Comments by "Doug JB" (@dougjb7848) on "The Drydock - Episode 236 (Part 1)" video.

If the question is “why was the RN in general or a specific RN capital ship like X” and the period is 1905-1920, the answer is always “Fisher.”
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👨🏻‍✈️ “Okay, so, we’ve all been trained in how this particular piece of equipment operates?” 🙋🏻‍♂️”Yes sir.” 👨🏻‍✈️ “Good. Can anybody suggest a valid, beneficial effect of the operation of this equipment?” 🤨🤨🤨 👨🏻‍✈️”Right. Chief Petty Officer, stow the equipment according to its manual and wheel it into the forward paint locker.”
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37:10 Excelsior Communications Officer: Sorry to wake you, sir. Captain Hikaru Sulu: What is it? Officer: Starfleet urgently requests any data we have on the whereabouts of Enterprise. Sulu: What? Officer: Apparently, they're refusing to acknowledge signal to return to spacedock, sir. Sulu: Signal Starfleet that we have no idea location Enterprise. Officer: Sir? Sulu: You have hearing problems, mister? Officer: [leaving] No, sir.
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34:20 KMS Lutzow didn’t do as much physical damage to friendly ships as Mogami, but she probably had a higher occurrence of “bad luck incidents” during the time she accrued in actual operational deployments.
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1:33:00 The Treaty of Versailles denied Germany the right to build any warship that had a displacement of more than 10,000 tons. Nothing in Versailles prevented Germany building heavy cruisers. Nor were they forced to use any particular gun size. In fact, since Germany wasn’t invited to the Naval Treaty, they could have used whatever they wanted. They built the Scheers with 11” because that was the largest gun they could get on a ship that whose speed and protection could be deemed “will do.” Any gun larger would force them to use either fewer guns or compromise speed or protection so much as to make the ships useless. Ironically, they wound up with ships that were massively overpowered for merchant raiding, insufficiently protected to withstand even a few hits from proper battleship guns, and too slow to escape the kinds of ships tje used to harass and shadow them while awaiting
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CV6 could certainly have continued in “active service” after WW2, and even launched airstrikes in a hot-war environment, even during the Korean War, but her overall capabilities would have been so much lower than the Essex class, even before those were modified to support gen-1 jet aircraft (which BigE simply could not have done), it would have been like a 2015 era sporting car that had run dozens of races per year, with occasional crashes, trying compete in 2023. Sure, the older car might be able to deliver the same, or even better, performance in raw stats like acceleration, braking, corner grip as when it was new, but it still can’t keep up with the brand new cars. And it’s gonna have some quirks and oddities that a rookie driver won’t understand, and eventually the drivers and crew who do understand them will themselves retire out of service.
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1:13:25 if I could travel through time I would go back to this point and tell Lee to ignore Halsey and stick to the plan — shepherd the landing and air-support ships. To quote Marlo Ramius: Halsey acted stupidly.
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44:30 Depends on definition of “inoperable.” Would the gun fire if the button were pressed? Probably. Is the likelihood the gun’s firing cause greater damage to our ship than we are likely to suffer if we don’t fire the gun at the target and they, instead, hit us? 🤨
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By the time the 1.1” was improved enough to meet its intended performance, it would have been insufficient to meet the need it faced and surpassed by the 40mm.
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Which stats are you referring to and how are you interpreting them? In World War II, 52 US submarines were lost, with a total of 3,506 officers and enlisted men killed. The US Navy Submarine Service had the highest casualty percentage of any American forces in the War: about 20%. However, compare that to the effect they had: U.S. submarines destroyed 1,314 enemy warships in the Pacific, representing 55% of all Axis power warships lost and a total of 5.3 million tons of shipping. In this regard, the IJN was not very good at ASW. Compare also to the enormous amount of time that the ~260 US submarines that were actively deployed racked up — ~80% of submarines served for multiple years, perhaps even throughout the war, which lowers the “loss rate per time-unit of operations” which is a different stat than “% of vessels lost.”
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