Comments by "Steve Valley" (@stevevalley7835) on "The Drydock - Episode 222" video.

@vikkimcdonough6153 if the US fleet was in harbor, they would still be sunk in shallow water, and salvageable, while the land based US air would sink the IJN force in deep water. My nightmare scenario, for the US, is Japan doesn't go anywhere near Hawaii, but invades the Philippines, maybe even giving the US forces there safe passage if they go away. If a lot of Americans were killed in the invasion, and public pressure forced FDR to launch a reinforcement mission. any force dispatched to the Philippines would run a gauntlet of Japanese held islands and subs, and suffer significant attrition before they reached the islands. If the US public feels the Philippines are sufficiently remote, and US casualties in the invasion are minimal, there may not be any pressure on FDR to engage in a war. Then, Japan is free to take anything it wants.
3
There was discussion, in the press, of upgunning the Tennessees to 16" in the later part of 1916, after the decision was made to go with the 16" on the Colorados. The newspapers quoted a Navy official as saying upgunning the New Mexicos would be prohibitively expensive, but, iirc, he did not directly answer the question wrt the Tennessees. The barbette diameter figures I have at had do not give the diameter for the turrets on the New Mexicos, however, the drawings on NavWeaps show the turret pan diameter being exactly the same as the Tennessees at 28' 11.5". According to the Wiki entry, 119 14"/50s were built, almost two complete sets of guns for every ship that used that model. I have read that the guns for the battlecruisers were ordered at the same time as the guns for the Tennessees. Even though California and Tennessee had not been laid down yet, I would expect contracts for that large number of 14" guns had been let, and, if the Navy did make the gun size change on the Tennessees, there would be substantial order cancellation charges that would need to be paid. The "more smaller guns equals more hits" argument that you mention was loudly and publicly exercised in the Navy at the time. While SecNav Daniels and the General Board eventually decided on 16", their determination that was the correct decision was probably not firm enough to pay the cancellation charges for the 14" guns that were already in production.
2
@vikkimcdonough6153 first, to hit anything with a battleship shell, you pretty well need to see the target. Scaling off of Google satellite view, Battleship Row is nearly 3 miles inland from the beach. Viewing from a low angle, the top of Missouri's mast is completely obscured by land, trees, and buildings. The Japanese would be pretty much shooting blind, as any spotter planes they send up would have P-40s all over them, unless the Japanese established total air superiority first. Even with air superiority, any spotter planes that survived the hail of AA fire that would be directed at them from the ships and surrounding land, only a small portion of the shells would hit anything. It would be a golden BB for those shells to hit anything vital. I read an interesting observation in "The Grand Fleet" a few weeks ago, words to the effect that unless the British battlecruisers were hit in the magazine, they stood up pretty well to gunfire. As for the TBD Devastator, it gets a bum wrap. The TBD performed well at Coral Sea, without a single loss to enemy action, though the torpedoes came up short. The TBDs were slaughtered at Midway because of a fatally botched attack. Blame luminaries like Stanhope Ring. I give secondary "credit" for the fiasco to Mitscher for not taking charge and setting the argument between Ring and Waldron. I'll throw in a dishonorable mention for Ray Spruance, because he was in command of TF 16. At Coral Sea, the TBDs, SBDs and fighters met at a rally point and attacked the Japanese formations together. The man who managed the strikes at Coral Sea, the man they needed at Midway. Aubrey Fitch, was on his way stateside, as his previous command, Lexington, had been sunk.
1