Comments by "" (@VersusARCH) on "Drachinifel"
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All planes borrow ideas from others more or less.
Zero was certainly not a direct copy of any plane in the world, and was a design compromise VASTLY different than anyone else decided to make (um - 1500+km range!!!). It only borrowed some concepts pioneered on other planes (some of them Japanese, notably A5M). It was a monoplane with NACA cowling, monocoque design, retractable landing gear, arrestor hook, enclosed cockpit, directed exhaust, radial engine, cannon armament, radio, light aluminium alloys, drop tanks, could carry bombs... Other planes featured some of those earlier, but Zero was a unique combination of it.
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1:44:09 The Mary Celeste: The ship had been rebuilt not long before the fatal trip: another deck had been added to increase her cargo hold. Her center of gravity had thus been raised and consequently she rolled more than before and, perhaps more crucially - took longer to right herself. The crew of the Dei Gratia (the ship that found the abandoned Mary Celeste) found a significant amount of water in the hold and critically - a pump which had been dissassembled while being repaired - a process which was not completed.
What most probably happened is this: the Mary Celeste was in a storm, she rolled considerably, it was difficult for the crew to measure the amount of water she took, as it constantly rocked with the ship, and then the pump, that was critical for removing the said water, broke down. The crew tried to repair it but was being unsuccessful, and as time passed, for all the captain knew, the ship's hold was filling with water, the danger of ship rolling over and capsizing, killing most if not all on board becoming ever greater. So the captain at some point decided to evacuate the crew to a lifeboat, taking the basic navigational equipment to find land in case the ship rolled over and sank (had that happened the crew would have cut the rope) but, since the ship might also ride out the storm-tied the boat to the ship to re-board her if all ended well after all. Unfortunately, the crowded boat ended up being more prone to being rolled over by the storm waves than the abandoned ship - especially because the former was being steered by the latter via the rope, rather than by its occupants. When the boat rolled over, its drag increased significantly and the rope snapped. The boat then sank and its occupants all drowned in the storm. The abandoned ship, however, rode out the storm, to be found by the Dei Gratia.
This is the only explanation that fits all the evidence for me
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The Germans wrote a book about using almost ACTUAL privateers in both world wars (Moewe, Zeeadler, Wolf, Atlantis, Wieder, Kormoran, Pinguin, Thor, Orion, Komet, Stier, Michel).
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25:34 You seem to be describing the ROTARY engine, a short-lived design used in WW1 visually similar to the RADIAL engine while motionless. In the rotary engine the propeller was fixed to the circularly arranged cylinders and both turned together, while the crankshaft was static. The mass of rotating engine amplified the torque effect. Such a bizzare solution was adopted because the airplane speeds were insufficient to provide enough airflow to cool the engine with fixed circularly arranged cylinders that rotate the crankshaft to which the propeller is fixed - which is a basic description of a radial engine. Rotary engines had a lot problems, so once the engines became powerful enough to propel the planes at sufficient speeds to generate enough airflow to cool them properly, they were abandoned. Sopwith Camel for instance had a rotary engine. WW2 designs such as Swordfish, Zero, Wildcat, Thunderbolt, early FW-190 all had radial engines.
Every propeller- driven aircraft (be it rotary, radial or inline engined) with an odd number of engines suffered a torque effect.
Japanese carriers Akagi and Hiryu had islands on the port (left) side however. They were expected to operate in divisions made of 2 carriers with islands on different sides (Akagi's pair was the Kaga and Hiryu's the Soryu, both of which had islands on the starboard or right side) sailing side by side, island to island, so that planes could bank to different sides and reduce the risk of collision. By the time they were designing the Shokakus they realized that the former requirement was unnecessary and prioritized making things easier for the pilots going around torque effect-wise like everyone else.
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I'd say the commander of the Spanish armada takes the cake - losing an entire fleet to a few fireships and some bad but not catastrophic weather. He was a thoroughly inexperienced guy who did have a competent advisor but it didn't work in the end.
Also you had Jacob von Wassenaer Obdam, an army colonel given command of the Dutch fleet in a crisis of unity who oddly enough actually came up with a sound tactical doctrine later successfully implemented by admiral Michiel de Ruyter, but had ill suited ships and no experience to implement it, consequently getting himself killed in one of the worst defeats in Dutch naval history.
Compared to those two any of the admirals Drach listed were experts since they could... sail at least. Of those he listed the worst one was the Korean guy, then Villeneuve (with Mandalzade Hüsameddin Pasha of the Chesma debacle, giving him a run for his money), then Persano. Instead of Beatty who while very flawed was still in quite a few respects competent, Drach should have listed Yevgeny Alekseev, viceroy of Russia's Far East, who had bouts of command over the First Pacific Squadron of the Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War, an outright incompetent.
WW2... Tough call all were at least competent, I disagree inclucing Gensoul, his biggest mistake being allowing himself to be surprised through insufficient scouting... Perhaps Angelo Iachino would be my candidate (first Matapan and then failing to press his huge advantages in the Battles of the Sirte). Or Karel Doorman who lost one destroyer wrecked (non-combat loss) and another one lost in one of his own minefields... On the Japanese side Admirals Sentaro Omori (of Empress Augusta Bay debacle), Sadamichi Kajioka (1st attempt to invade the Wake Island debacle), Hiraoki Abe (who messed up the 1st Naval Battle of Guadalcanal although he had superior force) perhaps even Boshiro Hosogoya (for retreating at Komandorski Island) and three certainly competent admirals who made costly mistakes: Chuichi Nagumo Gunichi Mikawa and Takeo Kurita. Probably the Soviets have some good contenders too. Germans: Oskar Kummetz of the Barents Sea debacle, Brits? Dudley Pound (QF-17), Victor Crutchley of the Savo Island debacle. US: Carleton Wright (Tassafaronga debacle), Daniel Callaghan (messed up US plan for the First Naval battle of Guadalcanal, won by sheer luck, but got himself and Adm Norman Scott killed in the process), William Halsey (almost lost the entire invasion of the Philippines in an afternoon). French pretty much have only Gensoul out there to be considered, but many of the listed admirals from other countries were way worse.
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Regarding the commerce raiding. RN was the silent deciding factor of WW1. Sure the enormous French and Russian land armies contributed significantly, but they were matched by the Central powers' land armies. It was the RN blockade of commerce to the Central Powers that tipped the scales by: 1) slowly starving the Central Powers out of the industrial pairity with the Entente in the long run, 2) Diverting all US cargoes bound for Germany or neighboring neutral countries to UK where they were bought by UK with US loans - thereby effectively ensuring US support, and, when necessity seemed to arise, active participation in the war on the Entente side.
Regarding commerce raiding today - the only two navies capable of seriously endangering the US-controlled worldide maritime trade, the Russian navy and the Chinese navy are both under siege in geostrategic terms. Russia's Black Sea fleet (submarines included) cannot sortie through Bosphorus without being detected by NATO, their Pacific fleet is under watch from Japan, South Korea and Alaska, their Baltic Fleet would be spotted at Oresund and their Northern fleet would be spotted at the UK-Greenland SOSUS barrier. The Chinese navy is under siege by US bases in Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam and I believe if worse came to worst the US would absolutely make sure they are back on the Philippines. So neither of the two navies could do more than briefly interrupt the maritime trade with any SSGs they had in the open ocean prior to commencment of hostilities that were, for any reason, not tailed by NATO forces.
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0:58:03 Goeben was sent to the Mediterranean during the 1st Balkan War (1912-1913) and the reasons are a bit complex: The Balkan League (the anti-Ottoman alliance of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro in that war) was backed by Russia which was hoping for it to chase the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and hopefully from the Bosporus strait (as kinda proxies or at least small countries easier to bully or bribe than even the declining Ottoman Empire). Bosporus was (and still is) to Russia a hostile-held bottleneck that was shutting their Black Sea fleet in the Black Sea in case of war. Even if the League failed to take Bosporus it would still be a bite and hold step towards it - it was a long-term plan. Other European powers were for a long time doing their best to maintain the balance of power in Europe (although Germany managed to get away with the unification but the late response materialized during WW1). Earlier Russian moves towards Bosporus were countered with direct intervention in the Crimean War and a joint threat of intervention in 1878. which was diffused at the Berlin Congress (1878). During the 1st Balkan War the European powers agreed to throw the wrench into the League's plan (and indirectly Russian plans) by agreeing to form an "independent" country of Albania (in reality it was to be a kinda international protectorate mostly in the Austro-Hungarian and Italian spheres of influence). According to Balkan League agreements Albania was to be split between Greece, Serbia (thereby finally giving it a long coveted access to the sea) and Montenegro (a small part). The Balkan League quickly defeated the Ottoman field armies, failed to conquer the heavily defended Bosporus and besieged the several remaining holdout fortified towns. The poor, mountainous Albania was very poorly connected overland with Macedonia (where the decisive fighting of the Serbian theatre of that war took place) at the time and supplying a large conquering army via the existing roads was difficult to impossible.Therefore, Serbia agreed with Greece that the Serbian army which just conquered its part of Macedonia was to be ferried and supplied with Greek merchant ships from Salonika to Albanian ports to conquer its part of Albania and help the poorly equipped Montenegrin Army conquer the besieged Ottoman stronghold of Scutari (Shkoder) in their part. This was opposed by the other European powers who insisted Albania be made a separate country, The first batches of Serbian troop transports were already sent and arrived (disembarkation of one was interrupted by the Ottoman protected cruiser Hamidiye, sent to harass the Greek shipping in hopes the Greek armored cruiser Georgios Averoff would be detached from the blockade of the Dardanelles to catch her but to no avail - the Ottoman cruiser sank several ships in the shallow harbor of San Giovani di Medua but was prevented from sinking more still by the Serbian mountain guns firing from the deck of the merchant ship Trifimia which forced her to sail beyond range and the geography of the harbor, abysmal Ottoman accuracy and limited shell supply did the rest). Anyway, to stop the Serbian troop transports and ensure the creation of an independent Albania, the big powers (Austria Hungary, Germany, Italy, France, UK) sent a joint fleet to blockade the Albanian coast and prevent further seaborne transport and threatened direct intervention. That is why Goeben was originally sent there. The top left photo on the infobox montage is showing the flags of the intervening powers over the Shkoder fortress after it fell, note the German one in the foreground:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Scutari_(1912%E2%80%9313)
Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins persisted and eventually conquered the whole Albania overland including Shkoder (via bribery) but agreed to evacuate it after the war at Russian advice. (note the heavy Serbian and Montenegrin casualties during the siege of Shkoder, a testament to difficulties of properly supplying the besieging army in 1913 Albania overland) With most of the Serbian and Montenegrin armies fighting the Ottomans in 1913, Austro Hungarian army could have easily overrun Serbia and Montenegro (the League members with the greatest Russian influence) if it decided to intervene and with UK and even its ally France also backing independent Albania, Russia (and its proxies) would be defeated if they tried force their agenda. The Russians however got their Serbian proxies to intensify stirring Slav nationalism in Bosnia hoping to create national uprisings in Austria Hungary (the same tactic was used on the Ottomans by all the Balkan League Allies just before the 1st Balkan War) - which later resulted in the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. The creation of independent Albania led to a dispute among the Balkan League countries about the division of spoils taken from the Ottomans, now when the total was reduced at everyone but Bulgaria's expense which resulted with the 1913 2nd Balkan War and the dissolution of the Balkan League. Goeben stayed in the region along with other ships to protect German interests during that conflict too and beyond - until WW1 started. Serbia and later Yugoslavia continued to attempt to assert its influence over Albania by supporting factions within the newly formed country and was opposed in those efforts chiefly by Italy which had the same goals and methods - that game continued until WW2.
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1:02:50
By 1944 the Japanese were on the strategic defense. Their airpower, both land and carrier based was not sufficient to support large amphibious offensives the likes of which they were conducting in 1941-42 (and back then it was against weak opposition - by 1944. US has filled the Pacific with combat units). Besides they got the resources they wanted in the Dutch East Indies and all they needed to do to win the war is to beat the Chinese while repelling Allied counterattacks. The Japanese were not SEEKING a decisive naval battle. Kantai Kessen assumed a war with US - which now was the case - and in such a war such a battle would be coming to Japan anyway and the doctrine was looking for ways to offset the US superiority.
One thing that seems to slip off of minds of people is that WAR IS NOT A LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR ANY COUNTRY! It is a huge burden on economy, production is focused on war materiel which, unless it conquers something, results in 0 return for the investment immediately (and in case of a loss the return is less and less long term - depending on how bad the loss was - and even a victory can return a net loss on investment). Meanwhile population growth decreases, treasury gets drained, mortality and inflation rises, productivity in many if not most spheres falls (many of the farmers and workers are at the front not producing...), trade and exports decrease... And the neutral powers, potential rivals are often making a ton of cash selling necessities to war parties at inflated prices. Think of a country at war as a man running. Running a 100 m dash at 41 km/h would be akin total war, but it can only be done for a a few minutes (akin a few years of war). A man running a marathon is akin USA in Vietnam - limited war commitment. The man can run for a couple of hours just as the country can sustain a limited war for up to a few decades, but the marathon runner still needs to stop and rest after those few hours of running. In the end a man can go farther by walking (peacetime) than by running in one go. But certain situations necessitate running. So war is a kind of a race. The invader chooses when the race starts, so it is usually better prepared, but also usually runs on an uphill track since he needs to be stronger to succeed and his supply lines are by default longer.
The attacker therefore needs to concentrate his forces on sea, air and land in such a way to achieve the necessary advantage. In addition US is stronger economically overall. Kantai Kessen doctrine has correctly recognized both and was looking for a way to turn the tables. In effect it says "If we fight US or UK, they'll come at us in consecutive big concentrated fleet efforts that outgun us. Let's see how we can defeat those the way we had to defeat the Russian fleets in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima". There is no big difference in DOCTRINE between the Japanese attack on Midway and the US attack on the Marianas. Both seek to capture a strategically significant objective with a concentrated fleet action (as the most rational way) and there were hopes that a decisive blow could be struck against the enemy's fleet if it appeared (see the contemporary criticism of Spruance after the Philippine Sea for not pursuing the Japanese). It was just the US and Japanese TACTICAL dispositions that were different as they were shaped by the technology available to each at the time (the Japanese had no radar at the time hence they spread their destroyers around to provide early warning - the US later kinda did the same even with radar - posting forward the radar pickets - to provide earlier warning).
A doctrine postulates how you use your forces once the war starts. It may influence the decision, but certainly not decisively, on whether a country will start a war with a given country or not.
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@dennisweidner288 Yes. What you are talking about is true grand strategic consideration which takes into account perceived balance of power worldwide. Kantai kessen was an operational doctrine based on percieved operational doctrine of the enemy (notably plan Orange) and designed to give Japan the best operational and tactical chance to respond to it successfully. But the outcomes of the wars depend on many things other than tactical and operational doctrines. If you look at it, kantai kessen was not wrong at all... Most of the decisive US island hopping thrusts in the pacific were done with massed surface seapower and could only be effectively parried with massed surface seapower which Japan tried an the Philippine Sea and Leyte. And in both cases, in spite of them being terrible defeats it is generally recognized that doctrinally, the Japanese operational plans were sound, possibly the best available and and, superior to US plans in the same battles as ultimately implemented. The reasons for defeats lie elsewhere. Even the earlier battles such as Midway and to a lesser degree Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz involved concentration of nearly all first rate striking power of both sides in one place (sorry, battleships, you are outpaced and outranged by this point by carrier airstrikes) which is no surprise. Japan, at least in the first year of the war often fared quite well in smaller battles where the enemy managed to mass his fleet only partially or locally (Force Z, Java Sea, even Coral Sea a to an extent) which allowed Japan to concentrate enough forces to outnumber them decisively or fight under their own terms (ironically using tactics developped for the kantai kessen) - dealing with them was less of a problem than with full fleet actions.
Kantai kessen essentially says: when they come, they will mostly come in full force (rather than peacmeal) since that will give them the best chance to achieve their objective. They will outnumber us due to treaties and our industrial disadvantage. Now this is how we best deal with this and defeat them... Kantai kessen does not decide whether or when Japan declares war on the US but is a plan prepared in case war is already declared. It does not contain plans for Japanese war economy, just acknowledges the current reality. It reeally gets too much misplaced hate.
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Pre dreadnought fight: in 1904, after the Japanese torpedo boats attack the Russian 1st Pacific squadron at Port Arthur, France honors its alliance with Russia and declares war on Japan, UK honors its alliance with Japan and declares war on France, Germany decides to ally with France (note that they did historically help the Russian 2nd Pacific squadron with coaling) to even the odds and bring down RN (and get some colonies). Austria Hungary and Italy honor the Triple Alliance with Germany and declare war on UK. Finally Teddy Roosevelt, ever the opportunist, sees a good opportunity to gang up with the allies to take down RN and expand. So: you have RN vs Russian 2nd Pacific squadron, the French fleet, the German fleet, portions of the US fleet (plausibly - US contigent sails to Brest) and Italian and Austro-Hungarian fleet. The French Brest fleet and the USN from one side, and the allied Mediterannean fleets sail to break the British Gibraltar station, while the 2nd Russian Paific squadron sails to Germany to break out to Brest if the main RN body sails to help Gibraltar. If the latter stays put and the allied Mediterannean fleets breaks out to Brest, two combined allied fleets, one from Brest the other from Wilhelmshaven sail to jointly (coordinated by wireless) challenge the RN in, a climactic pre-dreadnought battle of Jutland. RN, on the other hand, would naturally attempt to engage the allied fleets piecemeal.
Japan meanwhile battles Russia's 1st Pacifific squadron and perhaps some US reinforcements based in Manila (which may, or may not decide to sail to Vladivostok).
I think the historians may have missed the significance of France not intervening for Russia in 1904. (out of fear of the superior RN) on Austro-Hungarian decision to declare war on Serbia in 1914. (banking on Russia not intervening out of fear of strong Germany, or at least France not intervening for the same reason).
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00:45:56 Apart from the RN campaign to destroy SMS Koenigsberg in the Rufiji river delta, and several battles in the Paraguay War, there was one river battle (estuary to be precise) at the mouth of the Pearl River during the 2nd Sino Japanese War:
From Wiki article on Chao Ho:
On 14 September 1937. Chao Ho and Hai Chow (formerly the Arabis-class sloop HMS Pentstemon) engaged the Japanese cruiser Yūbari and the destroyers Hayate and Oite. The Japanese ships were forced to retreat with the aide of the Bocca Tigris' forts land based artillery but both ships were damaged.
From www.combinedfleet.com tabular record of movement for the light cruiser IJN Yubari:
14 September 1937:
YUBARI is standing into the Pearl River estuary with HAYATE and OITE when they encounter two Chinese warships, the protected cruiser CHAO HO and the revenue cutter HAI CHOW (ex-HMS PENTSTEMON), leaving Humen (Bocca Tigris) Strait. The result is what might be the only surface action between the Chinese and Imperial Japanese Navy in the whole war. [2]
The Japanese squadron engages the Chinese vessels and the shore batteries at the forts protecting the Humen Strait. Both Chinese ships are damaged; HAI CHOW is hit three times and loses steering control. This causes her for a short time to be heading directly at the Japanese fleet, as if on a charge. Just as it seems the cutter will be blown out of the water, HAI CHOU regains control. The more powerful CHAO HO inexplicably fights only intermittently, and her captain soon orders a retreat. HAI CHOW manages to escape upriver as well. Ironically, CHAO HO's leaving the battle does her little good: she runs aground short time thereafter.
While returning to Taichang anchorage, the IJN squadron is attacked by CAF Northrop A-17 attack bombers, scoring several near misses. Five sailors from YUBARI are injured.
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Roberts: OK guys, the IJN has given us a lot of trouble in the past, and uh… they somehow survived the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea and reached Taffy 3. Does anybody feel our jeep carriers and a few destroyers can fight 4 battleships and a shitton of cruisers and destroyers or can we just run away from them?
Gambier Bay: Uhh, we're too slow and I think Evans on the Johnston had been spoiling for a fight for a while.
Roberts: Oh, he needs those admiral's epaulettes? Does he even have sufficient connnections and backing for such hopes?
Hoel: Yeah… but if he wins a Medal of Honor it will gain him the connections and he will have more backing.
Roberts: [sighs] Christ. OK, uhh well what we’ll do, I’ll run in first, uh…draw their fire. We can kinda just, ya know, lay a smokescreen. Um, I will use torpedoes to kinda scatter ’em, so we don’t have to fight a whole bunch of them at once. Uhh… when my torpedo run is done, I’ll need Gambier Bay to send his planes too, uh… so we can keep them scattered and not to fight too many. Um… when his air attack is done, of course will need St Lo to run in and do the same thing. Uh…we’re gonna need torpedoes on our planes, uhh so they can hurt, uh so we can of course sink them fast, ’cause they outgun us so badly. I mean, we’ll be in trouble if we don't take them down quick. Uhh, I think this is a pretty good plan, we should be able to pull it off this time. Uhh, what do you think St Lo? Can you give me a number crunch real quick?
St Lo: Uhhh.. yeah, gimme a sec… I’m coming up with thirty-two point three three uh, repeating of course, percentage, of survival.
Robberts: Uh…that’s a lot better than we usually do. Uhh, alright, you think we’re ready guys? [interrupted]
Johnston: Alright chums, (I’m back)! Let’s do this...
ERNEEEEEST EVAAAAAAAAAANS! [steams all ahead flank into the approaching Japanese Center Force]
Hoel: [incredulous] … Oh my God he just ran towards them. [follows]
Gambier Bay: Save him!
St Lo: Oh jeez, stick to the plan.
Roberts: Oh jeez, let’s go, let’s go! [follows]
Gambier Bay: [laughing] Stick to the plan chums!
Roberts: Stick to the plan!
Hoel: Oh jeez, oh fuck.
Roberts: Gimme air support, hurry up.
St Lo: Launching!
Gambier Bay: It’s saying I can’t launch! I can’t move, am I lagging, guys?
Hoel: I can’t move!
Roberts: What the – what the hell?
St Lo: I don't have time to arm torpedo bombers with torpedoes!
Gambier Bay: Oh my God…
Hoel: They just keep comming! More battleships!!
Roberts: I don’t think your planes can hurt them just with depth charges!
Hoel: Oh my God!
Johnston: We got em, we got em!
Roberts: I got it! I got it! [muffled shouts]
Gambier Bay: Planes, take off! Take off! [muffled shouts]
Hoel: Hoel's down. Hoel’s down.
Roberts: Oh my God..
Hoel: Goddamit, Johnston!
Roberts: Goddamit…
Gambier Bay: Johnston, you moron! [various other put-downs of Johnston amongst group]
St Lo: I’m on it.
Roberts: Smokescreen is on.
Hoel: Listen, this is ridiculous.
[Unknown:] You d*****s!
Gambier Bay: I’m down, Gambier Bay down. Goddamit. [shouting, then a pause, followed by other put-downs]
St Lo: St Lo is down.
Hoel: This is the (drowned out)th time IJN surprised us, God!
St Lo: Roberts, tow us! Roberts, tow us!
Hoel: Why do you do this shit, Johnston?
Roberts: I’m trying!
Johnston: [cries] It’s not my fault!
Roberts: Who’s dead in the water?
St Lo: We do have a tow line, don’t we? [everyone dies] Think I need a hull repair?
Hoel: Yeah but I don’t think we brought a repair ship.
Gambier Bay: [noticing everybody is dead] … Oh God…
Roberts: Oh for – [sighs, nearly chokes and swallows] Great job!
[Unknown:] For Christ’s sake! [indistinguishable]
Hoel: Johnston, you are just stupid as hell.
St Lo: Nimrod.
[[Another Ship:] Oh my God…
Johnston: … At least I ain't chicken.
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@Drachinifel [Singing to the tune of the song "Happy, Happy, Joy, Joy" from the Ren & Stimpy show]:
"Fletcher, Fletcher Tribal,
Fletcher, Fletcher, Tribal,
Fletcher, Fletcher, Tribal,
Fletcher, Fletcher, Tribal,
Fletcher, Fletcher, Tribal,
Fletcher, Fletcher, Tribal,
Fletcher, Fletcher, Yugumo!" 😂
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No country ever went to war due to "public opinion", USA included. It has always been a high level political descision based on strategic interests. Once the descision has already been made, the subordinate media would gear up and shape the public opinion to support the war in order to make the prosecution of the war less costly (for example in the price of cannon fodder).
USA entered WW1 when Russia began faltering (after the February Revolution) and a threat of a Central Power's victory became real. Of the two warring sides the Entente borrowed vastly more from the US - courtesy of the Entente navies' blockade that wasn't letting anything through to the Central Powers, the cargo being immediately purchased by the Entente thereby adding to their debts, and US otherwise also had far more business ties with the Entente Powers, particularly UK than with the Central Powers. Hence a Central powers' victory would both create massive problems for the Entente to pay its debt to the US and damage US economy. The Entente victory had an added benefit of damaging the competing, rather than cooperating, German economy. The Zimmermann Telegram and its acknowledgement, rather than being a major German blunder, was obviously a desperate attempt by Germany, which was aware that the Americans are about to join the war on the opposing side, to try to scare them away from it and reassure Mexico that they meant what they promised in the telegram. It just didn't work, but had it never been sent nothing would have been different, other than the declared pretext for the US entry to WW1 on the Entente side.
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Fluyt, Corvette, Merchant, Frigate, East Indianman, Fourth Rate, Third Rate, Second Rate, First Rate, Fifth Rate, Sixth Rate, Caravel, Carrack, Barque, Galleon, Galleas, Yacht, Sloop, Brig, Clipper, Pram, Retourn Ship, Pinnace, Brigantine, Junk, Sampan, Ketch...
I am of confuse...
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Drach, had Gensoul sailed to join the British or sailed to Martinique to be blockaded by them there - it would have amounted to treason to France, effective breaking of Franco-German Armistice provisions and led to German-Italian attack on Zone Libre as well as Algeria and Morocco then and there (instead of in 1942. after operation Torch). British seizure of French vessels in their harbors, their media promotion of De Gaulle and finally the attempt to force the French warships in Oran and Dakar to join them were certainly done with hope of provoking the Germans to attack the French again thereby forcing the French to defend themselves no matter how hopeless that defense might be. Such intent can be clearly seen in their subsequent attempt to create a forlorn hope Balkan front with Greece and Yugoslavia, their reasoning being that even if (I might as well say "when") those countries were defeated and occupied they would further stretch the German forces and expose them to guerilla warfare. You are hugely overestimating the importance of Gensoul's omission of relaying to Vichy of the "sail to Martinique" option. I have some doubts that it is even true, but even if it was - Vichy would certainly not have taken that option, but ordered Gensoul to sail to Toulon as he did.
Reasoning that "Hitler breaks agreements, therefore one should do whatever the Allies demand" does not hold water. EVERYONE breaks agreements (or at least renegotiates them in force) when the balance of forces guaranteeing the said agreements shifts and there is sufficient need. Allies broke agreements too (the very attack on Mers El Kebir is a prime example). And there were quite a few agreements that Hitler did not break (he respected Swiss, Swedish, Spanish and Turkis neutrality just to name a few).
Gensoul might be guilty of insufficient scouting (although the French did not have radar and the British sneaked up from nearby Gibraltar during the night, so it would have hardly helped anyway). He might be guilty of not mining the sh1t of the approaches to Mers El Kebir (a risky move internationally), or making sure sufficient force of Aeronavale aircraft is nearby to threaten to attack the British if they attacked (or coordinated with L'Armee de l'Air commanders to make sure they had such a force at hand if Aeronavale was depleted). But he was not wrong to reject the British ultimatum. He did his duty to his country. He got caught with his pants down (which was not all his fault) but did make the best out of a bad situation (bought time to raise steam and escaped the British with Strasbourg and all destroyers except the Mogador).
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38:19 - while the RN trolled the French, the French did respond a bit - Surcouf, Suffren, Dugay-Trouin, Massena, Montcalm, later also De Grasse for instance - named after the French naval and land commanders successful against the British. Oddly enough the British kinda trolled THEMSELVES (or showed a bit of solidarity with their French allies - take your pick) with the monitors Marchal Soult (named after a Napoleon's marshal, a fierce adversary of the British in the Peninsular war) and Marchal Ney named after a Napoleon's marshal that beat them at Quatre Bras (debatable). The Dutch navy trolled the RN with the names of their cruisers and destroyers - named after their famous admirals that successfully fought the English in the Anglo-Dutch wars (must have been fun for the captain of the RN HEAVY cruiser Exeter to be commanded from the Dutch flagship of the ABDA force at the Battle of the Java Sea - the LIGHT cruiser De Ruyter...). But the USN was perhaps the biggest troll of the British... Ships named Yorktown, Lexington, Saratoga, Bunker Hill, Bon Homme Richard... All connected to US victories over the British during the US War of Independence. And even if one got sunk the USN would give the same name to a new ship... Must have been fun for the British Pacific Fleet in late WW2 operating with the USN... In turn, one navy that nowadays kinda trolls the USN is the JMSDF - re-using the names of the Kido Butai's carriers and other major units of the IJN that terrorized the Americans in early Pacific War (although many of the names have actually had a far longer tradition in the IJN).
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@davefranklin7305 That might be true among the conservative higher ups like Osami Nagano, mostly prior to Pearl Harbor, but they were not in operational command of the Combined fleet which was handled by their younger and more up-to-date, tech savvy subordinates like Yamamoto or Ozawa. Yamamoto committed the Kongos to shell the Henderson Field on Guadalcanal only after the carriers, land airpower and lesser warships got beaten back (Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Cape Esperance, aerial campaign from Rabaul). At Midway - he withdrew them after the carrier debacle (USN targets too fast, the island - not worth it). Ozawa's plan for the battle of the Philippine Sea relied on long range airstrikes, battleships were only the escort. Only at Leyte Gulf where his air arm was woefully inadequate did he commit the battleships as the main striking force - because he had nothing left. No oplan survives contact with the enemy. Also applies to contact with technological advances. Whether rationalizing holding back battleships as the main strike force was used in planning papers to sell any particular carrier airpower-reliant plan to any conservative higher-ups I don't know but that is the likeliest explanation. By looking of what the Japanese actually did - they sure did not consider the battleships as a decisive weapon. Simply too slow, too heavy on resource consumption, firepower of too short a range compared to airpower, too big a moral blow if lost, too vulnerable to air or submarine attack. In short - cost innefficient. Finally - after Midway they began a huge crash program to rebuild the Kido Butai that included turning the two Ises to hybrid battleship-carriers, while after losing two Kongos at Guadalcanal they - as Drach said, converted the 3rd Yamato Class battleship hull to - not a carrier (since - low top speed) but - a huge air transport (with limited asw carrier capability for self defense). If this isn't a proof enough that they put emphasis on airpower (in case of carrier airpower - hit and run) rather than battleship guns - I don't know what is.
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00:54:48 Russian blood was up after the surprise attack at Port Arthur and they were bigger yet they lost. Granted, 1940s US and 1904 Russia has vastly different production capacities and the technology has advanced immensely, air power for instance, (the same applies to USSR vs 1904 Russia too). But high blood does not decide battles. It was still possible (albeit very difficult) for Japan to badly repel every US invasion fleet they produced and sent (and capital ships take long to produce, crews than need to be trained...). Of course they would have had to have done many things differently (pilot training x10 and MUCH better ASW), had a lot more luck (Midway), had much better intelligence (basically having their own ULTRA) and greater (and earlier) technology exchange with Germany (aircraft engines, radars, AAA...) .
Nuke Japan in 1945? Assuming Japan wins a string of naval victories that includes repelling the invasion of the Marianas and beyond... HOW DO YOU DELIVER A 4+t EARLY NUKE TO JAPAN?
Given that a B-29 or a heavily modified Lancaster were the only WW2 planes that could deliver such a massive bomb, you would have to do one of the following:
1) Fly them from unoccupied parts of China (assuming the Japanese failed to crush KMT in this alternate history in which they are far more successful than they historically were) - spies, much better early warning... In this alternate history Japan has not been firebombed for almost a year before nuking and its interceptor force is not bled dry... The bomb carrying plane would have been shot to pieces long before it reached Japan.
2) Fly a one-way B-29 mission (crew parachutes near a submarine) or wait until 1946 for B-36 Peacemaker and fly a strike from Anchorage - similar to above.
3) Get the USSR (which has a non-aggression pact with Japan from 1939 until it broke it in Aug 1945) to allow a nuclear bombing mission... Allowing a communist country to possibly snatch a nuclear weapon at the time USA has nuclear monopoly and falsely believes the USSR is decades from making its own bomb... unlikely. And the problems stated in point 2) still apply.
4) Battlefield use - nuke front line island bases or Japanese troop concentrations in China?... Assuming the plane does not get shot down by land or carrier based interceptors, the IJN still prevents seaborne taking of the nuked island as nukes are not that effective against fleets. On land, the troops are relatively widely dispersed. It would hurt but 10,000 troops lost is not something Japan quits a war for. Also, only one nuke in 2 weeks could be produced (granted Japan didn't know this, but in this scenario it is not Japan proper that is hit and its production capacities are not affected), and Japan (and Germany) had their own nuclear programs that would be switched into overdrive and produced some bombs of their own in a few years USSR style... If USN could not break IJN, nukes still stay far away from Japan... and in China - how far would the poorly supplied (by air bridge across Himalayas only) Chinese advance after a few nukes? Also after the first nuke the Japanese troops would start digging deep dugouts as bomb shelters (as they historically did on Iwo Jima or theGermans did on Western front in WW1 to shelter from heavy artillery) which would minimize the effects of nuclear strikes.
PS Getting the USSR to join the war - again, depends how it fares against Germany in this alternate history, but assuming war in Europe ended as it did, would have done the trick, but only on Asian mainland - thus - peace, not capitulation.
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00:26:27 Midway (Japanese strategic carrier offensive capability largely neutralized), Phillipine Sea (Japanese carrier arm largely neutralized), Leyte Gulf (IJN as a whole largely neutralized)...
Before WW2: Salamis, Ecnomus, Actium, Sluys, Raid on Medway, Qiberon Bay, Saintes, Nile, Trafalgar, Yellow Sea, Tsushima,
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With regards to the speculative night action at the Indian Ocean in 1942: Both the Japanese carriers and their escorting Kongo class battleships were significantly faster than the British battleships (30+kts vs 23kts, the exception being the slightly faster Warspite at 25kts). With the advantage of radar the British could potentially position their ships to have moonlight to their advantage and surprise the Japanese with opening salvoes and cripple a couple of ships, but they would never be able to close as much as at Matapan since the Japanese had 19 destroyers screening their fleet, whereas the 2 Italian cruisers sent to tow the damaged third one at Matapan had just two destroyers with them. And time and time again the WW2 night engagements showed that the fighting power of smaller, torpedo-armed ships was much closer, or even superior to that of bigger gun-ships at night with prime examples being the battles of Cape Bon, Bali, Tassafaronga, naval battles of Guadalcanal (Washington retired out of fear of being torpedoed), US PT boats' successes against the Tokyo Express at night, opening moves at Surigao Strait or sinking of the Haguro. And in 1942. Indian Ocean, we are talking IJN at its prime armed with long range type 93 torpedoes, good night optics and night fighting training not behind that of the RN. So at best the British would be able to hurt the Japanese, perhaps sink a capital ship or two and then the action would turn into a destroyer brawl and the remaining Japanese carriers and battleships successfully fleeing the battle firing only if necessary (see Chuichi Hara's handling of the fleet during the battle of the Coral Sea in the night before the final day of the battle). And in the morning the livid Japanese would send all the planes they have to get Revenge (and other RN BBs :)) - last day of the Coral Sea or Midway style and unless some very bad weather saved them the British would be hit. However, the Japanese would certainly not manage to sink all the RN battleships (that too goes for the ideal Japanese scenario where all the carriers launch a comfortable concentrated attack in the morning). Just check the battle of the Sibuyan Sea or even the Pearl Harbor itself. My estimate is that they would manage to sink between 1 and 3 battleships depending on the size of the attacking force and luck. The British would not scatter but rely on mutually supporting AAA. Even at the sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse the escorting RN destroyers got away. Their 90 attackers had been heavier twin engined land based bombers with bigger bombloads than the D3A carrier dive bombers, (albeit with lower accuracy). The 5 Japanese carriers had something like 120 torpedo bombers between them, but the far stronger escort of destroyers and cruisers would lay a far stronger AAA barrage than the one defending the PoW and Repulse.
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Jutland was a skirmish compared to Leyte Gulf, Tsushima, Four Days Battle, St James Day Battle, Beachy Head, Lagos, Trafalgar, Nile, Lepanto, Actium, Ecnomus or Salamis. Seriously, in spite of all the talk about battleships (just because they WERE at Jutland and fired shots) - almost all the decisive hits in the battle were scored by battlecruisers, all the capital ships sunk were battlecruisers and therefore - for all practical intents and purposes it was a German battlecruiser victory, and a brief indecisive skirmish of the main battlefleets.
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@Drachinifel Hey, thanks for the response. Btw I believe I was a bit stingy on praises in my comments on your videos thus far since I commented almost exclusively about the things I disagreed with you about, but I should say: whatever I did not comment about I either mostly agreed with or simply learned from :) So kudos, a great effort! (I've been a subscriber for a while)
The reasoning in my comment above is based on the following historical examples:
1) Polish pilots: they trained extensively on their PZL fighters in the 30s expecting to face the Soviets sooner or later, but once the Germans attacked with more numerous and technologically superior aircraft and mostly rush-trained pilots (there weren't all that many Spanish Civil War veterans), they won. Sure the Poles proved elusive targets and shot down some planes but it was futile. But once the survivors got up-to date Hurricanes in the Battle of Britain - they shone. You may check the "Bloody Foreigners" - The Untold Story of The Battle of Britain (available on youtube) 17:59-18:37 the testimony of one of the Polish fighters from the RAF 303 Squadron (Polish) who fought both at home and in Britain about how easy it all was in a Hurricane vs the old PZL-11
2) The Soviets. They got massacred in the beginning although they had veterans as well as the Germans - from Spain, Finland and Khalhin Gol. They also had the numbers. But most of the aircraft were outdated (I-15, I-16) sub-par (LaGG-3) or poorly suited for the battle ahead (Mig-3). So by late 1942. the rookies held the line and the training was the most basic. But then they got Yak-9s, and La-5s which were a match for the German fighters in Eastern Front battle conditions. And by mid-1943. they turned the tide.
3) The Japanese vs US historically, mid 1943. Just watch Dogfights: Zero killer (available here on youtube) from 12:00 to 15:00 - how a US rookie in a new Hellcat easily killed a Japanese 9 kill ace in an A6M3 Zero in a 1:1 dogfight just thanks to the superiority of his aircraft. Sure there were accounts of skillful Japanese pilots being a headache to hit for the green Americans, notably the Japanese ace Saburo Sakai, blind in one eye by this point in the war, in an A6M5 Zero evading an attack of 15 green Hellcats in late 1944. off Iwo Jima, but one needs to hurt the enemy badly enough too in addition to surviving in order to win a war.
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@chrisknight6884 France, although defeated in 1940, still had some negotiating options. Firstly their fleet could be useful to the allies. If the Germans pushed too far with thrir demands France could continue the war from their colonies, some of which were beyond Axis reach, with their fleet being the major asset. The Axis needed to balance their desire to grab the French fleet against having to invade the whole of France, garrison it, therefore dispersing their troops, and fight even more resistance fighters. And even then they would likely not grab their fleet as it could sail to the allies (as bulk of the Italian fleet did in 1943) or scuttle itself (like the French ships in Toulon did in 1942). On the other hand the French knew that price for continuing the war was a straight away full occupation of the metropolitan France by the Axis, further destruction there, executions due to resistance (see Klaus Barbie - butcher of Lyons to see what I am talking about). Now many of the German-occupied countries faced the same dilemma, with certain members of the government and army command fleeing the country just before it was overrun with some military forces, and joining the Allies to continue the fight, while back at home some sort of puppet government was formed as some sort of administration was needed to keep order and prevent general famine (even if some of those were forced by the Germans to commit terrible atrocities against parts of their populace). Therefore it was a dilemma: make a modest contribution to the fight for the greater good against the Germans at massive cost in lives and property to your country (see Yugoslav, Greek or Polish guerilla resistance movements during WW2) or mostly shy away from further provoking the Germans by attacks and/or sabotage and be largely left alone by them to sit out the war that could only be won by huge unoccupied industrial powerhouses like USSR and USA and to a lesser degree UK anyway (see Denmark, Norway - their resistances, while existing and active came nowhere close to near all-out commitment made by the first group of countries). Sweeden, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey played the latter part masterfully, avoiding the war altogether (some joined symbolically just before it ended). Now France obviously did not avoid the war altogether but it was still a highly developed industrial country. Continuing the war for the Allies as a mere auxiliary would incurr a disproportionately high cost compared to contrubution. The poor countries like the newly resurrected Poland or the Balkans had little to lose other than lives of their mostly simple folk. France was a great power before the war, it had industry and a critical mass of highly educated populace that could help it stay a great power after the war. I think trying to prevent war from destroying those was on Vichy officials' mind all along - Gensoul included. As a vindication of this stance note that most of the resistance leaders were upstarts - those who were clawing their way to power, not those who already had it before the war (Polish, Yugoslav, French, Italian and Greek communists that never held power there before the war and Mihajlovic in Yugoslavia, De Gaule in France - mere colonels etc. With the possible exception of the heads of Armia Kraiowa in Poland). Had Gensoul joined the Allies or sailed to US, Germans would have seen that as betrayal of the Armistice terms and invaded the Zone Libre in 1940. - just as they historically did in 1942. after receiving information that the French largely allowed the US and the British to invade their North African possessions without resistance in the operation Torch - whereupon the French Fleet in Toulon scuttled itself. Other than disrepair, the British attack on Oran and Dakar in 1940. probably was a major reason why, at that point, when they had nothing more to lose, they refused to sail to join the Allies instead.
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Could you make a similar video about the destroyers of minor navies: Poland, Spain, The Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Norway, Sweden etc? (sorry if I missed anyone who had interwar destroyers, AFAIK China and Finland did not). If one video would be too long, you could cluster them into Baltic & North Sea group, Mediterannean group and South American group.
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@mylanmiller9656 On the top of my head I can name the following allied fighters that faced more powerful Axis counterparts:
Facing superior Bf-109 variants:
PZL-11, Ms-406, MB-152, MB-152 Curtis Hawk 75, Fokker D XXI, Fokker G. I P-40, LaGG-3, I-15, I-16, Hawker Hurricane, Hawker Fury,
Facing the A6M2: Brewster Buffalo, P-39
Facing Fiat Mc-200 and G-50: PZL-24, Gloster Gladiator,
Facing FW-190 P-38, Spitfire V,
Facing Me-262: P-47. late war Spitfire variants Hawker Tempest P-51, Yak-9, Yak-3, La-7...
I am sure quite a few could be added
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@UNSCForwardontodawn No successful propaganda ever stated "This is propaganda, now listen:" History books are full of various types of propaganda you need to learn to spot them by applying critical thinking on facts only and ignoring conclusions the book is trying to shove into your head since that is one of the places of the book where the propaganda is most often found - be it by the propagandist author or by other propagandists whose spin the author has bought into and is repeating.
Excellent example of propaganda BS is the notion (found in, among other places in Encarta Encyclopedia no less) that the sinking of the Lusitania was an important factor in US entry to WW1; in reality US entered the war about a full year later and just used it as a rallying cry, having no single better event during which Germans killed Americans to point to.
K/D is always important, but that does not mean more than 1:1= victory, it differs from battle to battle, not to mention war to war - based on balance of power between the combatants, but could be other objectives too. But sufficiently favorable K/D was the HSF objective at Jutland and they achieved it. It was achieved at considerable risk - but due to the balance if power that was HSF's ONLY (slim) CHANCE to beat RN. Scheer effectively had ptsd after the battle so he to a degree chickened out instead of continuing with the strategy with the same drive as before Jutland (he actually did, but more timidly). But a cooler head would have drawn different conclusion - since, it is not just hindsight to say that Germany was slowly being starved into defeat by being almost completely cut off from world trade by Entente powers, in which the RN blockade played a very important part.
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@HootOwl513
O'Hare was last seen at the 5 o'clock position of the TBF. About that time, the turret gunner of the TBF, Alvin Kernan (AOM1/c) noticed a Japanese G4M "Betty" bomber above and almost directly behind O'Hare's 6 o'clock position.[39] Kernan opened fire with the TBF's .50 cal. machine gun in the dorsal turret and a Japanese gunner fired back. O'Hare's F6F Hellcat apparently was caught in a crossfire. Seconds later O'Hare's F6F slid out of formation to port, pushing slightly ahead at about 160 knots (300 km/h; 180 mph) and then vanished in the dark. The Avenger pilot, Lieutenant Commander Phillips, called repeatedly to O'Hare, but received no reply. Ensign Skon responded:[40] "Mr Phillips, this is Skon. I saw Mr O'Hare's lights go out and, at the same instant, he seemed to veer off and slant down into darkness." Phillips later asserted, as the Hellcat dropped out of view, it seemed to release something that fell almost vertically at a speed too slow for anything but a parachute. Then something "whitish-gray" appeared below, perhaps the splash of the aircraft plunging into the sea.
In Chapter 16, "What Happened to Butch", the authors write, "Butch fell to his old familiar adversary, a Betty. Most likely he died from or was immediately disabled by, a lucky shot from the forward observer crouched in the rikko's [Betty's] forward glassed-in nose ... the nose gunner's 7.7 mm slugs very likely penetrated Butch's cockpit from above on the port side and ahead of the F6F's armor plate."[42] In the index, Ewing and Lundstrom flatly state that Kernan is "wrongly accused of shooting down Butch."
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How about you start making bio specials on notable naval personnel?
Some ideas: Temistocles, Sextus Pompey, Christopher Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci, Vasco Da Gama, Andrea Doria, Uluj Ali, Ferdinand Magellan, Admiral Yi, Michiel de Ruyter, L'Olonais, Henry Morgan, Francis Drake, John Paul Jones (ok you kinda covered him), Fyodor Ushakov, Balili de Suffren, Tordenskjold, Thomas Cochrane, Robert Surcouf, Miguel Grau, Felix von Luckner, Lothar von Arnauld de la Perierre, Helmuth Von Ruckteschel, Tetsuzo Iwamoto, Luigi Durand de la Penne.
Oh and a special on the mutiny on the Dutch East Indianman "Batavia" would be great.
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@allangibson8494 No. American forward bases were much closer to Japanese economic sea lanes than Japanese bases were to US economic sea lanes. The Japanese could only hit transports carrying troops and equipment to those forward bases, but as I explained, those were concentrated into heavily guarded convoys, and those bases bristled with ASW assets.
Economic sea lanes are sea lanes which carry vital strategic raw materials for the war industry. That's many more ships than those carrying concentrated end products in form of armament, manpower and provisions to the front. Japan, being an island nation with scarce resources relied heavily on maritime transport to feed its industry and population and those sea lanes became exposed to US submarine attacks fairly quickly as US had a forward pase at Pearl Harbor and continued to establish new, closer ones as it advanced throughout Pacific. US economic sea lanes that Japanese submarines could theoratically hit albeit briefly were those along the US West Coast, but there were others beyond Japanese reach (East Coast, Great Lakes) the former of which, granted, Germany could hit but also only briefly. However, USA constituted a better part of a resource-rich continent crisscrossed by railways, so sea lanes were not that vital to the US was industry in the first place.
Japanese submarine doctrine largely reflected the geostrategic reality of the Pacific War. It did not have an island-nation enemy, heavily reliant on sea lanes right next door like Germany did once France fell, so it simply had far fewer merchant ship within its reach to target, even if some of their submarines were indeed some of the longest range ones during the war...
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@gregorywright4918 They tried to stop what they saw a wave of intruders establishing a country on the land they considered their own. Israel did not exist for millenia, Egypt diid exist in some form at the time. Israel engages in ethnic cleansing of Arabs on the territory it holds to this day. One could point out they could be far worse, but the fact that they are not is due to pressure from great powers that are making good money out of that long and bitter conflict.
When in the 1969-1971 period a group of Native Americans tried to take over the Alcatraz island (which USA took from them just a few hundred years before) and declare it an independent country, US objected of course and most probably broke up their movement through infiltration and murder (by NSA). The difference was Israel had powerful backers when it was being re-established and the said Native Americans did not.
Purpose of my responses was to point out how biased, propagandistic, hypocritical and quite simply stupid is to try to argue how one side is "right" and the other is "wrong". In reality might makes the reality, (that is why armies, and the topic of this entire channel - navies, exist) and then the propaganda of the side that has the upper hand at the moment tries its best to make that side appear "right" and "just", mostly by using cherry picked information, lies (rarely) and spinning interpretation. Simultaneously the opposing side's propaganda is trying to do the same using the same methods.
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33:54 Yes, 3 Austro-Hungarian monitors that included the monitor SMS "Bodrog" fired the first shots of WW1 at Belgrade (capital of Serbia which was separated from Austria Hungary to the north only by Sava and Danube rivers) a little after 01:00 AM on 29. 7. 1914. (A-H declared war on Serbia the previous day) while escorting a troop transport named "Alkotmany". The shelling was responsible for the first soldier KIA in WW1 - a young Serbian paramilitary volunteer named Dušan Đonović (Dushan Djonovich). The first Central powers' KIA followed soon after when the Serbian Army pontooneers commanded by captain Mihailo Alić (Mihailo Alich) blew up the Belgrade railway bridge over the Sava River (which still exists as "Old Railway Bridge") as the "Alkotmany" was sailing underneath, the collapsing steel truss killing its captain Karlo Eberling.
The monitor "Bodrog" survived the war, was captured by the Serbian Army in the closing days of the war (in a grounded state), renamed "Sava", joined the navy of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes (the country was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929), was scuttled during the 1941. German invasion of the country , was raised by them, repaired, given to the collaborationist Independent State of Croatia, was scuttled towards the end of WW2, raised again by the postwar communist Yugoslavia, used for a while, then retired, turned into a gravel barge, later hulked and left to rust until being recently restored and turned into a museum in Belgrade. I visited her. Main guns are fake look-alikes, but light guns are real. It has a nice collection of photos, uniforms and crew items, but I believe work on her is not complete.
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@mishkata348 In order for Japan to win the USSR would have had to be neutralized by Germany, otherwise the Soviets would crush the Japanese in Manchuria as they historically did in 1945. sooner or later. Also by the time the US developed nuclear weapons Germany would have to develop its own and occupy Britain. Japan would consequently invade the British India (creating a puppet state if wise), Ceylon, and Madagascar (to maintain control over its maritime trade) starving the Chinese into surrender and possibly occupying Australia. Cooperation, coordination and tech-exchange between Germany and Japan would have to be far better than it historically was. In Britain the Germans could have gotten their hands on centimetric radars and advanced fire control computers. If passed on to Japan and mass-produced it just might have enabled the Japanese to beat back US carrier offensives (faster aircraft engine development, better ASW and better use of their own submarines would also be imperative for the Japanese to win). Invading Oahu? Just maybe once all of the former was done. The war would then turn into a race for nuclear-armed aircraft carriers and intercontinental bombers, but if the kind of Cold-War tech pairity was achieved the war would end with US in firm control of the Americas, Germany controlling Europe, a puppet USSR/Russia and Africa and Japan fusing with China, controlling Austraila and a pupet India. The future would be determined by the relations between Germany and Japan. If cordial, the US would slowly be marginalized.
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Wrong about what would make the most difference for the Japanese in WW2 of those three. Had they kept pace in aircraft design, it would in their case, before anything else, mean that they have AIRCRAFT ENGINES OF THE SAME POWER AS THE ALLIES. A6M2 Zero engine: 950 hp, Wildcat engine: 1350hp, and it only gets worse mid-war. If Zero had the engine as powerful it would have been designed very differently. The design would have been able afford sturdier construction, self-sealing fuel tanks, boosted controls, some armor etc. The plane would have been far less perishable. The same goes for dive and torpedo bombers. BOOM - casualty rates go down compared to history. I doubt it would have saved the Japanese carriers sunk at Coral Sea, Midway or Eastern Solomons in itself, though - it would take at least radar for that - but it would have made the battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz more damaging for the USA - Enterprise would have been sunk. With that and fewer losses in the air - Shokaku and Zuikaku remain in the field, drive away USN from Guadalcanal, together with Rabaul (or if brains prevail faster-built Munda) based aircraft neutralize the Henderson field and 1st marine division gets captured. Furthermore, it is not the experienced prewar pilots that won WW2, it was the wartime-trained rookies/regulars. With up-to date machines the Japanese would have had some chance to keep beating the batches of Essexes as they got sent to the Pacific until the war across such a distance became too expensive even for the USA to prosecute and it agreed to some kind of compromise. But it is true that keeping their carriers would have made the least difference (It would have made a difference at Guadalcanal though - an overwhelming air attack on Enterprise and Hornet by four-carrier (not 6 due to air losses) Kido Butai would have driven the USN away, knocked out the Henderson field and won the campaign. But they'd lose 2 more carrier's worth of aircraft so they'd be out of breath for the upcoming major USN counteroffensives.
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