 6.580 miles at 18 knots, Graf Spee had a range of 18.800 miles at 18.69 knots. So her design was well for the task, and the RN needed more than a quarter year to find her. Drachinifel, we debated already Bismarck's failed turret construction. But the failure of Bismarck was due to her admiral. In the Battle of Denmark Strait, she would have been able, with the support of a heavy cruiser (PE), to sink Hood and PoW (KGV-class), that's the fact, (PoW was already done for) so your comparison is wrong. Afterwards her fate was again sealed by her admiral. And her admiral did not used the offer of Captain Topp of Tirpitz to invite Tirpitz into Rheinübung. Bismarck's beam of 36 meters was superiour to every other battleship, except the Yamato-class with 39 meters, to steady the ship in the case of a broadside-firing. The losses of the RN at the Falklands were most times sufferend against old Skyhawks of the Argentine air force. Without US support the RN is not able to defend the Falklands in a longer war. And with those F-35 jump jets there is no hope for the future.
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  744.  @OrdinaryEXP  you deserve an answer. The British performace to shoot at a slow moving sitting duck at nealy point blank range in the final battle of Bismarck (a target of 250 meters) was extremely miserable. Bismarck hit the bridge of PoW at Denmark-Strait with a 15 inch-shell, only captain Leach survived by coincidence. Very late the Brits developed a better shooting performance with radar-technique in 1943, when DoY made, very precisly in complete darkness, 13 14-inch hits on Scharnhorst with 2 formidable hits. One hit knocked turret A out of action, and the main century-hit slightly above the main belt the propulsion room, which limited the superiour speed of Scharnhorst down, the ship could not escape anymore. And it is most difficult to hit the very flat hull of a Scharnhorst-class BB. But to sink Scharnhorst, the Brits needed 14 torps. The point is the hit, not the caliber. High velocity 11-inch-shells from Gneisenau or Scharnhorst penetrated easily the armor of Renown, which meant cold food for Renown's crew. About Lütjens is to say, in his back 2 heavy cruisers, on his portside 2 battle-ships, on starboard the ice. There was no escape without fighting. And Lütjens never gave the order to open fire. Captain Lindemann and Captain Brinkmann gave the order to open fire as commander of their ships. Honestly speaking, a Holland in the same situation as Lütjens would have been court-marshalled and shot post mortem on his quarterdeck, judged for cowardice facing the enemy. I had the debate with doveton sturdee on Drach's Channel. Doveton is a well educated on-paper-seaman. Armor on paper is not the reality. The construction is decisive, and we see the results in rare historical battles. The German idea to build unsinkable ships made no sense, because the Germans, in case of losing the battle, always scuttled their ships. In the case of Lützow an entire fleet protected the evacuation of the Lützow's crew at Jutland. But without a fleet in your back it is nonsense. And the Germans had no fleet in WWII and the stupid German admiralty denied their 4 BBs combats against British or French BBs, a failure for the main purpose they were built for. And there were officers in the Reichsmarine who voted against the conversion of Gneisenau from 9 11-inch guns to 6 15-inch-guns. In WWII BBs were already to expensive to build and too vulnerable against air-strikes or torp-attacks. About Kirishima is to say, it was a British ship and old, in spite of several reconstructions. Kirishima failed to hit South-Dakota decisively. 9 16-inch-hits at point blank range of the undetected Washington were enough to sink Kirishima after many hours. But the main aspect were the hits, not the caliber. Washington was able to hit a magazine. And with this experience the US navy never exposed their BBs again, too expensive, too vulnerable.
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