Comments by "boz" (@BOZ_11) on "LBC" channel.

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  145.  @jonathandnicholson  --“True regarding no legal compulsion to enact the result from the enacted legislation” --The poll obviously isn’t legislation and there was no bill tied to the poll; they didn’t even know what the question meant (at the time, which is why the speak of customs union and Swiss deal were bandied about). --“(50% of the electorate plus one vote because, for a binary vote, that is how democracy works)” --Major constitutional changes (which leaving the EU, is) ALWAYS require a threshold to add legitimacy to the result. Who told you that constitutional changes don’t require a threshold? From what planet did you glean that? --“Referendum means a vote on a particular issue to direct policy, so I would regard the result as morally and politically if not legally binding” --There was no legal binding, that’s how we know it wasn’t a referendum; and morality doesn’t come into it, since these are Tories we’re talking about (they lied to the Queen about proroguing parliament, so spare the morality speak). The winning vote was only 51.8%, a number that would never breach ANY threshold. --“how would you have felt/what would you have said if Remain won and, say, Boris Johnson said 'Well, the legislation did not compel us to implement the result, so we are going to leave anyway'?” --That’s not the question to ask. The question to ask, is: “If we were outside the EU, and the public polling showed 51.8% of voters to go into the EU, but UK politicians say we won’t go in, because the poll was advisory and we don’t need to act”? We’re moving from the status quo to a new position.
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  159. "A new book, Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of the Cold War Stalemate, by the prize-winning historian Mary Elise Sarotte, charts all the private discussions within the western alliance and with Russia over enlargement and reveals Russia as powerless to slow the ratchet effect of the opening of Nato’s door. The author concludes the charge of betrayal is technically untrue, but has a psychological truth. What is the basis of the complaint? At one level it narrowly focuses both on verbal commitments made by the US secretary of state James Baker under President George HW Bush and the terms of a treaty signed on 12 September 1990 setting out how Nato troops could operate in the territory of the former East Germany. Putin claims that Baker, in a discussion on 9 February 1990 with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, made the promise that Nato would not expand to the east if Russia accepted Germany’s unification. The following day Chancellor Helmut Kohl, ambiguous about Germany remaining in Nato after unification, also told Gorbachev “naturally Nato could not expand its territory to the current territory of the GDR”. The promise was repeated in a speech by the Nato secretary general on 17 May, a promise cited by Putin in his Munich speech. In his memoirs, Gorbachev described these assurances as the moment that cleared the way for compromise on Germany. Were these promises ever written down in a treaty? No, largely because Bush felt Baker and Kohl had gone too far, or in Baker’s words he had “got a little forward on his skis”. The final agreement signed by Russia and the west in September 1990 applied only to Germany. It allowed foreign-stationed Nato troops to cross the old cold war line marked by East Germany at the discretion of the German government. The agreement was contained in a signed addendum. Nato’s commitment to protect, enshrined in article 5, had for the first time moved east into former Russian-held territory." The Guardian - Wed 12 Jan 2022 05.00 GMT
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  166. "A new book, Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of the Cold War Stalemate, by the prize-winning historian Mary Elise Sarotte, charts all the private discussions within the western alliance and with Russia over enlargement and reveals Russia as powerless to slow the ratchet effect of the opening of Nato’s door. The author concludes the charge of betrayal is technically untrue, but has a psychological truth. What is the basis of the complaint? At one level it narrowly focuses both on verbal commitments made by the US secretary of state James Baker under President George HW Bush and the terms of a treaty signed on 12 September 1990 setting out how Nato troops could operate in the territory of the former East Germany. Putin claims that Baker, in a discussion on 9 February 1990 with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, made the promise that Nato would not expand to the east if Russia accepted Germany’s unification. The following day Chancellor Helmut Kohl, ambiguous about Germany remaining in Nato after unification, also told Gorbachev “naturally Nato could not expand its territory to the current territory of the GDR”. The promise was repeated in a speech by the Nato secretary general on 17 May, a promise cited by Putin in his Munich speech. In his memoirs, Gorbachev described these assurances as the moment that cleared the way for compromise on Germany. Were these promises ever written down in a treaty? No, largely because Bush felt Baker and Kohl had gone too far, or in Baker’s words he had “got a little forward on his skis”. The final agreement signed by Russia and the west in September 1990 applied only to Germany. It allowed foreign-stationed Nato troops to cross the old cold war line marked by East Germany at the discretion of the German government. The agreement was contained in a signed addendum. Nato’s commitment to protect, enshrined in article 5, had for the first time moved east into former Russian-held territory." The Guardian - Wed 12 Jan 2022 05.00 GMT
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  178. America and Ukraine passed about a hundred checkpoints for diplomacy, and decided they wanted a war, at the great cost of Ukrainian lives. Ukraine has as much right to join NATO as James does of walking down an unlit blind alley in Thamesmead at 3am. Part of statehood is negotiating geopolitics, and they failed to err on the side of caution. Stop NATO accession, and end the violence. We don't need another to incorporate these Balkan states; they're more trouble than they're worth. "A new book, Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of the Cold War Stalemate, by the prize-winning historian Mary Elise Sarotte, charts all the private discussions within the western alliance and with Russia over enlargement and reveals Russia as powerless to slow the ratchet effect of the opening of Nato’s door. The author concludes the charge of betrayal is technically untrue, but has a psychological truth. What is the basis of the complaint? At one level it narrowly focuses both on verbal commitments made by the US secretary of state James Baker under President George HW Bush and the terms of a treaty signed on 12 September 1990 setting out how Nato troops could operate in the territory of the former East Germany. Putin claims that Baker, in a discussion on 9 February 1990 with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, made the promise that Nato would not expand to the east if Russia accepted Germany’s unification. The following day Chancellor Helmut Kohl, ambiguous about Germany remaining in Nato after unification, also told Gorbachev “naturally Nato could not expand its territory to the current territory of the GDR”. The promise was repeated in a speech by the Nato secretary general on 17 May, a promise cited by Putin in his Munich speech. In his memoirs, Gorbachev described these assurances as the moment that cleared the way for compromise on Germany. Were these promises ever written down in a treaty? No, largely because Bush felt Baker and Kohl had gone too far, or in Baker’s words he had “got a little forward on his skis”. The final agreement signed by Russia and the west in September 1990 applied only to Germany. It allowed foreign-stationed Nato troops to cross the old cold war line marked by East Germany at the discretion of the German government. The agreement was contained in a signed addendum. Nato’s commitment to protect, enshrined in article 5, had for the first time moved east into former Russian-held territory." The Guardian - Wed 12 Jan 2022 05.00 GMT
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