Comments by "Gaza is not Amalek" (@Ass_of_Amalek) on "The Reason Prigozhin Stopped His Rebellion" video.

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  6. ​ @LasseEklof I also think that threats from putin's people, probably via hostages, are likely to have been more important than any pay-off offer. though with a pay-off, you need to consider that by giving up on the rebellion, prigozhin has surrendered a huge portion of his and his family's wealth, probably much more than half (at least if you assume that any assets in russia are gone, though they may have been promised to remain in prigozhin's possession, for whatever that's worth). money in russian bank accounts and investments could be gone, both prigozhin and his wife own dozens of businesses in russia (mostly in saint petersburg) that would be gone, and likely most valuable of all is the likely total loss of the income streams generated by wagner's foreign deployments (mining and oil drilling concessions). even if prigozhin retained command authority over wagner, wagner has very little ability to enforce its claims on the resources granted to them now that russia not only does not support their claims, but opposes them (again assuming that continuing this was not promised in the withdrawal agreement, since the promise would not be reliable enough to make it worth considering). in weaker countries like the central african republic or mali, wagner may have some very limited ability to violently enforce its claims, but then they would be in a very different sort of business (at that point, it might make more sense to depose governments instead). in syria, wagner has no chance of keeping anything that putin doesn't want them to have. and really anywhere else, putin has plenty of leverage to make any contractual partner of wagner turn against wagner. without russian government support giving it access to all necessary military equipment and recruitment of personnel, wagner can no longer deliver on its security guarantees anyways. so basically, besides the possibility of hostages, prigozhin would have gotten a buy-out from putin calculated as surpassing the value of most of his possessions multiplied by the percentage chance of success if he continued the rebellion. if he actually did it for the money, with no hostages involved, then the payment must have been enormous (really not the sort of money that would normally change hands in physical form). wagner's holdings include stuff like ownership of a gold mine in the CAR that was projected to yield $3bn in 8 years of operation when they got it ~3 years ago, and a 25% profit cut on oil installations that wagner recaptured for the syrian government. prigozhin may also have a lot of money safe outside of russia and not tied to continued russian support for wagner, but wagner's holdings certainly are gone, unless putin promised that prigozhin could keep them and actually delivers on that promise. my guess would be that there was a payment, but much less than would compensate for the lost chance of prigozhin keeping his property, and the main part of the deal were hostages. not necessarily prigozhin's own family, family members of other essential coup perpetrators could also suffice to kill the coup. but if the russian authorities really did find that personal go-bag of prigozhin with the money, gold and false passports at the wagner HQ in saint petersburg, that speaks for rather shoddy planning that could also have included failure to secure prigozhin's own family. and there is the problem that trying to get all close family members of prigozhin and other important coup plotters out of russia in preparation would have been suspicious and would have posed a risk of information leakage. so perhaps they instead went with sending wagner personnel to those family members immediately before the operation to hide them in safe houses in russia, and perhaps that plan failed for some of them. if by "not without a parachute" you mean that any deal would have required security for prigozhin: money is the only security he could have gotten, besides weapons for his troops.
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