Comments by "" (@VersusARCH) on "Guadalcanal Campaign - Eastern Solomons (IJN 1 : 1 USN)" video.

A very Entrepreneurial officer indeed.
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You want to read about the efforts to save the damaged cruiser Kumano at Leyte Gulf too.
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@Philistine47 LOL you need to read more about all the battles you listed including the first day at Coral Sea... As for Kido Butai having radar at Midway... ROTFLMAOZEDONG, so where were radar sets on Shokaku and Zuikaku at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz? They had periods in dock in the meantime... Finally as flawed as the Japanese fighter control was, USN's was bad as well, but the radar made all the difference and that is my point (read my first message again). It provided early warning, enabled all ships to prepare for attack (CO2 in avgas lines...) directed the fighters... Even with mistakes on USN side the difference in the number of carriers sunk in carrier battles tells (IJN submarines nearly equalled the 1942 tally though). Nagumo too learned from his mistakes, changing tactics at Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz (detatching light carrier baits). Nagumo retreated after PH, Fletcher retreated after landings at Guadalcanal, both had wins and losses, both got sacked...
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@OrbitalAstronaut Kiel canal (significant in both world wars and actually it's completion determined in no small part the starting date of the war - during the earlier crisis in the Balkans Germany declined to support Austria Hungary while risking war with the UK since it was not yet complete), Panama Canal (an entire country was created around it, was significant in both world wars, the Japanese planned to attack the locks...) Suez Canal (a country was created more or less around it, was significant in many wars and was a cause for at least one), War of 1812 on the great lakes...
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The decisive difference between Fletcher and Nagumo was that the former had radar at his disposal and the latter did not.
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@Philistine47 USN radar provided crucial indication on the bearing of the Japanese fleet once any of their ships launched any planes as soon as the plane came within radar range. If the launching ship too was within the range, the radar could pinpoint the distance as well as soon as the plane reached sufficient altitude to escape the Earth Curvature radar blind spot. Also it provided the crucial early warning to the USN CAP. Had the Japanese had radar the bombing of Akagi, Kaga and Soryu would have definitely not been uncontested, and given how the previous attackers were served by the IJN CAP it would have likely been a slaughter too...
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NMS Amiral Murgescu
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@grandadmiralzaarin4962 Japanese heavy battleships 1) Were slower than the Kongos (which were used). They were likely to be hit by US airstrikes if they faild to neutralize the Henderson field or US carriers happened to be around. 2) Consumed too much oil to be comitted to bombard an island which was really not that important. Taking the island would just extend the Japanese defense perimiter further and isolating Australia would require taking many more islands (which US would likely also contest) as well as basing large naval forces there to hit any supply ships going to Australia which would all be a logistical challenge to Japan. On the other hand, letting the US have Guadalcanal did not seriously endanger the vital Japanese shipping lanes in the Yellow and South China Seas as well as Dutch East Indies. Guadalcanal came to be a flashpoint for battle for both navies and it was the destruction of the enemy naval assets rather than the island itself that was more important. 3) Intelligence failure. One determins the size of the forces he plans to commit based on intelligence estimates of the enemy. Commiting too few loses him a battle. Committing way too many wastes precious resources and runs the risk of leaving some other theatre with insufficient forces. Intelligence on committed enemy forces is the input used for making the decision. The Japanese made the former mistake obviously. 4) Night actions are messy and risking Nagatos or Yamatos after both sides lost most of their pre-war carriers (we are talking after the Battle of Santa Cruz) for, again, an island that was not crucial in itself was a bad idea for a nation dependent on maintaining regional sea control just to sustain itself as a great power.
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@lancepugh6081 WW1 compared to WW2: even more effective individually. On the whole? I guess a little less effective due to equipping fewer of raiders and prey ships being on average smaller. But in turn the raiders had fewer losses both percentage-wise amd in abrolute terms.
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He did not command Kido Butai vs HMS Hermes during the Indian Ocean Raid.
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