Comments by "Ralph Bernhard" (@ralphbernhard1757) on "Drachinifel"
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The "pitiful retreat" from the continent in 1940, was a result of a geographical advantage London enjoyed compared to continental powers.
In a nutshell, they "put their tail between their legs" because they could and France couldn't.
As far as London was concerned, France was a part of the continent...a useful tool to protect the British Empire.
Nothing more.
Nothing less.
The London lords misused whoever stepped forward to offer themselves, as useful tools. Paris accepted, and was therefore abandoned like the "tool" is was.
Outdated.
No longer useful to the lords...
Remember the above.
Because the nice part follows...
There is a big picture.
In fact, let's call it a "massive picture", almost never addressed in documentaries and popular history books (unless very specific ones about geopolitics).
Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
What really counts is a geographical advantage.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
At the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
[Google: The American Century and what was behind it]
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
[Google: American_exceptionalism]
In 1945, it was GB which couldn't "run" anymore.
The world had shrunk.
New technology and weapons made the world a much smaller place that the turn of the century (say 1900).
As far as Washington DC was concerned, GB was a part of Europe.
LMAO. Talk about "a little misunderstanding".
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Under De Gaule, France finaly put on their "big boy boots".
No more begging for Spitfires (Battle of France), and no more begging for help from an uncaring world of "fwiends" with an attitude problem: cheering you on in an hour of need...but little else. No soldiers, no tanks, no battleships, no honor. Just "hopes and prayers", just silent admiration, and a pat on the back...but not much more. Paris would no longer be begging for help, or grovelling for assisistance. No more having your ships blown up by "best fwiends" and their "pwomises", if one is down and out and forced to surrender by a vastly superior enemy.
No more "cordial" amistad.
Under De Gaule, France had own nukes now, and a "new best fwiend" Konrad Adenauer, and leverage.
A marriage made in heaven :-)
Finaly after hundreds of years, and with a different set of "balance of power", it would not be "empires" squaring off, but "new best friends" with a common enemy this time, and if those Russians were going to come storming through the Fulda Gap, it wasn't London or Washington DC which was going to decide whether West Germans were "poor enough" to start a "world war" for.
Well done France.
One might not like De Gaule for all his other faults, and the list is long. But he did get that one thing right. He rid France of the need for "best fwiends". No more "faraway empires" with a "geographical advantage" going "well, it doesn't really look that bad...for me...so good luck..."
Accompanied by snidy remarks of "who saved you last time duh?", De Gaule did the only right thing: if Paris wasn't on the same level as Washington/London in NATO, it would be out, and an "associated power".
(Google how that unfolded with "France/De Gaulle/Force the Dissuasion")
No more "cordial" ententes.
No more "pwomises" to the one with an inferior geographical location.
Paris would decide if Germans were "poor enough" to help, not London with their "well most Belgians, but not all of them are 'poor enough', but the people in Luxembourg are not really 'poor enough' to deserve our blood"-attitude problem ...lol. That what happens if one believes "pwomises" of being "best fwiends".
No contract.
Just "pwomises"...
When it comes to the crunch, or in an hour of need, it's "me first" in the dog-eat-dog world of big boys and their aspirations.
From that point on, Paris would decide, and Paris only, if Germans are "poor enough"...and wipe a sufficiet amount of mother Russia off the map, should a single Russian ever set a single foot on a single "poor West German" in their new barrier state.
And De Gaule?
I guess he threw in a bit of that "revenge is a dish best served cold"-attitude. When London was desparate for "markets", Paris denied entry into the EU with a veto. Third in line, after the "old best fwiends of WW2," Washington DC, and Moscow (rescinding the "percentages agreement" for markets in Eastern Europe), France would now kick London while it was down and out, economically weak and economically failing...
De Gaule: "You want markets for your Vauxhalls? I want markets for my Citroens and my Renaulds..."
(Google: "Paris vetoes UK applications for EU membership 1963 and 1967")
If it were up to De Gaule, no more London "hopping onto" some continental power across the English Channel, when it suited London, only to "hop" somewhere else the minute it didn't suit London no more...
And De Gaule was right: the economy in the UK started brightening up, and viola...Brexit.
Oh, they did ooops do it again...
After EU-membership did its fair share of pulling the cart out of the rut of after a failure of "Empire", it was "we're Brexiting now. Cheerio...oh, but we want that and that and that and that..."
No responsibilities.
Just advantages.
Just like the "600 London lords" of Empire geostrategists.
Loosely quoting Lord Palmerston: "England has no eternal friends and no eternal enemies. Only eternal interests."
And that counts for everyone.
"King" one day, "pauper" the next.
That's how it goes in the dog eat dog world of "empires"...
Too bad, London didn't make some real friends while it was "in charge".
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@manilajohn0182 Excellent first paragraph. I might borrow it at some point :-)
Yes, and that is excactly what happened after WW2.
London got "screwed over" by her WW2 "best friends", because she no longer had the leverage to impose or insist on agreements once made in war.
Of course, wars are "won" by men in suites, after the last shots have been fired, and the parades to soothe the tormented souls are over.
After the war, that is what counts: Leverage
Agreed about Putin.
In the bigger picture he is a "Wilhelm II" of sorts.
Just like Wilhelmine Germany once refused the requests of the "alpha" (London) to become a tool for an "empire", I assume (without evidence) that Putin refused the USA's requests to become a tool to encircle China.
Of course, it's all about "Chy-naah" and the "bomb, bomb, bomb; bomb, bomb Iran"-wishes of a certain fraction in Washington DC.
That was clear even before Trump turned up, trying to jank "little rocket man" off the Beijing leash...
The historical "narrative" re. Germany/Wilhelm II is dead wrong.
At the time, say the late 1890s, the British Empire approached Berlin, with a request/suggestion for an alliance (see Balfour/Chamberlain).
Of course, such an "alliance" had the main objective of turning Berlin into a temporary "best friend" and "lightning rod" for Russian and French venom, boiling up due to imperialistic differences of the three powers (GB/France/Russia).
Berlin was not that naive.
It wanted to be considered an alliance partner on eye level, with the own risks it would be taking (wedged in between Russia and France) suitably considered in such an "alliance".
It would have meant that London would have to voluntarily step down from its self-appointed role of "balancer of powers/decider of wars", and accept Berlin on the top "rung" of "Empires". Or, imagine an athlete, having to share the top position on the podium...
Of course, by the late 19th century, Berlin had also already become London's "default rival/default enemy in war", as decided per "economy/weight", same as "Chy-naah" starting becoming the new alpha's "default rival/default enemy in war" around the turn of the century (around 2000).
And Putin?
I assume he said "no".
He was no "drunk Jelzin" or "naive Gorbachov".
And so history repeats itself...seemingly.
Of course, I'll have to wait for the "30-year rules" to pass, and the archives opened to the backdoor dealings of our dear leaders.
So at the moment it is just a haunch.
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What was the REAL "lesson" of the Barbary Wars, and the subsequent series of events?
What is the strategic lesson almost no historian ever talks about?
Answer: the price of not unifying to speak with a single voice.
First they (outside powers, more or less "united" in a cause), came for the Barbary States.
The last one to "go" was Morocco, finally "carved up" by European powers, in conjunction with the USA, in 1911.
Last to "go" was The Ottoman Empire, in WW1.
From "empire" to "Turkey" (post WW1) in around 200 years.
Later this maxim of POWER would repeat again, and again.
The price of not uniting in time.
This is regardless of any "feelings."
Since "facts" (strategy) count higher than "feelings."
Same as the Ottoman Empire failed to unite into a single cohesive "united states" speaking with a single voice, and neither did Europe, so the USA could pick them apart piecemeal...
First to "go" was Spain.
First the USA came for Spain, but the rest of Europe was like "I don't care, I'm not the Spanish Empire..."
Lastly, they came for the British Empire, but there was nobody left to speak for them...
"What actually occurred was that Britain and other countries became hopelessly indebted to the United States once again (edit: during World War 2) ... “We have profited by our past mistakes,” announced Roosevelt in a speech delivered on September 3, 1942. “This time we shall know how to make full use of victory.” This time the U.S. Government would conquer its allies in a more enlightened manner, by demanding economic concessions of a legal and political nature instead of futilely seeking repayment of its wartime loans (of World War 1). The new postwar strategy sought and secured foreign markets for U.S. exports, and new fields for American investment capital in Europe’s raw materials producing colonial areas. Despite Roosevelt’s assurances to the contrary, Britain was compelled, under the Lend-Lease agreements and the terms of the first great U.S. postwar loan to Britain, to relinquish Empire Preference and to open all its markets to U.S. competition, at a time when Britain desperately needed these markets as a means by which to fund its sterling debt. Most important of all, Britain was forced to unblock its sterling and foreign-exchange balances built up by its colonies and other Sterling Area countries during the wartime years. Instead of the Allied Powers as a whole bearing the costs of these wartime credits to British Empire countries, they would be borne by Britain itself. Equally important, they would not be used as “blocked” balances that could be used only to buy British or other Sterling Area exports, but would be freed to purchase exports from any nation. Under postwar conditions this meant that they would be used in large part to purchase U.S. exports." (page 115/116)
"By relinquishing its right to block these balances, Britain gave up its option, while enabling the United States to make full use of its gold stock as the basis for postwar lending to purchased generalized (primarily U.S.) exports. At a stroke, Britain’s economic power was broken. What Germany as foe had been unable to accomplish in two wars against Britain, the United States accomplished with ease as its ally." (Page 117)
"Furthermore, under the terms on which it joined the International Monetary Fund, Britain could not devalue the pound sterling so as to dissipate the foreign-exchange value of these balances. Its liability thus was maximized – and so was America’s gain from the pool of liquidity that these balances now represented." ("Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire." -- Michael Hudson, 2nd edition 2003)
In case that seems a bit technical, here is the "nutshell version": Just like the bank takes your house if you don't pay up in the real world, the British Empire was run into the ground by the "best friends" USA, who stole the Empire's markets; hidden behind a whole lot of "technical jargon", thereby taking the means London had to pay its debts. A suitable micro level example would be the bank having an eye on your house, then making sure you get fired so you can't pay your debt. On the macro level the term is "debt trap diplomacy", and on the (privatized) propaganda level the means is "projection: accuse somebody else of being something which one is oneself", and that "being" has started waaaaaay earlier as a matter of own policy. A "debt trap" the Allies walked into after 1916, after they had spent all their own money, and squeezed as much out of their colonies as they could get away with, but refused to come to terms at the negotiating table: another factor usually associated with the Central Powers.
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"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
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@rinzler9171 Agreed then.
Because there were basically two types of US Presidents (administrations). One "leaning inwards" = concentrating on the USA and its people aka "isolationism"...
And those leaning outwards. Set on expanding the US sphere of influence at the expense of other powers, dragging the USA (and the overwhelming percentage of inhabitants, against their will, into international wars).
Wilson was an American Century advocate, and dragged the USA into WW1.
FDR was also, and did the same concerning WW2.
Because all throughout the late-19th/early-20th centuries, while Europe armed itself to the teeth, wasting away their inherence on weapons, the USA made use of this disunity (remaining isolationist, concentrating on the sphere of interest protected y the Monroe Doctrine), and were saving their pennies for a rainy day.
US military spending, a fraction of that of Europe.
For US leaders set on expansion had a plan, greatly aided by their geographical and political isolation (aka "geopolitics")....
In a nutshell, to hang in there long enough, until Europe had torn itself to shreds. And if not, also okay. They were already the undisputed regional power controlling "the new world" of North and South America.
A win-win.
1) A destructive war in Europe = a win for Washington DC/The American Century advocates, and their "hard power" approach.
2) No destructive war in Europe = a win for the isolationist, with their focus on trade, soft power, etc.
In case of war in Europe then, step in and pick up the (financial) "debris"...in a nutshell:
The American Century.
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@rinzler9171 100% agreed.
And that was no coincidence, but known as "never let a crisis/war" go to waste.
Especially possible to implement, if an own geographical position allows it to remain distant from those squabbling and scrambling for more power, potentially clashing.
I say "no coincidence", because in the leadup to WW1, the USA was the "new power", whose political position was basically (in a nutshell) "to observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
Washington DC was very good at "biding time" and "keeping a low profile" until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old Europe", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Unlike the arsenals of M-A-I-N they also used another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Washington DC: "If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them."
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@rinzler9171 Yes, FDR is greatly admired for "winning WW2", although his favoritism of the madman/mass-murderer Stalin meant that we in the west ended up giving away half the world, in return for "trusting Stalin's signature".
Dumbest move ever, and we ended up fighting the communist we supported in WW2, in the other half of the world, for the next 50 years during the Cold War.
Of course, Stalin the crook never had any intention to stick to any agreement he had made under the duress of WW2, with the Nazis breathing down his neck intent on his destruction.
After the war was over, the "niceties" were soon forgotten, treaties torn up like "scraps of paper", and we were forced to defend "our half" of the world (China, Korea, Vietnam, Latin America, ME, Africa, etc.) by overwhelming use of military/financial power.
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@rinzler9171 Of course, another option existed to "the Big Three".
We in the west shouldn't have had even the slightest inhibitions about "tweaking Lend-Lease" (to avoid the complete collapse of the SU, but not enough for communism to win). In other words, just as much Lend-Lease as needed, but not enough for the commie to storm all the way into Central Europe.
We should have "aided" the Nazis by as little strategic bombing as possible, but only as much as necessary to aid D-Day, but to avoid the complete collapse of Germany, the backbone of the Axis.
Why shouldn't it have bothered us in the least if the Eastern Front had settled somewhere between Leningrad and the Black Sea, with the two sides fighting until utter exhaustion?
Because we owed Stalin nothing.
Not single Jeep and not a single Studebaker truck, carrying commies into Central Europe by the millions.
Not a single drop of blood.
"Comrades! It is in the interest of the USSR, the Land of the Toilers, that war breaks out between the [German] Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done so that the war lasts as long as possible in order that both sides become exhausted. Namely for this reason we must agree to the pact proposed by Germany, and use it so that once this war is declared, it will last for a maximum amount of time."
Stalin 19th August 1939
So our leaders sacrificed own soldiers, own resources, and millions of own dollars, to hand over half the world to the commies. Only to end up fighting them in the other half for the next fifty years. Korea, Vietnam, the ME. Thousands of body bags of "our boys".
Rather silly to "help Stalin", if we could have just let them "slug it out to utter exhaustion, and then march over the ruins, a fate Stalin had intended for us.
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@rinzler9171 Yes, top US leaders must have known that the Japanese were going to attack.
Mainly because
1) not leaving Japanese negotiators the diplomatic "face saving" way out
2) British troops in Malaysia were already on high alert, following the spotting of Japanese convoys 2 days before Pearl Harbor
3) the Japanese attack on Malaysia took place 2 hours before Pearl Harbor (on Dec 8th, but because it was on the other side of the International Date Line, it Dec 7th in Hawaii)
Not saying they should have known it was going to be PH, but a high alert of all Pacific bases should have been called for.
It should have been inexcusable to be caught like that, totally unprepared, and then blaming the local base commander (scapegoating).
The embargo you mentioned was of course because of China, which the Japanese had invaded in 1937. Then, to cut off supplies to China, the Japanese invaded French Indochina, directly triggering the US oil and scrap metal embargo.
So, not for the first time, it was "Nam" leading to a US war in the Pacific. Ironical that the US would be fighting in East Asia twice because of the weakness of France (first during WW2, later after the commies kicked the French out of Vietnam).
IMO (debatable) the US should never have made a deal with Stalin concerning Manchuria.
Seeing that Stalin had already tried to gain China twice before (invasion of Xinjiang in 1934, and supporting Mao's Long March) they should have known that Stalin would not be bound by any "honor" or "signature" on a piece of paper.
The fact that China is socialist today, and a western rival, and a united regional power, is a direct result of that.
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When reading the ultimatum, the inexperienced "Limbic brain thinker" is mesmerizingly drawn to "choice (a)"...
I wonder why?
" ... His Majesty’s Government have instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now at Mers el Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance with one of the following alternatives; (a) Sail with us and continue the fight until victory against the Germans, (b) Sail with reduced crews under our control to a British port. The reduced crews would be repatriated at the earliest moment. If either of these courses is adopted by you we will restore your ships to France at the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation if they are damaged meanwhile. (c) Alternatively if you feel bound to stipulate that your ships should not be used against the Germans unless they break the Armistice, then sail them with us with reduced crews to some French port in the West Indies — Martinique for instance — where they can be demilitarised to OUR satisfaction, or perhaps be entrusted to the United States and remain safe until the end of the war, the crews being repatriated. If you refuse these fair offers (edit: LOL, a false premise), I must with profound regret, require you to sink your ships within 6 hours ..."
Note here: All alternatives would have resulted in the removal of these French naval vessels, meaning that there would be no defense against seaborne elements of a potential future attack, to protect French citizens in Tunesia and Algeria.
London: "Looky here. I have a scrap of paper that says WE have the same enemy, but YOU are going to do most of the dying, and our common best fwiends in Washington DC are totally fine with that."
SIR Bolivar: "How honorable of us (ingroup conclusion."
How the mind of a deceiver works:
The deception offered by option (a), sticks out like a sore thumb
If chosen, it would mean that France broke the armistice conditions shortly after signing it, meaning that Italy would no longer be bound by these Armistice conditions. Not only Italy of course, but nothing then stopped Germany from occupying ALL of France as a result, leading to more FRENCH bloodshed and destruction of FRENCH property. If the French stuck to the armistice, on the other hand, it would leave roughly 80% of the French navy as deterence in the Med (40% in Oran/40% in Toulon/status quo). If they chose option (a), it would leave only 40% of the French Navy in Toulon, and possibly none, should Germany decide to occupy all of France because it broke the armistice. NO French ships to deter an attack to French North African territory, because they would have nowhere to operate from should Germany occupy all of France, and Italy if struck at Tunesia/Algeria.
Goading Italy into sending her massive Libyan armies westwards to fight France, rather than eastwards to fight GB, towards the Suez Canal, or if both were tried by Italy, then seriously weakening the forces available for attacking Egypt.
Choosing option (a) would have risked that the entire French Navy had no legal basis to operate under (no French based state), becoming fugives, maybe being forced to hope for breakaway French colony as harbor, and if none of the above then to join Great Britain like the Dutch Navy before, because the Empire HAD naval bases, just what London wanted: the French fleet under British CONTROL, to protect the British Empire "for free."
THE "DIVISION" PER "RULING" OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE
Note here that the Dutch government/navy can NOT serve as an example of "honorable solution" for France a few weeks later, since after May 1940, the Netherlands had nothing more to lose in Europe. All its unoccupied territory was far outside of the reach of the Axis powers (Indo-Pacific),an therefore a typical "apples/oranges"-comparrison.
If France chose the same "honorable government-in-exile" solution as Den Hague, as one can be easily misguided into thinking, France would lose even more: potentially French North Africa, to the "hyena Italy" and the total occupation of all her citizens by Germany. Meanwhile, for all of that, there was no guarantee that London might not simply make a deal with Berlin herself a few weeks later, in order to save its Empire from collapse, because a weak London offered the perfect opportunity for an expanded Axis Berlin-Moscow.
Note here, it was all about the British Empire, while saying "we".
Not a single word is wasted about any contigencies for the protection of French territory or citizens in North Africa, in the event of an attack by (most likely) Italy, being in the most advantageous location to make use of this stage of "French weakness" to invade Tunesia and Algeria (main attack/land warfare), and use the wide-open ports if the French navy bowed down to British demands, as re-supply and landing points for stores and equipment. The entire purpose of a navy is defense against such forms of enemy naval operations in support of land warfare. The ultimatum was a cleverly disguised intention to trade the French Navy in for a "promise" of protecting these with the Royal navy, or a combination of ships under British control.
London: YOU shall be given the choice between deception (a) and dishonor (aka the "false dichtomy").
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall break your armistice agreement, by choosing either deception or dishonor, and continue the Battle of France because it is advantageous to US.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall continue the Battle of France, with NO visible potential for success, because neither WE or the USA is lifting as much as a finger to help (effective support). YOU shall "extend Germany" for as long as possible, to the LAST FRENCH SOLDIER, and goad Italy into attacking Tunesia/Algeria which is YOUR territory, away from Egypt, which is OUR territory.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: Your citizens in France, and your cities and towns, shall goad Germany into continuing their attack, because you broke the armistice with them ...ahem "voluntarily" (he, he,he) so it's ALL YOUR OWN FAULT if the Germans choose to occupy all of France, just like we successfully implemented in Norway in April ("drawing" the bull, off the matador).
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall bow down to a mere captain, who doesn't even have the slightest POWER OF NEGOTIATION, who will decide the future of your citizens and your navy.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall sacrifice French cities and towns and French blood, to save OURS, because you were stupid enough to make a treaty with us. Guess what? WE are an island, which we shall largely retreat to, and YOU have a border with our enemy (imbalance in power).
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: YOU shall bleed MORE so that WE shall bleed less, just like Poland before.
Paris: Nah, thanks.
London: And the coolest, COOLEST thing all, YOU are not going to complan about all your BLEEDING, because it was avoluntary decision. We had absolutely nothing to do with YOUR choices.
France: Yeah, right...
London: We have the POWER of the superior mind, because it doesn't matter what WE do, the overwhelming majority of our citizens, in blind trust and incapable of grasping how we tick (strategy), will cheer us along because of our words, and they will do so into their own destruction.
Paris: Yeah, I guess I'm fine with that.
London: Let me rephrase those famous words for you... YOU shall fight on (faraway) beaches, FOR the interests of the British Empire, without even being aware that you are fighting for the British Empire. YOU shall fight in the hills in Tunesia or Algeria, FOR the interests of the British Empire, without even being aware that you are fighting for the British Empire. WE will ensure that the Battle of Britain will start with "a depleted Luftwaffe", and far less firepower, because most of the planes were bombing somewhere else.
(Sounds of cheering crowds in the background)
Paris: I said, nah thanks...
On the 3rd of July 1940, France finally found out what it had signed up for as mere "entente"-best fwiend in 1904, as "buck catcher" (Prof. John Mearsheimer) for the British Empire. It went out the "buck catching"-way, same as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway before, and the same way the Ukraine is being "extended today", and will most likely go out the same "buck catching"-way.
Obviously, viewed through the lens of systems/strategy (specifically grand strategy), if the "favored nation" os the "buck catcher", it can also be used to goad a rival of the "buck passer" (the greater power in the relationship). The "buck passer/s" can then steer, manage, or moderate the resulting crisis or war.
Even Churchill was not convinced that every London lord would be fine with such a mockery of the term "friendship", and prepared two speeches. One defiant, one conciliatory. But he was wrong, and after the bloodbath there was no need to roll out the "conciliation".
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@lilinamouse2111 Germany and Austria-Hungary were not blameless re. the start of WW1.
However, when it came to the concept of "setting up Europe for failure", the lion's share of the blame goes to Russia, France, and the UK.
Notice how almost every history book mentions the M-A-I-N causes of WW1, and of that "A" is for alliances. It was the alliance system which caused the "domino stones" to topple one after the other.
It was Wilhelm and Berlin which tried to change the alliance system, to remove the built in "automation", and as the main benefit, remove the threat of a 2-front war, but their plans to do so were torpedoed at every possible opportunity.
Russia, France and GB wanted to keep Germany "under the boot" of encirclement, so they could control and/or threaten its trade and international expansion.
They wanted to expand their own sphere of influence, markets, and colonies, at the expense of Germany, making dirty little backroom deals amongst each other, excluding Berlin wherever possible.
Greed destroyed Europe.
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@lilinamouse2111 One such example of changing the alliance system, is the Treaty of Bjorko in 1905, and signed by Willhem II and Tzar Nicolas.
If ratified, and as foreseen to include France, it would have served as an early form of collective security for every citizen of continental Europe.
Of course, GB could have used the temporary Russian weakness in 1905 too (Tsushima, revolution, etc.) to conclude a separate peace with St Petersburg, with good prospects of success.
Once implemented successfully, it would have engineered an "impossible big war scenario", per treaty clauses (google this treaty for more info. The wiki article has the exact treaty clauses).
Wilhelm always wanted peace.
A peace which would not draw Germany into one of the many imperialistic Russian "adventures", and potentially drag Germany into a resulting war with another power.
Notice the complete absence of secret land exchanges, scheming little "side plots", the "signing away" of 3rd party territories or rights...
A truly visionary concept.
But of course, for visionaries to succeed, it needs a visionary environment.
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@lilinamouse2111 Tzar Nicolas signed Bjorko, but was outvoted by his 2nd tiers...
Because Russia (1905) was already in discussions with GB (Japan's ally), re. "a deal" concerning the Dardanelles. That is on record, and not speculative. There was obviously more "in it" for St. Petersburg to make a deal with London (chance of expanding into a long desired sphere of influence), rather than with Berlin ("only" a chance of peace between Russia, Germany, and by extension, to include France).
By ratifying Bjorko, it would have been for St Petersburg to convince Paris to "sign up" as well, something they obviously thought too difficult.
As it was, "little a deal" with London could potentially bring them access to a warm water port.
[See the entire "warm water port"-narrative, which is also established historiography, not speculation]
London is on record for dangling "a sweet carrot" in front of St Petersburg's ever greedy nose, in order to torpedo a "grand alliance" on the continent.
Duplicious as ever, Grey made a non-committing "promise", and St Petersburg fell for it:
Note all 1905:
"Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey thought entente with Russia a good idea. On 20 October 1905, during the election, he said:[10]
...if Russia accepts, cordially and whole-heartedly, our intention to preserve the peaceable possession of our Asiatic possessions, then I am quite sure that in this country no government will make it its business to thwart or obstruct Russia's policy in Europe. On the contrary, it is urgently desirable that Russia's position and influence be re-established in the councils of Europe.
and later, writing to his ambassador to Russia Sir Arthur Nicolson:[9]
It is not for us to propose changes with regard to the treaty conditions of the Dardanelles. I think some change in the direction desired by Russia would be admissible and we should be prepared to discuss the question if Russia introduces it.
In early 1907, Alexander Izvolsky, the Russian ambassador at Paris, raised the question. and talks were carried on in London with Russian Ambassador Count Alexander Benckendorff. Little is known but the "suggestion appears to have been made that Russia should have free egress from the Black Sea through the Straits, while other powers should have the right to send their vessels of war into the Straits without going into the Black Sea" together with some talk of "Russia's occupying the Bosphorus and England the Dardanelles, after which the Straits might be opened to other warships as well." In the event nothing came of the discussions at the time.[9]"
[Wiki]
Obviously, London made "promises" to St Petersburg it never intended to keep, just to avoid an alternative alliance system on the continent, which would have ensured peace (as a "collective system" of security).
Bjorko would not be ratified.
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@thevillaaston7811 The only thing "wall to wall" here is your lack of historical comprehension :-D
"The mid-1870s witnessed a series of violent rebellions against Ottoman rule in the Balkans, and equally violent and repressive responses from the Turks. The Russian Tsar, Alexander II, wanting to intervene against the Ottomans, sought and obtained an agreement with Austria-Hungary. In the Budapest Conventions of 1877, the two powers agreed that Russia would annex Bessarabia, and Austria-Hungary would observe a benevolent neutrality toward Russia in the pending war with the Turks. As compensation for this support, Russia agreed to Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[9]"
[From wiki]
It was a simple "territorial exchange", or the mutual agreement of "no interest".
Russia got the "rights" to annex parts of Besarabia.
Austria-Hungary got the "exchange" to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Aka "a bilateral deal".
They simply just didn't annex Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately.
If the power mongers in St Petersburg have a short-term memory, and then throw a hissy fit (in 1908) in order to "save face" in respect to their own upset citizens (see there), that is really their problem, aka "war mongering".
Austria-Hungary did nothing wrong.
Nice try, [yawn] again ;-)
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@alexh479 Kind words in diplomacy are often a result of necessity rather than what the leaders really thought.
Maybe "revenge" is the wrong word, but De Gaule certainly got some gratification/satisfaction out of his later stand re. British entry into the EU.
Under De Gaule, France finaly put on their "big boy boots".
No more begging for Spitfires (Battle of France), and no more begging for help from an uncaring world of "friends across the Atlantic": cheering you on in an hour of need (May 1940)...but little else. No soldiers, no tanks, no battleships, no honor. Just "hopes and prayers", just silent admiration, and a pat on the back...but not much more. Paris would no longer be begging for help, or grovelling for assisistance.
No more having own ships blown up by "best friends" and their "promises", if one is down and out and forced to surrender by a vastly superior enemy.
No more "cordial" amistad.
Under De Gaule, France had own nukes now, and a "new best fwiend" Konrad Adenauer, and leverage.
A marriage made in heaven :-)
Finaly after hundreds of years, and with a different set of "balance of power", it would not be "empires" squaring off, but "new best friends" with a common enemy this time, and if those Russians were going to come storming through the Fulda Gap, it wasn't London or Washington DC which was going to decide whether West Germans were "poor enough" to start a "world war" for.
One might not like De Gaule for all his other faults, and the list is long. But he did get that one thing right. He rid France of the need for "best friends". No more "faraway empires" with a "geographical advantage" going "well, it doesn't really look that bad...for me...so good luck..."
Accompanied by snidy remarks of "who saved you last time duh?", De Gaule did the only right thing: if Paris wasn't on the same level as Washington/London in NATO, it would be out, and an "associated power".
(Google how that unfolded with "France/De Gaulle/Force the Dissuasion")
Paris would decide if Germans were "poor enough" to help.
When it comes to the crunch, or in an hour of need, it's "me first" in the dog-eat-dog world of big boys and their aspirations.
From that point on, Paris would decide, and Paris only, if Germans are "poor enough"...and wipe a sufficiet amount of mother Russia off the map with own nukes, should a single Russian ever set a single foot on a single "poor West German" in their new barrier state.
And De Gaule?
I guess he threw in a bit of that "revenge is a dish best served cold"-attitude. When London was desparate for "markets", Paris denied entry into the EU with a veto. Third in line, after the "old best fwiends of WW2," Washington DC, and Moscow (rescinding the "percentages agreement" for markets in Eastern Europe): France would now also kick London while it was down and out, economically weak and economically failing...
De Gaule: "You want markets for your Vauxhalls? I want markets for my Citroens and my Renaulds..."
(Google: "Paris vetoes UK applications for EU membership 1963 and 1967").
Just like the "600 London lords" of Empire geostrategists.
Loosely quoting Lord Palmerston: "England has no eternal friends and no eternal enemies. Only eternal interests."
And that counts for everyone, also Paris/de Gaule.
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@manilajohn0182 Yes, correct of course.
All existing and aspiring empires are "perfidious by nature". Self-serving, more or less.
Or as I always say "nobody does anything for free", and that includes all empires.
Some might be more benevolent than others, but there is always a "price tag" for "help", and "help" is often self-serving.
It reminds me of the airline safety message of "put on your own oxygen mask first before helping others".
That's how "empires" tick. They "put on their own oxygen mask", and only then "help others"...sometimes :-)
Mackinder is great.
But unfortunately London did not seem to understand nor follow their own geopolitical "logic", and somehow missed the USA's rise "across the pond".
Or the fact that there might be some long-term grievances resulting from history.
Logic almost dictates that London should have sought to unite Europe, not play their "divide and rule" games with the continental powers.
After WW1, they descended one rung, and after WW2 they would lose their markets to the USA, their sphere of interest in Central Europe/Baltics/most of the Balkans to Moscow, the nr.1 position as "ruler of the world, the privilege of "Pax Britannica, both to the USA", their self-determined role of "balancer of powers" for the continent, their stated goal of being the "decider of wars" on the continent, and finally their "Empire".
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For the British Empire, commencing roughly the year 1900, every "victory" was in fact a nail in the own coffin.
The following essay will explain how first London, and then Washington DC used mainly divide and rule/conquer strategies at key watershed moments throughout history in order to effect world domination, mainly facilitated by a geographical advantage. Unlike conventional wisdom suggests, such policies were not only implemented in overseas territories and colonies, but were indeed also used against the continental European powers, within the limitations of the power balance at any given time in history. In order to first become and then later stay the world hegemon, distance coupled with a financial and technological edge, were converted into political means (policies) by London power players. Up to the early-20th century, these realities gave London that slight edge over their continental rivals which were already divided due to a variety of reasons. As time progressed and war ravaged Europe in the first half of the 20th century, technology advanced further, so that the geographical advantage once enjoyed by London, passed over to the USA and Washington DC's power players. After World War 2 the multipolar world up to the 19th century turned bipolar, then unipolar as the Cold War ended or the systems morphed.
Historically, European conflicts between systems based on structurally similar dynasties, turned into a struggle between ideologically different systems. Rather than the previous limited wars up to the early-20th century, wars then became total. The different systems tended to strive to overpower, marginalize, integrate or destroy other conflicting systems if symbioses was not possible. The key to success here, and the novelty of the theory presented, was that the core means employed were strategies resembling divide and rule/conquer. The systems which had the geographical advantage, either allied with, beguiled, befriended or otherwise favored other systems if useful for own gain. What set these loose alliances of friendships or ententes apart from other systems which also united, was a lack of obligation to react in any specific way during times of crises or wars. The distinct advantage of geography being that those with such a competitive advantage would not have to fear an existencial threat to the own systems and could be more bold in international relations, or delaying actions in crises or wars until a favorable point on the timeline, based on the technological standpoint humanity had reached at the point in time.
Such divide and rule strategies were in fact standing London policies, disguised by careful use of language in policies. Since the logic of balanced powers to avoid great wars was widely accepted within the framework of the Concert of Europe, no other capital city seemed to have noticed or objected. Rather than aiding relative peace, which persisted in most of Europe for around a century after 1815, London's policy standpoint as sole "balancer of powers", resulted in an ever greater risk of a total war of the systems. At the core of Europe, these older continental European systems grew in extent and power in the leadup to 1914, under constant stress in efforts to balance power due to the fact that land borders resulted in more exposure to danger from a neighboring system: placing continental powers in a situation of a relative geographical disadvantage while engaging in crises or wars. While London could always find a power to temporarily ally with on the continent, the reverse was not possible (on Britain), because the UK had achieved an early unification process. The "decider" would always be London. Continental powers therefore faced the geographically disadvantageous locations with regards to expansive aims. This was directly opposed to faraway systems which had the geographical advantage of distance from this core of the Old World. Few seemed to have noticed the potential for MAD as time passed. Due to her geographical advantage, and at London's sole discretion, the "balancer" London stood aloof. The technological standpoint at the time meant she was detached from all danger to the own heartland which was England. A role which was guarded by the Royal Navy. London was the "sole divider and sole decider of wars". That eventually lead to the unintentional end of European world rule and domination, including their own. It was a careful use of language which meant that most of the above did not need to be kept hidden, but the words used indeed reveal a standing policy of "divide et impera". In fact, most of it happened out in the open, in newspaper articles, treaties, conferences, political summits, etc. and for all current witnesses to observe and study because just like today, it is possible to drive multiple policies in parallel. Most observers simply did not recognize the events for what they were, or they noticed and considered the status quo as a meritocracy or a well-deserved own right, or they did not pay attention. Distinct systems with many similarities and many differences employing strategies as a way to achieve greater gain for the own system.
The theory comes in two parts, that of 1) divide and rule, in which case the dividing power is actually in a position to exploit an imbalance in power, to impose a ruling on another side by ensuring the continued rift between opposing systems, and the more common 2) divide and gain, where the power intent on creating an advantage for its own system, has to suffice with splitting potential unity in the making apart, but lacks sufficient power to impose a ruling.
Divide and rule/conquer is revealed by events.
Unlike human beings, events don't lie, steal, or kill.
Unlike human beings, events which are proven to have happened, and are not disputed to have occured, do not deceive, manipulate, or "tweak" the own perceived "truths" in order to generate positive feelings in a flurry of "99% ancillary details", which then distorts vision...
The biggest mistakes France ever made was making "best fwiends" with rimlands (geoploitics/London/Washington DC), who were not on the continent of Europe.
In 1940, Paris finally found out how much they were "valued".
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Correct.
French leaders were dumb as a pile of bricks concerning geopolitics and geostrategy.
Because after the "won" WW1, it was the USA and GB which divided the "rule of the world" amongst themselves.
According to Mahan, those who rule the oceans, rule the world.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Thayer_Mahan
France finished WW1 with a mighty army, but was not granted the "rule" of the World Island with this army (see Heartland Theory).
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History
Unattainable for the French economy anyway, since according to one historian France had a "giant appetite, but had rotten teeth" (meaning that the willpower of their elites to rule and dominate was not matched by the economy or political landscape which was a shambles after WW1).
In other words, London had the "leverage" to control the destiny of the French Empire (naval power), but in return France did not have the leverage to control the destiny of the British Empire (land forces).
A bad deal, in my books...
France relinquished it's position as a first class naval power in return for "a deal" to dominate or share a few regions (Balkans, ME , Central Europe), but not the geostrategically vital Heartland (aka the "pivot" of Eurasia from which the destruction/dismantling of the British Empire by land forces was possible).
According to London, if London could not rule this herself, or by proxy, it would be divided or "balanced " amongst several rivals.
France allied herself to another power which could simply hop across the channel if a war didn't turn out as expected...
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Yet, once the "unfortunate WW1" (which French leaders played a large part in starting and expanding) was "won"...
My school French isn't the best, so I copied and pasted this from another YT poster, in case you can read French:
"Pour la politique secrète de réarmement de l'Allemagne, d'après les archives (partiellement numérisées dans google books) des services secrets français du 2e Bureau, l'Allemagne avait été prise en flagrant délit de détention et d'exportation d'armes chimiques en 1921 à l'Espagne, alors que ça lui était interdit.
L'Allemagne a semble t'il aussi fait une action de guerre économique contre le franc depuis l'Espagne, alors qu'ils étaient supposé être "écrasés par le diktat".
On aurait pu arrêter la stratégie hostile des 1er allemands militaristes qui allait servir Hitler à cette date là.
Et tous les petits accords des allemands militaristes avec les autres pays, la Yougoslavie, l'URSS,... étaient aussi plus ou moins connu des services secret français et d'après les rapports les anglais savaient aussi.
Quant on lit dans les rapports des services secrets que les anglais faisait du lobbying anti-français dans le Monde, c'est pas cool.
Et la France va en réunion diplomatique avec les autres pays, la France dit que l'Allemagne se réarme secrètement, viole le traité de désarmement, tout le monde fait comme si c'était faux, alors que tout le monde est complice ou témoin du réarmement allemand. L'allemagne avait de l'argent pour faire des recherches en armement interdits et des guerres économiques secrètes, mais pas pour payer d'indemnités de la guerre, xd."
(Waard la France)
In a nutshell, French leaders whining to London about Germany re-arming, even though...uhm...they knew why London wasn't going to do anything about it.
London's policy for the continent was called "Balance of Power".
https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power#:~:text=Balance%20of%20power%2C%20in%20international,power%20of%20the%20other%20side.
That meant that London had unilaterally decided that it would be "the balancer" of power on the continent.
With Berlin, Moscow and Vienna (temporarily) out of the picture, this policy did not favor a re-emergence of an overpowering Paris or Warsaw.
This was a well-known fact at the time: the British admiral-in-chief, more or less expressed it this way to his French counterpart in February 1919 when the discussions on the first treaty of naval limitation began (they couldn't believe it).
Discussions which have been archived and scanned at the archives at the Quai d'Orsay
If Paris did not agree with the attitude of the lords in London, they should have looked for a more powerful continental ally than the weak states in the Little Entente, or the economically impotent Warsaw....
So the symbol of world domination (Navies and Battleships) was decided on in Washington 5-5-3-2-2....
A mere "2" for France, making it quite clear what Washington and London thought about France's position in the world after WW1.
They, the new rulers, gave themselves a "5".
A mere "2" for France, who had scraps of diplomatic "world rule" (Balkans, Central Europe, and the ME) thrown at her, and who had leaders who thought "walls" (Maginot) and encirclement of Berlin would protect her forever and ever in a military sense...
What was needed was the wisdom of "a de Gaulle", allying himself to an arch enemy, "an Adenauer".
Unfortunately, it took another world war, more endless death and suffering, the collapse of the British Policy of Balance of Power at the end of WW2, and last not but least...the threat of mutual destruction by red hordes storming through the Fulda Gap and not stopping until they reached Paris, before wiser heads came together and decided to bury the hatchet...
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@chieftenphatts7048 It was far more than a tragedy.
It was a geopolitical/grand strategy disaster.
They got a suitable answer from The American Century aka Washington DC after WW2.
The story of how the Brits lost their Empire...
The big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying a power or alienating it was neither wise, nor in GB's best interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, pissed off by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
After WW2, London had no leverage to further enforce or secure agreements, and down went the British Empire.
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The big picture...and how the little piece of the puzzle called "Mers el Kebir" fit into it.
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent or dissing it, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying the continental balance of power, was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings.
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
And down went the British Empire too...game over...
Yup.
Well done.
Like pulling the rug from underneath one's own feet and then falling over.
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Lastly, they came for the British Empire, but there was nobody left to speak for them...
"What actually occurred was that Britain and other countries became hopelessly indebted to the United States once again (edit: during World War 2) ... “We have profited by our past mistakes,” announced Roosevelt in a speech delivered on September 3, 1942. “This time we shall know how to make full use of victory.” This time the U.S. Government would conquer its allies in a more enlightened manner, by demanding economic concessions of a legal and political nature instead of futilely seeking repayment of its wartime loans (of World War 1). The new postwar strategy sought and secured foreign markets for U.S. exports, and new fields for American investment capital in Europe’s raw materials producing colonial areas. Despite Roosevelt’s assurances to the contrary, Britain was compelled, under the Lend-Lease agreements and the terms of the first great U.S. postwar loan to Britain, to relinquish Empire Preference and to open all its markets to U.S. competition, at a time when Britain desperately needed these markets as a means by which to fund its sterling debt. Most important of all, Britain was forced to unblock its sterling and foreign-exchange balances built up by its colonies and other Sterling Area countries during the wartime years. Instead of the Allied Powers as a whole bearing the costs of these wartime credits to British Empire countries, they would be borne by Britain itself. Equally important, they would not be used as “blocked” balances that could be used only to buy British or other Sterling Area exports, but would be freed to purchase exports from any nation. Under postwar conditions this meant that they would be used in large part to purchase U.S. exports." (page 115/116)
"By relinquishing its right to block these balances, Britain gave up its option, while enabling the United States to make full use of its gold stock as the basis for postwar lending to purchased generalized (primarily U.S.) exports. At a stroke, Britain’s economic power was broken. What Germany as foe had been unable to accomplish in two wars against Britain, the United States accomplished with ease as its ally." (Page 117)
"Furthermore, under the terms on which it joined the International Monetary Fund, Britain could not devalue the pound sterling so as to dissipate the foreign-exchange value of these balances. Its liability thus was maximized – and so was America’s gain from the pool of liquidity that these balances now represented." ("Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire." -- Michael Hudson, 2nd edition 2003)
In case that seems a bit technical, here is the "nutshell version": Just like the bank takes your house if you don't pay up in the real world, the British Empire was run into the ground by the "best friends" USA, who stole the Empire's markets; hidden behind a whole lot of "technical jargon", thereby taking the means London had to pay its debts. A suitable micro level example would be the bank having an eye on your house, then making sure you get fired so you can't pay your debt. On the macro level the term is "debt trap diplomacy", and on the (privatized) propaganda level the means is "projection: accuse somebody else of being something which one is oneself", and that "being" has started waaaaaay earlier as a matter of own policy. A "debt trap" the Allies walked into after 1916, after they had spent all their own money, and squeezed as much out of their colonies as they could get away with, but refused to come to terms at the negotiating table: another factor usually associated with the Central Powers.
-----------------------------------
"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
§§§footnote
If you wish to know more about exactly how the British Empire was "being dismantled," please respond...
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All the more reasons why "generals in a Chateau miles away from the front lines, should never give orders".
A recipe for disaster.
Back in the days of sail, British Admirals had wide-ranging powers, even of a political nature for obvious reasons (communications).
It was also the most successful days of Empire.
Strange how historians would conclude that it was "generals sitting in Chateaus far away from the action" which lost many battles in WW1 and early-WW2, rather than allowing front-line commanders and officers to lead from the front, when given "objectives", rather than specific orders.
The specific orders by the Admirality, coupled with Churchill's "settle matters quickly" had 2 main effects:
1) it took the decision out of the hands of Admiral Somerville
2) put emense pressure, by dictated orders (rather than "stated objectives")
Even Churchill must have instinctively grasped that it was a mistake, and he prepared 2 speeches for Parliament.
One conciliatory, the other more defiant...
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@dovetonsturdee7033 In view of more than 3 million Germans, yes, the British contribution after Dunkirk was "token".
Furthermore, after Dunkirk, these token forces overwhelmingly "hugged" the coasts, where they could quickly hop on a boat and evacuate when the heat turned up.
The own air defenses were already held back by Dowding, so the combined effort suffered from a lack of air cover.
I've given the overall grand strategy overview at the top, under the video.
In view of the fact that in mid-June 1940 France was basically alone, Brits more inclined to view defending the continent a "lost cause", so France surrendered rather than needlessly sacrificing more French soldiers, civilians, and property destruction.
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@KatyushaLauncher The British didn't have the power of clairvoyance, re. Nazi Germany's intentions. Mistrust of the the "word" of Berlin was justified, seeing that Hitler had agreed to the Munich Accord, only to break it (his own signature and "word") just 6 months later.
What the British did have have firm assurances, and orders to scuttle or sabotage own ships, in case of a danger of a takeover.
From critical(dot)org(uk):
"[During the negotiations between Somerville and Gensoul]...Gensoul produced orders from Darlan dated to June 24th stating that the French fleet was to be moved to the United States or sabotaged in case of an attempt to capture them by Germany."
Had Somerville been granted full negotiating powers, and an objective (say "ensure that the French Fleet does not fall into Axis hands"), rather than an ultimatum and the knee-jerk panicky "settle matters quickly"-order an agreement ensuring that the French Fleet was out of the reach of either Berlin or Rome, could have been reached.
Mers el Kebir is what happens when a nation doesn't trust its own military, but prefers to meddle politically, with specific orders, from faraway "chateauxs", rather than trusting the skill and integrity own competent military leaders, who then lead from the front.
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@KatyushaLauncher Yes, that is correct.
French military = ensures the safety and protection of the French Empire, against enemies, whoever they were.
In the context of Mers, it was Germany, or a supposed "handover to the Nazis"-rhetoric.
No, the French did not "owe" GB, and the British Empire anything.
British military = ensures the safety and protection of the British Empire, against enemies, whoever they were.
Same logic counts for all.
After GB refused further aid to protect France (for example, sending more fighter planes to counter the LWs air superiority, which Dowding refused), no side owed anything to the other side anymore.
I can produce a long list of "British betrays to France" in the leadup to the French decision to accept an armistice, so both "sides" can play the "being betrayed"-game.
It goes both ways.
I'm neutral btw.
I have zero sympathy for what I term "dumb Europeans" who with cases like these (like Mers), against a backdrop of a changing world ("geopolitical" big picture) squandered away their inheritance.
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99% of the video, and 99% of the commentary here is totally beside the point, because it leaves out a key actor: The USA.
Wiki: Robert Greene, 48 Rules of Power (edited as a selected few); " 2. Never put too much trust in "best fwiends", learn how to use rivals (as "proxies" for example London/Paris) 3. Conceal your intentions (from fwiends too) 4. Always say less than necessary ... 7. Get others to do the work for you, but always take the credit (edit: "heavy lifting") 12. Use selective honesty and generosity to disarm your victim 13. When (edit: attempting own goals); appeal to people’s self-interest (imperialism), never to their mercy or gratitude 14. Pose as a friend, work as a spy (aka gathering information by posing as "a fwiend")... 20. Do not commit to anyone ... Play on people’s need to believe to create a cultlike following [ze "freedumb and democwacy"- argument, which works like a dream] ... 31. Control the options: get others to play with the cards you deal (ahem..."lease and lend" help to select "favorites") 32. Play to people’s fantasies 33. Discover each man’s thumbscrew (money/influence/desire for power and control) 34. Be royal in your own fashion: act like a king to be treated like one 35. Master the art of timing ... 38. Think as you like but behave like others (imperialism/neoimperialism for example employing "acts of ENABLING") 39. Stir up waters to catch fish (for example "send a gunboat/military, wait to get shot at, or 'a Maine explosion', to then 'act in self-defence', or 'for the poor people', or whatever...") 40. Despise the free lunch ... 42. Strike the shepherd and the sheep will scatter ... (take out the main opposition to own goals, in this case Berlin) 44. Disarm and infuriate with the mirror effect (hypocrisy is a strategy, not "an oversight") 45. Preach the need for change, but never reform too much at once ("conservatism" is an -ism and a bias) 46. Never appear too perfect (In other words, have a few massacres and regime change opps/invasions oneself, to "blend in" with the other kids in the imperialist club) 47. Do not go past the mark you aimed for: in victory, learn when to stop (strategy aka "one step at a time")"
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@Thoradim They got a suitable answer from The American Century aka Washington DC after WW2.
The story of how the Brits lost their Empire...
The big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying a power or alienating it was neither wise, nor in GB's best interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, pissed off by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
And down went the British Empire too...wind, wind, whirlwind, hurricane, game over...
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Re. "Who benefited most from Mers, and who lost most".
The general consensus is that The British Empire was the "winner", and that "France was the loser".
Wrong.
Reality? For the second time in 20 years, "the lights would go out", and others would benefit. Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
So at the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Century
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_exceptionalism
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@thevillaaston7811 I "speak English", so how could I ever ever intend harm? :-D
Just like everyone who "speaks English" must be "a fwiend", right?
Right...
It all started off soooo gweat...
That "Hollywood movie Band of Brothers"-stuff.
Everyone speaking English.
The good guys...
EPISODE 1:
"By 1901, many influential Britons advocated for a closer relationship between the two countries. W. T. Stead even proposed that year in The Americanization of the World for both to merge to unify the English-speaking world, as doing so would help Britain "continue for all time to be an integral part of the greatest of all World-Powers, supreme on sea and unassailable on land, permanently delivered from all fear of hostile attack, and capable of wielding irresistible influence in all parts of this planet."
[Google: The_Great_Rapprochement]
Sooooo gweat.
Everybody "speaking English" and being "best fwiends".
What could possibly go wrong?
EPISODE 2:
"At the end of the war, Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
Brits being squeezed like a lemon by US banks, having their Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, being refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's expansion, munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under...lol, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War"...
Maybe they should have informed themselves how "empires" tick, because there was another "ring".
A "ring which ruled them all".
The American Century.
So they woke up one morning, only to discover that their "best fwiends forever" had stolen all their markets...
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@thevillaaston7811 The same Apartheid which led to the failure of South Africa in the 1970s/1980s is the same "apartheid" which led to the end of the pathetic "Empire".
Of course, in both cases the gentlemen in control were too slow to pull the helm around, and change the disastrous course the "ship" was steering.
Reminds me of Captain Smith on the Titanic shouting "Full speed ahead!".
Do you understand why I left SA as soon as I reached the age of reason?
For the British Empire.
1) Make timely internal changes:
In a nutshell, more "freedom, liberty, and self-determination" for all the subjects of the British Empire, thereby turning it into a "Pound block of equals" of sorts.
2) dump the disaster created by their own Policy of Balance of Power:
That pitted GB/Empire against the strongest continental power/alliance/country as a default setting.
Aww.
Too bad.
Like your "London lords" who once stiff-upper-lipped their way over the proverbial "lemming cliff", you are simply too proud and arrogant to accept the reasons your pathetic "Empire" faded away in less than a lifetime.
From the unmistakable nr.1 at the turn of the century (around 1900), down to "merely on par" with your "new best fwiends" (lol) the USA, down to "third fiddle" in the Cold War...
All "engineered" by The American Century, using the same political/financial/policy "tools" (because after 1900 geography slowly began giving Washington DC the leverage/advantage), that London once used when London had the geographical advantage (during the 19th and early-20th century)...
Sorry :-)
LOL. No, not really...
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The big picture...and how the little piece of the puzzle called "Mers el Kebir" fit into it.
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying a continental power or dissing it, was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings.
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
And down went the British Empire too...
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The big picture...and how the little piece of the puzzle called "Mers el Kebir" fit into it.
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying a continental power or dissing it, was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings.
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
And down went the British Empire too...
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@patrickbotti2357 At the end of it all, someone "ran off" with the British Empire and the old slogan "speaking German" is just simplistic chanting for the meek, to cover up how British leaders lost their Empire through incompetence and greed.
"At the end of the war, Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
How'd that work out after WW2?
Brits being squeezed like a lemon by US banks, having their Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, being refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's expansion, munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under...lol, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War"...
Maybe they should have informed themselves how "empires" tick, because there was another "ring".
A "ring which ruled them all".
The American Century.
Sorreeee. That's what happens when you make the wrong "fwiends".
So they woke up one morning, only to discover that their "best fwiends forever" had stolen all their markets.
The only "special" thing about that "relationship" was that somebody had to be the one who had to bend over...
You see "speaking English" doesn't save anybody either :-D
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@pbotti A good comment.
Of course, it makes little sense "whining" about the course of a specific historical event, without exploring viable alternatives.
Of course such an alternative already existed.
It is even mentioned in almost every history book about wars.
Re. "viable alternatives", at the time, and easily implementable, I repeat: I find it strange how historians would conclude that it was "generals sitting in Chateaus far away from the action" which lost many battles in WW1 and early-WW2, rather than allowing front-line commanders and officers to lead from the front, given "objectives", not specific orders.
That is so true.
Lesson learnt? I fear not.
The specific orders by the Admirality, coupled with Churchill's "settle matters quickly order" had 2 main effects:
1) it took the decision out of the hands of Admiral Somerville
2) put emense pressure, by dictated orders (rather than "objectives")
Even Churchill must have instinctively grasped that it was a mistake, and he prepared 2 speeches for Parliament.
One conciliatory, the other more defiant...
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It was far more than a tragedy.
It was a geopolitical/grand strategy disaster.
They got a suitable answer from The American Century aka Washington DC after WW2.
The story of how the Brits lost their Empire...
The big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying a power or alienating it was neither wise, nor in GB's best interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, pissed off by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
After WW2, London had no leverage to further enforce or secure agreements, and down went the British Empire.
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Unfortunately, it wasn't only "the French thinking about French interests (their "Empire") which must be considered, but also Brits thinking about their Empire, thereby ignoring common sense.
Unfortunately, rules went out the back door, but not logic...
British leaders were fools, and ignored the big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying Germany, nor "dissing" one of these "balancing tools" (France), was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, pissed off by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
[Search for: britannica(dot)com/topic/balance-of-power]
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
And down went the British Empire too...
Sad.
"Justifiable" is a bs premise for any debate concerning war.
What really counts is smart leadership, and Brits sucked at geopolitics/geostratey, and lost their Empire....
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The big picture in regards to the potential Anglo-German Alliance.
Let's not forget there is always a big picture.
"The Naval Laws (German: Flottengesetze, "Fleet Laws") were five separate laws passed by the German Empire, in 1898, 1900, 1906, 1908, and 1912."
[wiki]
Note that these had to be approved and passed in the German Reichstag (Berlin parliament), and were therefore not secret.
Without sufficient support, any bill (such as in any democratic process) could have been downvoted.
British "offers" re. "an alliance", or limiting the effects of blockades, or at least the "heartfelt desire" (LOL) of neutrality in case of a European War made to the continent's most powerfull country (alliance):
1898: The Chamberlain/Balfour offers re. "an alliance" (1898), serious efforts to achieve are generally considered (by most historians) as to have pettered out and ending in 1903.
1906: ...
1908: The Hague International Law 1899 and 1907 (an attempt by the international community in London in 1908 to limit the effects of blockades to short range blockades of ports only, which would therefore not affect neutrals or non-belligerents). This was negotiated, agreed upon, signed, but then not ratified by London.
1912: The Haldane Mission (1912). Berlin of course soon found out that Haldane was there to "talk, not negotiate"...
Weird...
Bait and switch....
Make a "sweet offer"...
Dangle a juicy carrot in front of the donkeys, hoping that the "other side" were "lions lead by donkeys"...
Potentially influence members of the German parliament, in the way they would vote on the Naval Bills (the typical "undecided" minister could be potentially "swung"). Or "dragging feet" with regards to negotiations themselves, until the date of the vote, thereby torpedoeing its implementation.
Re. the critical question concerning the obvious correlation between the dates of the German naval bills, and sudden London "friendly offers" re. alliances, talks regarding changes to International Law which would deeply affect London's "grip" (via the Royal Navy) on a continental power, or a neutrality accord with the continent's most powerfull state (and alliance, the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary).
Of course "What about the missing 1906?" is a perfectly valid question.
The "naval act" of 1906 was merely an insignificant amendment, without great weight.
"1906 Amendment: Approved 19 May 1906; strength unchanged except for 5 extra large cruisers for the foreign fleet plus 1 extra large cruiser in material reserve, and 48 additional torpedo boats."[from wiki]
Here the lack of any special London interest in the leadup to the German parliament voting on the bill of 1906 is even more conspicious that the cause for London's "offers" is related the German Naval Acts, and that there is a direct connection between these (cause and effect).
But surely the dates are "purely coincidence" or could simply be "correlation", not causal (search for "correlation does not imply causation").
None whatsoever.
London considered itself the "balancer of powers", and had no intention of having her hands tied re. the way they intended to fight in any "next great war", whichever way it unfolded, whoever "started it", or whatever the causes and reasons for such war could be (no hindsight, since of course nobody knew there would be a war in 1914: but "policy" was "policy" regardless).
London had no intention of using the diplomatic means realistically at London's disposal to limit the risk of a war breaking out, by attempting to alleviate the tension between the three powers in question (Germany/France/Russia). It suited the London lords just fine that Germany was wedged in between GB's main historical imperialist rivals for territory and gain (Russia and France), and the lords had no intention of sacrificing the potential situation that all continental powers, engaged in a "total war", would end up "mutually exhausted", thereby strengthening the grip a little nation of 40 million people had on world affairs ("weight"). Of course, if everybody else ended up "totally exhausted" and "totally demoralized", one's own "power"/"leverage" would automatically rise respective to others.
Of course, for politicians who considered the presence of an opposing army in Belgium as a threat, as Casus Belli, or a "pistol pointing at the heart of London", the fact that Russian soldiers were less than 100 miles from Berlin, and of great worry (two-front war) to Berlin, is pure hypocrisy.
Even a simple neutrality accord or non-aggression pact between London and Berlin would have taken a great burden off Berlin's shoulders, since a war (any war threatening the balance of power) would have automatically included GB/Empire.
Berlin was confident of being able to repulse any French/Russian attack (two-front war), but with GB thrown into the deal as the self-proclaimed "balancer of powers", it would have to be a "short war" through Belgium (note: "in strategy" or "an explanation", not to be confused with "apologia" or "sympathy for invading armies" for which there is none on my part).
A pre-war neutrality agreement or non-aggresion pact between London and Berlin would have meant Berlin could return to the pre-1905 situation (no single contingency plan, aka the so-called "Schlieffen Plan" only, but rather multiple war plans adapted to expected circumstances as had existed prior to 1913), comfortable in mastering any potential Russian or French aggression should such aggression ever arise. Lastly, with any form of long-term mutually beneficial treaty/alliance/accord in place and ratified, Germany would also not have needed a bigger navy.
History is not set in stone, and any positive changes along the way would have effected events on the timeline.
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Churchill lost the British Empire.
It was far more than just a tragedy.
It was a geopolitical/grand strategy disaster.
They got a suitable answer from The American Century aka Washington DC after WW2.
The story of how the Brits lost their Empire...
The big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying a power or alienating it was neither wise, nor in GB's best interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, pissed off by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
After WW2, London had no leverage to further enforce or secure agreements, and down went the British Empire.
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@KatyushaLauncher Back in the days of sail, British Admirals had wide-ranging powers, even of a political nature for obvious reasons.
It was also the most successful days of Empire.
Strange how historians would conclude that it was "generals sitting in Chateaus far away from the action" which lost many battles in WW1 and early-WW2, rather than allowing front-line commanders and officers to lead from the front, given "objectives", not specific orders.
True.
The specific orders by the Admirality, coupled with Churchill's "settle matters quickly" had 2 main effects:
1) it took the decision out of the hands of Admiral Somerville
2) put emense pressure, by dictated orders (rather than "objectives")
Even Churchill must have instinctively grasped that it was a mistake, and he prepared 2 speeches for Parliament.
One conciliatory, the other more defiant...
It was neither "necessary", nor wise.
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@dovetonsturdee7033 There is a much deeper issue never discussed in documentaries or videos like this, which is geopolitics.
If a state always does what it can, rather than what it should, then these actions will have effects.
An "issue" I've never seen discussed, except for the false "Roosevelt had to be impressed"-narrative, is the attitude of the USA.
Concerning WW2, it had the geographical advantage of being able to sit on the fence, and "steer" events for the own advantage.
According to the logic of "never let a crisis/war go to waste", the American Century aimed to benefit from the mistakes of its rivals. Yes, the British Empire was a rival.
The "Roosevelt had to be impressed"-narrative is false.
All the American Century fanboys in Washington DC were waited for was to see (after France), was how the alliances were going to play out, who was going to end up fighting whom, before investing in the war.
The USA was safe.
[I'll copy a longer comment re. "geographical advantage" below this one]
For the American Century, it was purely a matter of knowing that GB would keep on fighting the Axis powers, and for that an attack on the Axis powers somewhere would also have sufficed.
What Mers effectively ended, was the "cordial" part of the "entente". Regarding the way ensuring how The British Empire was indirectly protected on the continent, that was one of the last "nails in the coffin" of Empire. After Mers, France (figuratively) went across the Atlantic to cry on the ample American shoulder, and was no longer a "power" protecting the British Empire [I'll post a longer comment regarding how "balancing powers" on the continent, protected the British Empire indirectly].
Mers was a geopolitical disaster, because of its political effects.
On the other hand, giving viewers "options" about "what else could have have done", but leaving out the obvious (or not considering it a viable option) is known as "false dichotomy". Implying that there were no other options, even though there were, and better ones.
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@dovetonsturdee7033 The British Empire was indirectly protect on the continent. GB never had the population or the industrial might to rule a quarter of the globe, and indirectly achieved this aim successfully for more than a 100 years.
Of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected on the continent by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, or dissing it irreparable, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angry about Mers el Kebir and had slipped under Washington's wings.
After Mers, France was out of the equation.
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = sold off, and overrun by the commies
After WW2, there was nothing left to "balance" with...
Why do you think Roosevelt "was really pleased"?
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@williambradley9419 Another "good book" for you, if it isn't too TLDR for you...
Unfortunately London did not understand how "balance of power" works.
Most debates are a completely pointless waste of time, same as 99% of all "history books".
Ancillary details being regurgitated again and again, in efforts to distract from what really happened.
Ever since the establishment of "Empire", London aimed to protect it, by (as a matter policy), making the strongest continental power/alliance the rival in peace/enemy in war.
London's "fatal mistake", was "snuggling up" to The American Century, thinking it would save the "Empire"...
London was always going to oppose the strongest continental country/power/alliance, as a default setting.
By own admission:
"The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England’s secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side, opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single, State or group at any time."
[From Primary source material:Memorandum_on_the_Present_State_of_British_Relations_with_France_and_Germany]
In a nutshell, oppose every major diplomatic advance made by the strongest continental power in times of peace, and ally against it in times of war. Because the own policy meant that London shied away from making binding commitments with continental powers, as a matter of policy, London set off to look for "new friends"...
EPISODE 1:
"By 1901, many influential Britons advocated for a closer relationship between the two countries. W. T. Stead even proposed that year in The Americanization of the World for both to merge to unify the English-speaking world, as doing so would help Britain "continue for all time to be an integral part of the greatest of all World-Powers, supreme on sea and unassailable on land, permanently delivered from all fear of hostile attack, and capable of wielding irresistible influence in all parts of this planet."
[Google: The_Great_Rapprochement]
Sooooo gweat.
Everybody "speaking English" and being "best fwiends".
What could possibly go wrong?
EPISODE V:
"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
Brits being squeezed like a lemon by US banks, having their Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, being refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's expansion, munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under...lol, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War"...
Maybe they should have informed themselves how "empires" tick, because there was another "ring".
A "ring which ruled them all".
The American Century.
So they woke up one morning, only to discover that their "best fwiends forever" had stolen all their markets.
Now, fill in the blanks yourself.
EPISODES II THRU IV...
Fake "narratives" of a supposed "Anglo-German Naval Arms Race" by "nasty Wilhelm" (reality = it was an international naval arms race, which included the USA/The American Century®).
Fake "narratives" like "the USA was on our side in WW1, and an ally" = total bs. (Reality? By own acknowledgement, they were "an associated power", and they fought for the American Century®)
Fill in the gaps.
See "the handwriting" of London's Policy of Balance of Power: at Versailles, at Saint-Germaine...everywhere.
Then there was another war. A result of the failed peace of the 1st: the totally flawed decision to concentrate most resources in an attempt to "flatten Germany". Reality? A large Strategic Air Force is one of the most expensive forms of warfare ever devised. "Flattening Germany" as a matter of policy, as flawed as trying to "snuggle up" to a faraway "empire", in order to try and save the own...
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@soapmaker2263 The "fiat currency" was a global policy created in the New World (USA) to overpower the Old World (Europe).
All the strategists in Washington DC (Internationalists soon to become the American Century) had to do was keenly observe...
A London policy made the strongest continental power the default "rival in peace", and the default "enemy in war".
London had 2 chances to correct their faulty reasoning.
One with Wilhelm II, roughly until 1900, until German leaders lost their patience trying to get a mutually beneficial treaty with London.
The 2nd chance, after WW1, while Germany was a democracy.
They blew both chances, and would subsequently lose their Empire.
Because roughly in parallel to Germany on the continent across the English Channel, there was another "new power" rising across the Atlantic, whose position was basically "observe calmly, secure our position, cope with affairs calmly, hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership.”
It was the USA.
Or "maybe they (Europe) won't notice if we sneak up on them..."
The American Century advocates in Washington DC were very good at "biding time" and "keeping a low profile...until they were strong enough to eclipse "the old", and not to care anymore.
With the "leverage" geography gave them (distance from squabbling Europeans), plus a drastically increasing power, as technology shrunk the world, they knew they would just have to wait long enough until the eternally squabbling Europeans had torn themselves to shreds.
Because in the arsenals of M-A-I-N there was another "weapon".
Well-known at the time, and formulated into words by John Quincy Adams: "There are two ways to conquer and enslave a country: One is by sword and one is by debt."
Note: it was "a plan" of sorts.
Wait.
Simply wait.
Washington DC/The American Century: "Let's see what happens. Never let a crisis or war go to waste."
Washington DC: If your rivals are making a mistake, don't interrupt them...
The main big difference?
While London afronted/confronted the strongest continental power/alliance which was Germany and the Dual Alliance at the time, as a matter of policy, the USA made the strongest power/alliance the "temporary friend" during crises and wars, only to overpower it commercially/economically/financially after WW2 was over."
Smart.
Kaiser Bill wished for "a place in the sun" (i.e. "markets", and "spheres of influence").
IMHO they should've just given him one, without the push-back.
It was greed and the control-freak instincts of "old empires", jealously guarding their own.
What unfolded after that, was basically a bed Europe had made for themselves, and with WW1, Versailles (and others like Saint-Germaine, or Trianon) and WW2, had to sleep in.
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Who "wanted to rule the world"?
Every "empire" eventually turns into what they accuse others of being (projection).
1) In 1907 Kaiser Wilhelm said: "Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be overlooked or left unused."
Such words written down without the intention of ever becoming public, give a clear indication of intent...
Believe me, it means nothing.
You WILL change your mind regarding "what it sounds like", in less than 2 minutes.
2) After WW2, German strategist envisioned a "Grand Area" as an almost exclusive "back yard", and under their "natural rights" to control: Every part of the new world order was assigned a specific function. The more industrial countries were to be guided as "great workshops". Those who had demonstrated their prowess during the war (would now be working under German supervision/finance). More, undeveloped regions were to "fulfill its major function as a source of raw materials and a market" for the industrial centers, as a memo put it. They were to be "exploited" (sic.) for the reconstruction of Europe (The references are to South America and Africa, but the points are general.). German strategists even suggested that "the destroyed parts of Europe might get a psychological lift from the project of exploiting" (sic.) Africa."
Of course the Germans were simply thinking about the psychology of the beaten and battered, and how good it must feel to be at least "able to kick down" if ones own future looks bleak.
Perfectly OK strategy, believe me...
You WILL change your mind regarding "waht it sounds like", in less than a minute, if you continue reading...
3) At the same time, German strategists seemed to favor the idea that since there was a lack of civilized origins in Southern and Eastern Europe ... "and since the processes of government are destined to operate for a long time in the future, in many of these countries, in ways which are strange and uncongenial to Germans ... Berlin should make no moral distinctions with respect to local governments, whether they are democratic in nature or authoritarian ... only an examination of German interests at stake not just political, but economical as well ... should be in order when assessing foreign relations in Southern and Eastern Europe. Moltke goes on to recommend the naked exertion of German national power in influencing the behavior of new states, short of the use of military force, while downplaying the multilateral binding obligations that might result from the new systems system of Conferences." (loosely quoted)
Of course in the minds of such strategists, it is the people's own fault if their destiny was to become only superficially "quasi independent/sovereign" states, with own leaders to be dominated and directed as mere German puppets, and the people controlled by a police state financed from and by Berlin (and a few other "chosen few"). If some "scraps" fall off the richly-lain tables at home, onto the locals they should not complain, but be happy about such scraps...
In such a system, everybody in power understood that disloyalty would be met by immediate repercussions: a little "regime change invasion" here, and coup there, or propaganda campaigns of "discontent" funded from outside, or "disgrunted masses" suddenly finding themselves funded by sh*tloads of cash from secret slush funds...all depepending on what strategy best suited the country and times.
All with the subtle "message" to all others to "be nice, or else..."
Of course, all of the above were simply "ideas floated" on how to control "lesser people" so that 3% or 4 % of the population in this sphere of influence (so-called "Grand Area") can then control 50% of the wealth contained here.
Nothing wrong with that of course, since such instincts of greed are normal, as we shall see.
The "plan" to "rule the world" is of course based on loosely gathered strings of information from official and inofficial sources (incl. NGOs), strung together into a giant story.
For the average readers/viewer, the quotes above are of course part of "a plan" or "the perfect evidence" of how Germans wanted to "rule the world", and subdue the British Empire, their biggest rival.
Only...
...the words...
Are not German.
The first paragraph was made by Woodrow Wilson, one of the world's biggest advocates of imperialism/white supremacy (whilst hiding behind a "an image" of being a liberal/idealist) and taken from a unpublished paper of 1907, as quoted in The Rising American Empire (1960) by Richard Warner Van Alstyne, p. 201.
Wilson of course was simply looking at what had happened the past 200 years as the original "13 colonies", first fought for independence, and then started going N.E.W.S. (North/East/West/South), brushing away all in its path. They wouldn't stop going, until they bumped up against European imperialism, their biggest rivals.
The second and third paragraphs were taken from a series of Washington DC "strategy papers": "During World War II, study groups of the (US) State Department and Council on Foreign Relations developed plans for the postwar world in terms of what they called the "Grand Area," which was to be subordinated to the needs of the American economy. The Grand Area was to include the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, the Far East, the former British Empire (which was being dismantled), the incomparable energy resources of the Middle East (which were then passing into American hands as we pushed out our rivals France and Britain), the rest of the Third World and, if possible, the entire globe. These plans were implemented, as opportunities allowed."
To further quote the article: "These declassified documents are read only by scholars, who apparently find nothing odd or jarring in all this."
(taken from, in parts: GEORGE KENNAN AND THE HISPANIC-LUSITANIAN WORLD: A CONTEMPORARY REFLECTION Antonio Luis Ramos Membrive Diplomático y escritor)
NOTE:
Parts 1), 2) and 3) in the first half were taken verbatim from US leaders, and only changed to mask the country of origin. I did this to make a point, which is hopefully understood...
These strategies by leaders who "wanted to rule the world" is simply a part of that "1%" of history which just does not make it to the mainstream for wider audiences...
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The French Fleet at Mers was no threat to the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of US corporate capitalism (Washington D.C.) and communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and had slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
So yes.
The superior geostrategists in Washington D.C. won.
No wonder, that the "smiling emperor" FDR was pleased with Churchill.
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Most debates are a completely pointless waste of time, same as 99% of all "history books", incl. the "debates" around this mini-topic of Mers el Kebir, re. the "right or wrong"-dichotomy...
Reality, does not give the proverbial hoot about what any individual considers "right" or "wrong".
There is only the reality of "what happened", incl. what happened afterwards.
And if you are an a$$hole, eternally bent on setting others up against each other, in order to gain, you'll eventually lose your empire.
A history of 99% ancillary details being regurgitated again and again, in efforts to distract from what really happened.
Ever since the establishment of "Empire", London aimed to expand and protect it, by (as a matter policy), making the strongest continental power/alliance the rival in peace/enemy in war. London was always going to oppose the strongest continental country/power/alliance, as a default setting. A virtual admission that divide and rule/conquer was at the heart of these policies, since it was only nominally or "technically known" as balance of power...
By own admission:
"The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is (ahem) technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England’s secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side, opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single, State or group at any time." [From Primary source material: Memorandum_on_the_Present_State_of_British_Relations_with_France_and_Germany]
In a nutshell, oppose every major diplomatic advance made by the strongest continental power in times of peace, and ally against it in times of war. Because the own policy meant that London shied away from making binding commitments with continental powers.
London's "fatal mistake" was "snuggling up" to the rising American Century, thinking it would serve further expansion, easy victories, and save the "Empire". This "hopping from one side of a scale" (countries) to another, balancing out powers on the continent, is also known, and not generally contested by historians as the "avoid the single hegemony on the continent"-narrative.
It was a policy.
After 1895, finally, here was a another power (Washington DC) which did not constantly insist on signatures or long-term/binding alliances. Washington DC seemed to express and share the lords' heartfelt desire for the free hand, to address "issues" as they rose. The two powers started "nodding off" each others' conquests (generally agreed upon narrative is that "US imperialism started in 1898, with the Spanish-American War).
And today? "In a similar poll in 2014 although the wording was slightly different...Perhaps most remarkably, 34% of those polled in 2014 said they would like it if Britain still had an empire." (whorunsbritain blogs)
Even today, one in every 3 adult British polled still dreams of the days of "ruling the world".
There are still some 15-20 million citizens in the UK who wake up every morning wanting to sing "Rule Britannia."
So here is where the cognitive dissonance sets in: one cannot still wish for a return of the good ol' days at the turn of this century (around 2000), yet at the same time admire the fools who lost the British Empire at the turn of the previous one (around 1900).
Every decision made back then was a conscious choice, made in London, by the London lords, and as a result of age-old London policy standpoints.
Any attempt to spin history into a version of events portraying London of acting defensively, or as a result of a real or immediate danger, or trying to protect the world, or otherwise, are fallacies. And if you are a dragon (imperial power), don't snuggle up to a dragon slayer (anti-imperialist power). From wiki: "The Great Rapprochement is a historical term referring to the convergence of diplomatic, political, military, and economic objectives of the United States and the British Empire from 1895 to 1915, the two decades before American entry into World War I."
EPISODE I:
From ROYAL PAINS: WILHELM II, EDWARD VII, AND ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1888-1910 A Thesis Presented to The Graduate Faculty of The University of Akron: "... 'I look forward with confidence to the co-operation of the English-speaking races becoming the most powerful civilizing factor in the policy of the world.' It is crucial to compare this statement by the King of England with the view held by supporters of the Fischer thesis and others that the German Kaiser was bent on world domination; clearly others were keen on achieving this goal. Edward and Roosevelt therefore can be seen as acting like de facto allies, even though their respective legislatures would never approve a formal one."
There is a big picture reality which does not change, irrelevant of what "story" we are being told. And if you are a dragon (imperial power), don't snuggle up to a dragon slayer (anti-imperialist power). The suitably distanced and the just-so-happened-to-have-been the long-term historical victim of mostly British and French "divide and rule"-policies, called Washington DC as North America's single hegemony, was "standing down and standing by" to make a "pig's breakfast" out of European empires the minute they weakened. All they needed was a temporary friend.
1898: The ICEBREAKER sets sail...
EPISODE V:
"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
After WW2 Brits were squeezed like a lemon by US banks, had the global influence of the Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, were refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's beginning expansion (see Percentages Agreement), munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War". So they had woken up one morning, only to discover that their "best fwiends forever" had stolen all their best and most profitable markets.
No markets = no trade = no money = no power = no influence = no Empire.
Now, fill in the blanks.
EPISODES II THRU IV...
Fake "narratives" of a supposed "Anglo-German Naval Arms Race" by "nasty Wilhelm" (reality = it was an international naval arms race, which included the USA/The American Century®). Fake "narratives" like "the USA was on our side in WW1, and an ally" = total bs. (Reality? By own acknowledgement, Washington DC leaders were "an associated power", and they fought for the American Century®)
Fill in the gaps. See "the handwriting" of London's Policy of Balance of Power: at Versailles, at Saint-Germaine...everywhere.
After 1945 there was no more "multipolar world" to divide and rule over, and London had to give way to Washington DC (American Century) and a new unipolar reality of master/junior partner. The old colonial master, now the new junior partner. A "Big Three" to rule the world? No such thing. The Truman Doctrine was Washington DC's unmistakable alpha bark to "heel boy"...choose either Washington DC or Moscow. And the new left-leaning British government (frantically busy selling everything it could get its hands on for gold, incl. brand new jet technology to their WW2 communist friends in Moscow), had no choice but to obey. There would be no more "hopping" about onto some or other power in order to "balance out" the power of Washington DC. There was nobody left to "hop onto" to play the age-old "divide and rule"-games.
All as a consequence of own misguided previous attitudes (policy standpoints) and actions going back centuries
Therefore, as a result of an own unwillingness to adapt to changing realities, their own Empire died.
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@Drachinifel What was the REAL "lesson" of the Barbary Wars, and the subsequent series of events?
What is the strategic lesson almost no historian ever talks about?
Answer: the price of not unifying to speak with a single voice.
First they (outside powers, more or less "united" in a cause), came for the Barbary States.
The last one to "go" was Morocco, finally "carved up" by European powers, in conjunction with the USA, in 1911.
Last to "go" was The Ottoman Empire, in WW1.
From "empire" to "Turkey" (post WW1) in around 200 years.
Later this maxim of POWER would repeat again, and again.
The price of not uniting in time.
This is regardless of any "feelings."
Since "facts" (strategy) count higher than "feelings."
Same as the Ottoman Empire failed to unite into a single cohesive "united states" speaking with a single voice, and neither did Europe, so the USA could pick them apart piecemeal...
First to "go" was Spain.
First the USA came for Spain, but the rest of Europe was like "I don't care, I'm not the Spanish Empire..."
Lastly, they came for the British Empire, but there was nobody left to speak for them...
"What actually occurred was that Britain and other countries became hopelessly indebted to the United States once again (edit: during World War 2) ... “We have profited by our past mistakes,” announced Roosevelt in a speech delivered on September 3, 1942. “This time we shall know how to make full use of victory.” This time the U.S. Government would conquer its allies in a more enlightened manner, by demanding economic concessions of a legal and political nature instead of futilely seeking repayment of its wartime loans (of World War 1). The new postwar strategy sought and secured foreign markets for U.S. exports, and new fields for American investment capital in Europe’s raw materials producing colonial areas. Despite Roosevelt’s assurances to the contrary, Britain was compelled, under the Lend-Lease agreements and the terms of the first great U.S. postwar loan to Britain, to relinquish Empire Preference and to open all its markets to U.S. competition, at a time when Britain desperately needed these markets as a means by which to fund its sterling debt. Most important of all, Britain was forced to unblock its sterling and foreign-exchange balances built up by its colonies and other Sterling Area countries during the wartime years. Instead of the Allied Powers as a whole bearing the costs of these wartime credits to British Empire countries, they would be borne by Britain itself. Equally important, they would not be used as “blocked” balances that could be used only to buy British or other Sterling Area exports, but would be freed to purchase exports from any nation. Under postwar conditions this meant that they would be used in large part to purchase U.S. exports." (page 115/116)
"By relinquishing its right to block these balances, Britain gave up its option, while enabling the United States to make full use of its gold stock as the basis for postwar lending to purchased generalized (primarily U.S.) exports. At a stroke, Britain’s economic power was broken. What Germany as foe had been unable to accomplish in two wars against Britain, the United States accomplished with ease as its ally." (Page 117)
"Furthermore, under the terms on which it joined the International Monetary Fund, Britain could not devalue the pound sterling so as to dissipate the foreign-exchange value of these balances. Its liability thus was maximized – and so was America’s gain from the pool of liquidity that these balances now represented." ("Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire." -- Michael Hudson, 2nd edition 2003)
In case that seems a bit technical, here is the "nutshell version": Just like the bank takes your house if you don't pay up in the real world, the British Empire was run into the ground by the "best friends" USA, who stole the Empire's markets; hidden behind a whole lot of "technical jargon", thereby taking the means London had to pay its debts. A suitable micro level example would be the bank having an eye on your house, then making sure you get fired so you can't pay your debt. On the macro level the term is "debt trap diplomacy", and on the (privatized) propaganda level the means is "projection: accuse somebody else of being something which one is oneself", and that "being" has started waaaaaay earlier as a matter of own policy. A "debt trap" the Allies walked into after 1916, after they had spent all their own money, and squeezed as much out of their colonies as they could get away with, but refused to come to terms at the negotiating table: another factor usually associated with the Central Powers.
-----------------------------------
"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
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@manilajohn0182 Yes correct.
Of course, Washington DC knew of the perfidious nature of the European empires, incl. London/British Empire.
And of course if London and Washington were such "great friends" as our history wish to lead us to believe, then why on earth would Washington DC have kicked the meddling "London lord"-types off the American continent?
After 2 wars (1776 and 1812), and London initially siding against Washington DC during the American Civil War and the Mexican American War (later on), it was obviously quite clear to Washington DC that London was a meddling "perfidious Albion" trying to gain a foothold on the North American continent, and turning it into a "Europe 2.0".
Luckily for the American people, the USA had "weak neighbors to the north and south, and only fish on both sides" (loosely quoting Bismarck).
Imagine if Canada and Mexico/Spain had been stronger, and not been "weak neighbors"...
You would have been turned into a "Europe 2.0", with London "hopping on the scale this side or that", during war as well as during peace, just "balancing powers", as they proudly self-confessed to doing across the English Channel.
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@manilajohn0182 Yes. A complex topic.
People though, with a similar belief system can breach the language barrier.
As far as i'm concerned, the biblical "Tower of Babel" did not fail because of "languages" suddenly popping up, but that the "languages" (in the story) are simply symbolic for how large "projects" (Tower of Babel, the EU, whatever), might fail, because as the "project" grows in proportions, so do all the negative human characteristics. The ones you've mentioned, to which I could add a few more -- greed, the narcissism of some nations, the issue of "who's the boss", control-freak instincts, etc.
IMO, the biggest reason for the failure of a potentially possible "EU" back then, was a lack of urgency.
There simply wasn't a common enemy which would unite all the divergent agendas, as during the Cold War.
Since they only had each other to glare at, all sides pouring fortunes into arms races, Europeans only had other Europeans to focus onto.
If the "Tower of Babel" which is the EU fails again, it will most likely also be because there is no longer such a common enemy, which creates a powerful urge to stand united, which crosses boundries (culture, languages, ethnicity, history, etc.).
The "Russia/Putin" (largely fabricated) "threat" doesn't seem to do the trick.
It divides more than it unites.
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Brits paid the price later on.
Re. "Who benefited most from Mers, and who lost most".
The general consensus is that The British Empire was the "winner", and that "France was the loser".
Wrong.
Reality? For the second time in 20 years, "the lights would go out", and others would benefit. Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
So at the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
[Google: The American_Century]
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
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@3vimages471 I have more than 30 years of reading, and thousands of books under the belt.
With millions of memorized facts, it becomes clear that most debates are a completely pointless waste of time, same as 99% of all "history books".
Ancillary details being regurgitated again and again, in efforts to distract from what really happened.
Ever since the establishment of "Empire", London aimed to protect it, by (as a matter policy), making the strongest continental power/alliance the rival in peace/enemy in war.
London's "fatal mistake", was "snuggling up" to The American Century, thinking it would save the "Empire"...
London was always going to oppose the strongest continental country/power/alliance, as a default setting.
By own admission:
"The equilibrium established by such a grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power, and it has become almost an historical truism to identify England’s secular policy with the maintenance of this balance by throwing her weight now in this scale and now in that, but ever on the side, opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single, State or group at any time."
[From Primary source material:Memorandum_on_the_Present_State_of_British_Relations_with_France_and_Germany]
In a nutshell, oppose every major diplomatic advance made by the strongest continental power in times of peace, and ally against it in times of war. Because the own policy meant that London shied away from making binding commitments with continental powers, as a matter of policy, London set off to look for "new friends"...
EPISODE 1:
"By 1901, many influential Britons advocated for a closer relationship between the two countries. W. T. Stead even proposed that year in The Americanization of the World for both to merge to unify the English-speaking world, as doing so would help Britain "continue for all time to be an integral part of the greatest of all World-Powers, supreme on sea and unassailable on land, permanently delivered from all fear of hostile attack, and capable of wielding irresistible influence in all parts of this planet."
[Google: The_Great_Rapprochement]
Sooooo gweat.
Everybody "speaking English" and being "best fwiends".
What could possibly go wrong?
EPISODE V:
"At the end of the war [WW2], Britain, physically devastated and financially bankrupt, lacked factories to produce goods for rebuilding, the materials to rebuild the factories or purchase the machines to fill them, or with the money to pay for any of it. Britain’s situation was so dire, the government sent the economist John Maynard Keynes with a delegation to the US to beg for financial assistance, claiming that Britain was facing a "financial Dunkirk”. The Americans were willing to do so, on one condition: They would supply Britain with the financing, goods and materials to rebuild itself, but dictated that Britain must first eliminate those Sterling Balances by repudiating all its debts to its colonies. The alternative was to receive neither assistance nor credit from the US. Britain, impoverished and in debt, with no natural resources and no credit or ability to pay, had little choice but to capitulate. And of course with all receivables cancelled and since the US could produce today, those colonial nations had no further reason for refusing manufactured goods from the US. The strategy was successful. By the time Britain rebuilt itself, the US had more or less captured all of Britain’s former colonial markets, and for some time after the war’s end the US was manufacturing more than 50% of everything produced in the world. And that was the end of the British Empire, and the beginning of the last stage of America’s rise."
[globalresearch(dot)ca/save-queen/5693500]
Brits being squeezed like a lemon by US banks, having their Pound crushed by the US dominated IMF, being refused the mutually developed nukes to act as a deterrent against the SU's expansion, munching on war rations till way into the 1950s, losing the Suez Canal in a final attempt at "acting tough" and imposing hegemony over a vital sphere of interest...and going under...lol, "third fiddle" in the "Concerto de Cold War"...
Maybe they should have informed themselves how "empires" tick, because there was another "ring".
A "ring which ruled them all".
The American Century.
So they woke up one morning, only to discover that their "best fwiends forever" had stolen all their markets.
Now, fill in the blanks yourself.
EPISODES II THRU IV...
Fake "narratives" of a supposed "Anglo-German Naval Arms Race" by "nasty Wilhelm" (reality = it was an international naval arms race, which included the USA/The American Century®).
Fake "narratives" like "the USA was on our side in WW1, and an ally" = total bs. (Reality? By own acknowledgement, they were "an associated power", and they fought for the American Century®)
Fill in the gaps.
See "the handwriting" of London's Policy of Balance of Power: at Versailles, at Saint-Germaine...everywhere.
Then there was another war. A result of the failed peace of the 1st: the totally flawed decision to concentrate most resources in an attempt to "flatten Germany". Reality? A large Strategic Air Force is one of the most expensive forms of warfare ever devised.
"Flattening Germany" as a matter of policy, as flawed as trying to "snuggle up" to a faraway "empire", in order to try and save the own...
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They paid the price later on.
Re. "Who benefited most from Mers, and who lost most".
The general consensus is that The British Empire was the "winner", and that "France was the loser".
Wrong.
Reality? For the second time in 20 years, "the lights would go out", and others would benefit. Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
So at the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Century
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_exceptionalism
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@thevillaaston7811 Yes.
Your "best fwiends" over on the other side of the Atlantic, far far away from the action...in no danger whatsoever...and the American Century for those who walk the corridors of power, and fairy tales of the "Big Three" and cute "Uncle Joe" for those who don't understand how the world works...
Ever wonder why the "best friends" over in the New World didn't sail in like heroes to help out in 1939 or 1940?
Because during WW2 the concept of "a Big Three" was a joke, because the "big three" were not only allies, but also rivals.
Each wanting to be on top once the war was over...
At the turn of the century, nothing symbolized power and rule like the big gun battleships, and by 1945 nothing symbolized power and rule like the mushroom cloud of a nuke...
But while at the end of WW1 the powers got together and divided and negotiated who would get what share of the "symbol of power (Washington Naval Treaty, 1922), at the end of WW2, there would be no such negotiations.
Strange...
The USA said to the rest of the world, including "good friends", you shall not have nuclear weapons!
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/british-nuclear-program
Strange, how "best friend forever" would let the financially drained GB spend 5 years and millions of Pounds on developing a weapon for themselves which was already completed in development...and just had to be handed over to "a friend"...
Strange also, that during WW2 GB merrily gave their "special friend" all the best war-winning secrets (Tizzard Committee, and all that), but when it became time for the "new best friend" to return the favor, and give the secret of nuclear arms back to GB whose scientists had helped develop nukes in the USA, the answer was "no, it's mine".
@TheVilla Aston Cash, cash, cash....for the coffers of the American Century...
https://www.ucg.org/the-good-news/the-american-century-what-was-really-behind-it
Thanks GB.
You not only practically financed the development of our nukes, costing around 2 billion dollars, you also gave us your scientists to help the US develop them...
Thanks "best fwiends" :-)
That is some weird "special relationship" if you ask me.
A "friend" who does not even want you to have nukes, if he has some himself?
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@thevillaaston7811 Looks like I'll have to answer my own question again...
They didn't because there was nothing "in it" for Washington D.C.
Washington DC followed the principle of "America first", even if not propagating this aloud...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Century
If London or Paris thought there'd be "another Versailles" after WW2, with the British and French empires "drawing lines on the map" and "carving up power" to protect their own interests, they were to be disappointed...
https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power
The attempt by Churchill to use the USA to throw Stalin out of Eastern Europe, and remain "the balancer" of power, too transparent.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Unthinkable
There would be no US support to start Unthinkable.
The "poor Poles have to be liberated"-argument, wasn't swinging...
Of course "not enough nukes", or "there are just tooooo many of them Winnie", and "it's soooooo risky, my fwiends" were made.
A fool, is one who cannot distinguish between "excuses" and "ulterior motives"...
After being dragged into another European (World) War, Washington decided to become the "balancer of powers" herself, and Europe was divided in "East" and "West"...
Stalin: "I figured out Washington isn't going to support you in your efforts to restore the post-WW1 Balance of Power, so I changed my mind about the Percentages Agreement we made. Here's Greece, now eff off and I'll take the rest 100%. Whadda ya gonna do about it?"
Churchill: "...but, but, but...you pwomised..."
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@thevillaaston7811 British and French leaders went to Versailles under the rather childish illusion that the SU and Germany would stay weak forever and ever and ever....
They ignored the big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying Germany, or alienating France was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Not hindsight, but a lack of foresight (aka "short-sightedness")
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, pissed off by Mers el Kebir had slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
And down went the British Empire too...
Sad.
So sad...
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@johnrogers1423 The premise was stil "showing a resolve to fight (to Washington DC)".
"At the Nuremberg Trials, German military commander Alfred Jodl said that "if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions."[11] General Siegfried Westphal stated that if the French had attacked in full force in September 1939 the German army "could only have held out for one or two weeks."[12]
From wiki
The correct number of available forces were 40 divisions, 78 artillery regiments, and 40 tank battalions.
Irrelevant of success or not, their immediate attack would have forced the Germans to withdraw significant number of troops from Poland, giving the Poles a "breather" and possibly even have saved Warsaw.
There is no reason to believe that the Western Alles and the SU would have clashed, had London/Paris informed Warsaw (after the 17th) that they would have to accept the loss of their eastern territories (east of the post-WW1 Curzon Line), and that London/Paris would under no circumstances continue their assault on Germany in the west, should Polish forces decide to attack the SU.
The people who lived east of the Curzon Line were overwhelmingly White Russians and Ukrainians, so there would have been no moral obligation to oppose the SU from "taking them back".
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Obviously, the only mistake France ever made was choosing GB as a "friend".
When it comes to history, it doesn't take long for historians large and small, to appear on the scene with "shouda done"-logic. Of course, everybody else "shouda just" done this or done that, then the world "wouda been" such a gweat place...
Japan for example.
Japan suffered from a geographical dilemma typical of powers which lacked the ability (economy/industry) to focus on one strategy, like France.
Just like France, which also had (a result of geography) political forces which divided economic/industrial/financial power between a "navy league" of supporters, and an "army league", resulting in both being less powerfull.
Japan, as an island, should have concentrated on the navy at the expense of the army, just like GB which was also an island. Its failure was trying to do both, at the expense of her own population (domestic economy).
If one sees the logic of that:
Same with France.
So where are the historians pointing out that France "coulda" started a rapprochement with Germany after "Francophobe"-Bismarck took his hat, thereby enabling France to concentrate on its navy and its empire?
Obviously, with a treaty in its pocket, there would be no need for such a powerful army.
France instead "chose" Russia, thinking that there would be more "in it" for herself (imperialism).
End effect 50 years later, is that it went down.
Some would say that this was a good thing.
"Obviously", millions dying to "end colonialism" was a great thing, since no other option ever ever ever existed...
So.
Back to square one.
Where are these "shouda done" historians stating that France should have simply morphed its own empire into a "franc block of equals" (economic/military block of equal partners), avoiding their own bloody colonial/decolonisation history altogether, which would even have made Machiavelli very happy in his grave indeed...
Of course, according to the "finger pointers", it's only always and ever only the other guy who always only ever "shouda done" something different.
Never the own leaders.
Never point back at the own self, or "best friends"...
The above is of course the "false dilemma", stating that the own "dear leaders" only and ever always had that 1 choice, and made the right one, while everybody else was always just "wrong/evil".
From wiki: "A false dilemma, also referred to as false dichotomy, is an informal fallacy based on a premise that erroneously limits what options are available. The source of the fallacy lies not in an invalid form of inference but in a false premise. This premise has the form of a disjunctive claim: it asserts that one among a number of alternatives must be true. This disjunction is problematic because it oversimplifies the choice by excluding viable alternatives, presenting the viewer with only two absolute choices when in fact, there could be many. For example, a false dilemma is committed when it is claimed that, "Stacey spoke out against capitalism; therefore, she must be a communist". (end of quote)
The truth is of course that everybody always had multiple choices at most times in history, and own leaders simply did not choose correctly, but were enticed by their "darker side" to step towards the wrong side of history.
France's main mistake was not Mers el Kebir, but choosing GB as a "best friend" looooong before WW1.
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@m00nch11d Betrayed came at a price.
Because there was the big picture...and this is how the little piece of the puzzle called "Mers el Kebir" fit into it.
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, neither totally destroying Germany, nor dissing France, was either wise or in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings.
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
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THE BARBARY WARS; AND LUISIANA
The Barbery Wars were of course not about "ending slavery."
The Barbary States employed an economy partly based on plunder and slavery, and it was attacked by a new state (USA) which partly based its economy on plunder and slavery. Sweden was still an imperialist power back then, and "player." Why the US economy was based on plunder, and land-theft? See the consecutively running Indian Wars, accompanied by land theft and attrocities. US slave trade and slavery was only decided 50 years later, during the Civil War. Search for the "appeal to emotion. There were no "good guys" vs. "bad guys" at all, only the stronger, better organized, and technologically more advanced ingroup ("us") vs. the weaker outgroup ("them"). How do the Barbary Wars fit into the global picture, which was the Napoleonic Wars, just kicking off in earnest? (1803) Because at this early point in time, the USA needed a few "friends" in North America, and paying tribute to deflect the forces of the Barbery States (affiliated with the Ottoman Empire) away from the own trade interests, meant that this money and these resources could then be employed by pirates to attack others: and both Spain and France were needed as friendly powers (Luisiana Purchase). One could hardly expect a solid foundation of a better political understanding, whilst US resources were employed to attack those one wished to align with. A "gift" was needed. A war to ...cough, cough..."end slavery"... Such land purchases were of course not to be understood the same way we as commoners "buy" houses. These were simply the exchange of "spheres of influence" under which the understanding was that the "seller" would no longer meddle in the affairs of the "buyer," and that the "buyer" could do with the territory as seen fit. A similar deal was later also struck with Spain (1819/Adams-Onis Treaty), already too weak to really influence matters globally anymore, after the Napoleonic Wars in Europe collectively and conveniently "extended" all the major European powers. US money was simply re-routed from "paying pirates" to "buying a sphere of influence," in broad terms.
Outside powers paid the Barbary states tribute, which meant safety for the own, whilst directing the pirates at whomever was not paying tribute.
That meant richer states with means to pay could direct the attacks away from themselves, at others. In other words, the Berbers were the proxies of whoever paid them.
How the Barbary Wars fit into the bigger overall global geopolitical "picture," see below...
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Jefferson, Adams, color revolutions, and setting Europe alight from one end to the other...
Most Americans consider their founding fathers as "Americans".
They were in fact British. I'm not familiar with each any every bio, but I assume most of these elites were born in the British Empire, enjoyed a solid "Empire" education, and therefore "thought" British. Everbody "speaking English." They were therefore not "American," but "turncoats." The concept of Arminius as the "turncoat" who turned against those who had trained and educated him (Rome), springs to mind...
Once you can understand this concept of how perceptions are often involuntarily skewed, one can then go next level: these British lords had ambitions for the colonies they were in. These colonies were entrapped in multiple manners, both by geographical and technological restraints, as well as by neighbors. First and foremost by the British Empire of course, but also European and Native American neighbors. If any ideals of expansion were to be achieved, then a series of strategies would have to be implemented.
The fledgling USA (post-1776) was in danger of becoming surrounded and encroached upon, by European neighbors, who held it in their hands to forge alliances with agrieved Native American tribes, and the British Empire alike, still licking its wounds from its loss...
Color revolutions, the Barbary Wars, the Luisiana land "purchase," and other events, are all major parts of the USA's expansive drive in North America.
THE COLOR REVOLUTION 1.0
The USA's role in trying to break apart the failing Holy Roman Empire, in lieu of a "color revolution." The gist of it: A revolution bringing France and Holland closer together, and Holland still controlled Antwerp, the "pistol pointing at the heart of England." Strategist in the USA knew of the importance of this "red line" for London, even if not provably, at least instinctively as explained in the first paragraph: they were still "British" in their world view. Adams already knew that London would set Europe alight from end to end, if there was even the slightest danger of England becoming invaded by an alliance of continental powers. The small "chess piece" the still weak USA would contribute, was to ease a Franco-Dutch alignment of interests. How do we know Adams knew this? Because he wrote it down on a "scrap of paper" (letter). Should there ever be a (paraphrased)"constitution more popular than the own by London", then the despised "rich, proud, hectoring, swearing, squibbing" lords in London, his brethen, would set Europe alight (Napoleonic Wars).
In the shadow of this war, ...cough, cough... "extending" all its North American neighbors, the USA could grow.
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The French Fleet at Mers was no threat to the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of US corporate capitalism (Washington D.C.) and communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and had slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
https://www.britannica.com/topic/balance-of-power
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
So yes.
The superior geostrategists in Washington D.C. won.
No wonder, that the "smiling emperor" FDR was pleased with Churchill.
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After the collapse of France, ending the stage of WW2 in grand strategy of "three powers" on continental Europe (GB/France/empires + Germany/fascist states + SU/communism) , potentially morphing into "2 powers in Europe."
The fear in Washington DC, exposed as early as 1912, by such authors (strategists) like Homer Lea, that a united continental Eurasia could "strike in three directions" if Japan joined in, and common goals could be found and common objectives decided upon.
Washington DC's biggest fear being that the alliance between Berlin and Moscow might even hold up and deepen, in case common goals could be found against the British Empire, in case London decided on quitting and throwing in the towel (peace with Berlin, after the collapse of France.)
After Mers el Kebir, a massive sigh of relief must have been heard in Washington DC.
Roosevelt, I'm sure, smiled benighnly...
A naval man, I'm sure he understood such things.
The "bloodletting war" (John Mearsheimer) in Europe would continue, one stage at a time...
In geopolitics and grand strategy, citing the Italian East African Campaign actually supports the above: If Italy put pressure on GB/Empire in Africa in general, and Germany attacks London/England by air and sea, this could then intice Stalin to show more interest in "joining the winners", and to get lured into joining the Axis Powers, or at least gravitating closer towards them.
None of this precludes Italy from equally seeking to strike at "weak and demoralized" France, by equally striking into Tunesia or Algeria, or seaborne attacks (landings) in French North Africa in order to secure Axis bases on the Atlantic coast (end goal = Morocco), or threatening Gibraltar.
As a French strategist, the first priority in Jun/July 1940 was the defense of French citizens and subjects, which GB through her own actions had actually PROVEN that they would not "defend to the last bullet" (Battle of France, which had just ended).
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@dovetonsturdee7033 ...tweak Lend-Lease to a bare minimum.
A Russian general once said (and I'm paraphrasing) that the Russian soldiers rode into Berlin with American boots on their feet, with bully beef in their bellies, on the backs of Studebaker trucks...
A good start to "stopping the commies" from taking over half the world, was by curbing Lend Lease to the most minimal level, and emoting Stalin to the status of "cobelligerent" (rather than a full alliance).
From wiki: "The United States delivered to the Soviet Union from October 1, 1941, to May 31, 1945 the following: 427,284 trucks, 13,303 combat vehicles, 35,170 motorcycles, 2,328 ordnance service vehicles, 2,670,371 tons of petroleum products (gasoline and oil) or 57.8 percent of the high-octane aviation fuel,[32] 4,478,116 tons of foodstuffs (canned meats, sugar, flour, salt, etc.), 1,911 steam locomotives, 66 diesel locomotives, 9,920 flat cars, 1,000 dump cars, 120 tank cars, and 35 heavy machinery cars. Provided ordnance goods (ammunition, artillery shells, mines, assorted explosives) amounted to 53 percent of total domestic consumption.[32] One item typical of many was a tire plant that was lifted bodily from the Ford Company's River Rouge Plant and transferred to the USSR. The 1947 money value of the supplies and services amounted to about eleven billion dollars.[61]"
British equipment:
Significant numbers of British Churchill, Matilda and Valentine tanks were shipped to the USSR.[67]
Between June 1941 and May 1945, Britain delivered to the USSR:
3,000+ Hurricanes aircraft
4,000+ other aircraft
27 naval vessels
5,218 tanks (including 1,380 Valentines from Canada)
5,000+ anti-tank guns
4,020 ambulances and trucks
323 machinery trucks (mobile vehicle workshops equipped with generators and all the welding and power tools required to perform heavy servicing)
1,212 Universal Carriers and Loyd Carriers (with another 1,348 from Canada)
1,721 motorcycles
£1.15bn worth of aircraft engines
1,474 radar sets
4,338 radio sets
600 naval radar and sonar sets
Hundreds of naval guns
15 million pairs of boots
Without this logistical support, the Eastern Front would have stabilized somewhere between Leningrad and the Black Sea.
By 1944, both sides would have been utterly exhausted, and D-Day could have rolled past Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest...
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@dovetonsturdee7033 A delicate matter, because these strategists were plotting on taking over the nr.1 spot, from the British Empire.
The leaders of the British Empire seemed to have held the mistaken idea that closer relations with the USA would guarantee their Empire against "greedy continental rivals", but they were wrong.
Because, the type of rule or economy or political model chosen, plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
So at the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not. They could play out the ambitions of rulers on the continent against each other, always siding with the weaker waring state or empire, and thereby "engineer" solutions which they perceived would guarantee the survival of their Empire.
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation...
[Today, with nukes, that "logic" of using (or rather "misusing") conventional wars to become top dog does not apply anymore].
US leaders like Wilson (WW1) or Roosevelt (WW2) knew they just had to wait long enough for European leaders to dismantle what 500 years of empire building had achieved, and to pick up the pieces.
Washington D.C. "going west" started with the consolidation of power with the Civil War, and ended when US President Eisenhower forced GB and France (together with Israel) to stand down in the Suez Crisis. For all practical reasons ending the period in history when London or Paris got to decide on the defense or the expansion of their spheres of influence...
If it wasn't yet quite clear who the alpha male was, and who the beta males...that was it. Of course, all conveyed in very friendly manner, and very diplomatically, as usual...
In that respect, there were many visionary US leaders, and few in Europe...
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@thevillaaston7811 Lend-Lease did not "win the war on the Eastern Front" or "saved the SU from the Nazi invasion".
There was a limit to the potential maximum German penetration into the SU, set by many factors. Mainly, the tenacity of the Soviet soldiers, weather, crappy infrastructure, massive distances, and the lack of production by the Axis powers to overcome this.
In short, the Germans could never have achieved the "A-A Line", let alone hold it for any length of time.
Due to the massive destruction of factories, infrastructure, shelter, etc. by the war, Russian scorched earth measures during their retreat, and German scorched earth measures during their retreat, the entire Eastern Front was a wasteland.
Similar to North Africa, where the ability to supply the front line made or broke any attempts at deep advances, so was the SU in the massive land area between the Baltic and the Black Sea.
According to David Glantz, the American military historian known for his books on the Eastern front:
Although Soviet accounts have routinely belittled the significance of Lend-Lease in the sustainment of the Soviet war effort, the overall importance of the assistance cannot be understated. Lend-Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient quantities to make the difference between defeat and victory in 1941–1942; that achievement must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and to the iron nerve of Stalin, Zhukov, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, and their subordinates. As the war continued, however, the United States and Great Britain provided many of the implements of war and strategic raw materials necessary for Soviet victory. Without Lend-Lease food, clothing, and raw materials (especially metals), the Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Perhaps most directly, without Lend-Lease trucks, rail engines, and railroad cars, every Soviet offensive would have stalled at an earlier stage, outrunning its logistical tail in a matter of days. In turn, this would have allowed the German commanders to escape at least some encirclements, while forcing the Red Army to prepare and conduct many more deliberate penetration attacks in order to advance the same distance. Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken twelve to eighteen months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same, except that Soviet soldiers could have waded at France's Atlantic beaches.[45]
Fact remains, that similar to North Africa, no side would have had the ability for large scale operations far away from the home fronts.
Any German attempt to advance would have run out of steam after a few hundred miles advance to the east, and (without the key aid in logistics), the same would have applied for the SU until around 1945.
A 30% total of trucks (Lend Lease) is significant.
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@thevillaaston7811 The only thing I'm "pro" is for the values of freedom, liberty, and self-determination (that is both on the micro level of individual human beings, as well as on the macro level of countries and empires).
I'm not pro-Nazi, even if you repeat it 1,000 times.
I'm as anti-Nazi as I'm anti-Communist.
Wishing that one lost, doesn't mean wishing the other won.
That is a dumb accusation.
I'd have preferred if both lost, by playing them out against each other, by "tweaking" Lend-Lease (no logistical support at all) and "aiding" Berlin by less Strategic Bombing.
The combined effect of that, would have meant the the Eastern Front would have stabilized somewhere in the middle, leading to both systems strained to a breaking point.
By your own logic of "Stalin hero worship", I could say you are a commie. Or is it that you don't like either?
In case you are a "Stalin fanboy", do you like systems of collectivism, Gulags and "bullets in the back of the head" as state measures?
So stop the bs.
Or do you prefer debates in which I accuse you being a commie all the time? Hmmmm?
I also don't like the British Empire (colonialism) or US Corporate Imperialism, but I realize that in WW2 they were simply the best of all the worst systems.
They were not "fighting for freedom, liberty or self-determination".
I'm not a fool.
But still better than the worst, which was Communism and Fascism.
So, the Western Allies would have had my support.
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Allow me to educate you with a brief overview of the GEOPOLITICS ensuring the future of the British Empire (and by extension, the French Empire) at the end of WW1.
In other words, the "logic" which dictated Versailles.
Remember the policy of Balance of Power?
And the Heartland theory? Hmmmm?
Let's put it another way.
History for 2 dimensional little brains which can't compute in 3 dimensions :-)
In very simplistic terms, one could say that in 1939 "Germany had the industry and the technology", while the SU had the "manpower and the raw materials". Of course, this is just a very simple way to explain a complex geographical situation.
According to the British policy of "Balance of Power", London would never have allowed any continental alliance or hegemon to control all of it.
According to this binding policy, London (dragging along France as the "lapdog"), always have allied against the stronger power, to avoid a single hegemon control all of Central and Eastern Europe (in a nutshell "German brains and Russian muscle").
This policy had the intention to protect the Empire.
If, Poland fell to either Berlin or Moscow, then that could only lead to Nazi forces storming into Moscow (German victory, and gain of raw material), or Soviet forces storming all the way to the Rhine (Soviet victory, and gain of industry and technology).
Proof of this is Operation Unthinkable. When Soviet did enter Central Europe, London wanted to (again), ally with the weaker side to "balance the power"...
The entire idea behind the policy of Balance of Power was to avoid any of these scenarios, and as the policy dictated, the Empire would always ally with the weaker alliance/country to keep the balance.
In a nutshell.
Survival of the British Empire = keep "German brains" and "Russian muscle" separated.
Get it?
Do you finally get it?
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So.
I'll have to answer my own question again...
Why did Germany initially build a navy?
At this stage, supported by GB, because the Russian and British Empires were fighting in Asia ("The Great Game"), and imperialist GB and France clashed and squabbled all over the world.
Germans were fwiends lol...not really (aka London's still secret policy of Balance of Power meant that should it come to war, GB and Germany were already predetermined enemies. Make sense? No?)
Anyway...
Germany built up a navy to protect her coastal cities and shores completely unaware that they were already London's enemy after uniting, and industrializing rapidly.
The often stated "naval arms race" being a cause for WW1 is a misconception. Historians pin their flag on the date "1906", saying that here is where that "history" started.
Actually, the naval arms race started in 1871, with an unsuccessful attempted blockade of northern German ports during the Franco-Prussian War by the French navy.
The "cause" was therefore the intention of German leaders to protect German citizens from the threat of blockade. Blockading an enemy, was one of the favorite means of economic warfare at the time. Naval bombardment was a favorite tool of blackmail, extortion, and power politics.
It therefore "started" with a German-French naval arms race, and expanded to a German - French/Russian arms race after France and Russia formed an alliance (Entente Cordial).
When GB joined the Tripple Entente, this "naval arms race" was already in full swing. Obviously, German leaders then had to protect German ports from a potential blockade of THREE navies. British, Russian, and French.
In other words, the German naval re-armament was an "effect" of previous actions (causality).
Not THE "cause" for an Anglo-German Arms Race, but an "effect" of previous French-Russian-German naval arms race.
The German leaders reacted to a potential threat (blockade).
Furthermore, they did not know that London had already made them an enemy as a default setting.
A confusion of "cause and effect", by simply pinning a "starting date" randomly on a timeline.
Also, study the design parameters of the German ships built up to WW1.
Note that they were close range, coast defence vessels without any global reach.
Did you know that the Imperial German Navy wasn't a "blue water navy"?
Do you even know what that means?
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@thevillaaston7811 STAGE 1 HISTORY FOR DUMMIES
Germany: Can we be friends? I mean, look at nasty Rusky over there, trying to steal India from you. And don't even get me started with those Frenchies....Napoleon, ha, ha, ha...
London: uhm...err...well...don't mind us, we're just splendidly isolated over here. Peacefully minding our own business. [grins] Why don't you build some ships? Here's some plans, ships, and technology....
Germany: Gee, great, thanks. Shall we discuss becoming real friends? You know, like allies?
London: unm...err..well...ahm...not today, I'm not feeling well...next week?
Germany: oh ok...
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@whitewolf1298 As anybody can discover for himself, and as a general rule, navies are divided into certain categories...
Also, as a general rule, "global reach" can only be achieved by a Blue Water Navy...
https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Blue-water_navy
...as advocated by Mahan, and that is as true today as it was in 1850, 1900, or 1950.
No blue water navy = no global reach
The global reach achieved by a Blue Water Navy is composed of two elements.
1) the design of the ships themselves
2) logistics / naval bases
As to point 1 and 2.
If one studies the design of the German ships themselves, and German naval bases, one can only reach one conclusion.
Before WW1 there were never any plans for "global reach", i.e. any attempt to "rule the world" as often claimed.
As design criteria, one can simply look at the drawing (flared or raked bow = Blue Water Navy) and a few statistics like size, range, and livability.
The design elements of ships (true even today) are divided into two main criteria : offensive elements (firepower, speed and seakeeping) vs. defensive elements (armor protection, nr. of watertight compartments, sturdy construction).
Nations which desire "global reach", built fast, large, high firepower, long ranged, seaworthy vessels, supported by a dense network of naval bases, and international ports (either by alliance, or by own construction) supported by large fleets of tankers, repair ships, and replenishment ships.
Less emphasis is placed on armour, and much more on speed and range.
Nations which wish to concentrate on the own doorstep, built smaller, sturdier, ships with smaller caliber guns and more/thicker armor, and with with stubby bows (seakeeping less important, since designed for coastal waters).
In short, one can gather information about the policies of a nation, by merely looking at the design of its weapons. And this is as true for tanks as it is for ships...
A nation that built the S-tank (Sweden) had no desire to "rule the world" :-)
As for the design of the the Imperial German Navy's ships....
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_of_the_Imperial_German_Navy
....and you can see that from the destroyers (called "torpedo boats" right through to the big gun battleships, the design criteria fits that of the coast defense navy (today called "Green and Brown Water Navies"). You don't have to look at all of them, but maybe click on a few links and look at the specifications, and filter it with the information above.
As for the numbers of units built, that was a result of the alliance system (see my initial comment right at the top). As the Russians found out at Tsushima, there was no point sending a large fleet halfway around the world, if the ships and crews were going to arrive in bad shape...
(No recreational facilities, docks, replenishment, etc.)
Simply having a lot of ships, doesn't imply wishing to "rule the world".
Strange fact.
The first pure German capital ship that fitted the criteria for a Blue Water Navy was the Weimar Republic's Deutschland Class of 1933.
To conclude: any accusations of Germany trying to "steal something from the British Empire", or "trying to overpower the Royal Navy" or "threatening GB" are at best misconceptions, at worst straight out lies....
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@dovetonsturdee7033 Stalin, or why we shouldn't have had even the slightest inhibitions about "tweaking Lend-Lease" (to avoid the complete collapse of the SU, but not enough for communism to win)
Stalin, or why we should have "aided" the Nazis by as little strategic bombing as possible, but only as much as necessary, but to avoid the complete collapse of Germany, the backbone of the Axis?
Why it shouldn't have bothered us in the least if the Eastern Front had settled somewhere between Leningrad and the Black Sea, with the two sides fighting until utter exhaustion?
Why everything should have been done so that the war lasts as long as possible, in order that both sides become exhausted?
"Comrades! It is in the interest of the USSR, the Land of the Toilers, that war breaks out between the [German] Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done so that the war lasts as long as possible in order that both sides become exhausted. Namely for this reason we must agree to the pact proposed by Germany, and use it so that once this war is declared, it will last for a maximum amount of time."
Stalin 19th August 1939
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@dovetonsturdee7033 Here is the truth, because as a British PM in those days, any British PM, you had an Empire to protect.
A PM heading an Empire which refused Stalin's insidious "requests" for "an alliance", for a good reason.
Because the SU was already safe, and in no need of "an alliance." It was protected by barrier of independent states in the west, and only had Japan to worry about. As long as Stalin did nothing, the status quo would persist...indefinitely.
Because the Limitrophe States which Stalin wanted as a precondition for such "an alliance"...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limitrophe_states
....was not only a wall.
Poland was not only a barrier, but also "a gate"
Should Stalin ever try to break out of the World Island he sat on, the gate would open and Nazis would come pouring in...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History
Should Stalin ever try to attack or eclipse western interests in China, or the Middle East, he'd get a suitable response.
He knew it, and it infuriated him...
The Limitrophe protected the British Empire, and Stalin wanted to erode it away with promises of "an alliance".
Hitler was a lapdog, and he knew it, and it infuriated him...
When Chamberlain came to Munich and put him in place, Hitler had to bow down to a little man with an umbrella, which was also "a big stick".
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Stick_ideology
Because Hitler cowered at Munich and gave in, not Chamberlain and historians have it all wrong...
Here's the thing about the deceiver.
The deceiver will always tell you "what the other side is planning" (sic.), but the deceiver will never tell what he is planning himself...
Stalin.
The great deceiver...
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@dovetonsturdee7033 Stalin's devious offer for an "alliance" was sinister.
The aim of Stalin's politics (hinting at fake promises of mutual assistance) in case of war were never honest.
Neither before 1938, nor after.
Pre-1938, what would Stalin have done in case Hitler had invaded Czechoslovakia? (under any scenario with or without the "fake alliance")
Answer: Nothing
He would simply have pointed at his N/A Pact with Poland, pointed at "nasty Japan" in the East and said: "Sorry you guys, I'd really really really like to to help you chaps out, but, but, but..."
That would have been the result of trusting a mass-murderer and psychopath who's idea of a "debate" was a bullet in the back of the head...
A war between GB, France and Germany.
Luckily Chamberlain was wise enough to stave that off as long as possible, and to prepare the industrial and financial foundation for a war.
Post March 1939, Stalin made it perfectly clear what he wanted.
He wanted GB and France to "sign away" Poland, The Baltic States and Romania.
So dissed, what would these states have done the minute they found out they would be thrown under the bus in return for a Brit/French "dirty little deal" with Stalin?
Again, an easy answer: flee into the loving tender open arms of the eagerly awaiting Axis...
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@dovetonsturdee7033 ...and even in hindsight, Appeasement was not a mistake, but the only sensible thing to do.
A "bed" the power players at Versailles had eagerly made, and now had to "sleep" in. Too bad...
Unfortunately, the way the world had been set up post-WW1, there was no alternative to appeasing Hitler.
And even those relying on "Churchill" (aka "the hardliner") for their alternative history, must admit reality.
If in power, Churchill would have done the same as Chamberlain, because (reality) the British Prime Minister doesn't have the authority to declare war out of the blue, and that would have depended on how the ministers would have debated it out...
The second "reality" was that in 1938, the Legion Condor was in Spain, next to Gibraltar (15,000 well-trained and combat ready soldiers with tanks and air support). Also, an Italian dictator keen on "Mare Nostrum" and a Spain which would have liked Gibraltar back....hmmm....a rather unfortunate combination of "reality" concentrated in one area vital to the British Empire.
Churchill of course, was a naval strategist.
1) Would Churchill (a navy guy) have risked losing Gibraltar to "protect little nations"?
2) What would the lords in London have thought about "protecting little nations"?
3) And even if they did value "little nations" enough to declare war on their behalf, what would have been the first military/strategic priority had it come to war in 1938?
Especially the last one being not a difficult question to answer...
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The narrative here is entirely beside the point. Allow me to help out, with a similar event. Not exact, because "history only rhymes", but close enough to explain how diplomacy works.
Drax went to Moscow in 1939 to "talk", not "negotiate".
According to the narrative Stalin (whose snowflake feelings got upset about not receiving an equal "Munich" treatment, with the highest level London diplomat jetting off to see Hitler) felt dissed, just like the French did when a "mere captain" arrived to discuss the future of their own empire (at least, the possessions in N.Africa).
Apparrently Stalin understood quite well what sending a lower prominence delegation meant.
Also what power of negotiation means.
Neither Drax nor Holland had these powers, which is why they were sent off with matters unaccomplished.
The French Navy was going nowhere without political assurances. Say, from the USA to step in to safeguard Algeria with own ships, and protection for the French citizens here (at the time, Algeria was a part of France proper) from the threat of invasion.
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What connects the topic of this video, as "compartmentalized history" and 99% ancillary details, with the bigger overall European "picture"?
It is "divide and rule" as THE "systems/strategies" tier of things, as the 1% of history that counts...
Exemplary of a divide and rule/conquer strategy:
Entire regions of human beings are used or set up as proxies, as "walls" or "Limitrophe States" to seperate potential areas which might unite.
Wiki: "In modern history, it was used to refer to provinces that seceded from the Russian Empire at the end of World War I, during the Russian Civil War (1917–1922), thus forming a kind of belt or cordon sanitaire separating Soviet Russia from the rest of Europe during the interwar period.[4]... The nations were then "the cards to change hands in big political games" and included the Baltic peoples, Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians."
These nations were, and still are today, simply "tools" for the empires who hold the geographical advantage of power
When everybody started talking about Versailles as a "peace conference" back in the days following WW1, it allowed for narratives to take shape. These "narratives" then floated to the top of discussions and debates, books and documentaries, and became the way people started thinking at the time, and...more importantly, still think*** today.
Historians should stop talking about The Treaty of Versailles as a "peace conference" (name branding), but to start calling it out for what it was in terms of geopolitics and grand strategy: it was divide and rule/conquer of and over continental Europe, by the outside world powers, all imperialistic in nature, with a geographical advantage (Washington DC/London), using Paris as a continental foothold, or an "extension" of their own power. Such language abounds in the strategy papers of the true powers.
These powers favored Paris for this specific reason, regardless of what ideologues desired (Idealism is an '-ism' or ideology).
Favoratism is a core technique used in a divide and rule strategy.
The Fourteen Points were largely written by a "think tank", the New York based "Inquiry" group. As for Wilson, was he really that naive to think that the large and prominent forces of isolationism would not prevail, and lead to the USA/Washington DC not joining any collectivised system of security for the entire planet?
Was there really no "Plan B" in Washington DC?
Divide and rule as a strategy is elaborated in more detail in the comments thread under the Kaiser Wilhelm video of the "History Room" educational channel. Go to the other channel, select "latest comments" first (three little bars at the top of every comments section), and read as far back as desired.
The "oh so fine" British Lordships thought they could play divide and rule/conquer games with the world, and in the end British citizens and military men lost bigtime, as at the very end of the Empire, their own Lordships "...ran off with all the f%cking money..." (quote = George Carlin/ reality = tax havens).
The answer to any observed divide and rule strategy is eventually going to be brute force. On a micro level, it will be some form of uprising or revolution. On the macro level (states/empires) it will be crises and war. If words no longer achieve the desired effects to oppose the actions by the psychopaths who have infiltrated positions of power (incl. our so-called "western liberal democracies"), and become uncompromising and start using bully tactics, the answer will be brute force. No system is going to "turn the other cheek" indefinitely.
No, this is not a "yet another conspiracy theory," but elaborated and provided with sufficient evidence, and inductive/deductive reasoning on the other channel/video.
Divide and rule/conquer is a strategy, not a conspiracy theory.
**As a mixture of opinions, biases, emotions, analyses, assessments, etc. proclaimed in a multitude of books, documentaries, journals, essays, stories and...just about everything related to "compartmentalized history". In reality, how every individual "thinks" is not important: it is the *systems/strategies tier of events which is the truly indicative tier.
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yankeetrader
The narrative in this video is entirely beside the point. Allow me to show how, with a similar event. Not exact, because "history only rhymes", but close enough to explain how diplomacy works.
Drax went to Moscow in 1939 to "talk", not "negotiate".
According to the narrative Stalin (whose snowflake feelings got upset about not receiving an equal "Munich" treatment, with the highest level London diplomat jetting off to see Hitler) felt dissed, just like the French did when a "mere captain" arrived to discuss the future of their own empire (at least, the possessions in N.Africa).
Apparrently Stalin understood quite well what sending a lower prominence delegation meant.
Also what power of negotiation means.
Neither Drax nor Holland had these powers, which is why they were sent off with matters unaccomplished.
The French Navy was going nowhere without political assurances. Say, from the USA to step in to safeguard Algeria with own ships, and protection for the French citizens here (at the time, Algeria was a part of France proper) from the threat of invasion.
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Correct.
Re. "Who benefited most from Mers, and who lost most".
The general consensus is that The British Empire was the "winner", and that "France was the loser".
Wrong.
Reality? For the second time in 20 years, "the lights would go out", and others would benefit. Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
So at the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Century
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_exceptionalism
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@AlshainFR Yes, in the "little world" of the average Joe, Jack, Fritz, Alaine, Igor, and Guisseppe, it's a small world, with many emotional aspects...
The big picture...and how the little piece of the puzzle called "Mers el Kebir" fit into it.
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Search for London's Policy of Balance of Power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, totally destroying a continental power or dissing it, was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
Firstly, a 100% collapse of Germany as a power...was a dream condition for communism (Moscow) and US corporatism (Washington D.C.).
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings.
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to "balance" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself.
And down went the British Empire too...
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They paid the price later on.
Re. "Who benefited most from Mers, and who lost most".
The general consensus is that The British Empire was the "winner", and that "France was the loser".
Wrong.
Reality? For the second time in 20 years, "the lights would go out", and others would benefit. Because, the type of rule or economy plays little role in the outcome of whether one "rules the world" or not.
Geography plays a far bigger role.
So at the turn of century London "ruled the world" because geography isolated them from the continent and their island status gave them the upper hand at a time when war was still the common way to determine "top dog" or not....
When development of weapons produced ever further reaching weapons of war, GB's island status did not offer the same measure of protection anymore...so they went down.
The weapons of 1900 couldn't harm the British Empire, but the weapons of 1945 could....
In that era around WW2, it was the USA which was (as the sole power) isolated from this "great game", and benefited as the result of its geographical isolation, and because there was that "one ring which ruled them all"...lol, but in a good way of course.
And it wasn't only the forces of evil who wanted to "rule the world", but also people who thought they had a God-given right to do so...
[Google: The American_Century]
...and who thought they were better than everybody else...
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@raywest3834 No, in view of how London had "set up" continental Europe to protect their Empire, it was unwise to "diss France", with 2 (note two, not one) hostile systems eyeing territory.
First and foremost, despite what our history books say, was "communism", exemplified by "Moscow/Stalinism/Stalin".
There were other, and better options, even at the time.
Fatal mistake in June 1940?
Not leaving it to capable commanders "on the spot", or the entire "leading from the front"-narrative.
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@raywest3834 To add to the above, or to expanding a bit on the concept of "leading from the front".
Back in the days of sail, British Admirals had wide-ranging powers, even of a political nature for obvious reasons.
It was also the most successful days of Empire.
Strange how historians would conclude that it was "generals sitting in Chateaus far away from the action" which lost many battles in WW1 and early-WW2, rather than allowing front-line commanders and officers to lead from the front, given "objectives", not specific orders.
True.
The specific orders by the Admirality, coupled with Churchill's "settle matters quickly" had 2 main effects:
1) it took the decision out of the hands of Admiral Somerville
2) put emense pressure, by dictated orders (rather than "objectives")
Even Churchill must have instinctively grasped that it was a mistake, and he prepared 2 speeches for Parliament.
One conciliatory, the other more defiant...
Conclusion: It was a mistake at the time, not only in hindsight.
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@raywest3834 How was France dissed?
It is mentioned in almost every doc about Mers.
Remember?
The pledge to rather scuttle the own ships, rather than hand them over, was simply ignored.
That decision would also come back to haunt the Allies later.
A worthy and mutually agreed upon agreement would have aided the war effort in multiple ways.
Remember the decision of French soldiers, who would rather repatriate to France rather than fight on? Remember the bravery of the few French soldier who protected Bir Hachim in the Western Desert campaign? Imagine there were 100,000 French soldiers in the Western Desert, rather than a few thousand...
The Indian and ANZAC soldiers fighting here could have been stationed in Singapore, fighting off the Japanese.
And the French ships sunk in Toulon in 1942, as promised?
They could have hunted submarines, provided shore bombardment for Allied landings, served as AA defense for convoys, etc., etc.
Like I said before.
It was not only wrong in hindsight.
Not trusting own capable commanders "on the spot", to make accurate judgements when given an objective (say, for example: "ensure that the French fleet doesn't join the Axis"), rather given a specific order is an attitude problem, which comes back to those adhering to such fallacious command structures.
Usually, politicians, overriding the better judgment of capable military commanders present on site.
Our history books are full of such cases, and Mers is simply another such case of "politics meddling in a military issue".
What is your standpoint re. "The generals sitting in faraway chateauxs", directing actions hundreds of miles away, of which they don't even have exact realtime information?
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All agreed.
Of course there were choices.
Back in the days of sail, British Admirals had wide-ranging powers, even of a political nature for obvious reasons (lack of communication).
It was also the most successful days of Empire.
Strange how historians would conclude that it was "generals sitting in Chateaus far away from the action" which lost many battles in WW1 and early-WW2, rather than allowing front-line commanders and officers to lead from the front, given "objectives", not specific orders.
True.
The specific orders by the Admirality, coupled with Churchill's "settle matters quickly" had 2 main effects:
1) it took the decision out of the hands of Admiral Somerville
2) put emense pressure, by dictated orders (rather than "objectives")
Even Churchill must have instinctively grasped that it was a mistake, and he prepared 2 speeches for Parliament.
One conciliatory, the other more defiant.
Somerville, given an objective ("ensure that the French Navy doesn't switch sides") would have meant enough leeway for alternatives.
Peace of mind for London, and a "face saving way out" for the new French leaders, barely in office.
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@Doveton Sturdee
You seem to be a regular "defender" of the British Empire here.
Read below please.
All you'll have to do is to figure out how and where "Mers el Kebir" fits into the big picture reality:
Today, Washington DC intends to keep its role as "alpha" of the world, gained from European empires after WW2.
There is even an "insider joke" about NATO, which is that it intends to "keep Germany down, and Russia out".
Effect: Washington DC/USA stays the master of European affairs.
NATO is now just another tool in the toolbox of "divide and conquer", going back all the way to the 18th century, when the USA was first established.
European powers failed to morph NATO into a more suitable system following the end of the Cold War "around the year 2000".
A system including Russia and all post-Warsaw Pact nations equally, in a comprehensive security agreement.
Note always: What did not happen.
Of course a comprehensive security agreement without ...ahem...."parallel tweaties", and a "morphed NATO" into a strong arm of international law = power to actually follow up with punch if "the law" is broken.
A new system under which laws, codified by the international community, actually formed a basis of cooperation, not "muh interests you know..."
US leaders realized that the key to their own superiority lay in dividing Europeans any which way they could (note, "Europe" is a geographical term, and includes Russia).
Sowing dissent.
The "freedom and democracy"-argument, backed up by coffers filled to the brim with "slush fund" money...
Sow dissent.
Irrelevant of whether the actors come with good intentions, or are even aware of what they are ultimately doing: Divide and Rule/Conquer, for a different system.
"In Holland, a bourgeois democratic revolution had been defeated and its leaders, who had been instructed in the American Revolution by John Adams, were cruelly suppressed or driven into exile by the Stadtholder, William V, Prince of Orange, in league with the old oligarchs and with the intervention of Britain and Prussia. Adams and Jefferson agonized for the Dutch Patriots, but felt that they had been betrayed by their own excesses as well as by their Bourbon ally. The fact that France, pledged to the Patriots, had not lifted a finger in their support offered a melancholy lesson for the United States..."
(from ugapress manifoldapp)
Who doth even recognize the "freedom and democracy"-argument here?
Irrelevant of intentions, it fits the definition of "sowing dissent" in an existing "system".
Irrelevant of whether the reader has any personal preferences: the actions fit words, and words have definitions, which are a strategy. Divide others, to avoid unity.
Of course, at this early stage the USA had no way to implement "rule" in any form.
A divided Europe suited Washington DC just fine, because should Europe ever unite, it could pose an existential threat to the new USA...
The more division in Europe, the better.
Support whatever divides.
Oppose whatever unites.
For the own side: the more unity in North America, the better.
The "rule"-part over Europe would have to wait...
And in North America, other...ahem..."systems" would have to go too (American Civil War, all about "poor slaves" we are told...)
So much for the New World.
In the leadup to WW1, London thought they were clever, and that they could gain by dividing everybody else in Europe. "Divide and rule/conquer": note that "rule" has different meanings, and one meaning of the word is simply to "dictate terms" to others, based on an advantage in power.
To make it clear, London never intended "direct rule" over any continental country or adversary, because they were to weak for that, but rather to divide continental powers and thereby gain the advantage of dictating terms in case of negotiations, crisis, or wars.
What "the lords" didn't seem to notice, was that while they were "ruling" over the continent, based on a geographical advantage, somebody else was playing the same game with them.
It was Washington DC, playing "divide and conquer/rule" with Europe, and to the leaders here, GB was simply a part of "Europe" (geographical entity).
There are two ways to conquer people: one is by war, the other by debt, which is exactly what Washington DC did.
After a few hundred years, the game had simply been flipped 180 degrees.
Around 1900 there were "two systems" in Europe: one "librul" (lol), one "conservative"...
The "dividers and rulers" could play to their heart's content...
And around 2000 "history rhymed", and nobody noticed...
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In view of the overall grand strategy implications as painted below, in which the military collapse of France offered the potential of an "strengthening Eurasian block of authoritarian states" formating, and "striking outwards", the British pressure on France to remove the French fleet from North Africa, where they protected the French Empire against potential Italian attack (a potential "hyena move" by Mussolini) becomes clear.
If the French fleet could be strongarmed into leaving North Africa wide open to a seaborne assault, the Italians could be baited into attacking here, rather than concentrating their forces on British territories like Egypt or East Africa (first shots fired in June 1940), or reinforcing their military forces for attacks on Greece. Or in other words, luring Italy into "overextending" her forces in what looked like already defeated or weakened enemies.
How could Italy be goaded into attacking French North Africa?
French strategists of course, already knew what "game" was being played.
For Italy, the exposed seaborne flank of French North Africa was the "honeypot" (strategy) intended to divert Rome's attention into "going west", rather than "going east" (grand strategy).
Sticking a knife into the back of an old "ally" was not a difficult choice, and the only mistake Paris ever made was trusting these deceitfull "Albions" in London in the first place, when they first came with their "fwiendly offers" for burrying the hatchet way back in the 1880s...
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It would be one of the last times.
After WW2, GB lost the political leverage to impose onto others, and lost their Empire.
All causal effects of the own "attitude problem".
"Right or wrong", or "Was it a war crime", is all irrelevant.
Because there's always a big picture...
And of all the "big pictures", this is the biggest of all...
The worst choice of all was ignoring the reality of how Europe had been "set up" to protect the British Empire.
The British Empire was actually protected in Europe by uniquely "balancing powers" on the continent.
[Google: britannica & balance-of-power]
For more than 100 years, "balancing powers" on the continent, kept these powers opposing each other, unable to divert military or economic resources to affront the status of the British Empire as the nr.1 in the world...
According to the logic of this policy, completely ruining a power on the continent, or dissing it (like France) would lead to an imbalance, which could then be directed at the British Empire...
Therefore, alienating France, and totally destroying Germany was neither wise nor in GB 's interests.
Concerning WW2.
After WW2, there was no strong Central Europe to "balance out" the rise of communism (Moscow).
France broken, still angered by Mers el Kebir and slipped under Washington's wings...
Germany = alles kaputt
Eastern Europe = overrun by the commies...
GB was no longer the boss.
Nothing left to play "balancing games" with...
Sorreee. That's just how it goes if your eternal "balancing" games on the continent go south...you loose your empire to the new kids in town...
From the unmistakable "Nr.1" in 1900, down to "merely on par" with Washington DC after WW1, down to "third fiddle" during the Cold War. All in less than a single lifetime...
Washington got tired of bailing GB out, and decided to become the "balancer of powers" in Europe herself. The world was divided in "East" and "West".
And down went the British Empire too...
I suggest not wasting your time arguing with immoral people.
Simply tell them the outcome of own actions.
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