Comments by "" (@VersusARCH) on "The Drydock - Episode 100" video.

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  5.  @davefranklin7305  That might be true among the conservative higher ups like Osami Nagano, mostly prior to Pearl Harbor, but they were not in operational command of the Combined fleet which was handled by their younger and more up-to-date, tech savvy subordinates like Yamamoto or Ozawa. Yamamoto committed the Kongos to shell the Henderson Field on Guadalcanal only after the carriers, land airpower and lesser warships got beaten back (Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Cape Esperance, aerial campaign from Rabaul). At Midway - he withdrew them after the carrier debacle (USN targets too fast, the island - not worth it). Ozawa's plan for the battle of the Philippine Sea relied on long range airstrikes, battleships were only the escort. Only at Leyte Gulf where his air arm was woefully inadequate did he commit the battleships as the main striking force - because he had nothing left. No oplan survives contact with the enemy. Also applies to contact with technological advances. Whether rationalizing holding back battleships as the main strike force was used in planning papers to sell any particular carrier airpower-reliant plan to any conservative higher-ups I don't know but that is the likeliest explanation. By looking of what the Japanese actually did - they sure did not consider the battleships as a decisive weapon. Simply too slow, too heavy on resource consumption, firepower of too short a range compared to airpower, too big a moral blow if lost, too vulnerable to air or submarine attack. In short - cost innefficient. Finally - after Midway they began a huge crash program to rebuild the Kido Butai that included turning the two Ises to hybrid battleship-carriers, while after losing two Kongos at Guadalcanal they - as Drach said, converted the 3rd Yamato Class battleship hull to - not a carrier (since - low top speed) but - a huge air transport (with limited asw carrier capability for self defense). If this isn't a proof enough that they put emphasis on airpower (in case of carrier airpower - hit and run) rather than battleship guns - I don't know what is.
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  6. 38:19 - while the RN trolled the French, the French did respond a bit - Surcouf, Suffren, Dugay-Trouin, Massena, Montcalm, later also De Grasse for instance - named after the French naval and land commanders successful against the British. Oddly enough the British kinda trolled THEMSELVES (or showed a bit of solidarity with their French allies - take your pick) with the monitors Marchal Soult (named after a Napoleon's marshal, a fierce adversary of the British in the Peninsular war) and Marchal Ney named after a Napoleon's marshal that beat them at Quatre Bras (debatable). The Dutch navy trolled the RN with the names of their cruisers and destroyers - named after their famous admirals that successfully fought the English in the Anglo-Dutch wars (must have been fun for the captain of the RN HEAVY cruiser Exeter to be commanded from the Dutch flagship of the ABDA force at the Battle of the Java Sea - the LIGHT cruiser De Ruyter...). But the USN was perhaps the biggest troll of the British... Ships named Yorktown, Lexington, Saratoga, Bunker Hill, Bon Homme Richard... All connected to US victories over the British during the US War of Independence. And even if one got sunk the USN would give the same name to a new ship... Must have been fun for the British Pacific Fleet in late WW2 operating with the USN... In turn, one navy that nowadays kinda trolls the USN is the JMSDF - re-using the names of the Kido Butai's carriers and other major units of the IJN that terrorized the Americans in early Pacific War (although many of the names have actually had a far longer tradition in the IJN).
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