Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "History is a Debate | Responding to a Comment from my Operation Market Garden Documentary" video.
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Literally making shit up and rearranging contentwhat a sad example.Monty not only liked little boys he was a crappy commander.That's not what Buckingham said at - you lying HOUND 🤣 - I have the book right here,VILE's already crap reputation is swirling the drain again. Here I'll even type it for you - real slow like,have the nurses at the home there read it to you.Anyone reading this can fetch the book also and this is what they shall find
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations
Large scale night landings proved not to be a success and september 17 put Market into a no moon period.Large scale airborne landings were simply not viable in moonless conditions Both parachutists and glider pilots required a degree of natural illumination in order to judge height ,orientation and degree of descent to avoid landing accidents, with lost/damaged equipment,injuries and probable fatalities
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p309 Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable .General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea." Gavin did not have an answer for him
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate. *Yet Guards Armored did not move
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge. Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south. By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September. Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
The Grenedier Guards and the 2nd Battalion 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment were shortly to pay a high price for Brownings operational ineptitude
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent,if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced -
From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line
I should be charging you for this .So the the Germans,GIs and Irish Guards all agree but you know better?🤣 Hey Vile share with the congregation how "MUM" captured some German Prisoners - you and history have but a fleeting acquiantance
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THICKO how many times at least 50 over 4 yrs ignorant knob I've presented this
From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 321-322 Montgomery's official biographer remarked that Monty's bid for the Ruhr via Arnhem had proved nothing less than foolhardy Staff officers at his tactical HQ had never seen "the Master" look so quiet and withdrawn.The sacrifice of the 1st airborne had been enough .Market Garden had all but used up the striking power of the 2nd Army and lead it into a blind alley where it could do nothing. Even Field Marshall Brooke has concluded that his strategy had been at fault."Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place",he wrote in his diary The failure to secure the Scheldt estuary leading to that vital port now stood out as a glaring lapse of judgement.
history of war.org
Three distinguished British officers who fought in Holland that winter and later became army commanders believed that the Allied cause could have profited immeasurably from giving a more important role to Patton. Lieutenant Edwin Bramall said: “I wonder if it would have taken so long if Patton or Rommel had been commanding.” Captain David Fraser believed that the northern axis of advance was always hopeless, because the terrain made progress so difficult. He suggests: “We might have won in 1944 if Eisenhower had reinforced Patton. Patton was a real doer. There were bigger hills further south, but fewer rivers.” Brigadier Michael Carver argued that Montgomery’s single thrust could never have worked: “Patton’s army should have been leading the U.S. 12th Army Group.” Such speculations can never be tested, but it seems noteworthy that two British officers who later became field-marshals and another who became a senior general believed afterwards that the American front against Germany in the winter of 1944 offered far greater possibilities than that of the British in Holland, for which Montgomery continued to cherish such hopes.
World War II Database
The Australian Chester Wilmot generally an admirer of British rather than American military conduct in north-west Europe, nonetheless observed brutally “what was at this stage the gravest shortcoming of the British army: the reluctance of commanders at all levels to call upon their troops to press of regardless of losses, even in operations which were likely to shorten the war and thus save casualties in the long run.” Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, confided to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay on 28 November (according to the admiral’s diary) that he was “rather depressed at the state of the war in the west . . . the SHAEF plan had achieved nothing beyond killing and capturing a some Germans, and that we were no nearer to knocking out Germany . . . The higher direction of the war had been bad in the last 2 months . . . Ike’s policy was only skin-deep and anyone could deflect it.” Between the beginning of November and mid-December 1944, British Second Army advanced just ten miles
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It's your Funeral - Little Villa have your friend read these to you real slow.Alan Brooke.IKE,Air Marshall Tedder,Admiral Ramsay,SHAEF CoS Beddel Smith,And Monty's CoS Freddie Deguingand.I think you are going to have to come up with a lot of wonderful new lies, or people just aren't going to want to go on reading.
Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "*...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From a PHD at King's College
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
With Prejudice, by Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder,Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
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