Comments by "" (@VersusARCH) on "The Drydock - Episode 142" video.
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1:02:50
By 1944 the Japanese were on the strategic defense. Their airpower, both land and carrier based was not sufficient to support large amphibious offensives the likes of which they were conducting in 1941-42 (and back then it was against weak opposition - by 1944. US has filled the Pacific with combat units). Besides they got the resources they wanted in the Dutch East Indies and all they needed to do to win the war is to beat the Chinese while repelling Allied counterattacks. The Japanese were not SEEKING a decisive naval battle. Kantai Kessen assumed a war with US - which now was the case - and in such a war such a battle would be coming to Japan anyway and the doctrine was looking for ways to offset the US superiority.
One thing that seems to slip off of minds of people is that WAR IS NOT A LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR ANY COUNTRY! It is a huge burden on economy, production is focused on war materiel which, unless it conquers something, results in 0 return for the investment immediately (and in case of a loss the return is less and less long term - depending on how bad the loss was - and even a victory can return a net loss on investment). Meanwhile population growth decreases, treasury gets drained, mortality and inflation rises, productivity in many if not most spheres falls (many of the farmers and workers are at the front not producing...), trade and exports decrease... And the neutral powers, potential rivals are often making a ton of cash selling necessities to war parties at inflated prices. Think of a country at war as a man running. Running a 100 m dash at 41 km/h would be akin total war, but it can only be done for a a few minutes (akin a few years of war). A man running a marathon is akin USA in Vietnam - limited war commitment. The man can run for a couple of hours just as the country can sustain a limited war for up to a few decades, but the marathon runner still needs to stop and rest after those few hours of running. In the end a man can go farther by walking (peacetime) than by running in one go. But certain situations necessitate running. So war is a kind of a race. The invader chooses when the race starts, so it is usually better prepared, but also usually runs on an uphill track since he needs to be stronger to succeed and his supply lines are by default longer.
The attacker therefore needs to concentrate his forces on sea, air and land in such a way to achieve the necessary advantage. In addition US is stronger economically overall. Kantai Kessen doctrine has correctly recognized both and was looking for a way to turn the tables. In effect it says "If we fight US or UK, they'll come at us in consecutive big concentrated fleet efforts that outgun us. Let's see how we can defeat those the way we had to defeat the Russian fleets in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima". There is no big difference in DOCTRINE between the Japanese attack on Midway and the US attack on the Marianas. Both seek to capture a strategically significant objective with a concentrated fleet action (as the most rational way) and there were hopes that a decisive blow could be struck against the enemy's fleet if it appeared (see the contemporary criticism of Spruance after the Philippine Sea for not pursuing the Japanese). It was just the US and Japanese TACTICAL dispositions that were different as they were shaped by the technology available to each at the time (the Japanese had no radar at the time hence they spread their destroyers around to provide early warning - the US later kinda did the same even with radar - posting forward the radar pickets - to provide earlier warning).
A doctrine postulates how you use your forces once the war starts. It may influence the decision, but certainly not decisively, on whether a country will start a war with a given country or not.
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