Hearted Youtube comments on Drachinifel (@Drachinifel) channel.

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  37. I enlisted in the USN back in 1977, went into the Naval Nuclear Power Program, all my time on submarines and a tour on the old sub tender Hunley. All the damage control gear and practices were still from the WWII / 1950's era. In 1982 when the Falklands War occurred, I was aboard the Hunley in Holy Loch Scotland. A year later I returned to the United States, and was stationed aboard one of the first Trident submarines in Washington state. I was amazed by what I saw as far as damage control gear - nearly all of the WWII / 1950's era gear was gone, except for the occasional bits that were still useful, even those having undergone a serious upgrade - but the vast majority of it had been completely replaced, they had leapfrogged ahead 30 years or more in technology, in the span of little more than a year - thermal imagers, full insulated fire suits, modern multi-position fire hose nozzles, Scott air packs, a serious upgrade to the old OBA oxygen canister breathing apparatus, they had adopted the RN practice of using flash hoods and protective clothing, updated their air sampling equipment, and updated their fire fighting techniques and strategy. The USN had taken a good hard look at what the RN had went thru in the Falklands War, and with what can only be described as amazing speed and alacrity for any agency of the US Government, had completely revamped all the damage control gear and practices based on the lessons they'd drawn from that analysis, little more than a year after that war was over. It could be that many of these changes were already being contemplated, with the Falklands War providing the necessary kick in the arse to get things moving and funding provided. Those lessons extended to ship construction as well - in the Arleigh Burke class, the USN abandoned the use of aluminum superstructures to save weight, and went back to steel, based in part on what happened to the Sheffield when struck by an Exocet missile.
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  41. It became pretty clear by the mid-30's that the 8" guns of the Lexingtons were a lot of weight and space for something that was unlikely to have ever been used in battle. There were plans to replace them with 5"/38 guns after their outstanding trials successes in the first postwar destroyers. However, the one good thing about the 8" guns was they received the then experimental FC (Mk3) radar fire control director. The Lexington received two of these in late-1941 and participated in trials of the first radar directed surface gunfire. It turned out to be accurate enough that it was able to get a fix within 50 meters on the range and direction of a surface target. It worked particularly well on the Lexington due to less local interference by the superstructure compared to a battleship, and the operators on Lexington were able to confirm distance to target by being able to track her own shell splashes, using lobe switching. The FC (Mk3) was installed on a number of battleships in late 1941, and the lessons learned from the Lexington were used to improve accuracy with the FC (Mk3). One of the first FC (Mk3) battleship units was installed on the USS Washington, and her radar operators, trained by the Lexington operators, were able to straddle the Japanese battleship Kirishima on her first salvo during the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, probably saving the South Dakota by doing so. In a way, the Lexington actually did participate in surface action almost six months after she was sunk.
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