Comments by "Ronald Greene" (@ronaldgreene5733) on "Binkov's Battlegrounds" channel.

Easier said than done at that time without the ability to provide escort to the target and risk the very limited number of weapons as they became available. It would have likely been much later in the conflict, when longer range bombers were available and sufficient escort could be provided.
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Leaving out major factors regarding training and experience, it's a great account of the known and potential strengths and weaknesses of both aircraft. The muppet figure serves no contribution, is a distraction and seems at odds to the otherwise informative and objective report. If humor is the attempt, maybe there is something that can better serve rather than distract from a good presentation . . something at least remotely in character for the role . .
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If the Soviets had intentions to over-run Western Europe, they would not have bothered to transfer a very substantial number of men and resources to the east to attack Japanese held territory, when Japan represented no real threat at that time and limited potential if they made any attempt to invade Soviet territory. It was the prime moment to take advantage of the circumstances when Soviet forces and production were at their maximum as a result of the intense campaign -- the threat of extinction in their monumental struggle being the only driving force that enabled them to overcome the extremely inefficient system of government and economy of the communist state -- where before, it was only with difficulty that they had defeated Finland which had much smaller but more highly trained fighting army. As mentioned, air power would have allowed the allies to prevent the total surrender of Europe, following with a long drawn out process to eventually push back as the west ultimately over-achieves in production and weapons development -- ultimately able to have victory in sight when major targets are within reach of nuclear weapons, making them much more effective while Soviet air power would also be severely weakened by that time so that conventional air strikes would disrupt the Soviet ability to maintain supply lines, and when the psychological trauma of nuclear weapons inflicted upon the Soviets would have their greatest demoralizing effect.
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