Hearted Youtube comments on Mark Takacs (@MarkTakacs-u1w) channel.
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Back when the 2022 war started I assumed the russians would be working on their "deep battle" georgii isserson model, but they proved to have insufficient coordination above the battalion level to attempt such a thing. I am still wondering if thier use of battalion tactical groups, what with div and brig level assets pushed down to battalions, is a result or cause of their chronic leadership dysfunction and atrophy. In any case, as the war dragged on and ISR via drones and other things became ubiquitous, and better integrated with artillery and other support, even accumulating a company to stage an attack became extraordinarily risky, forcing attacks to be meat-wave trickles. The trend of large attacks this past year I believe was partly a result of Ukrainian artillery and ISR starvation, and increasing pressure for the russians to be in as best a position as possible before the US election and other potential countdowns.
One practice they have retained at an operational level as you point out here, is the use rolling successive concentrated attacks across different points of the front, instead of such simultaneously. This is a core aspect of isserson's deep battle and was common practice during wwii even when the soviets were not yet capable of exploiting their successes.
Good video, hope to hear more from you, subbed.
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I disagree,especially the last part.The recon by force at Ulkakly,actually met with the strike drone company of 36th moto(Balkay). Up to 50 guys got OFSPd and vogged,and night FPVd.And the ukraianians did send a lot of reinforcments at Dachne,its just that harassment fire from both optifibre and regular FPVs were so effective,made it so that lot of ukrainans never reached their positions.At Dachne pocket ,the russians also actively used remote minning by drones en masse for the first time actually. Overall ukrainians lost roughly a 100-120 vehicles between Konstantinopol and Dachne ,starting from early january(Including 2 companies of tanks). They play the same book at Boryspirol,where logistics are hardpressed. Ukrainians counter this by using MRAPs/IMVs as last mile logistics,which leds further exhaustion of protected mobility.Sidenote:The russian strikedrone companies are no slouches either both 36th ,114th,242nd have excellent drone units supplemented by a detachment of russian SSO(Rubikon center).Ukrainan artillery often completely/partially supressed by optifibres.
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Can you talk more about "soviet style" leadership and how it differs from leadership in other armies that are to 95% made up of conscripts? How do leadership needs differ between a largely proffessional/experienced army and a conscripted/inexperienced army? What is the difference between good leadership, soviet leadership, and bad leadership?
I realise these are huge questions but I struggle to just accept that Soviet style leadership = always bad, as it seems to me as if both the RAF and AFU pretty quickly got adjusted to the 2022 conventional war, while at the same time critical voices are heard about the training AFU personell recieves by NATO. With this in mind, and with NATO countries not having been in a relative symmetrical conventional conflict for a good while (I do not really count Iraq), how prooven is NATO leadership, especially after Afghanistan example?
My hypothesis (based on nothing) is that NATO level leadership has proven better at achieving results on tactical level, and coordinating efforts between tactical-operational level, while the Russian/Ukrainian Soviet hybrid leadership are better at the strategic level, mobilizing a nations combined military and civilian forces for a long term war effort
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A fast way to lose a war is to lie to yourself.
The Russians turned what should have been a quick war into a bloody slog by lying to themselves about the Ukrainian will to fight. Had Russia taken the war seriously from the outset, mobilized 300-400,000 reservists to fill out the infantry squads before their initial invasion they likely would have won the war by the Summer or Fall of 2022.
Likewise the Ukrainians, or more accurately their Western backers, lied to themselves about Russian defensive prowess and capacity for force regeneration and wasted any chance for Ukraine to reclaim her 1991 borders by hopelessly pursuing a counter-offensive in Summer 2023 against the most prepared and fortified positions of the Russians in Zaporizhia, believing that the Russians would just give way and fold as they had in Kherson and Kharkov. That counter-offensive cost not only mountains of equipment but irreplaceable experienced personnel, especially infantry, whose absence has been sorely felt the last year and a half.
Now both sides are in a slugging match trying to force each other into exhaustion to get the best negotiating position. The Ukrainians are doing this by inflicting damage on the Russian oil and gas sector that funds the war(and the leadership's lifestyle) and inflicting more losses of men and equipment than the Russians can replace. Meanwhile the Russians are using their strategic bombing campaign against Ukraine's energy infrastructure to both degrade their productive capacity and render Ukrainian statehood untenable, with the secondary goal being a cascade collapse of the Ukrainian line as soldiers dessert in order to look after loved ones.
With this in mind the Ukrainian leadership is lying to itself if they think Kursk gives them a better negotiating position. What would have been a better use of the elite and mobile brigades devoted to Kursk would be to use them as a counterattacking force, to plug up breaches in the Ukrainian line, forcing the Russians to mount more costly assaults to gain less ground. As the way Ukraine achieves a favorable outcome is Russia exhausting her available reserves of men and equipment as the regime is unwilling to risk future Russian security and regime survival by eroding her economic and demographic foundations. If Moscow doesn't believe it can make progress they will cut their losses and try again in ten years. That's probably the best Ukraine can hope for now.
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